ALVMNVS  BOOK  FYND 


THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO    •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON   •  BOMBAY   •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


THEOLOGY  AS  AN 

EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 


BY 

DOUGLAS  CLYDE  MACINTOSH,  PH.  D. 

\\ 

DWIGHT    PROFESSOR    OF    THEOLOGY    IN    YALE    UNIVERSITY, 


•Dfom  ffnrk 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1919 

All  rights  reserved 


A/3 


COPYRIGHT,  1919 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  June.  1919 


TO 

MY  BROTHERS  AND  SISTERS 
AND  TO  THE  MEMORY  OP 

OUR  PARENTS 

IN  THE  THOUGHT  OF  WHOSE  FAITH  AND  LOVE 
THERE  IS  ABIDING  INSPIRATION. 


414843 


Let  empiricism  once  become  associated  with  religion,  as  hitherto, 
through  some  strange  misunderstanding,  it  has  been  associated  with 
irreligion,  and  I  believe  that  a  new  era  of  religion  as  well  as  of 
philosophy  will  be  ready  to  begin.  William  James. 

If  any  one  is  able  to  make  good  the  assertion  that  his  theology 
rests  upon  valid  evidence  and  sound  reasoning,  then  it  appears  to  me 
that  such  theology  must  take  its  place  as  a  part  of  science. 

T.  H.  Huxley. 


PREFACE 

A  word  of  explanation  seems  called  for,  in  order  to  remove, 
if  possible,  an  initial  prejudice  which  is  likely  to  be  aroused  by 
the  title  chosen  for  this  volume.  Let  it  be  understood  from  the 
first,  then,  that  what  is  claimed  here,  essentially,  is  just  this: 
that  it  is  possible  to  relate  theological  theory  to  that  acquaint- 
ance with  the  divine  which  is  to  be  found  in  religious  experience 
at  its  best,  as  the  physical  and  social  sciences,  with  their  theo- 
ries as  to  the  nature  of  things  and  persons,  are  related  to  our 
common  human  acquaintance  with  things  and  persons  in  sense 
and  social  experience.  What  is  aimed  at  in  almost  all  of  the 
recognized  empirical  sciences  is  not  a  mere  description  of  the 
processes  of  our  experiencing;  otherwise  individual  psychology 
would  be  the  only  empirical  science.  What  we  are  after,  ordi- 
narily, is  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  things 
and  persons  with  which  ordinary  experience  makes  us  ac- 
quainted. And  if  the  reader  comes  finally  to  grant  not  only  that 
genuine  knowledge  of  a  divine  Reality  has  been  gained  through 
religious  experience  at  its  best,  but  also  that  this  knowledge  may 
be  formulated  and  further  developed  by  means  of  the  inductive 
procedure  advocated  and  exemplified  in  the  body  of  this  book, 
the  author  will  not  be  disposed  to  quarrel  with  him  over  the 
comparatively  unimportant  question  as  to  whether  or  not  it 
is  expedient  to  speak  of  the  resultant  theology  as  "an  empirical 
science." 

In  order  that  the  theology  may  be  viewed  in  relation  to  a 
harmonious  philosophical  background,  I  have  appended  to  the 
main  discussion  a  sketch  of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  with 
illustrations  of  a  point  of  view  and  method  which  I  have  called 
Critical  Monism. 

D.  C.  M. 

New  Haven, 
May  1,  1919. 

ix 


ERRATA 

Page  37,  line  3:    change  "casually"  to  "causally." 

Page  37,  line  4:  instead  of  "two  instances"  insert  "an  instance 
of  the  presence  and  an  instance  of  the 
absence." 

Page  129,  first  line  of  last  paragraph:  change  "has"  to  "had." 
Page  145,  line  5:  insert  "the"  before  "religious." 

• 

Page  155,  line  3:  change  "mere"  to  "more." 
Page  269,  column  2:  transpose  lines  17  and  18. 

Page  270,  column  2:  between  lines  10  and  n  insert  "White, 
A.  D.,3." 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

:  THEOLOGICAL  METHOD 1 

The  Problem  Stated 1 

The  Varieties  of  Theological  Method 5 

I.  Conservative 7 

A.  Traditionalistic 7 

1.  Ecclesiastical 7 

2.  Biblical 7 

3.  Individual 7 

II.  Radical 8 

B.  Rationalistic  (Speculative) 9 

C.  Empirical 11 

1.  Mystical 12 

2.  Eclectic 13 

a.  Individual 13 

6.  Social : 14 

(1)  Psychological  (Schleiermacher) 14 

(2)  Historical 17 

(a)  Restricted  (Ritschl) 17 

(6)  Universal  (Troeltsch) 19 

c.  Pragmatic  or  (3)  Sociological 22 

3.  Scientific 25 

The  Procedure  of  Theology  as  an  Empirical  Science 26 

PART  I:  THE  PRESUPPOSITIONS  OF  THEOLOGY 47 

Chapter  1.  The  Presuppositions  of  All  Empirical  Sciences. .  .  49 

The  Possibility  of  Empirical  Knowledge 49 

The  Scientific  Attitude  toward  Evidence 49 

Chapter  2.  The  Pertinent  Results  of  Other  Sciences 51 

Summary  Statement  of  General  Results 51 

A  More  Detailed  Statement  of  Results  as  to  the  His- 
toric Jesus 52 

The  Original  Sources 52 

An  Examination  of  the  Miraculous  Element  in  the . 

Narrative 52 

The  Irreducible  Minimum  of  Assured  Fact 57 

Two  Rationally  Possible  Interpretations 59 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The  More  Radical 59 

The  More  Conservative 61 

The  Common  Element  in  the  Two  Views 67 

Chapter  3.  Human  Free  Agency 68 

What  Free  Agency  Would  be 68 

Its  Theoretical  Possibility 70 

Its  Moral  Certainty 70 

Chapter  4.  The  Possibility  of  Immortality 72 

Procedure 72 

The  Desirability  of  Immortality 72 

A  Critique  of  Speculative  and  Non-Religious  Empirical 

Arguments  for  Immortality 75 

A  Critique  of  Attempted  Empirical  Disproofs 79 

A  Defense  of  the  Theoretical  Possibility  of  Life  after 

Death 79 

Chapter  5.  The  Fact  of  Sin,  with  its  Evil  Consequences 81 

Procedure 81 

The  Nature  of  Sin,  Objectively  Considered 81 

Moral  Responsibility  for  Wrong  Conduct 83 

The  Evil  Consequences  of  Sin 86 

In  the  Present  Life 87 

In  the  Future  Life 88 

The  Nature  of  the  Consequences : . .  88 

The  Duration  of  the  Consequences 88 

Chapter  6.  The  Presupposition  Peculiar  to  Theology:  The 

Existence  of  God 90 

Procedure 90 

A  Preliminary  Definition  of  God 90 

A  Critique  of  the  Classical  Theistic  Arguments 92-98 

The  Empirical  Argument  Stated 91-99 

PART  II.  THE  EMPIRICAL  DATA  AND  LAWS  OF  THEOLOGY 101 

Chapter  1.  Revelation  in  General 103 

A  Critique  of  Historic  Concepts  of  Revelation,  Inspi- 
ration and  Religious  Authority 103 

The  Primitive  Religio-Empirical,  or  Occult  View. . .  103 

The  Traditionalistic  View 104 

The  Rationalistic  View 105 

The  Modern  Religio-Empirical,  or  Scientific  View 106 

Of  Revelation 106 

Of  Inspiration  and  the  Bible 109 

Of  Religious  Authority 110 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

Chapter  2.  Revelation  in  the  Person  of  Christ 112 

Procedure 112 

A  Critique  of  Historic  Concepts  of  the  Person  of  Christ  112 

The  Older  Orthodox  Christology 112 

Hebrew  Elements 112 

Greek  Elements 114 

Latin  Elements 115 

The  Transition  to  Modern  Views:  Unitarianism. .  .  .  116 

Modern  Christology 116 

The  View  of  Rationalistic  Monism 116 

The  View  of  Empirical  Pluralism 117 

The  View  of  Critical  Agnosticism 117 

Constructive  Statement 118 

The  Divine  Value  of  the  Historic  Jesus 118 

His  Divine  Function  in  Human  Experience 119 

His  Essential  Divinity r . . .  121 

Special  Christological  Problems 121 

The  Question  of  Pre-Existence 121 

The  Question  of  Present  Communion  with  Christ .  .  122 
The  Question  of  the  Possibility  of  Transcending 

Jesus 122 

Chapter  3.  Revelation  in  the  Work  of  Christ 124 

Procedure 124 

A  Critique  of  Historic  Theories  of  the  Atonement 124 

The  Reconciling  Work  of  Christ,  as  Revelation  of  the 

Work  of  God 129 

Chapter  4.  Revelation  in  the  Christian  Experience  of  Salva- 
tion   132 

The  Concept  of  Salvation 132 

Elements  in  the  Christian  Experience 133 

The     Preliminary     Experience     ("Conviction    of 

Sin") 133 

The  Beginning  of  a  Definitely  Christian  Life  ("Con- 
version," "Repentance,"  and  "Faith,"  "Regen- 
eration")   134 

The  Continuation  of  the  Christian  Life  ("Persever- 
ance")   136 

The  Health  of  the  Christian  Life  (The  "Life  Abun- 
dant" or  "Fulness  of  the  Spirit") 137 

The  Development  of  Christian  Character  ("Sancti- 

fication"  or  "Growth  in  Grace") 137 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter  5.  The  Laws  of  Empirical  Theology 140 

Procedure 140 

Constants,  e.  g.,  the  Religious  Object 140 

Variables,  e.  g.,  the  Religious  Adjustment 141 

Primary  Theological  Laws  (Volitional) 146 

Laws  of  Elemental  Experiences  (E.  g.  the  Law  of 
"Revelation,"  "Special  Providence,"  or  the  An- 
swer to  Prayer) 146 

Laws  of  Composite  Experiences  (The  Laws  of  "  Re- 
generation," "Perseverance,"  "Life  Abundant," 

and  "Sanctification") 148 

Secondary  Theological  Laws 150 

Laws  of  Emotional  Experiences  (The  Laws  of 
"Conviction  of  Sin,"  and  of  Christian  "Peace," 

"Joy"  and  "Love") 150 

Laws  of  Intellectual  Experiences  (The  Laws  of 
"Divine  Guidance"  and  Christian  "Assur- 
ance")   152 

Laws  of  Physiological  Experiences  (E.  g.,  the  Law 

of  "Divine  Healing") 154 

Laws  of  Social  Experiences 155 

Ecclesiastical 155 

General 156 

PART  III.  THEOLOGICAL  THEORY 157 

Chapter  1.  The  Moral  Attributes  of  God,  and  the  Relation  of 

God  to  Men 159 

Procedure:  the  Transition  from  Laws  to  Theory 159 

The  Fundamental  Attribute:  Absoluteness 162 

The  Moral  Attributes 163 

Holiness  and  Justice 163 

Love  and  Mercy 163 

God  as  Father 163 

Practical  Significance  of  the  Moral  Attributes 164 

Opportunity 164 

Human  Freedom  and  God  as  Sovereign:  an  Exam- 
ination of  the  Concepts  of  Predestination  and 

Election 165 

God  as  Judge 166 

God  as  Redeemer:  the  Atoning  Work  of  God  for 

Man 166 

The  Forgiveness  and  Justification  of  Man 168 


CONTENTS  xv 

PAGE 

The  Satisfaction  of  the  Divine  Justice 170 

The  Divine  Providence  in  Relation  to  Man 172 

Chapter  2.  The  Metaphysical  Attributes  of  God 176 

Procedure 176 

The  Fundamental  Attribute:  Absoluteness 177 

A  Critique  of  the  Negative  Attributes 177 

Incorporeality 178 

Invisibility,  etc 178 

Incomprehensibility 179 

Impassibility 179 

Immutability 179 

Timelessness 180 

Infinity 180 

An  Exposition  of  the  Positive  Attributes 181 

Aseity 181 

Omnipotence 181 

Omniscience 184 

Omnipresence 186 

Immanence 187 

Transcendence 188 

Personality 189 

Unity 190 

Trinity 192 

Existence 194 

Chapter  3.  The  Relation  of  God  to  the  Universe 195 

Providential  Control 196 

Creative  Preservation 200 

Creation 201 

The  Question  of  Miracles .  .  . .- 201 

Chapter  4.  Eschatological  Deductions 205 

Immortality 205 

Continued  Divine  Justice  and  Mercy 207 

"Heaven" 209 

The  Future  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  on  Earth 212 

Chapter  5.  The  Problem  of  Evil  (Theodicy) 216 

The  Problem  Stated 216 

The  Thesis 217 

The  Problem  of  Physical  Evil  (Disaster  to  Life  and 

Possessions) 217 

The  Problem  of  Psychical  Evil  (Pain) 219 

The  Problem  of  Intellectual  Evil  (Error) 221 


xvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The  Problem  of  Moral  Evil  (Sin) 223 

The  Problem  of  Religious  Evil  (Irreligion) 224 

The  Problem  of  Physical  Evil  Again  (Universal  Death) .  225 
The  Problem  of  the  Origin  of  Evil,  and  the  Question  as  to 
a  Personal  Devil 227 

Appendix:  A  Sketch  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Showing  the 
Relation  of  Theology  as  an  Empirical  Science  to  Philosophy.  231 


THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 


THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL 
SCIENCE 

INTRODUCTION 
THEOLOGICAL  METHOD 

THEOLOGY,  in  its  days  of  undisputed  supremacy,  was  defined 
as  the  science  of  God.  Of  late,  under  the  stress  of  much  hostile 
criticism,  there  has  been  a  strategic  retreat,  and  the  definitions 
generally  favored  are  modest  statements  to  the  effect  that 
theology  is  the  intellectual  expression  of  religion.  The  general 
situation,  however,  has  come  to  be  such  as  calls  for  a  counter- 
attack, having  as  its  objective  the  recovery  of  a  scientific  status 
for  theology,  and  a  much  stronger  and  more  secure  consolida- 
tion of  this  scientific  position  than  originally  existed. 

But,  of  course,  this  counter-attack  must  begin  from  where 
theology  now  is.  Whatever  else  it  may  have  a  right  to  be  or 
the  power  to  become,  theology  is  the  intellectual  expression 
of  religion.  And  by  religion  what  is  meant  here  more  particu- 
larly is  what  may  be  called  experimental  religion.  There  is  a 
broad  sense  in  which  the  term  " religion"  may  be  used,  as 
meaning  conscious  relation  to  the  divine,  the  term  "divine" 
standing  for  either  ideal  value  or  supreme  reality.  Devotion 
to  the  divine,  i.  e.,  to  values  worth  living  for  and  on  occasion 
worth  dying  for,  may  be  called  fundamental  religion.  Experi- 
mental religion  will  then  be  an  appropriate  term  for  dependence 
upon  the  divine,  i.  e.,  upon  a  supreme  or  at  least  higher  power, 
regarded  as  capable  of  responding  in  some  way  to  this  attitude 
of  dependence.  A  conceivable  harmony  of  fundamental  and 
experimental  religion  is  involved  in  the  two-fold  fact  that  on 
the  one  hand  while  in  fundamental  religion  the  religious  object 
must  be  regarded  as  ideal,  it  may  also  be  believed  to  be  real, 
and  on  the  other  hand  while  in  experimental  religion  the  re- 

1 


AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 


ligiou's  Jobject;  xnfist  i>e  JbIieyed  to  be  real,  it  may  also  be  re- 
garded as  ideal.  Devotion  and  dependence  toward  a  responsive 
higher  power,  believed  in  and  regarded  as  ideal,  would  be 
a  synthesis  of  fundamental  and  experimental  religion. 

But  while  in  what  follows,  we  may  occasionally  refer  to 
fundamental  religion,  we  shall  be  mainly  and  almost  exclusively 
concerned  with  experimental  religion.  For  what  theology 
seeks  to  systematize  is  not  so  much  our  appreciations  of  the 
divine  ideal  as  our  knowledge  of  the  divine  being.  And  so,  an 
appropriate  title  for  this  work  would  have  been,  The  Theology 
of  Experimental  Religion. 

Moreover,  as  in  life  generally,  so  in  experimental  religion, 
the  function  of  ideas  is  threefold.  Not  only  do  they  give  ex- 
pression to  experience,  particularly  to  feeling;  they  supplement 
experience  by  representing  certain  phases  of  reality  which 
may  not  at  the  moment  be  presented,  and  they  guide  practical 
adjustments  and  thus  lead  to  further  experience.  All  this 
theology  undertakes  to  do  for  experimental  religion.  It  is 
intimately  related  to  the  three  main  phases  of  religious  con- 
sciousness, viz.,  feeling,  cognition  and  action.  Not  only  does 
it  give  intellectual  expression  to  religious  experience;  it  aims 
to  represent  by  means  of  ideas  the  divine  reality  with  which 
religion  is  concerned,  and  thus  to  guide  the  religious  attitudes 
of  the  subject  and  lead  him  to  the  kind  of  religious  experience 
most  to  be  desired. 

The  question  to  be  faced  is  as  to  whether  theology,  under- 
stood thus  as  description  of  the  divine  reality,  can  be  made 
truly  scientific.  And  what  we  mean  by  "scientific"  is  not 
merely  logical  in  the  older  deductive  sense,  i.  e.,  consistent 
with  presuppositions.  Ancient  and  mediaeval  science,  modelled 
upon  the  geometrical  method,  was  essentially  abstract,  apriori, 
unempirical.  With  its  formal,  deductive  logic  it  was  an  instru- 
ment of  criticism  and  discovery  within  but  narrow  limits.  It 
was  the  lesser  organ  of  exact  knowledge.  Modern  science,  with 
its  concrete,  empirical,  inductive  method,  is  an  instrument 
of  criticism  and  discovery  within  limits  set  only  by  human 
experience  itself.  It  is,  as  Francis  Bacon  called  it,  the  novum 
organum,  the  new  and  greater  organ  of  exact  knowledge. 
Whereas  the  older  science,  in  the  main,  undertook  no  more 


INTRODUCTION  3 

than  to  measure  the  consistency  of  conclusions  with  assumed 
premises,  modern  science  admits  assumptions  only  to  test  them 
by  the  facts  of  experience,  thus  enabling  man  the  better  to 
adjust  himself  to  his  environment  and  to  be  a  factor  in  its 
changes.  In  view,  then,  of  the  magnificent  contribution  of  the 
physical,  mental  and  social  sciences  to  human  progress,  the 
question  here  raised  is  as  to  whether  religious  knowledge  may 
not  eventually  become  scientific  in  the  full,  modern  sense  of  the 
word,  or  in  other  words,  whether  theology  may  not  become  a 
descriptive,  or  empirical,  science.  If  this  were  to  happen,  re- 
sults of  the  most  momentous  importance  might  be  expected,  for 
religion  has  always  been  a  potent  factor  in  directing  human 
development. 

As  human  knowledge  in  general  has  been  becoming  gradually 
more  scientific,  it  has  been  growing  more  and  more  evident  that 
the  effect  of  science  upon  religious  knowledge — real  or  sup- 
posed— is  to  be  nothing  short  of  revolutionary.  One  has  but  to 
read  such  books  as  Draper's  "Conflict  between  Religion  and 
Science,"  or  Andrew  D.  White's  "History  of  the  Warfare  be- 
tween Science  and  Theology,"  to  find  sufficient  evidence  to  show 
that  at  least  outside  of  the  theological  field  in  the  strictest  sense 
of  the  term,  dogmatism  in  the  name  of  religion  has  almost 
invariably  suffered  ultimate  defeat  at  the  hands  of  empirical 
investigation,  and  has  been  forced  to  abandon  field  after 
field  to  the  scientific  method.  Science  has  thus  gained 
steadily  increasing  prestige,  and  theology  constantly  growing 
disrepute. 

It  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  after  all  these  defeats  of 
theology  on  the  territory  of  her  neighbors,  they  should  combine 
to  deny  her  any  standing-ground  at  all.  Dogmatic  theology,  as 
"queen  of  the  sciences,"  was  a  despotic  monarch.  She  under- 
took to  prescribe  for  all  the  others  first  principles  and  limits 
beyond  which  they  must  not  presume  to  go.  All  went  smoothly 
enough  so  long  as  the  sciences — if  such  we  may  call  their  first 
crude  beginnings — were  subservient.  The  rule  of  theology  was  a 
benevolent  despotism.  But  as  soon  as  the  developing  sciences 
began  to  show  a  spirit  of  independence  and  to  appeal  more 
fearlessly  to  experience  for  themselves,  theology  began  to  rule 
them  with  a  rod  of  iron;  some  of  them,  indeed,  beginning  to  be 


4  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

openly  insubordinate,  she  would  have  dashed  in  pieces,  as  a 
potter's  vessel.  But  the  sciences  gathered  strength  and  united 
to  dethrone  the  tyrant,  dogmatic  theology,  and  by  this  time 
she  has  received  at  their  hands  double  for  all  her  sins.  And 
yet  their  anger  is  not  turned  away,  but  their  hand  is  stretched 
out  still.  Among  the  empirical  sciences  theology  can  find  none 
so  poor  as  to  recognize  her,  much  less  do  her  reverence.  More- 
over, even  the  world  at  large,  including  hosts  of  persons  who 
still  think  of  themselves  as  religious,  is  coming  to  share  in  the 
contempt  of  the  scientists  for  theology.  What  is  the  ultimate 
meaning  of  this  development?  Was  Comte  right  after  all,  and  is 
theology  destined  soon  to  disappear  before  the  steadily  encroach- 
ing advance  of  the  positive  sciences? 

And  if  theology  disappears,  what  will  become  of  experimental 
religion,  that  practical  relation  of  dependence  upon  a  higher 
power,  which  is  of  the  essence  of  religion  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  term?  Is  J.  G.  Frazer  right,  and  are  we  to  be- 
lieve that  religion,  having  arisen  because  of  man's  despair 
of  magic,  is  in  turn  to  give  way  to  science,  whose  progress 
is  at  once  both  cause  and  effect  of  man's  ultimate  despair  of 
religion? 

There  are  many  who  view  with  ill-concealed  satisfaction  what 
they  regard  as  the  steady  rationalization  of  theology  and 
religion  out  of  existence.  But  from  the  very  beginning  of 
modern  scientific  research  there  have  been  those  who  have 
tried  to  secure  for  the  dethroned  "queen  of  the  sciences"  a 
sheltered  realm  beyond  the  reach  of  empirical  investigation, 
within  which  she  might  dogmatize  to  her  heart's  content— a 
realm  of  "over-beliefs,"  concerning  which  the  scientist  as  such 
must  remain  agnostic,  but  which,  it  is  triumphantly  maintained, 
he  is  as  unable  to  disprove  as  the  theologian  is  to  prove.  Thus 
many  modern  scientists  are  benevolently  disposed  to  patronize 
theology  by  handing  over  to  her  the  undisputed  possession  of 
such  fields  as  are  supposed  to  be  hopelessly  beyond  the  reach  of 
human  experience.  But  can  theology  safely  consent  to  such 
an  arrangement?  If  ideas  as  to  a  supposed  reality  cannot  find 
place  in  any  science,  are  they  a  part  of  genuine  knowledge  at  all? 
Are  they  not  possibly  mere  products  of  confused  imagination? 
Must  they  not  at  best  remain  comparatively  inert  in  the  en- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

lightened  human  consciousness;  and  after  a  period  of  religious 
indifferentism  and  easy-going  eclecticism,  must  not  serious 
thought  be  expected  finally  to  cease  to  occupy  itself  with  such 
manifestly  fruitless  speculations? 

But  there  is  another  alternative  for  our  thought.  With 
the  progress  of  science  and  general  information,  theology  and 
religion  have  been  developing  in  rationality.  Instead  of  being 
rationalized  out  of  existence,  may  it  not  be  that  religion  and  its 
theology  are  being  rationalized  into  a  universally  valid  and 
finally  satisfactory  form?  The  history  of  practical  religion  may 
fairly  be  regarded  as  a  prolonged  empirical  investigation.  It 
has  proceeded  according  to  the  thoroughly  accredited  "trial  and 
error"  method.  And  while  hopelessly  unscientific  theological 
notions  are  being  steadily  eliminated  by  scientific  thought  and 
investigation,  may  not  theology  itself  possibly  be  so  rejuvenated 
by  modern  methods  as  to  become  more  than  ever  able  to  give  to 
religion  the  knowledge  it  needs?  Perhaps  empirical  science  will 
yet  prove  to  be  the  best  friend  in  disguise  that  religion  has 
ever  had.  In  the  process  of  removing  those  things  that  are 
shaken,  may  it  not  become  evident  that  things  which  are  not 
shaken  still  remain?  And  may  not  thus  a  firm  foundation  be 
found  for  theology  as  a  descriptive  or  empirical  science?  In- 
deed, the  surest  way  of  meeting  successfully  the  attacks  of  the 
sciences  is  for  theology  herself  to  become  genuinely  scientific. 
If  this  can  be  accomplished,  she  may  yet  regain  in  all  its  essen- 
tials that  honorable  place  she  once  held  as  queen  of  the  sciences, 
in  their  unanimous  recognition  of  her  as  entitled  to  the  highest 
station  in  the  commonwealth  of  science. 

If  we  glance  over  the  history  of  the  development  of  theological 
method,  we  can  readily  see  that,  from  a  comparatively  early 
period,  theology  has  sought  to  become  scientific.  In  becoming 
" systematic  theology"  evidence  was  given  of  her  good  inten- 
tions. With  the  aid  of  deductive  logic  a  system  of  doctrine  was 
elaborated,  resting  upon  the  premises  of  religious  tradition  to 
be  sure,  but  having  the  merit  of  at  least  aiming  to  eliminate  all 
contradiction  between  the  doctrines  included.  Thus  at  an 
early  stage  in  the  history  of  the  greater  religions  and  of  Chris- 
tianity in  particular,  we  find  the  theologian  as  the  more  or  less 
scientific  expositor  and  systematizer  of  a  body  of  traditional 


6  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

lore,  interpreted  as  "the  Word  of  God."  Deduction  from  this 
body  of  premises  was  the  one  recognized  theological  procedure. 
Theological  error  was  to  be  corrected  by  further  examination  of 
the  traditional  basis,  together  with  more  rigidly  logical  deduc- 
tion therefrom.  A  questioning  of  this  traditional  basis  could 
be  met  only  by  increasing  dogmatism  as  to  fundamentals, 
and  by  adding  to  the  anathemas  for  those  who  presumptu- 
ously dared  to  doubt  the  plain  "Word  of  God."  Thus 
honest  inquirers  were  repelled  and  became  the  avowed 
enemies  of  theology  and  rebels  against  her  authority.  And 
still  for  centuries  the  Church,  Catholic  and  Protestant, 
has  clung  to  the  old  traditionalistic  dogmatism — moved  in 
part,  it  would  seem,  by  a  misplaced  confidence;  in  part,  by  a 
mistaken  fear. 

Of  course  scientific  investigation  could  not  be  kept  forever 
from  turning  to  the  traditional  records  which  had  been  made  the 
basis  of  dogmatic  theology;  and  so,  following  upon  the  pre- 
liminary work  of  "the  higher  criticism,"  there  is  growing  up  a 
highly  scientific  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  that  religious 
tradition.  But  this  science,  a  central  part  of  which  is  com- 
monly called  "biblical  theology,"  is  not  really  theology  at  all. 
Strictly  speaking,  it  is  a  branch  of  the  history  of  religion,  nothing 
more.  It  gives  us  scientific  knowledge,  not  of  what  God  does  and 
is,  but  of  what  certain  men  have  experienced  and  thought  and 
expressed  in  spoken  or  written  words.  Thus  it  comes  that  a 
very  large  proportion  of  what  is  taught  in  modern  theological 
institutions,  while  it  has  become  scientific,  indeed,  is  no  longer 
theology,  but  simply  history.  Time  was  when  the  Protestant 
Professor  of  Old  Testament  and  New  Testament  Exegesis  was, 
as  such,  like  the  Catholic  Professor  of  "Positive  Theology" 
(Biblical  and  Patristic),  a  theologian;  but  from  the  modern  point 
of  view  this  is  no  longer  true  of  the  biblical  scholar  except  as  he 
may  turn  aside  from  the  particular  scientific  task  in  hand.  In- 
deed it  is  scarcely  aside  from  the  mark  to  say  that  the  bulk  of 
what  is  taught  in  modern  theological  institutions  is  made  up  of 
science  which  is  no  longer  theological  and  theology  which  is  not 
yet  scientific. 

.  But  before  undertaking  to  discuss  in  detail  the  progressive 
modification  of  theological  procedure  in  the  general  direction 


INTRODUCTION  7 

of  a  truly  scientific  method,  it  may  be  well  to  present  a  table  of 
Types  of  Theological  Method. 
I.  Conservative. 

A.  Traditionalistic. 

1.  Ecclesiastical. 

a.  Uncritical. 

b.  Critical. 

2.  Biblical. 

a.  Uncritical. 

b.  Critical. 

3.  Individual. 

a.  Uncritical. 

b.  Critical. 
II.  Radical. 

B.  Rationalistic. 

C.  Empirical. 

1.  Mystical. 

2.  Eclectic. 

a.  Individual. 

b.  Social. 

(1)  Psychological. 

(2)  Historical. 

(a)  Restricted. 

(b)  Universal. 

c.  Pragmatic. 

3.  Scientific. 

Theological  methods  may  be  divided,  as  this  table  suggests, 
into  two  main  types,  conservative  and  radical.  These  terms  are 
not  to  be  taken  as  necessarily  implying  that  the  doctrinal  con- 
tent of  the  former  is  more  "orthodox"  than  that  of  the  latter. 
What  is  indicated  is  the  way  in  which  that  content  is  obtained. 

The.  conservative  method  is  dependent  upon  external  au- 
thority. Beginning  with  the  teachings  of  its  recognized  tradi- 
tional authority,  whether  it  be  Church  or  Bible  or  individual 
Teacher,  its  aim  is  to  conserve  as  fully  as  possible  the  whole  of 
the  doctrinal  content  received.  If  the  theologian  can  remain 
sufficiently  uncritical  toward  his  accepted  authority,  he  may  be 
able  to  conserve  practically  all  of  the  traditional  content  un- 
impaired, and  such  values  as  it  has  for  the  life  of  the  present 


8  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

will  thus  be  made  available.  If,  however,  on  grounds  of  reason 
or  experience  it  becomes  impossible  for  him  to  retain  all  of  this 
traditional  content,  the  method  comes  to  be  one  of  progressive 
subtraction  from  the  originally  accepted  content.  This  process 
is  damaging  to  religious  certainty;  for  while  the  critical  tradi- 
tionalist may  feel  sure  that  all  the  vital  and  permanently  ten- 
able doctrines  of  his  religion  are  included  in  what  he  still  be- 
lieves, he  can  never  be  quite  certain — at  least  until  he  has 
adopted  some  new  method  of  determining  his  beliefs — that  still 
further  subtractions  may  not  have  to  be  made.  And  so  there 
tend  to  be  two  types  of  traditionalist  with  reference  to  the  au- 
thority recognized,  the  one  still  uncritical  and  the  other  more 
critical  and  progressive.  Moreover,  the  modem  transition 
first  from  the  ecclesiastical  form  of  the  traditionalistic  method 
to  the  biblical,  and  further  from  the  biblical  form  to  the  in- 
dividual, itself  indicates  a  growing  progressiveness  and  desire 
for  independence  and  freedom  from  any  external  absolute  au- 
thority in  theological  construction.  While  a  sense  of  the  value 
of -the  traditional  content  tends  to  make  the  theologian  cling 
to  some  form  of  the  conservative  or  traditionalistic  method,  an 
increasing  desire  for  religious  certainty  may  eventually  lead 
him  to  adopt  some  one  of  the  radical  methods. 

The  radical  or  independent  methods  are  not  all  of  them  neces- 
sarily in  the  end  less  conservative  of  vital  religious  truth  than 
the  so-called  conservative  methods.  Indeed  it  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  "live  dangerously"  is  a  safer  motto  in  the  end  than 
"safety  first."  The  radical  theologian,  interested  primarily  in 
religious  and  theological  certainty,  refuses  to  begin  with  a  docile 
acceptance  of  any  doctrinal  content  solely  upon  the  basis  of  its 
having  been  taught  by  some  recognized  institution  or  book 
or  person,  no  matter  how  great  the  prestige  of  that  authority. 
On  the  contrary  he  adopts  some  criterion  which  he  can  apply 
as  an  independent  thinker  and  investigator,  and  accepts  only 
such  doctrines  as  can  be  built  from  the  ground  up  by  this  radical 
method.  Unlike  the  conservative's  theology,  his  theological 
system  will  at  first  be  poor  in  content;  but  if  it  contains  less 
truth,  it  also  contains  less  error,  and  it  has  the  advantage  of 
having  from  the  first  been  more  careful  than  the  other  to  make 
provision  for  certainty.  Moreover,  if  the  radical  method  has 


INTRODUCTION  9 

been  happily  chosen,  it  may  lead  in  the  end  to  a  system  contain- 
ing all  the  vital  truths  to  which  the  traditionalist  clings  so 
tenaciously  but  often  with  so  little  final  certainty.  At  any  rate 
the  radical  method  is  proceeding  by  addition,  a  circumstance 
which  constantly  gives  help  with  respect  to  certainty  and  hope 
with  respect  to  content,  whereas  the  conservative  method,  as 
we  have  seen,  having  ultimately  to  proceed  by  way  of  repeated 
subtraction,  in  the  face  of  this  partial  loss  of  content  begins  to 
lose  certainty  with  respect  to  the  remaining  content,  and  may  in 
the  end  lose  all  religious  certainty  and  theological  content 
together. 

Turning  to  an  examination  of  the  particular  types  of  radical 
theological  method,  we  find  that  comparatively  soon  after  its 
emancipation  from  dogmatic  traditionalism,  theology  tends  to 
employ  a  rationalistic,  speculative  procedure  as  a  means  of 
becoming  scientific.  Instead  of  starting  from  the  premises 
of  some  particular  tradition  as  to  some  particular  revelation,  the 
rationalistic  or  speculative  theology  claims  to  start  with  prem- 
ises universally  admitted  by  reasonable  beings,  whether  they  are 
religious  or  not.  Then,  proceeding  by  strictly  logical  processes, 
it  would  compel  all  rational,  i.  e.,  consistent  thinkers  to  accept 
positive  religious  conclusions  as  to  the  being,  nature  and  activity 
of  God. 

At  first,  in  scholasticism,  there  was  an  overlapping  of  the 
processes  of  dogmatic  traditionalism  and  this  dogmatic  rational- 
ism. The  speculative  theology  of  rationalism  was  constructed 
as  a  support  to  the  dogmatism  of  the  church.  But  in  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  with  the  beginning  of  modern 
philosophy,  speculative  theology  cut  loose  from  religious  tradi- 
tion and  undertook  to  furnish  a  theology  more  geometrico.  This 
" geometrical  method"  was  characteristic  of  the  more  ad- 
vanced thinkers  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Then  again,  in 
spite  of  Kant's  criticism,  it  reappeared  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
especially  among  the  Hegelian  theologians.  It  is  not  many  years 
since  a  Glasgow  professor  of  theology,  the  late  Dr.  Hastie, 
published  a  little  book  entitled  "Theology  as  Science,"  claim- 
ing to  set  forth  a  way  of  universal  rational  demonstration  for  the 
essentials  of  theological  doctrine. 

Now  as  compared  with  the  traditionalistic  dogmatism  this 


10  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

rationalistic  method  has  certain  advantages.  It  is  free  from  any 
bondage  to  external  traditional  authority.  Moreover,  it  makes 
much  of  consistency,  not  only  within  the  theological  system, 
but  with  all  human  knowledge.  But  historically  rationalism 
has  suffered  great  impoverishment  of  religious  content.  It  has 
lightly  parted  with  some  of  the  most  vital  and  precious  doctrines 
of  historic  religion,  simply  because  it  could  not  prove  them, 
there  being  no  way  of  doing  so  without  appealing  to  religious 
experience.  And  indeed  this  whole  independent  rationalistic 
development  can  be  taken  as  symptomatic  of  religious  decline. 
There  is  a  persistence  of  religious  interest  with  a  cessation  of 
religious  experience.  The  attempt  is  made  to  secure  by  the 
comparatively  cheap  and  easy  process  of  thinking  what  was 
formerly  obtained  through  the  struggles  and  achievements  of 
personal  religious  experience.  On  psychological  grounds,  there- 
fore, there  is  reason  to  fear  that  the  cessation  of  deep  religious 
experience  will  lead  to  a  lower  appreciation  of  religious  values, 
religious  interest  will  decline  and  life  tend  toward  irreligion. 
The  history  of  modern  philosophy  bears  out  this  surmise;  re- 
ligion is  being  crowded  into  a  very  small  corner  by  the  majority 
of  present-day  philosophers.  But  the  chief  reason  for  this  fact 
is  doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  failure  of  rationalistic  theology 
to  make  good  its  claims,  even  with  reference  to  the  reduced 
theological  content  which  it  claimed  to  prove.  It  claimed  to  get 
rid  of  all  dogmatism  and  to  give  complete  rational  certainty; 
but  criticism  has  shown  up  the  logical  discrepancies  and  the 
cleverly  concealed  or  unconscious  begging  of  the  question  in- 
volved in  all  purely  speculative  theology.  And  so  it  is  made  to 
appear  that,  instead  of  one  species  of  unscientific  theological 
dogmatism,  we  have  two,  the  rationalistic  as  well  as  the  tradi- 
tionalistic. 

There  is  not  space  here  to  recount  in  detail  the  evidence 
against  rationalistic  theology;  but  one  particular  instance  may 
be  cited  as  an  example.  It  is  a  way  of  arguing  which,  under  one 
disguise  or  another,  is  to  be  found  pretty  generally  in  such  specu- 
lative theology  as  builds  upon  modern  philosophical  idealism. 
Knowledge  of  reality  is  possible,  it  is  claimed,  for  to  deny  this 
proposition  is  to  assume  it.  But,  it  is  claimed,  all  that  we  know 
or  ever  can  know  is  essentially  idea,  thought-construct;  and  so 


INTRODUCTION  11 

reality,  we  may  conclude,  is  idea,  a  rationally  constructed 
system  of  ideas.  In  other  words,  the  real  is  intelligible,  rational ; 
and  only  the  intelligible,  the  completely  rational  is  ultimately 
real.  Absolute  Reality  is  the  Absolute  Idea,  Absolute  Reason, 
the  "Concrete  Universal/'  the  perfectly  logical  within  the  com- 
pletely psychological,  a  completely  rational  and  all-inclusive 
Experience,  Mind,  or  Spirit.  And  so  a  foundation  is  laid  in  a 
purely  speculative  way  for  the  characteristic  theological  doc- 
trines of  absolute  idealism. 

But  the  argument  is  fallacious  and  cannot  be  made  demonstra- 
tive. Not  to  dwell  upon  the  possibility  of  an  undogmatic  ag- 
nosticism as  a  third  alternative  between  the  assumption  that 
Reality  as  a  whole  is  intelligible  and  the  denial  that  any  knowl- 
edge of  any  reality  is  possible,  it  should  be  insisted  that  the 
possibility  of  knowledge  does  not  imply  that  the  knowable  must 
be  idea;  what  we  know  does  not  need  to  be  identical  in  nature 
with  what  we  know  with,  viz.,  ideas.  There  is  equivocation  in 
the  use  of  the  term  "rational."  The  sense  in  which  it  is  identi- 
fiable with  intelligible  is  not  the  sense  in  which  it  necessarily 
involves  mentality.  In  the  one  case  it  means  capable  of  being 
understood,  in  the  other  case  it  means  capable  of  understanding. 

Speculative  theology,  even  at  the  best,  has  been  felt  by  prac- 
tical religion  to  be  very  unsatisfactory  in  its  doctrinal  content, 
particularly  with  regard  to  human  individuality,  free  will, 
and  the  nature  of  moral  evil;  but  its  strong  point  was  supposed 
to  be  its  absolute  logical  certainty.  When,  however,  its  ines- 
capable logical  fallacies  are  shown  up,  it  loses  all  claim  upon  our 
acceptance.  Its  certainty  vanishes,  and  with  it  goes  its  whole 
doctrinal  content.  Nor  should  anything  more  than  this  have 
been  expected.  Speculation  can  only  elucidate  what  is  involved 
in  a  hypothesis.  It  cannot,  apart  from  any  resort  to  experience, 
provide  verification. 

The  truly  scientific  method,  as  modern  men  well  know,  is  not 
the  "high  and  dry  apriori  road"  of  speculative  thought,  but 
the  method  of  observation  and  experiment,  of  generalization 
and  theoretical  explanation.  And  if  theology  is  to  become 
really  scientific  it  must  be  by  becoming  fundamentally  empirical. 
Now  there  have  been  developed  not  a  few  types  of  theological 
procedure  which  undoubtedly  appeal  to  religious  experience; 


12  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

it  remains  to  inquire  whether  any  of  these  methods  are  empirical 
in  the  scientific  sense. 

The  oldest,  or  one  of  the  oldest,  not  only  of  empirical  methods, 
but  of  all  methods  in  theology,  is  the  mystical  method,  if  method 
it  deserves  to  be  called.  The  mystic  is  the  dogmatist  par 
excellence.  From  a  contemplation  of  the  Divine  Being,  he  has 
passed  into  a  psychological  state  of  religious  "rapture,"  or 
"union"  with  God,  which  thenceforth  becomes  not  only  the 
basis  of  assurance  of  the  existence  of  God,  but  also — in  spite  of 
all  assertions  of  the  ineffableness  of  the  divine — the  source  of 
certain  suggestions  as  to  God's  nature  and  relation  to  the  uni- 
verse and  to  man.  In  the  mystical  state,  attention  is  so  concen- 
trated upon  the  religious  Object,  that  God  alone  seems  real; 
the  physical  world  and  the  finite  self  seem  to  have  lost  their 
separate  existence,  to  be  absorbed  in  the  Absolute  One;  the  lapse 
of  time  is  as  if  it  were  not,  and  all  sense  of  the  reality  of  evil  is 
submerged  in  the  vision  of  Absolute  Goodness.  And  so,  where 
the  thorough  mystic  is  able  to  break  loose  from  the  traditional 
doctrines  of  the  practical  religion  of  his  community,  he  tends 
to  assert  not  only  the  reality  and  absolute  sufficiency  of  God, 
but  also  that  God  alone  is  real,  that  the  material  world,  the 
finite  self,  time  and  evil  are  unreal — mere  illusions  of  "mortal 
mind."  And,  curiously  enough,  these  are  approximately  the 
doctrines  of  extreme  absolute  idealism,  as  evolved  by  the  method 
of  rationalistic  speculation.  It  ought  not  to  surprise  us,  there- 
fore, to  find  an  alliance  sometimes  existing  between  extreme 
mysticism  and  speculative  idealism.  But  mutual  corroboration 
is  not  necessarily  a  proof  of  truth.  There  may  be  agreement  and 
mutual  confirmation  in  error.  We  have  seen  how  fallacious 
the  arguments  of  rationalistic  speculation  can  be,  and  as  for 
mysticism,  while  we  may  regard  its  experiences  as  a  fruitful 
source  of  suggestion  of  theological  theories,  these  theories 
ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  verified  save  as  they  stand  the  test 
of  normal,  practical  religious  life.  The  reality  of  God  and  the 
absolute  sufficiency  of  the  Divine  goodness  and  power  for  the 
religious  needs  of  man,  involved  as  they  are  in  the  assurance 
of  the  mystic,  may  be  allowed  to  stand,  since  practical  religion 
at  its  best  confirms  them.  Moreover,  it  may  very  well  be  a 
distinct  advantage  to  have  one's  .subjective  assurance  of  these 


INTRODUCTION  13 

fundamentals  of  theology  heightened  through  a  sane  and  moder- 
ate mysticism.  But  that  the  material  world,  the  finite  self, 
time  and  evil  are  real,  we  are  entitled  to  affirm,  even  if  their 
reality  should  be  denied  by  both  the  mystic  and  the  speculative 
theologian;  the  hypothesis  of  their  reality  is  amply  verified  in 
that  normal  practical  experience  without  which  even  mystics 
and  speculative  theologians  could  not  long  continue  to  live. 

But  the  theological  method  of  the  mystic  is  not  the  only  em- 
pirical method.  The  mystic  is  almost  compelled  by  the  imper- 
ative suggestions  of  his  peculiar  psychological  state  to  make 
certain  affirmations.  There  are  others,  however,  who,  while  they 
do  appeal  to  experience,  seem  to  feel  comparatively  free  to  pick 
and  choose  their  theological  beliefs,  without  acknowledging  any 
absolute  compulsion  in  the  matter  on  the  part  of  either  tradi- 
tional authority,  speculative  metaphysics,  or  mystical  sugges- 
tion. Such  a  way  of  constructing  a  theology  we  may  call  the 
eclectic  method.  It  has  been  the  theological  method  character- 
istic of  most  of  the  advanced  theological  thought  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  and  is  still  widely  dominant. 

In  its  simplest  form,  however,  the  eclectic  method  has  tended 
to  appear  whenever  the  individual  has  been  allowed  freedom  in 
thought  and  religious  life.  This  simple  determination  of  one's 
religious  creed  according  to  one's  likes  and  dislikes  we  may  call 
the  individual  eclectic  method.  There  is  a  suggestion  of  it  in 
Pascal's  principle  of  appealing  to  the  heart  rather  than  the  head 
in  matters  of  faith,  and  also  in  Coleridge's  rather  vague  criterion : 
"Whatever  finds  me  brings  with  it  an  irresistible  evidence  of  its 
having  proceeded  from  the  Holy  Spirit."  But  essentially  the 
same  thing  is  commonly  met  with  in  statements  of  religious  opin- 
ion, prefaced  with  such  expressions  as  "I  feel,"  "My  impression 
is,"  or  "  I  like  to  believe."  More  pretentious  products  of  this  in- 
dividual eclectic  method  are  occasionally  to  be  found  in  articles 
or  booklets  bearing  such  titles  as  these : — "  My  Confession  " ; "  My 
Religion";  "What  I  Believe";  "The  Religion  of  a  Physician"; 
"The  Religion  of  a  Literary  Man";  The  Religion  of  the  Future" 
(always  the  writer's  own),  etc.  Such  statements  are  interesting 
human  documents,  but  there  is  commonly  so  little  sign  of  any 
definite  principles  of  method  underlying  the  construction  that 
the  reader's  reaction  is  not  likely  to  be  in  the  direction  of  serious 


14  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

discussion  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  or  communicating  re- 
ligious truth;  rather  will  he  be  tempted  to  view  questions  of  re- 
ligious creed  as  matters  of  taste,  and  say,  "  De  gustibus  non  dis- 
putandum."  And  so  the  chief  criticisms  to  be  made  against  this 
individual  method  are  that  it  is  scarcely  a  method  at  all,  that  it 
is  an  exhibition  of  an  almost  unrelieved  subjectivism  in  re- 
ligion, and  that  it  must  tend,  unless  corrected,  in  the  direction 
of  a  radical  religious  scepticism.  It  is  mere  impressionism  in 
theology,  and  so,  except  that  in  a  vague  way  it  appeals  to 
experience,  it  is  at  the  opposite  pole  from  the  scientific  attitude 
and  procedure. 

But  there  are  other  forms  of  the  eclectic  method,  which  under- 
take to  relieve  this  undue  subjectivism.  The  most  significant  of 
these  we  may  group  under  the  designation,  social  eclectic 
method,  inasmuch  as  they  undertake  to  furnish  a  norm  from 
some  social  source  by  means  of  which  the  vagaries  of  individual 
feeling  and  preference  may  be  corrected.  These  social  norms 
are  either  religio-psychological,  religio-historical  or  sociological. 

Of  the  application  of  the  social  norm  in  its  psychological  form 
the  outstanding  representative  is  Schleiermacher,  the  so-called 
"father  of  modern  theology."  His  norm  is  the  religious  feeling 
common  to  the  members  of  a  religious  group,  and  forming  the 
real  bond  of  their  union  in  this  group.  Theology,  according  to 
Schleiermacher,  normally  is  the  spontaneous  expression  in  terms 
of  intellectual  symbols,  of  this  religious  consciousness  of  the  re- 
ligious community,  a  consciousness  which  the  individual  comes 
to  share  by  becoming,  in  a  vital  experiential  sense,  a  member  of 
the  community.  Religion  is  defined  primarily  in  terms  of  feeling. 
It  is  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence,  i.  e.,  of  dependence  upon 
an  absolute  Being  who  acts  upon  our  lives  through  the  universe. 
But  there  are  specific  differences  in  this  religious  feeling  in  the 
different  religions  of  the  world,  and  in  Christianity  the  feeling 
of  absolute  dependence  is  modified  by  the  feeling  that  the  Being 
upon  which  man  is  absolutely  dependent  is  the  absolutely  de- 
pendable "God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ."  This 
Christian  "God-consciousness"  or  religious  feeling  was  origin- 
ally an  achievement  of  the  historic  Jesus,  and  having  been 
communicated  by  him  in  a  natural,  psychological  way  to  the 
primitive  Christian  community,  and  propagated,  through  vari- 


INTRODUCTION  15 

ous  vicissitudes,  by  the  vitally  religious  Christian  community — 
the  church  within  the  church — down  to  our  own  day,  this 
Christian  consciousness  of  the  church  is  at  once  the  source  of 
religious  salvation  to  the  individual  and  the  ultimate  norm  of  the 
church's  theology. 

The  merits  of  this  form  of  eclectic  theology  are  undoubtedly 
many.  It  has  all  the  freedom  and  independence  of  rationalistic 
theology,  and  is  able  to  make  room  for  tests  of  logical  consist- 
ency which  will  no  doubt  easily  make  it  at  least  as  rational  as 
ordinary  rationalism.  At  the  same  time  it  avoids  all  such  false 
pretences  as  the  claim  of  rationalism  to  demonstrate  its  doc- 
trines out  of  pure  thought,  without  the  necessity  of  experimental 
confirmation.  Its  appeal  to  the  heart  is  good — when  the  heart 
appealed  to  is  good.  It  provides  for  the  ultimate  conservation 
of  the  vital  essence  of  traditional  theology — provided  it  is  con- 
served in  the  faith  of  the  community.  Thus  it  may  possibly 
be  justified  in  claiming  to  combine  the  strength  of  traditional- 
ism and  rationalism  without  suffering  from  the  peculiar  dis- 
abilities of  either. 

But  it  is  not  only  this  appeal  to  religious  feeling,  with  its 
guarantee  that  the  theology  will  be  vitally  empirical,  that  makes 
the  system  of  Schleiermacher  an  approach  to  the  ideal  of  the- 
ology as  an  empirical  science ;  nor  even  is  it  this  empirical  em- 
phasis, together  with  its  provision  for  such  logical  tests  as  mean 
recognition  of  the  ideal  of  rationality.  The  appeal  to  the  relig- 
ious consciousness  of  the  community  is  also  a  step  in  the  di- 
rection of  the  sort  of  objectivity  of  control  that  one  finds  in  the 
established  sciences.  And  indeed  this  theology  of  the  Christian 
consciousness  is  very  commonly  characterized  as  the  "science 
of  the  Christian  faith."  On  the  one  hand  it  undertakes  to  set 
forth  what  the  vitally  religious  Christian  community  believes, 
and  in  order  to  do  this  it  must  make  use  of  strictly  scientific 
psychological  and  historical  processes.  On  the  other  hand  it 
undertakes  to  set  forth  what  the  Christian  religious  man  ought 
to  believe,  and  so  it  may  be  grouped  with  logic,  ethics  and 
aesthetics  as  a  normative  science,  i.  e. ,  a  science  which  describes 
the  processes  which  are  necessary  for  the  realization  of  an  ideal. 
Thus  it  may  be  claimed,  with  a  fair  show  of  reason,  that  a  the- 
ology of  the  type  under  consideration  is,  upon  these  two  counts, 


16  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

a  science:  as  setting  forth  what  has  been  and  is  believed,  it  is  a 
descriptive  science;  as  setting  forth  what  ought  to  be  believed, 
it  is  a  normative  science. 

But  upon  closer  examination  these  claims  seem  to  be  not 
quite  valid,  if  taken  to  mean  that  we  have  here  a  theology  that 
is,  as  such,  an  empirical  science.  It  is  easy  to  dispose  of  the 
contention  that  there  can  be  a  scientific  theology  of  a  psycho- 
logical or  historico-psychological  sort.  As  dealing  with  the 
observable  life  of  man,  the  discipline  may  be,  like  the  so-called 
"biblical  theology,"  scientific  enough.  But  as  scientific,  it  is 
not  theology;  as  theology,  doctrine  about  God,  it  is  not  a  sci- 
ence, but  simply  a  systematized  expression  of  the  feelings 
expressive  of  a  common  religious  experience.  As  science,  it  is 
simply  a  highly  specialized  branch  of  anthropology. 

But  what  about  the  so-called  normative  science  of  theology? 
If  we  can  have  a  scientific  description  of  what  ought  to  be 
believed  about  God  by  the  religious  community,  does  not  this 
necessarily  result  in  scientific  knowledge  of  what  God  does  and 
is?  On  the  surface  it  would  seem  so;  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  "  ought  to  be  believed  "  depends  upon  an  "  if."  Change 
the  "if" — the  purpose  or  ideal  for  the  sake  of  which  the  the- 
ology is  valued — and  you  change  the  content  of  the  theology 
which  ought  to  be  believed.  And  thus,  within  the  limits  of  a 
normative  science  of  religious  belief,  there  might  be  included 
many  systems  of  theological  fiction.  Evidently,  then,  a  merely 
normative  science  of  religious  faith  does  not  amount  to  the- 
ology as  a  descriptive  science.  It  does  not  decide,  as  true 
science  does,  between  rival  claims  to  truth. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  theology  of  Schleiermacher  is  still 
highly  subjective  and  essentially  eclectic  rather  than  scientific. 
It  states  no  adequate  universal  principle  upon  which  the  choice 
of  the  Christian  religious  consciousness  is  to  be  justified.  From 
the  standpoint  of  other  modifications  of  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence  (within  Mohammedanism  and  Buddhism,  for 
example)  other  systems  of  theology  ought  to  be  believed. 
Again,  there  is  made  explicit  no  adequate  norm  for  the  de- 
termination of  just  what  religious  doctrines  do  correctly  express 
the  Christian  consciousness  itself.  It  was  only  what  was  to  be 
expected,  when  Schleiermacher's  own  Glaubenslehre  was  fol- 


INTRODUCTION  17 

lowed  by  a  host  of  theologies  "of  the  Christian  consciousness," 
each  claiming  exclusive  validity,  however  widely  they  might 
differ  among  themselves.  Moreover,  there  was  in  Schleier- 
macher's  system  an  ambiguity  as  to  the  relation  of  the  theology 
to  his  metaphysics,  which  aggravated  the  impression  of  sub- 
jectivism. The  Christian  theology  of  the  "heavenly  Father" 
did  not  seem  to  fit  in  with  the  at  times  almost  Spinozistic 
identification  of  the  object  of  religious  dependence  with  the 
universe.  It  suggested  the  highly  objectionable  "  double  truth  " 
theory  of  the  later  scholastics. 

Probably  much  of  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  Schleiermacher's 
theological  method  has  its  roots  in  his  rather  one-sided  emphasis 
upon  feeling  as  the  essential  element  in  religion.  Where  feel- 
ing is  made  the  primary  thing  in  religious  experience,  the  best 
that  can  be  done  in  theology  is  to  formulate  a  normative  science 
of  the  intellectual  conditions  of  selected  varieties  of  religious 
feeling.  It  is  only,  as  we  shall  see,  when  the  volitional  element 
is  taken  as  primary,  that  the  basis  can  be  laid  for  theology  as 
a  descriptive  science. 

The  Ritschlian  theology  is  significant,  methodologically,  as 
marking  the  attempt  to  provide  a  more  definite  objective  norm 
for  the  theology  of  the  Christian  consciousness.  Instead  of  the 
appeal  primarily  to  the  feeling  of  the  religious  community,  a 
course  which  had  led  to  the  disconcerting  variety  of  theologies 
of  the  Christian  consciousness,  Ritschl  turned  for  objectivity 
to  history.  His  appeal  was  not  to  the  history  of  religion  in 
general,  however.  His  theological  method  was  religio-histori- 
cal,  but  only  in  a  restricted  sense.  The  true  norm  for  religious 
thought,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  the  historic  Christian  gospel, 
the  Christian  revelation,  i.  e.,  the  historic  Jesus,  religiously 
evaluated  as  divine.  The  historic  Christ,  as  founder  of  the 
Christian  experience  of  salvation  from  sin,  has  for  human 
consciousness  the  function  and  value  of  God.  The  task  of 
theology,  then,  is  to  expound  in  detail  what  is  involved  in  this 
Christocentric  principle.  Christian  doctrine  is  the  expression 
of  the  religious  consciousness  of  one  who  has  found  satisfaction 
and  moral  deliverance  through  viewing  the  person  and  work 
of  Christ  as  the  Divine  Word  to  men.  And  so,  while  religious 
knowledge  has  to  do  with  objective  facts  of  human  history,  it 


18  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

is  nevertheless  not  made  up  of  judgments  of  historic  fact,  but 
of  value-judgments,  expressions  of  appreciation  of  the  worth 
of  these  facts  for  practical  religious  experience.  And  so  self- 
sufficient  did  Ritschl  regard  the  Christian  consciousness  with 
its  experiential  knowledge  of  religious  value,  that  he  main- 
tained that  theology  ought  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  meta- 
physics. It  would  only  needlessly  imperil  Christian  faith,  if 
the  attempt  were  made  to  combine  its  value-judgments 
with  our  natural  knowledge  of  the  world  in  a  system 
of  rational  metaphysics.  Compromise  and  mutual  concession 
would  imperil  the  content  of  faith,  and  submitting  the 
value-judgments  of  religion  to  the  speculative  consciousness 
for  its  approval  would  tend  to  undermine  the  Christian 
certainty. 

The  Ritschlian  movement  has  meant  progress  in  the  direc- 
tion of  a  scientific  empirical  theology.  On  the  one  hand  its 
emphasis  upon  a  definite  historical  norm  has  provided  greater 
objectivity  of  control  in  the  expression  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. On  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  of  religious  value- 
judgments  has  brought  out  a  fact  of  fundamental  importance 
for  the  making  of  theology  scientific,  viz.,  that  appreciation 
of  religious  value  is  an  important  element  in  the  recognition 
of  revelation,  or  the  presence  of  the  divine  within  the  field  of 
human  experience. 

But  the  Ritschlian  theology  is  still  too  subjective  to  be  really 
scientific.  In  the  first  place  Ritschl  and  his  earlier  followers 
under-estimated  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  an  assured  scien- 
tific knowledge  of  the  person  and  work  of  the  historic  Jesus. 
In  the  second  place  there  is  a  certain  narrow  and  unscientific 
dogmatism  in  assuming  from  the  outset  that  in  the  appeal  to 
the  history  of  religion  for  objectivity  only  what  the  Christian 
religion  has  to  offer  is  to  be  considered.  In  the  third  place  the 
setting  forth  of  the  doctrine  of  religious  value-judgments 
against  a  background  of  Kantian  agnosticism  has  accentuated 
the  impression  of  subjectivity.  If  experience  gives  us  no  access 
to  ultimate  reality,  but  is  concerned  with  appearance  only,  our 
knowledge  is  likewise  necessarily  limited  to  the  realm  of  appear- 
ance. Now  there  are  two  things  the  mind  can  do  with  appear- 
ances: it  can  describe  them  and  it  can  evaluate  them.  Accord- 


INTRODUCTION  19 

ing  to  the  Ritschlian  theory,  we  must  get  our  theology  from  the 
evaluations.  Ritschl  himself,  followed  by  Herrmann  and  some 
others,  said  theology  was  made  up  of  the  religious  value- 
judgments  themselves.  Kaftan  on  the  contrary  held  that 
theological  propositions  are  theoretical  judgments,  postulates 
as  to  ultimate  reality,  based  upon  religious  value-judgments, 
but  not  themselves  judgments  of  value.  The  undue  subjec- 
tivity of  the  religious  judgments  is  evident  in  either  case. 
According  to  Herrmann  theological  judgments  may  be  allowed 
to  conflict  with  the  legitimate  conclusions  of  science,  and  there 
is  no  recourse  to  metaphysics  for  reconciliation.  According  to 
Kaftan  contradiction  between  science  and  theology  is  to  be 
avoided  only  by  assigning  to  the  latter  a  transcendent  realm 
inaccessible  to  either  scientific  description  or  to  any  genuinely 
cognitive  metaphysics.  This  fear  of  the  Ritschlians  to  submit 
the  content  and  certainty  of  the  Christian  faith  to  the  test  of 
metaphysics  is  partly  due  to  their  general  agnosticism  and 
consequent  distrust  of  metaphysics,  as  undertaking  to  deal  with 
the  unexperienceable  and  therefore  unknowable.  But  it  is  also 
due  in  part  to  their  virtual,  if  partially  veiled,  religious  agnos- 
ticism. Recognizing  the  subjective  conditions  of  religious  cog- 
nition, they  fail  to  secure  its  objective  validity.  This  is  because, 
with  their  doctrine  of  the  inaccessibility  of  ultimate  Reality, 
divine  or  other,  to  human  experience,  they  have  excluded  the 
idea  of  a  scientific  verification  of  religious  judgments.  And  so 
what  was  said  in  criticism  of  Schleiermacher's  "Science  of  the 
Christian  Faith"  applies  also  to  the  Ritschlian  theology,  in 
spite  of  the  transfer  of  emphasis  from  psychology  to  history. 
Descriptive  science  as  a  branch  of  the  history  of  religion  and 
of  thought,  and  so  as  a  branch  of  anthropology,  the  science  of 
man,  there  may  be;  but  theology,  a  science  descriptive  of  the 
divine  Reality — this  is  still  to  seek. 

Recently  the  attempt  has  been  made,  notably  by  Troeltsch, 
to  direct  eclectic  theology  into  more  objective  and  universally 
valid  channels  by  making  its  religio-historical  norm  universal, 
instead  of  narrowly  and  dogmatically  begging  the  question  of 
the  validity  of  the  Christian  gospel  at  the  outset,  as  Ritschlian- 
ism  does.  In  this  undertaking  Troeltsch  has  been  influenced  by 
the  "religio-historical  school"  of  New  Testament  scholars,  who 


20  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

have  approached  the  study  of  the  beginnings  of  Christianity 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  universal  history  of  religion. 
Troeltsch  wishes  to  be  the  systematic  theologian  of  the  move- 
ment. His  program  calls  for  a  preliminary  acquaintance  with 
the  facts  of  the  history  and  the  psychology  of  religion.  Then, 
as  transitional  to  theology,  there  are  questions  of  religious 
epistemology  and  of  the  philosophy  of  the  history  of  religion  to 
be  answered.  In  conformity  with  the  general  Kantian  defini- 
tion of  the  valid  as  the  rational  within  the  empirical,  Troeltsch 
maintains  that  on  the  one  hand  valid  religion  must  be  empiri- 
cal, i.  e.,  historical  and  individually  vital — even  somewhat  mys- 
tical; and  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  rational,  not  in  the 
sense  of  the  older,  speculative  rationalism,  but  in  the  sense  of 
being  systematized  in  terms  of  concepts  which  are  inherent  in 
universal  reason.  Theology,  then,  to  be  acceptable  must  be  ra- 
tional as  well  as  empirical  (historical  and  experiential).  But  the 
philosophy  of  history,  applied  to  the  history  of  religion,  leads  to 
the  conclusion,  according  to  Troeltsch,  that  the  historical  religion 
best  adapted  to  our  modern  Western  culture  is  Christianity. 
And  so,  after  a  systematic  determination  of  the  essence  of 
Christianity,  the  way  is  clear  for  the  setting  forth  of  the 
theology  of  this  essential  Christianity  in  rational  form.  The 
final  stages  of  this  process  will  be  frankly  metaphysical.  At 
this  point  again  Troeltsch  departs  radically  from  Ritschlianism; 
but  the  development  of  his  thought  in  this  direction  can  be 
readily  understood  as  due  to  the  attempt  to  relieve  the  sub- 
jectivity of  the  "dogmatics"  of  his  theological  teacher,  Kaftan, 
with  the  aid  of  the  interpretation  of  metaphysics  offered  by  his 
philosophical  teacher,  Dilthey.  According  to  Kaftan,  theology 
is  a  system  of  theoretical  judgments  about  the  unexperience- 
able  ultimate  Reality,  based  upon  an  experiential  conscious- 
ness of  religious  value.  According  to  Dilthey  all  metaphysics 
is  simply  the  exposition  and  theoretical  defence  of  beliefs  about 
the  unexperienceable  ultimate  Reality,  of  which  beliefs  the  real 
basis  is  to  be  found  in  practical  and  aesthetic,  i.  e.,  non-rational 
motives,  so  that  no  system  of  metaphysics  can  be  more  than  a 
practically  or  aesthetically  grounded  faith.  What  Troeltsch 
does  is  to  take  Kaftan's  Christian  "dogmatics"  and,  modifying 
it  as  far  as  may  be  necessary  for  rationality,  defend  it  against 


INTRODUCTION  21 

rival  world-views  as  best  fulfilling  the  demands  of  metaphysics 
in  Dilthey's  sense  of  the  term. 

Troeltsch's  theology  has  the  advantage  of  being,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  modern  philosophy,  more  objective  than  Ritsch- 
lianism.  This  it  is  by  virtue  of  its  more  universal  empirical 
basis  (in  the  general  history  of  religion),  its  emphasis  upon 
rationality  as  a  criterion  of  validity,  and  its  recourse  to  meta- 
physics for  final  confirmation.  But  his  method  does  not  avail 
to  make  theology  a  part  of  real  science.  Indeed,  from  his  point 
of  view  any  such  possibility  is  excluded  from  the  beginning. 
He  cannot  even  claim  that  it  is  knowledge;  strictly  speaking, 
he  has  to  confess  to  an  ultimate  agnosticism.  His  eclectic 
approval  of  Christianity,  as  valid  for  our  time  and  place  and 
culture,  is  symptomatic  of  the  incurable  subjectivity  which  re- 
mains in  his  religious  system.  And,  under  these  circumstances, 
the  appeal  to  rationality  as  the  ultimate  criterion  of  validity  in 
religion,  has  its  dangers,  as  critics  have  pointed  out.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  surest  way  of  guarding  against  the  loss  of 
vital  truth  through  the  negations  of  "rationalism"  is  not  to 
give  up  the  attempt  to  be  rational.  Rather  is  it  to  undertake  to 
be  both  rational  and  empirical  to  the  point  of  being  thoroughly 
scientific.  While  recognizing  an  ultimate  place  for  wisdom, 
in  addition  to  scientific  information,  in  philosophy,  provision 
must  be  made  whereby  as  much  as  possible  of  our  religious 
thinking,  as  well  as  of  our  thinking  about  religion,  will  be  turned 
into  descriptive  science. 

Another  contemporary  theologian  may  be  mentioned  here, 
viz.,  Wobbermin,  whose  method,  which  he  calls  the  "religio- 
psychological,"  is  really  an  eclectic  combination  of  elements 
derived  from  those  other  procedures  which  we  have  called 
"  eclectic."  Like  Troeltsch,  he  was  at  one  time  a  student  under 
Kaftan  and  Dilthey  and  has  been  led  to  a  similar  departure 
from  Ritschlianism  with  respect  to  metaphysics.  Theology 
without  metaphysics  is  impossible,  he  declares.  Religion  is 
essentially  a  tendency  toward  the  transcendent,  and  its  ideas 
have  to  do  with  the  transcendent.  The  psychology  of  religion, 
such  as  that  of  William  James,  has  to  do  with  the  varieties  of 
religious  experience;  but  inherent  in  religion  is  an  interest  in 
the  truth  of  its  ideas  about  the  transcendent.  Here,  then,  it  is 


22  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

necessary  to  add  to  the  descriptive  method  of  James  the  con- 
structive religious  method  of  Schleiermacher.  The  theologian 
must  set  forth  religious  ideas  as  true,  and  so  he  must  speak  as 
one  who  is  able  to  share  the  experience  and  point  of  view  of  a 
religious  community.  And,  according  to  Wobbermin,  he  is 
justified  in  regarding  as  true  the  ideas  involved  in  the  religious 
experience  which  is  ethically  best,  if  they  turn  out,  as  he  be- 
lieves they  will,  to  be  metaphysically  defensible.  His  position 
is  thus  somewhere  between  that  of  the  older  Ritschlians,  whom 
he  regards  as  too  narrow  and  dogmatic,  and  that  of  Troeltsch, 
whom  he  regards  as  endangering  unnecessarily,  through  his 
rationalism,  some  of  the  practically  essential  elements  of  Chris- 
tian faith. 

Wobbermin's  course  would  seem  to  be  one  of  considerable 
wisdom,  on  the  supposition  that  theology  cannot  be  made 
really  scientific.  But  as  it  stands  it  has  just  those  defects 
which  are  connoted  by  the  term  unscientific.  In  spite  of  all 
that  is  done  to  reduce  subjectivity  and  dogmatism  to  a  mini- 
mum while  conserving  the  values  of  Christian  faith,  the  the- 
ology remains  essentially  eclectic,  and  the  confession  has  to  be 
made  that  a  certain  circle  in  the  reasoning  is  unavoidable. 
And  with  reference  to  the  theological  methods  of  both  Troeltsch 
and  Wobbermin,  with  their  recourse  to  metaphysics,  it  may 
be  remarked  that  while  the  addition  to  an  eclectic  theology  of 
the  further  rational  test  involved  in  metaphysics  furnishes  a 
further  check  upon  subjective  vagaries  and  uncertainties,  it 
does  not  suffice  to  transform  a  mere  faith  into  knowledge.  It 
may  show  the  religious  hypothesis  to  be  theoretically  permis- 
sible; it  does  not  of  itself  amount  to  verification,  or  proof  that 
the  belief  is  true. 

One  more  eclectic  theological  method  remains  to  be  con- 
sidered, viz.,  that  of  religious  pragmatism.  Here  the  norm,  as 
distinct  from  the  psychological  and  historical,  is  ultimately 
sociological.  Its  principle  may  be  enunciated  as  follows:  We 
have  the  right  to  believe  that  those  theological  doctrines  are 
true  which  are  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  religion 
which  is  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  morality  which 
is  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  highest  well-being  of 
humanity.  The  application  of  this  principle  is  not  likely  to 


INTRODUCTION  23 

be  easy.  There  are  two  opposite  extremes  to  be  avoided:  on 
the  one  hand,  the  extreme  of  conservatism,  which  would 
appeal  to  the  general  practical  benefits  associated  with  a  tra- 
ditional form  of  religion  as  a  vindication  of  the  truth  of  its 
theological  doctrines;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  extreme  of 
radicalism,  which  would  treat  all  theological  ideas  as  mere 
instruments  of  practical  adjustment,  and  not  to  be  taken  as 
true  in  the  sense  of  correctly  representing  any  reality.  But 
while  avoiding  these  extreme  interpretations  of  pragmatism, 
the  critical  theological  pragmatist  would  have  to  undertake 
four  very  complex  empirical  investigations.  Most  fundamental 
of  all  would  be  the  sociological  investigation  as  to  what  con- 
ditions in  society  make  for  the  highest  human  well-being. 
Then  there  would  be  the  ethical  question,  as  to  the  principles 
and  rules  of  conduct  that  make  most  effectively  for  these  re- 
quired sociological  conditions.  Next  there  would  be  the  religious 
question,  as  to  the  land  of  religious  attitude  and  experience 
that  is  most  effective  in  promoting  the  required  morality.  And 
finally,  there  would  be  the  theological  investigation  proper, 
concerned  with  formulating  in  a  systematic  unity  the  religious 
ideas  necessary  for  the  most  effective  propagation  of  the  re- 
quired religion. 

Now  it  is  conceivable  that  this  pragmatic  principle  may  be 
quite  true.  A  high  degree  of  optimism  may  be  necessary,  if  it 
is  to  be  steadfastly  believed;  but  it  may  well  be  the  part  of 
truest  wisdom,  in  case  theology  cannot  be  made  a  science,  to 
act  upon  this  optimistic  pragmatic  principle.  It  is  the  most 
methodical  and  consistent  form  of  what  we  have  called  the 
eclectic  method. 

But  the  pragmatic  theological  principle,  as  we  have  stated 
it,  is  by  no  means  self-evident;  and  the  merely  pragmatic 
method,  however  critically  applied,  is  far  from  making  theology 
an  empirical  science.  It  can  lead  to  a  theology  of  postulates 
only,  not  to  one  of  verified  propositions.  The  religious  prag- 
matist, to  be  sure,  may  claim  the  contrary.  Pragmatic  theology 
he  defines  as  what  must  be  believed  if  a  certain  religious  ideal 
is  to  be  realized;  but  essentially  the  same  thing  is  true,  he  points 
out,  of  all  the  empirical  sciences;  they  set  forth  what  must  be 
believed  if  certain  purposes  generally  recognized  as  valid  are 


24  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

to  be  achieved.  Hence,  he  claims,  pragmatic  theology  and 
any  recognized  empirical  science  are  the  one  as  scientific  as  the 
other.  Both  are  essentially  normative  sciences.  Or,  in  other 
words,  the  test  of  truth  in  all  the  empirical  sciences  is  a  test  of 
satisfactory  working  in  experience;  hence,  it  is  claimed,  prag- 
matic theology,  whose  test  of  religious  truth  is  also  a  test  of 
satisfactory  working  in  experience,  is  also  a  science.  But  the 
fallacy  in  this  reasoning  should  be  readily  detected.  It  is  the 
undistributed  middle  term.  Put  in  still  a  third  way  the  falla- 
cious argument  is  as  follows:  pragmatic  theology  is  eclectic  in 
its  procedure.  But  all  empirical  sciences  are  eclectic;  therefore 
pragmatic  theology  is  an  empirical  science.  Now  it  is  by  no 
means  to  be  denied  that  each  particular  empirical  science  is 
organized  as  that  science  by  the  selection  and  systematic 
arrangement  of  material  for  a  certain  purpose  or  certain  related 
purposes;  but  the  point  of  importance  is  that  it  must  be  already 
verified  scientific  material  which  is  thus  selected.  And  so  for 
theology  as  an  empirical  science  there  must  first  be  verified 
theological  material  to  be  selected;  then  and  then  only  will 
pragmatic  theology  be  transformed  into  a  science. 

It  is  not  with  empirical  science  alone  that  religious  prag- 
matism agrees  in  making  some  sort  of  working  a  test  of  truth. 
Ordinary  common  sense  also  makes  use  of  pragmatic  criteria. 
And  religious  pragmatism  so  far  has  not  gone  much  beyond  a 
sort  of  ordinary  common  sense  in  religious  matters.  It  is  not 
yet  fully  scientific.  At  its  best  it  emphasizes  the  need  of  being 
very  critical,  so  as  not  to  take  any  and  every  sort  or  degree  of 
working  as  a  sufficient  test  of  truth;  but  it  is  still  without  the 
instrument  required  to  transform  this  critical  religious  common 
sense  into  science.  Theology  as  an  empirical  science  would  be 
at  the  same  time  a  pragmatic  theology,  no  doubt;  but  not  all 
pragmatic  theology,  even  when  it  is  carefully  critical,  amounts 
to  theology  as  an  empirical  science. 

With  all  its  merits,  then,  eclectic  theology  is,  in  all  its  forms, 
too  dogmatic  to  be  a  science.  It  assumes  not  only  that  some- 
thing which  ought  to  be  believed  for  some  particular  purpose, 
therefore  ought  to  be;  it  goes  on  to  assume  that  this  which 
ought  to  be,  therefore  is.  Herein  lies  its  dogmatism.  With 
traditionalistic?  rationalistic  and  mystical  theologies,  eclectic 


INTRODUCTION  25 

theology  must  take  its  place  as  one  of  the  forms — although 
itself  the  least  objectionable  form — of  unscientific  dogmatism. 
If  we  cannot  have  a  scientific  theology,  then  an  eclectic  the- 
ology, constructed  on  the  principles  of  a  critical  religious  prag- 
matism, will  be,  theoretically  at  least,  in  spite  of  its  great 
practical  difficulties  in  application,  the  best  method  available. 
But  a  scientific  theology  would  be  much  better. 

Systematic  theology  is  not  now  and  never  has  been  an  em- 
pirical science.  And  yet  this  does  not  mean  that  it  cannot 
become  a  science,  and  that  in  the  very  near  future.  Till  the 
seventeenth  century,  theology  was  prevailingly  traditionalistic ; 
in  the  eighteenth  century  progressive  theology  was  rational- 
istic; in  the  nineteenth  century  it  was  eclectic.  Will  theology 
in  the  twentieth  century  become  scientific?  It  will,  if  religious 
pragmatism  becomes  scientific.  Critical  pragmatism  passes 
over  into  science  when  a  clear  distinction  is  made  between  that 
working  which  constitutes  full  verification,  and  other  working 
which  falls  somewhere  short  of  it.  When  this  distinction  is 
applied  in  religious  pragmatism,  then  we  shall  have  alongside 
of  the  novum  organum  of  inductive  logic  in  general  a  novum 
organum  iheologicum,  a  new  instrument  for  the  criticism  of 
religious  thought  and  the  discovery  of  religious  truth,  which 
will  transform  theology  from  mere  religious  common  sense  into 
an  inductive  empirical  science.  This  will  be  the  final  blow  in 
the  warfare  against  that  undue  religious  dogmatism  which 
still  lingers  in  eclectic  as  well  as  in  traditionalistic  and  rational- 
istic theology. 

"If  anyone  is  able  to  make  good  the  assertion  that  his  the- 
ology rests  upon  valid  evidence  and  sound  reasoning,  then  it 
appears  to  me  that  such  theology  must  take  its  place  as  a  part 
of  science."  These  are  the  words  of  T.  H.  Huxley.  They 
constitute  a  challenge  to  the  theologian,  and  it  is  high  time  for 
the  challenge  to  be  accepted.  It  is  not  that  the  name  "science" 
matters  greatly.  It  is  not  an  "exact  science"  of  which  we  are 
thinking.  The  point  to  be  insisted  upon  is  just  this,  that  it  is 
possible  to  rest  theology  upon  "valid  evidence  and  sound 
reasoning."  This  being  done,  our  ideas  of  science  as  well  as 
of  theology  will  be  modified. 

Theology  as  an  empirical  science  would  be  dependent,  of 


26  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

course,  upon  religious  experience;  but  it  is  important  to  dis- 
tinguish it  definitely  from  the  psychology  of  religion.  All 
religious  experience  is  material  for  the  psychology  of  religion; 
it  has  no  criterion  for  distinguishing  between  true  and  false 
religions;  it  cannot  say  the  first  thing  about  the  existence  or 
nature  of  God.  Theology  is  related  to  the  psychology  of  re- 
ligion much  as  the  physical  sciences  are  related  to  the  psychol- 
ogy of  sense-experience.  Psychology  of  religion  is  simply  a 
department  of  psychology,  and  psychology  is  the  science  which 
describes  mental  activity  and  experience  as  such.  Empirical 
theology,  like  the  physical  sciences,  would  be  a  science  de- 
scriptive not  of  experience  but  of  an  object  known  through 
experience.  Psychology  describes  the  activities  of  the  human 
mind;  theology  is  concerned  with  the  activities  of  God.  The 
scientific  theologian,  therefore,  will  have  to  select  from  the 
manifold  of  religious  experience  those  elements  which  give 
knowledge  of  God,  just  as  the  physicist  selects  from  the  multi- 
tude of  the  elements  of  sense-experience  those  which  are  of 
importance  for  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  matter  and 
energy.  The  theologian  must  therefore  not  only  have  access 
to  religious  experience;  he  must  have  the  proper  norms  for 
distinguishing  the  divine;  for  as  the  magnet  draws  to  itself 
only  the  particles  of  steel,  so  must  he  distinguish  that 
which  has  scientific  theological  value  from  the  total  mass 
which  to  the  psychologist  is  simply  so  much  interesting  human 
experience. 

We  must  now  attempt  some  further  characterization  of  this 
proposed  theology  as  an  empirical  science.  The  crucial  problems 
for  a  scientific  theology  are  the  following:  (1)  Is  there  religious 
perception,  or  something  in  the  religious  realm  corresponding  to 
perception,  viz.,  cognition  of  the  divine  as  revealed  within  the 
field  of  human  experience?  (2)  Is  it  possible  to  formulate,  on 
this  basis  of  the  data  made  available  in  religious  experience, 
theological  laws,  or  generalizations  as  to  what  the  divine  Being 
does  on  the  fulfilment  of  certain  discoverable  conditions? 
(3)  Can  theological  theory  be  constructed  in  a  scientific  manner 
upon  the  basis  of  these  laws?  In  our  discussion  of  scientific 
theological  method,  however,  we  shall  have  to  deal  with  defini- 
tions, presuppositions,  empirical  data,  principles,  inductive 


INTRODUCTION  27 

methods,  working  hypotheses,  laws,  the  practical  application  of 
laws,  and  theory. 

The  definitions  with  which  an  empirical  science  begins  are 
very  different  from  those  which  enter  into  abstract,  deductive 
sciences.  In  the  abstract  or  hypothetical  sciences  the  definitions 
are  complete  from  the  beginning  and  must  be  held  unchanged 
throughout  the  whole  process  of  deduction.  The  definitions  in 
geometry,  for  example,  are  of  this  sort.  In  the  empirical  or 
inductive  sciences,  however,  it  is  different.  These  proceed 
"from  the  vague  whole  to  the  definite  whole."  They  construct 
their  definitions  a  posteriori.  The  initial  definitions  are  merely 
formal  and  provisional ;  they  must  be  sufficient  simply  to  mark  off 
from  all  other  objects  the  particular  objects  to  be  investigated, 
and  it  is  the  central  ami  of  the  science  to  learn  from  experience 
what  further  content  to  put  within  these  preliminary  formal 
definitions.  Thus  chemistry's  initial  definition  of  matter, 
biology's  initial  definition  of  life,  psychology's  initial  definition 
of  mind  or  consciousness  and  sociology's  initial  definition  of 
society  need  only  be  sufficiently  explicit  for  the  identification  of 
the  objects  to  be  studied.  The  definition  grows  as  the  science 
proceeds;  detailed  knowledge  of  the  object  is  the  end,  not  the 
beginning,  of  the  science.  And  it  is  not  different  in  empirical 
theology.  Here  the  most  important  definition  is  that  of  God,, 
The  science  should  begin  with  some  formal  definition  of  God,  as 
the  ultimate  Object  of  religious  dependence,  or  the  Source  of 
religious  deliverance.  Then  it  must  proceed  to  find  out  from 
religious  experience  more  particularly  just  what  attributes  and 
relations  can  be  ascribed  to  that  religious  Object. 

There  is  also  a  difference  between  the  abstract  sciences  and  the 
empirical  sciences  with  regard  to  their  initial  assumptions  or 
presuppositions.  The  abstract  sciences  may  assume  not  only 
the  axioms,  or  self-evident  truths;  they  may  assume  or  postulate 
anything  whatever,  such  as  motion  without  friction,  or  a  fourth 
dimension  of  space,  and  no  harm  is  done  so  long  as  the  deduc- 
tions are  consistent  with  the  premises,  and  the  conclusions  are 
not  confounded  with  fact,  but  recognized  as  hypothetical.  In 
the  empirical  sciences,  however,  one  must  never  assume  or 
postulate  anything  but  that  of  which  he  already  has  practical 
certainty;  unless,  indeed,  he  assumes  it  simply  as  a  working 


28  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

hypothesis  to  be  tested  by  experiment  and  observation.  But 
logically  the  consideration  of  working  hypotheses  belongs  more 
in  connection  with  empirical  laws  and  the  methods  of  induction 
than  among  the  presuppositions  of  a  science. 

Among  the  presuppositions  of  empirical  theology  we  may 
mention  first  the  laws  of  thought  and  such  assumptions  with 
regard  to  method  and  principles  as  are  common  to  all  scientific 
investigation  of  an  empirical  sort.  The  scientific  theologian 
may  also — and  not  only  may,  but  ought  to — presuppose  all 
pertinent  and  well-established  results  of  the  other  empirical 
sciences.  Of  special  importance  here  will  be  the  history  and 
psychology  of  religion,  including  the  results  of  scientific  his- 
torical and  literary  criticism  of  sacred  books,  and  the  essential 
facts  about  great  religious  personalities,  such  as  the  historic 
Jesus.  Because  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  question,  it 
will  be  well  to  presuppose  whatever  can  be  affirmed  with  respect 
to  human  free  agency,  before  undertaking  the  investigation  of 
the  empirical  data  of  theology.  Similarly,  if,  apart  from  any 
appeal  to  religion,  anything  with  regard  to  a  future  life  can  be 
presupposed,  however  tentatively,  after  an  examination  of  the 
pertinent  facts  of  brain  and  mind  and  such  phenomena  as  those 
of  spiritism,  such  a  presupposition  ought  to  be  included,  be- 
cause of  its  bearing  upon  what  may  be  believed  about  the 
consequences  of  sin  and  the  need  of  God.  It  is  important  that 
these  presuppositions  concerning  freedom  and  immortality  be 
limited  to  that  of  which  we  can  be  practically  certain  without 
appeal  to  religion,  and  that  they  be  stated  as  such  certainties, 
rather  than  that  more  than  this  should  be  affirmed  in  the  form 
of  mere  postulates.  What  we  are  interested  in  is  not  a  theology 
of  mere  postulates,  but  a  theology  of  verified  truth  about  reality. 
Then,  too,  we  ought  to  be  able  to  presuppose  a  clear  under- 
standing of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  sin,  or  moral  evil  in 
so  far  as  this  can  be  done  without  any  appeal  to  religion. 

But  there  is  one  presupposition  which  is  peculiar  to  empiri- 
cal theology,  just  as  there  is  always  one  presupposition  in  every 
empirical  science  which  is  the  special  presupposition  of  that 
science.  The  empirical  sciences  assume  the  existence,  and  the 
possibility  of  empirical  knowledge,  of  the  objects  they  under- 
take to  investigate.  Thus  chemistry  assumes  the  existence  of 


INTRODUCTION  29 

matter;  psychology,  the  existence  of  states  of  consciousness; 
psychology  of  religion,  the  existence  of  religious  experience,  and 
so  on.  In  each  case  there  is  assumed,  commonly  on  the  basis  of 
pre-scientific  experience,  the  accessibility  of  the  object  to  further 
knowledge  through  further  experience.  And  what  is  true  of  the 
other  sciences  is  true  of  empirical  theology.  As  in  the  physical 
sciences  one  does  not  first  assume  the  physical  world  and  then 
become  sure  of  it,  but  assumes  it  because  he  is  already  prac- 
tically sure  of  it;  so  it  will  be  normally  in  empirical  theology. 
The  common  procedure  will  not  be  to  assume  the  existence  of 
God,  the  religious  Object,  in  a  merely  provisional  way,  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  and  afterwards  to  become  for  the  first  time 
assured  of  his  existence.  Such  a  course,  if  not  impossible,  will 
be  at  least  exceptional.  Ordinarily  the  empirical  theologian,  it 
may  be  expected,  will  posit  the  existence  of  God — defined,  to  be 
sure,  in  preliminary  fashion — because  he  is  already  practically 
sure,  on  the  basis  of  religious  experience,  that  God  really  exists. 
If  it  be  objected  that  this  is  dogmatic,  the  reply  is  that  it  is 
dogmatic  only  as  every  empirical  science  is  dogmatic;  it  is  not 
dogmatic  in  any  unscientific  sense.  On  the  basis  of  knowledge  of 
God  through  religious  experience,  one  can  scientifically  assume 
that  God  is,  although  he  may  have  as  yet  very  little  knowledge  as 
to  what  God  is.  It  is  just  this  latter,  viz.,  what  God  is,  that  is  to 
be  investigated  through  scientific  theological  observation  and 
experiment  under  the  guidance  of  definite  working  hypotheses. 
This  matter  of  empirical  assurance  of  the  existence  of  God  .is 
of  very  fundamental  importance,  and  its  full  discussion  would 
carry  us  into  the  field  of  religious  epistemology  (theory  of  knowl- 
edge). But  however  desirable  it  may  be  to  have  the  problem 
of  religious  knowledge  discussed  before  taking  up  the  construc- 
tion of  a  scientific  theology,  it  is  not  logically  necessary  to  do  so, 
any  more  than  it  is  logically  necessary  to  take  up  for  special 
consideration  the  problem  of  knowledge  in  general  before 
undertaking  any  scientific  investigation  of  any  other  objects. 
There  may  be,  of  course,  a  greater  need  for  religious  epistemol- 
ogy than  for  epistemology  in  general,  because  of  the  greater 
prevalence  of  religious  scepticism  than  of  scepticism  as  to 
knowledge  of  things  in  general.  But  just  as  there  may  be  much 
knowledge,  and  even  scientific  knowledge,  of  particular  things 


30  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

without  much  knowledge  about  knowledge,  so  there  may  be 
much  knowledge  of  God  without  much  knowledge  about  this 
knowledge  of  God.  However,  some  further  treatment  of  this 
important  point  will  be  offered  in  connection  with  the  discussion 
of  the  empirical  data  of  theology,  both  in  this  introduction  and 
in  the  main  body  of  the  book. 

It  has  not  been  meant,  in  what  has  been  said  of  empirical 
knowledge  of  God,  that  in  all  religious  experience  there  is  equal 
and  sufficient  practical  assurance  of  God.  Some  religious 
experience,  operating  with  faulty  hypotheses  as  to  the  nature 
and  activity  of  God,  is  chiefly  negative  in  its  significance;  it  has 
value  only  as  showing  what  God  is  not  and  does  not  do.  Now 
for  practical  purposes  a  purely  negative  theology  differs  but 
little  from  no  theology  at  all;  and  so,  until  the  theologian  has 
before  him  religious  experience  in  which  there  is  positive  knowl- 
edge of  God,  he  would  do  well,  perhaps,  to  cling  to  some  pro- 
gressive form  of  the  traditionalistic,  or  to  some  eclectic  method. 

If  the  question  be  raised  as  to  whether  one  without  such 
religious  experience  as  is  necessary  for  adequate  assurance  of 
the  existence  of  God,  and  for  further  knowledge  as  to  what  God 
is,  might  not  become  an  empirical  theologian  in  spite  of  this 
lack,  somewhat  as  a  blind  man  might  be  an  investigator  in  the 
science  of  optics,  the  reply  is  that  such  a  man  is,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, necessarily  dependent  upon  testimony  for  his  facts. 
Still,  if  the  facts  are  correctly  supplied  to  him,  while  he  may  not 
share  the  practical  certainty  of  the  postulate,  he  may  make  it 
hypothetically  and  develop  an  empirical  theology  as  a  hypothet- 
ical science.  On  the  other  hand,  the  right  to  assume  in  empirical 
theology  the  existence  of  God  can  be  challenged  only  on  the 
basis  of  a  thoroughgoing  religious  agnosticism,  such  as  would 
deny  that  there  is  or  can  be  knowledge  of  God  in  any  re- 
ligious experience  whatsoever.  But  such  agnosticism  would  be 
in  the  highest  degree  dogmatic;  on  the  basis  of  an  individual's 
ignorance  of  God  it  would  generalize  and  assume  that  the 
ignorance  is  universal  and  incurable.  Experience  shows,  how- 
ever, that  ignorance  of  God  is  curable.  And  if  a  would-be 
theologian  finds  himself  able  to  assume  the  existence  of  God 
only  as  a  working  hypothesis,  still  if  he  faithfully  acts  upon  the 
hypothesis,  either  as  guided  by  experts,  or  in  the  more  round- 


INTRODUCTION  31 

about  way  of  trial  and  error,  he  may  hope  to  be  able  ultimately 
to  affirm  the  existence  of  God  as  part  of  his  assured  knowledge. 

In  close  connection  with  this  special  presupposition  of  the 
existence  of  God,  or  the  divine  Reality,  the  scientific  theologian 
must  deal  with  the  empirical  data  of  theology,  or  the  special 
facts  revealed  in  religious  perception,  or  again,  to  use  the 
religious  term,  the  instances  of  "revelation"  of  the  divine  within 
the  field  of  human  experience.  If  theology  had  to  be  no  more 
than  an  abstract,  deductive  science,  with  the  existence  of  God 
as  a  pure  assumption,  examination  of  empirical  theological  data 
would  be  uncalled  for.  And  even  where  theology  is  regarded  as 
empirical,  but  no  more  than  a  normative  science  (or  part  of  a 
normative  science)  of  human  religion,  made  up  of  postulates 
about  God  as  an  ideal  to  be  believed  in,  empirical  knowledge  of 
an  actual  God  being  impossible — even  here  comparatively  little 
reference  to  "  empirical  data  "  will  be  necessary.  But  if  theology 
is  to  become  a  descriptive  science  on  the  basis  of  the  reality  and 
experienceableness  of  God,  the  empirical  data  of  theology  must 
be  carefully  collected  and  collated  for  scientific  treatment. 

The  proper  selection  of  the  empirical  data  of  theology  pre- 
supposes sufficient  progress  in  religious  discrimination  to  be 
able  to  distinguish  the  distinctively  divine  elements  within 
human  experience,  the  qualities  or  events  which  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  more  immediate  products  of  the  divine  activity.  The 
intuition  involved  in  religious  perception  is,  in  a  sense,  "  pro- 
phetic," but  it  is  not  incapable  of  further  elucidation  or  analysis. 
Religious  perception  is  a  special  case  of  perception  in  a  complex. 
There  are  many  realities  which  we  perceive,  not  as  detached  or 
detachable  elements  of  experience,  like  colors,  sounds,  and  the 
like,  but  only  in  and  through  a  complex  of  elements.  Within  a 
certain  complex  of  sense-qualities  we  perceive  the  presence  of  a 
certain  physical  object.  Within  certain  changing  complexes, 
too,  we  can  perceive  activities,  the  life  of  bodies,  and  even  con- 
sciousness and  the  self.  That  is,  we  are  aware,  by  a  sort  of 
empirical  intuition,  of  the  presence  of  these  realities,  though  not 
as  isolable  elements  of  the  manifold  of  sense  or  inner  feeling. 
Similarly  in  the  experience  of  spiritual  uplift  through  religious 
dependence  there  is  intuitive  perception,  or  awareness  of  the 
presence  and  activity,  within  experience,  of  a  Power  that  makes 


32  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

for  a  certain  type  of  result  in  response  to  the  right  religious 
adjustment.  This  specially  divine  Factor  within  experience  is 
selected  from  the  objects  of  experience  in  general  by  means  of 
religious  apperception.  We  recognize  the  divineness  of  the 
activity,  because  its  quality  is  what,  as  we  have  learned,  is 
characteristic  of  the  religious  Object.  We  have  learned  this  in 
and  through  the  religious  experiences  of  ourselves  and  others, 
through  testimony,  observation  and  experiment.  The  religious 
apperception  itself  may  be  analyzed  into  an  appreciative  apper- 
ception and  a  substantial-causal,  or  realistic  apperception. 
Commonly  too  there  is  in  religion  what  Wundt  calls  a  "per- 
sonifying apperception";  but  this  is  perhaps  more  properly 
regarded  as  interpretation,  and  dealt  with  under  theory.  Ap- 
preciation of  genuine  religious  value,  (i.  e.,  divineness,  or  true 
holiness)  is,  however,  an  important  factor  in  the  recognition  of 
the  presence  of  the  divine  Reality.  This  is  the  true  essence  of 
the  somewhat  confused  Ritschlian  doctrine  of  religious  value- 
judgments.  But  the  realistic  apperception,  or  cognition  of  the 
religious  Object  as  a  real  Being,  causally  active  within  the  field 
of  religious  experience,  is  also  an  essential  factor  in  religious 
cognition  and  religious  common  sense.  There  is  no  more 
reason,  from  the  point  of  view  of  religious  experience,  to  adopt 
an  agnostic  or  subjectivist  interpretation  of  the  Object  of 
religious  experience,  than  there  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
sense-experience,  to  adopt  an  agnostic  or  subjectivist  interpreta- 
tion of  the  objects  of  sense-perception.  No  better  reason  can 
be  given  for  reducing  theology  to  the  psychology  of  religion 
than  can  be  given  for  reducing  physics  and  chemistry  to  the 
psychology  of  sense-experience.  And  as  we  cannot  maintain  the 
physical  life  without  acting  on  the  assumption  that  our  realistic 
intuition  as  to  physical  objects  is  essentially  true,  so  neither  can 
we  maintain  the  religious  life  without  acting  on  the  assumption 
that  our  realistic  religious  intuition  with  reference  to  the  divine 
is  essentially  true. 

The  empirical  data  of  theology,  then,  are  the  contents  of 
religious  perception,  or,  in  religious  phraseology,  the  facts  of 
"revelation. "  Not  all  that  presents  itself  as  revelation  is  to  be 
taken  as  such;  there  must  be  a  critical  evaluation  of  all  revela- 
tion-claims. Just  what  the  true  criteria  of  revelation,  or  of  the 


INTRODUCTION  33 

divine  within  the  human,  are,  we  shall  not  undertake  to  say  in 
this  introduction.  That  will  be  dealt  with  in  our  discussion  of 
the  empirical  data  in  the  body  of  the  book,  where  we  shall  have 
to  consider  not  only  the  idea  of  revelation  in  general,  but  also, 
more  specifically,  revelation  in  the  personal  life  and  activity 
of  the  historic  Jesus  and  in  the  Christian  religious  experience. 
Here,  then,  the  Bible,  critically  interpreted,  will  be  restored  to 
a  place  of  central  importance,  because  of  the  deep  religious 
experiences  which  it  records.  But  it  ought  to  be  readily  evident 
that  the  adoption  of  an  objectively  scientific  method  in  theology 
will  mean  that  religions  other  than  the  Christian  are  virtually 
invited  to  supply  such  data  as  their  experiences  afford,  as 
material  for  theological  science.  Genuine  empirical  values 
will  be  fairly  dealt  with;  scientific  method  will  guarantee  that. 
Nor  should  the  Christian  object  to  such  a  procedure,  as  he 
might  with  good  reason  to  a  merely  eclectic  syncretism  of  the 
beliefs  or  theories  of  other  religions  with  those  of  his  own. 
Conceivably  there  may  be  no  important  data  for  theology  in 
other  faiths  but  such  as  are  duplicated  or  transcended  in  Chris- 
tianity at  its  best;  but  if  this  is  so,  the  scientific  method  will 
reveal  the  fact,  and  in  any  case  the  method  of  inviting  other 
religions  to  contribute,  not  primarily  their  theories  and  in- 
herited beliefs,  but  their  empirical  data,  points  to  the  only  safe 
and  sane  religious  syncretism. 

But  not  all  that  has  been  experienced  in  historic  religion  is 
truly  divine  or  really  holy;  that  is,  not  all  has  positive  religious 
value  in  the  sense  of  furnishing  a  basis  for  assertions  as  to  the 
nature  of  God.  The  distinction  between  that  in  religious 
experience  which  can  and  that  which  cannot  be  taken  as 
revelation  of  the  presence  and  activity  of  God  has  long  been 
recognized.  It  is  common  to  prophets,  apostles,  mystics, 
theologians,  pastors,  missionaries  and  evangelists.  In  Old 
Testament  times  prophets  were  classified  as  true  or  false  ac- 
cording as  their  religious  inspirations  were  objectively  validated 
or  not.  In  New  Testament  times  the  greatest  apostle  insisted 
that  God  was  not  the  author  of  confusion,  even  when  it  came  in 
connection  with  religious  experience,  and  that  inspirations 
should  be  tested,  to  prove  whether  or  not  they  were  from  God. 
"Not  every  impulse  is  divine,"  says  one  of  the  greatest  of  the 


34  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

mystics,  criticizing  certain  phases  of  religious  experience.  But 
probably  no  one  has  even  yet  more  definitely  set  himself  the 
task  of  discerning  the  marks  of  divine  activity  in  the  midst  of 
the  total  of  revivalistic  and  other  religious  experiences  than 
Jonathan  Edwards  in  his  "Treatise  Concerning  Religious 
Affections. "  With  great  acumen  and  with  considerable  suc- 
cess in  spite  of  the  doctrinal  limitations  under  which  he  labored, 
he  has  undertaken  to  show  "what  are  no  certain  signs  that 
religious  affections  are  gracious,  or  that  they  are  not/7  and 
"what  are  the  distinguishing  signs  of  truly  gracious  and  holy 
affections."  Thus  from  the  larger  total  of  data  for  the  psy- 
chology of  religion  he  was  virtually  sifting  out  as  best  he  could 
the  data  of  empirical  theology.  And  indeed  the  modern  em- 
pirical theologian  might  do  much  worse  than  begin  with  this 
treatise  of  the  great  New  England  theologian,  revising  his  list 
of  criteria  of  the  divine  within  the  religious  and  making  a  more 
extended  application  of  the  same  fundamental  distinction. 
Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  when,  recently,  a  question- 
naire was  sent  to  a  large  number  of  ministers,  missionaries  and 
other  religious  workers,  asking  as  its  first  question,  "What 
experiences  and  what  qualities  of  life  do  you  regard  as  in  a 
special  sense  marks  of  the  divine  work  in  human  life?"  the 
results  not  only  confirmed  the  belief  that  religious  experts 
recognize  and  are  familiar  with  the  problem,  but  showed  also 
a  high  degree  of  agreement  in  the  answers  they  gave  to  the 
question. 

But  scientific  knowledge  is  not  satisfied  with  mere  individual 
description,  mere  data  of  particular  experience;  it  seeks  laws, 
generalizations.  Now  in  the  case  of  the  natural  sciences  there 
is  one  fundamental  principle  upon  which  all  generalization 
rests;  it  is,  for  the  investigation  of  nature,  the  ground  of  all 
induction.  Considered  as  an  hypothesis,  it  is  the  first  of  all  to 
be  acted  upon,  and  while  it  must  in  the  nature  of  the  case  be 
the  last  to  be  completely  verified,  it  is  the  one  to  which  the 
scientist,  like  the  man  of  common  sense,  must  cling  to  the  very 
end.  This  general  controlling  principle  is  what  Mill  called  the 
Principle  of  the  Uniformity  of  Nature;  more  recently  certain 
aspects  of  it  have  been  formulated  as  the  Law  or  Principle  of 
the  Conservation  of  Energy;  but  what  is  meant  essentially  is 


INTRODUCTION  35 

the  dependableness  of  nature.  If  the  scientist  is  to  generalize 
he  must  depend  upon  the  future  to  be  like  the  past,  so  long  as 
conditions  are  the  same.  Corresponding  to  this  principle  of 
the  dependableness  of  nature  in  the  natural  sciences,  there 
must  be  at  the  basis  of  any  empirically  scientific  theology  the 
principle  of  the  dependableness  of  God.  This  dependableness, 
in  a  way  parallel  with  the  dependableness  of  nature,  should  not 
be  interpreted,  we  may  remark  in  passing,  as  precluding  the 
possibility  of  the  personality  of  the  religious  Object.  Character 
is  the  basis  of  dependableness  in  personality,  and  the  more 
mature  and  perfect  the  character,  the  more  dependable  the 
person.  Nor,  again,  does  this  fundamental  principle  of  empir- 
ical theology,  that  there  is  a  dependable  Object  of  experimental 
religion,  mean  that  God  can  be  depended  upon  to  do  whatever 
man  may  desire;  it  means  that  God  may  be  depended  upon  to 
act  consistently,  so  that  man  may  learn  through  observation 
and  experiment  what  God  does  under  different  conditions. 
This  is  the  most  fundamental  hypothesis  of  theological  science; 
it  must,  of  course,  remain  the  last  to  be  completely  verified; 
but  it  is  the  one  to  which  the  scientific  theologian,  like  the  prac- 
tical religious  man,  must  adhere  from  the  very  beginning  to  the 
very  end. 

Scientific  method  in  the  discovery  and  proof  of  theological 
laws  may  take  any  one  of  two  or  three  courses.  These  courses 
are  theoretically  fairly  distinct  from  each  other,  but  in  practice 
they  merge  into  each  other.  First  among  these  courses  we  may 
mention  the  way  down — from  ideas  to  facts.  Here  the  procedure 
is  from  principles,  theories,  hypotheses,  tentative  generaliza- 
tions or  laws,  to  verification,  partial  or  complete,  or  refutation, 
as  the  case  may  be,  in  the  light  of  empirical  facts.  In  this  con- 
nection it  may  be  noted  that  just  as,  in  the  words  of  Mill, 
"scientific  induction  must  be  grounded  on  previous  sponta- 
neous inductions, "  so  in  inductive  theology  it  is  well  to  use,  as 
sources  of  suggestion  of  working  hypotheses,  not  only  the 
fundamental  principle  of  the  dependableness  of  the  religious 
Object,  but  also  tentative  or  even  pre-scientific  theories  as  to 
the  nature  and  character  of  God,  and  pre-scientific  spontaneous 
inductions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  divine  processes  or  activity. 
For  example,  the  ideas  of  the  holiness,  love  and  omnipotence  of 


36  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

God  readily  suggest  certain  practical  and  experiential  results, 
which  might  conceivably  follow,  if  man  were  to  relate  himself 
in  a  certain  way  toward  God.  The  adoption  of  such  suggestions 
as  working  hypotheses  in  experimental  religion  makes  it  pos- 
sible to  apply  the  pragmatic  test  to  traditional  and  speculative 
conceptions  of  God;  but  it  does  more  than  this.  It  opens  up  a 
possible  way  to  scientific  discovery  and  proof  in  the  realm  of 
theology.  From  traditional  or  speculative  and  tentative  ideas 
suggested  by  the  scientific  theological  imagination,  together 
with  the  above-mentioned  fundamental  principle  of  depend- 
ableness,  there  may  be  deduced  certain  major  or  more  general 
hypotheses,  from  which  in  turn  may  be  deduced  other  more 
specific,  minor  or  derivative  hypotheses.  Ultimately  in  this 
way  minor  hypotheses  will  be  reached  which  are  capable  of 
being  either  refuted  or  completely  verified  in  single  crucial 
experiments,  where  acting  upon  the  hypothesis  leads  to  an 
experience  in  which  there  is  an  immediate  awareness  either  of 
the  unreality  or  of  the  reality  of  what  was  supposed  in  the 
hypotheses.  Now  refutation  of  a  minor  hypothesis  involves 
refutation  of  the  major  hypothesis  from  which  it  was  logically 
deduced,  and  so  on  back  to  the  general  theory  concerned. 
This  elimination  of  inexact  inductions  and  untenable  theories 
will  mean  progress  toward  the  goal  of  a  scientific  theology;  it 
means  much  to  learn  what  we  must  not  believe.  But  it  must  be 
noted  that  verification  of  a  minor  hypothesis  does  not  logically 
involve  complete  verification  of  the  major  hypothesis  and  gen- 
eral theory  from  which  it  may  have  been  logically  deduced. 
To  assume  that  it  did  would  be  to  fall  into  the  fallacy  of  "affirm- 
ing the  consequent."  However,  the  verification  of  a  minor 
hypothesis  means  scientific  progress;  it  leads  in  the  direction 
of  the  complete  or  adequate  verification  of  the  major  hypotheses 
and  general  theory  from  which  it  has  been  deduced. 

A  second  course  which  may  be  pursued  by  empirical  theology, 
as  by  other  sciences,  is  what  we  may  call  the  way  up — from  par- 
ticular empirical  facts  to  more  and  more  general  laws  and  theory. 
The  procedure,  is  so  far  as  it  is  deliberate,  rather  than  intuitive 
and  spontaneous,  will  be  in  the  main  along  the  lines  of  MilPs 
"methods  of  experimental  inquiry."  Stated  in  somewhat  con- 
densed form  the  canons  of  these  methods  are  as  follows:  (1) 


INTRODUCTION  37 

Method  of  Agreement:  A  circumstance  (of  presence  or  absence) 
in  which  alone  all  instances  of  the  phenomenon  to  be  explained 
agree  is  casually  related  to  it.  (2)  Method  of  Difference:  The 
circumstance  in  which  alone  two  instances  of  the  phenomenon 
differ  is  causally  related  to  it.  (3)  Joint  Method  of  Agreement 
and  Difference:  If  two  or  more  instances  of  the  presence  of  the 
phenomenon  have  only  one  other  circumstance  in  common, 
while  two  or  more  instances  of  the  absence  of  the  phenomenon 
have  in  common  only  the  absence  of  that  circumstance,  that 
circumstance  is  casually  related  to  the  phenomenon.  (4) 
Method  of  Concomitant  Variations:  Whatever  phenomenon 
varies  in  any  manner  when  another  phenomenon  varies  in  the 
same  manner,  is  casually  related  to  that  other  phenomenon. 
(5)  Method  of  Residues:  Subtract  from  any  phenomenon  such 
part  as  is  already  known  to  be  the  effect  of  certain  antecedents; 
then  the  residue  of  the  phenomenon  is  (perhaps)  the  effect 
of  the  remaining  antecedents.  (This  last  is  the  least  conclusive 
of  the  methods,  but  it  has  often  proved  a  fruitful  source  of  dis- 
covery.) 

Now,  superficially  considered,  the  value  of  these  methods  ap- 
plied in  connection  with  religious  experience,  may  seem  to  be 
simply  for  the  psychology  of  religion,  and  not  for  theology. 
But  it  may  prove  possible  to  find,  by  the  use  of  some  of  these 
methods,  some  phenomenon  of  religious  experience  which  has  as 
its  "unconditional,  invariable  antecedent"  a  certain  sort  of 
religious  attitude  of  mind.  This  would,  of  course,  enable  the 
psychologist  of  religion  to  formulate  a  law  of  religious  experience. 
But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  religious  attitude  of  mind  which 
conditions  the  experience  necessarily  posits  the  existence  of 
the  religious  Object,  it  would  be  possible  to  formulate  the  law 
not  only  in  subjective  terms,  or  psychologically,  but  in  objective 
or  realistic  terms  also,  i.  e.,  theologically.  The  generalization 
would  then  state  what,  in  the  way  of  religious  experience,  the 
religious  Object  can  be  depended  upon  for,  on  condition  of  a 
certain  described  type  of  religious  attitude  on  the  part  of  the 
human  subject.  Moreover,  such  theological  laws  would  be 
quite  on  a  par,  scientifically,  with  the  physical  laws  which  state 
what  processes  physical  objects  can  be  depended  upon  to  pass 
through  when  man  adjusts  himself  to  them  in  certain  described 


38  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

ways.  The  purely  psychological  way  of  formulating  the  informa- 
tion is  no  more  the  only  way  in  the  case  of  religious  experience 
than  in  the  case  of  sense-experience.  The  question  is  not  one 
between  the  empirical  theologian  and  the  psychologist  of  re- 
ligion (as  J.  H.  Leuba,  for  instance,  seems  to  think);  it  is  a 
philosophical  question — the  question  between  the  subjective 
idealist  and  the  realist. 

The  distinction  is  an  important  one,  and,  while  its  full  dis- 
cussion would  carry  us  far  into  the  field  of  the  philosophy  of 
knowledge,  some  further  attention  must  be  given  it  here.  It  is 
well  to  recognize  from  the  first,  however,  that  the  course  we  are 
here  recommending  as  the  scientific  procedure  for  theology 
is  essentially  continuous  with  the  course  of  thought  followed  by 
religious  common  sense.  When  a  number  of  persons  in  a  testi- 
mony-meeting recount  the  stories  of  their  religious  conversion, 
dwelling  upon  the  essential  agreement  among  themselves  in  the 
sort  of  difference  that  took  place  in  their  spiritual  experience 
when  they  "  came  to  God,"  and  interpret  the  change  as  due  to 
the  gracious  operation  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  they  are  making 
a  religious,  and  so  an  essentially  theological  use  of  the  best  of 
all  inductive  methods,  the  Joint  Method  of  Agreement  and 
Difference.  Similarly  in  common  religious  life  and  thought 
there  is,  with  reference  to  the  varying  progress  in  experience  of 
what  is  interpreted  as  the  uplifting  and  steadying  power  of 
God,  according  as  the  prayer-life  and  religious  attitude  are  kept 
up  to  normal,  there  is  a  theological  use  of  the  Method  of  Con- 
comitant Variations.  Thus  once  more  we  are  reminded  that  in 
theology,  as  well  as  in  the  more  general  field  of  investigation, 
"scientific  induction  must  be  grounded  upon  previous  spon- 
taneous inductions." 

The  realistic  religious  position  here  assumed,  as  being  as  es- 
sential to  a  scientific  theology  as  it  is  to  experimental  religion, 
will  be  questioned.  Exception  will  be  taken  to  its  explanation 
of  religious  phenomena  as  in  any  instances  or  to  any  extent 
caused  by  God,  instead  of  in  terms  of  antecedent  phenomena 
exclusively.  In  anticipation  of  this  objection  it  may  be  sug- 
gested that,  apart  altogether  from  theology,  the  prevailing  con- 
cept of  cause  sorely  needs  revision.  A  definition  of  cause  in 
terms  of  antecedent  or  accompanying  phenomena  simply,  as  in 


INTRODUCTION  39 

the  influential  definition  of  J.  S.  Mill,  is  simply  what  cause 
would  be,  if  phenomenalism  (Mill's  philosophy)  were  true.  If  we 
experience  and  can  know  nothing  but  appearances,  phenomena, 
then  the  only  "causes"  we  can  intelligently  talk  about  are 
antecedent  or  accompanying  phenomena.  But  these  are  not 
real  causes — active,  productive  agents  or  agencies — at  all. 
When  we  exchange  phenomenalistic  or  subjectively  idealistic 
ways  of  thinking  for  realistic,  the  inductive  methods,  very  much 
as  Mill  formulated  them,  are  still  available;  but  they  must  be 
interpreted  as  leading  in  the  first  instance  only  to  antecedent 
conditions  instead  of  to  real  originating  causes.  The  uncondi- 
tional invariable  antecedent  "condition,"  however,  is  a  half- 
way house  on  the  road  toward  the  real  agents  or  agencies  (suns, 
planets,  satellites,  electrons,  atoms,  molecules,  sub-personal 
vital  and  psychical  entities,  human  persons,  communities, 
God).  If  cause  be  not  so  interpreted,  but  as  mere  antecedent 
phenomenon  of  some  sort,  there  can  really  be  no  science  but 
psychology  and  no  psychology  of  the  person,  but  only  of  a 
succession  of  "conscious  states."  Now  the  religious  individual 
is  one  of  the  ultimate  causes  of  his  own  religious  experience;  he 
is  a  determining  factor  in  the  religious  attitude  which  conditions 
the  responding  activity  of  God.  But  the  Church  is  also  a  cause 
of  the  individual's  religious  attitude  and  experience.  Still,  as 
has  been  pointed  out  already,  the  religious  attitude  is  an  attitude 
toward  an  objective  cause,  other  than  one's  self  and  other  than 
the  Church.  The  case  is  comparable  to  that  of  the  beginner  in 
chemistry,  the  results  of  whose  experiments  are  not  caused 
immediately  by  his  instructor  and  previous  chemists,  nor  simply 
by  himself,  but  also  and  essentially  by  the  reagents  with  which 
he  deals.  A  still  closer  analogy  exists  between  the  case  of  the 
experimental  religionist  and  the  experimental  biologist  or  physi- 
ologist, for  the  divine  activity  in  religious  experience  resembles 
more  that  of  living  substance  than  that  of  "inert"  matter. 

And  so  we  claim  that  the  psychologist  of  religion  has  no  right, 
as  scientist,  to  object  to  the  idea  of  a  scientific  empirical  theology. 
Its  legitimacy  can  be  legitimately  questioned  only  from  the 
standpoint  of  philosophy — the  philosophy  of  knowledge. 
Flournoy,  Leuba  and  other  psychologists  of  religion  are  correct 
enough  when  they  insist  that  the  psychology  of  religion  has  the 


40  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

right  to  deal  with  all  religious  experiences  and  all  phenomenal 
aspects  of  such  experiences.  But  this  is  something  which  em- 
pirical theology  is  not  concerned  to  dispute.  Even  experience 
of  the  objects  of  the  physical  sciences  has  its  psychologically 
describable  aspects,  as  we  have  admitted;  and  the  same  thing, 
no  more  and  no  less,  is  true  of  the  Object  of  religious  experience 
and  theological  science.  Leuba  seems  to  think  that  the  em- 
pirical theologian  makes  use  of  the  Method  of  Residues  to  find 
a  place  for  theology  in  those  aspects  of  religious  experience 
which  are  regarded  as  beyond  the  limits  of  psychological  de- 
scription; and  this  he  objects  to,  as  violating  the  Principle  of 
Parsimony,  according  to  which  explanatory  principles  (causal 
agencies)  are  not  to  be  multiplied  beyond  the  minimum  number 
necessary  to  explain  the  phenomena.  Now  it  may  be  remarked 
that  the  Principle  of  Parsimony  needs  to  be  supplemented  by 
the  counter-principle  of  pragmatism  or  common  sense,  accord- 
ing to  which  what  has  commended  itself  to  experience  and  prac- 
tice is  not  to  be  rejected  without  sufficient  reason.  Each  of 
these  principles  is  a  corrective  for  the  other.  But  still  more  to 
the  point  is  it  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  empirical  theology — at 
least  as  we  have  defined  it,  whatever  may  be  true  of  the  forms 
criticized  by  Leuba — is  not  dependent  upon  the  Method  of 
Residues  in  its  procedure.  Where  the  Method  of  Difference 
can  be  applied,  the  Method  of  Residues  is  not  required;  and  in 
theology,  as  we  have  seen,  we  can  not  only  apply  the  Method  of 
Difference,  but,  better  still,  the  Joint  Method  of  Agreement  and 
Difference.  To  find  a  place  for  an  empirical  theology  we  do 
not  need  to  look  for  some  small  corner  of  religious  experience 
where  psychology  breaks  down,  any  more  than  the  physicist, 
in  order  to  find  a  place  for  his  science,  needs  to  look  for  some 
break-down  in  the  psychology  of  sense-experience.  It  is  not 
psychology,  but  psychologism,  a  subjective  idealism  in  philoso- 
phy, which  is  inimical  to  objective  or  realistic  science.  We  are 
in  a  position  to  view  with  entire  complacency  the  overlapping 
in  large  measure  of  empirical  theology  and  the  psychology  of 
religion. 

One  other  variety  of  empirical  procedure  may  be  briefly 
mentioned,  viz.,  the  way  up  and  down,  or  the  inductive-deductive 
method.  This  is  employed  sometimes  in  order  to  arrive  at 


INTRODUCTION  41 

more  complex  laws  on  the  basis  of  simpler  results  of  induction. 
As  Mill  points  out,  the  method  involves  three  steps:  first,  ascer- 
taining the  simpler  laws  by  direct  induction;  second,  calculating 
from  these  laws  of  the  simpler  processes  what  should  be  ex- 
pected to  result  from  their  combination;  and  third,  appeal  to 
experience  for  verification  of  the  conclusion  deduced.  This 
method  might  be  employed  in  theology  in  deriving  laws  of  more 
composite  experiences  from  those  of  experiences  which  may  be 
more  elemental. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  make  some  general  statements 
about  empirical  theological  laws.  As  the  laws  of  the  physical, 
mental  and  social  sciences  are  general  or  universal  statements 
as  to  what  matter  or  physical  energy,  or  living  substance,  or 
mind,  whether  of  individuals  or  social  groups,  can  be  depended 
upon  for,  under  certain  conditions,  so  whatever  discoverable 
laws  of  empirical  theology  there  may  be  will  be  general  or  uni- 
versal statements  of  what  in  human  experience  God  can  be 
depended  upon  for,  under  certain  conditions.  As  laws  of  the  di- 
vine response  to  the  right  religious  adjustment,  they  will  in- 
clude, although  no  longer  in  their  traditionalistic  form,  the  bulk 
of  what  the  religious  speak  of  as  the  " promises"  of  God.  In- 
deed, the  scientific  theologian  ought  to  be  able  to  restore  in  its 
essentials  the  predictive  element  to  its  central  place  in  prophecy; 
on  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  empirical  theology  he  ought  to  be 
able  to  guide  individuals  to  the  religious  adjustment  that  con- 
ditions the  most  desirable  religious  experience,  and  to  predict, 
within  limits,  the  results  of  the  right  adjustment.  This  is  no 
more  than  has  been  commonly  assumed  by  religious  evangelists 
and  teachers;  with  scientific  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  the  divine 
operation  in  the  lives  of  men,  however,  the  prediction  can  be 
made  with  more  accuracy  and  justified  assurance.  Just  what 
the  right  religious  adjustment  is  in  its  general  characteristics 
and  in  its  special  forms,  must  be  learned,  as  a  fundamental  part 
of  all  theological  law,  through  observation  and  sincere  and  rev- 
erent experiment.  The  following  questions  from  a  question- 
naire addressed  to  ministers,  evangelists,  missionaries  and  other 
expert  religious  workers,  may  be  suggestive:  How  do  you  seek 
the  results  which  you  regard  as  the  work  of  God  in  the  human 
spirit,  in  yourself  and  in  others?  What  attitude  of  mind  and 


42  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

will,  toward  God  and  in  general,  do  you  seek  to  produce?  What 
ideas  do  you  regard  as  essential,  in  guiding  to  this  attitude? 
What  ideas,  further,  are  useful?  To  what  extent  is  it  well  to 
work  through  feeling  (emotion)  for  religious  results,  and  how 
would  you  do  this?  What  is  the  place  of  active  expression  in 
leading  to  deepened  religious  experience?  What  forms  of  ex- 
pression are  most  helpful?  What  social  religious  conditions — 
in  the  religious  community,  and  in  the  religious  meeting — are 
most  favorable  to  genuine  religious  results? 

The  laws  of  empirical  theology,  as  generalizations  from  the 
religious  point  of  view  with  regard  to  successful  religious  depend- 
ence, may  be  expected  to  be  fundamentally  volitional.  The 
most  elemental  of  these  will  be  essentially  laws  of  the  answer 
to  prayer.  Experience  wilt  show  that  the  indispensable  element 
in  prevailing  prayer  is  not  a  matter  of  mere  words  or  formal 
petition,  nor  of  the  name  or  national  mythology  associated  with 
the  deity,  whether  Jewish,  Grecian,  Mohammedan,  Hindu  or 
Christian.  It  is  the  character  of  the  religious  adjustment  that 
is  all-important,  and  this  will  be  influenced  by  the  belief  as  to 
the  character  and  power  of  the  religious  Object.  Moreover, 
experience  may  also  be  expected  to  show  whether  or  not  it  is 
scientifically  possible  to  formulate  a  law  of  the  answer  to  prayer 
for  such  external  things  as  changes  in  the  weather,  or  good  for- 
tune in  war  or  in  business,  or  some  specific  change  in  the  spirit- 
ual lives  of  other  persons,  apart  from  any  question  of  the  human 
use  of  means  toward  that  end;  or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  the 
generalizations,  to  be  scientific,  must  be  limited  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  an  impartation  of  the  divine  power  in  and  through 
the  will  and  spiritual  life  of  the  one  who  prays.  But  besides  the 
theological  laws  of  these  elemental  volitional  experiences,  the 
empirical  theologian  may  expect  to  be  able  to  formulate  the 
laws  of  composite  volitional  experiences,  such  as  are  designated 
in  the  language  of  traditional  religion  " regeneration,"  "per- 
severance," "the  fulness  of  the  Spirit,"  "sanctification,"  and — 
to  sum  up  all — "salvation."  And  in  addition  to  the  laws  of 
such  volitional  experiences,  elemental  and  composite,  it  may 
be  that  the  formulation  in  theological  form,  of  the  laws  of  cer- 
tain emotional,  intellectual,  physiological  and  even  sociological 
aspects  of  religious  experience  will  turn  out  to  be  a  possibility. 


INTRODUCTION  43 

In  any  case,  all  laws  of  theology  as  a  descriptive  science  will  be 
knowledge  of  religious  experience  in  relation  to  its  conditions 
and  central  cause,  the  conditions  here  being  largely  subjective, 
human,  while  the  central  Cause  is  not  only  objective,  but  divine. 

These  laws  of  scientific  theology  will  naturally  be  of  the  ut- 
most importance  in  evangelism  and  religious  education.  It  is 
desirable  that  ministers  and  all  other  religious  workers  become 
scientific  teachers  and  trainers  in  the  religious  life.  If  this  is  to 
be  realized  they  must  learn  how  to  promote  the  divine  life  and 
revelation  in  man;  and  to  know  this  they  must  have  scientific 
knowledge  of  what  God  will  do  in  human  life,  and  on  what  con- 
ditions. For,  after  all,  it  is  theology  that  one  makes  use  of, 
centrally  in  religious  training,  rather  than  psychology.  If  one 
goes  immediately  from  the  psychology  of  religion  to  evangelism 
and  religious  education,  without  having  attained  to  a  scientific 
theology,  he  is  likely  to  imagine  that  certain  psychological  de- 
vices of  suggestion  and  the  like  are  as  important  as  a  correct  ad- 
justment of  a  distinctly  religious  sort,  and  the  whole  process  will 
tend  to  be  degraded  to  an  irreligious  level.  Nor  will  it  do  to  have 
recourse  to  speculative  philosophy  simply,  in  order  to  supple- 
ment the  psychology  of  religion  with  positive  religious  ideas. 
Speculative  philosophy  is  no  proper  substitute  for  scientific  in- 
formation in  any  other  practical  undertaking,  and  it  does  not  ap- 
pear why  it  should  be  in  religious  education.  Evangelism  and 
religious  education  can  ultimately  succeed  only  if  they  become 
in  essence  an  applied  science,  and  that  not  an  applied  psychology 
of  religion  principally,  but  centrally  and  most  essentially  an 
applied  empirical  theology. 

But  the  laws  of  the  empirical  sciences  are  commonly  as  im- 
portant for  theory  as  for  practice;  we  get  scientific  knowledge 
of  what  objects  are,  by  observing  how  they  act.  In  the  light 
of  the  facts,  scientifically  organized  into  a  body  of  descriptive 
laws,  the  scientific  imagination  tends  to  construct  its  theory  of 
what  the  object  must  be  (beyond  what  is  immediately  perceived) 
in  order  to  account  for  what  the  object  does.  Moreover,  a 
theory,  to  be  scientifically  satisfactory,  must  be  one  from  which 
there  can  be  deduced  hypotheses  which  can  be  acted  upon  and 
verified  in  experience.  It  is  not  otherwise  in  the  case  of  scien- 
tific theology.  Scientific  knowledge  of  what  God  is,  it  will  be 


44  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

possible  to  gain  from  scientific  knowledge  of  what  God  does, 
and  this  the  scientific  theologian  will  possess  in  the  form  of 
theological  laws.  Thus  the  formal  definition  of  God  with  which 
we  started  will  gain  definite  content.  We  shall  learn  what  God's 
character  and  power  must  be,  in  order  to  account  for  what  ex- 
perience shows  he  can  be  depended  upon  to  produce  in  the  life 
of  man,  when  the  human  adjustment  to  God  is  made  what  it 
ought  to  be. 

But  there  are  other  ways  of  effecting  the  transition  from  the 
laws  of  empirical  theology  to  theological  theory,  besides  this 
way  of  deliberately  constructing  a  theory  to  account  for  the 
facts  embodied  in  the  laws.  One  may  begin  with  the  religious 
intuitions  of  experimental  religion  in  what  seems  to  be  its  best 
pre-scientific  form.  These  intuitions,  e.  g.,  as  to  the  sufficiency 
of  God  in  greatness  and  goodness  for  man's  religious  need,  may 
be  criticized  by  being  subjected  in  a  scientific  way  to  the  test 
of  religious  experience.  A  distinction  will  begin  to  appear  be- 
tween what  the  plain  man  of  profound  religious  experience  really 
knows,  and  what  he  only  thinks  he  knows.  In  so  far  as  his 
views  stand  the  test  of  experience  and  scientific  criticism,  they 
may  be  allowed  to  remain  as  elements  of  a  theological  theory. 
Moreover,  this  method  will  mean  the  discovery  of  an  ultimate 
and  universally  valid  basis  of  appeal  in  mediating  between  the 
various  religions  of  the  world,  with  their  more  or  less  mytholog- 
ical theologies.  Only  the  scientific  method  of  testing  inherited 
religious  beliefs  can  be  trusted  to  separate  the  gold  of  genuine 
religious  truth  from  the  dross  of  untenable  dogma. 

Moreover,  in  still  another  way  the  transition  to  theory  may 
be  made.  Postulating  the  view  of  God  which  seems  practically 
necessary,  this  view  may  be  taken  as  a  general  and  compre- 
hensive working-hypothesis,  to  be  refuted  in  the  refutation  of 
the  minor  hypotheses  deduced  from  it  by  strictly  logical  proc- 
esses, or  being  progressively  verified  in  and  through  the  veri- 
fication of  these  deductions.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  three 
methods  of  making  the  transition  may  be  employed  together,  as 
is  often  done  in  other  sciences. 

In  this  scientific  way  it  will  be  possible  to  build  up  a  theo- 
logical theory,  covering  such  points  as  the  moral  and  meta- 
physical attributes  of  God,  the  relation  of  God  to  individual 


INTRODUCTION  45 

men,  to  the  events  of  human  history,  and  to  the  realm  of  na- 
ture. It  will  then  be  possible,  on  the  basis  of  this  view  of  God 
and  of  the  divine  relations,  to  draw  inferences  with  reference 
to  the  future  of  human  individuals  and  of  the  human  race. 

Theology  as  a  bona  fide  empirical  science — this,  if  it  proves 
practicable,  will  eventually  be  the  one  and  only  "  New 
Theology,"  destined  to  displace  all  rivals  for  the  honor  of  that 
title.  To  the  undogmatic  experience-religion  of  the  present, 
it  will  be,  with  the  help  of  modern  science  and  the  principles 
of  induction,  what  the  theology  of  Thomas  Aquinas  was  to 
the  external-authority  religion  of  the  middle  ages  with  the  aid 
of  the  Aristotelian  logic  and  philosophy. 

Finally,  when  through  the  employment  of  empirical  methods 
there  will  have  grown  up  a  well-defined  body  of  theological 
laws  and  a  resultant  well-established  theological  theory,  the 
greatest  possible  contribution  will  have  been  made  toward 
solving  the  ultimate  problems  of  metaphysics.  To  be  sure,  the 
submission  of  the  theoretical  part  of  a  scientific  theology  to 
the  fire  of  metaphysical  criticism  will  constitute  its  last  intel- 
lectual test.  But  its  relation  to  metaphysics  will  be  parallel 
with  that  of  the  other  sciences,  except  that  it  will  be  of  much 
greater  philosophical  importance  than  most  of  them.  Meta- 
physics will  be  on  trial  as  truly  as  theology  itself;  it  must  be- 
come a  synthesis  of  the  well-established  results  of  the  descriptive 
sciences,  an  empirical  theology  included.  And  thus  theology 
will  probably  make  a  much  more  important  contribution  to 
metaphysics  than  will  metaphysics  to  theology.  It  has  been 
pretty  generally  conceded  that  to  take,  as  suggested,  the  re- 
sults of  the  special  sciences  and  combine  them  all  in  a  final 
theory  of  reality  would  be  the  most  obvious  and  theoretically 
unobjectionable  metaphysical  method.  But  all  such  syntheses 
hitherto  have  proved  religiously  unsatisfactory,  as  might  have 
been  foreseen  from  the  fact  that  there  was  no  scientific  religious 
knowledge  to  be  combined  with  the  other  sciences.  Whenever, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  religiously  satisfactory  philosophy  was 
constructed,  it  was  found  open  to  the  charge  of  being  subjec- 
tively conditioned  and  unscientific.  If  now  there  can  be  de- 
veloped a  scientific  theology,  it  would  appear  possible  for 
philosophy  to  be  strictly  objective  and  essentially  scientific, 


46  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

and  at  the  same  time  do  full  justice  to  the  legitimate  demands 
of  the  religious  life.  And  indeed,  may  not  this  perhaps  be  the 
real  reason  why  philosophy  (or,  more  particularly,  metaphys- 
ics) has  so  often  retraced  her  steps  and  made  so  little  progress — 
that  she  has  been  waiting,  without  realizing  it,  for  theology 
to  become  an  empirical  science?  When  once  this  has  been 
accomplished,  the  way  will  have  been  opened,  for  the  first  time 
in  the  history  of  thought,  for  the  making  of  philosophy  at  the 
same  time  adequately  spiritual  in  its  appreciations  and  ade- 
quately scientific  in  its  method. 


PART  I. 
THE  PRESUPPOSITIONS  OF  THEOLOGY 


»•*' 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  PRESUPPOSITIONS  OF  ALL  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCES 

IN  undertaking  to  set  forth  the  necessary  and  legitimate 
presuppositions  of  theology  as  an  empirical  science,  we  natu- 
rally begin  with  those  epistemological,  logical  and  methodo- 
logical presuppositions  which  our  special  science  shares  with 
all  other  descriptive  sciences. 

A  tacit  presupposition  of  all  empirical  science,  and  one  which 
is  justifiable  in  epistemology,  or  the  philosophy  of  knowledge, 
is  that  through  experience  and  reflection  according  to  the 
principles  of  induction  and  deduction  upon  the  experienced 
content,  knowledge  of  reality  in  general  is  possible.  Now 
inductive  procedure  rests  upon  a  general  postulate  or  principle 
which  has  been  called  the  "uniformity  of  nature,"  but  which 
would  be  expressed  more  accurately  as  the  dependableness  of 
the  universe.  And  yet  it  would  be  easy  to  become  too  dogmatic 
at  this  point.  Not  only  must  we  not  assume  that  only  those 
events  are  to  be  accepted  as  authentic  happenings  which  are 
completely  explicable  according  to  laws  already  known.  At 
the  outset  it  is  not  even  to  be  assumed  as  self-evident  or  in  any 
way  fully  established  that,  if  we  had  sufficient  knowledge,  all 
actual  events  would  be  seen  to  be  nothing  more  than  special 
instances  of  happening  according  to  an  already  familiar  or  a 
newly  discovered  uniformity,  or  general  law.  The  question 
as  to  whether  or  not  uniformity,  or  law,  is  absolutely  all-per- 
vading is  of  fundamental  importance  in  connection  with  such 
topics  as  freedom  and  miracle,  and  its  final  consideration  is  an 
affair  of  metaphysics.  We  may  assume,  however,  the  justice 
and  validity  of  the  scientific  attitude  and  procedure,  according 
to  which  the  investigator  first  endeavors  to  explain  by  means 
of  known  laws  all  that  is  to  be  accepted  as  fact — since  "the 
true  scientific  method  is  to  explain  the  past  by  the  present" 
(Bagehot) — and  then,  if  there  should  be  a  residue  of  well- 

49 


50  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

established  fact  not  thus  explicable,  tries  to  discover  new  laws 
under  which  the  particular  occurrence  would  fall  as  a  special 
instance.  If  an  alleged  event  is  not  explicable  in  either  way, 
and  is  not  supported  by  indubitable  experience  or  any  abso- 
lutely binding  imperative,  its  authenticity  must  be  regarded 
as  highly  questionable,  to  say  the  least.  This  is  in  accord  with 
the  attitude  we  should  insist  upon  as  justified  in  investigating 
the  probable  truth  of  the  events  recorded  in  the  sacred  writings 
of  other  faiths  than  ours,  and  we  ought  to  be  ready  to  apply 
the  same  scientific  procedure  in  dealing  with  the  traditions 
embodied  in  the  scriptures  of  that  religion  which  may  happen 
to  be  our  own. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES 

IT  is  a  recognized  part  of  the  procedure  of  each  of  the  special 
sciences  that  the  well-established  results  of  other  sciences  may 
be  presupposed  as  required.  The  same  is  true  of  theology  as 
an  empirical  science. 

Scientific  discoveries  which  are  especially  pertinent  to  the- 
ology are  the  following:  the  immensity  of  the  physical  universe; 
the  motion  of  the  earth,  and  in  general  the  heliocentric  nature 
of  the  solar  system;  cosmic  evolution,  with  the  certain  prospect 
that  the  earth  will,  at  some  remote  future  time,  become  so 
cold  as  to  be  unfitted  to  be  the  habitation  of  physical  life;  the 
great  antiquity  of  the  earth  and  of  plant  and  animal  (including 
human)  life  upon  it;  the  conservation,  at  least  within  the 
limits  of  possible  human  measurement,  of  mass  and  energy; 
the  molecular,  atomic  and  ultimately  electrical  nature  of  mat- 
ter; biological  evolution,  i.  e.,  the  descent  of  all  species  of  plant 
and  animal  life,  whether  now  extinct  or  still  extant,  by  natural 
generation  from  one  or  a  few  primitive  forms  of  living  matter, 
along  lines  determined  largely  but  perhaps  not  entirely  by 
natural  and  germinal  selection;  the  psychophysical  nature  of 
man,  with  the  presence  of  law  in  the  psychical  realm  as  well 
as  in  the  physical;  the  biological  function  and  survival-value 
of  the  more  primitive  manifestations  of  the  psychical,  together 
with  the  presence  of  natural,  evolutionary  processes  in  the 
development  of  the  moral  and  religious  as  well  as  the  intellec- 
tual and  aesthetic  consciousness;  and  finally,  the  evolution  of 
society  and  of  the  social  consciousness  of  the  individual. 

Of  particular  importance  are  the  results  being  reached  in  the 
science  (history  and  psychology)  of  religion.  Some  of  these  will 
be  utilized  in  the  course  of  our  theological  construction,  espe- 
cially in  connection  with  our  discussion  of  the  data  and  laws  of 
theology.  But  reference  should  be  made  at  this  point  to  certain 

51 


52  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

conclusions  within  the  field  of  the  scientific  history  of  religion, 
or  more  explicitly,  to  the  results  of  the  scientific  historical  and 
literary  criticism  of  sacred  books.  And  here  interest  will  be 
centered  in  the  resultant  view,  presumably  historically  sound, 
as  to  the  personality  and  career  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  On  this 
particular  topic,  however,  the  critics  have  not  yet  reached  com- 
plete agreement.  Even  if  we  eliminate  the  prejudices  of  ex- 
treme conservatism  and  the  vagaries  of  extreme  radicalism, 
there  seems  to  remain  the  possibility  of  a  considerable  diver- 
gence of  not  unreasonable  opinion  as  to  what  the  historic  Jesus 
really  was  and  thought  and  said  and  did. 

There  is  a  large  measure  of  agreement  among  careful  critics, 
however,  as  to  the  sources  upon  which  chief  reliance  must  be 
placed,  if  we  are  to  arrive  at  trustworthy  historical  results  with 
regard  to  the  reputed  founder  of  the  Christian  religion.  These 
are  the  genuine  letters  of  Paul,  the  bulk  of  the  Gospel  according 
to  Mark  (editorial  additions  having  been  eliminated),  and  the 
material  commonly  denominated  "Q"  (Quelle),  consisting 
largely  of  the  passages  common  to  Matthew  and  Luke  and  not 
found  in  Mark.  On  the  basis  of  these  and  similar  critical  views, 
and  guided  by  the  above-mentioned  principle  of  scientific 
methodology  (according  to  which  the  investigator  should  first 
try  to  explain  all  that  is  to  be  accepted  as  fact  by  referring 
to  known  laws  of  nature  or  of  mind,  and,  failing  that,  should 
search  for  some  new  law,  in  the  light  of  which  he  can  understand 
such  alleged  occurrences  as  he  still  believes,  on  grounds  of 
critically  examined  evidence,  that  he  ought  to  accept  as  fact), 
what  results  concerning  the  historic  Jesus  may  be  presupposed 
by  the  empirical  theologian? 

To  begin  at  the  beginning,  what  should  theology  presuppose 
with  reference  to  the  "virgin  birth  of  Christ "?  Later  theological 
theory  has  attached  much  importance  to  this  alleged  event,  as 
establishing  the  divine  nature  of  the  Christ,  but  it  is  rather  re- 
markable that  we  find  no  allusion  to  it  either  in  the  Pauline  or 
the  Johannine  literature,  in  Mark  or  the  "Q"  material  of 
Matthew  and  Luke,  or  indeed  anywhere  in  the  New  Testament 
save  in  the  material  of  obscure  origin,  at  the  beginning  of 
Matthew  and  Luke.  Nor  do  we  find  any  reference  to  it  in 
extra-canonical  literature  until  some  time  after  the  synoptic 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES          53 

gospels  had  received  practically  their  present  form.  Moreover, 
in  other  parts  of  the  synoptic  gospels  we  find  Joseph  and  Mary 
spoken  of  by  the  evangelist  as  "his  parents,"  Mary  represented 
as  speaking  of  Joseph  to  Jesus  as  "thy  father,"  and  the  people 
as  asking,  "Is  not  this  Joseph's  son?"  while  no  negative  answer 
is  in  any  way  suggested  by  the  evangelist.  Then,  too,  the  gene- 
alogies in  Matthew  and  Luke,  incompatible  with  each  other  as 
they  seem  to  be,  both  trace  the  ancestry  of  Jesus  back  through 
the  Davidic  line,  and  each  claims  to  be  the  genealogy,  not  of 
Mary,  but  of  Joseph.  The  parenthetical  clause,  "as  was  sup- 
posed," in  Luke  3 :23,  where  Jesus  is  spoken  of  as  being  the  son  of 
Joseph,  is  evidently  a  later  addition,  for  there  would  have  been 
no  point  to  be  gained  by  introducing  a  genealogy  which  was 
not  that  of  Jesus.  Especially  important  is  the  fact  that  in  the 
well-known  Sinaitic  Syriac  manuscript,  translated  from  an 
early  Greek  original,  which  apparently,  for  obvious  reasons, 
was  not  allowed  to  remain  extant,  the  sixteenth  verse  of  the  first 
chapter  of  Matthew  reads,  "And  Jacob  begat  Joseph;  and 
Joseph,  to  whom  was  betrothed  Mary,  the  virgin,  begat  Jesus 
who  is  called  Christ." 

In  view,  then,  of  these  various  strands  of  damaging  evidence, 
and  since  apart  from  this  story  there  is  no  basis  for  supposing 
that  human  parthenogenesis  is  even  possible,  it  seems  not  un- 
reasonable to  suppose  that  the  virgin-birth  story  is  a  legend, 
comparable  with  the  similar,  although  more  crudely  expressed 
birth-legends  that  grew  up  about  certain  Greek  and  Roman 
heroes,  and  such  religious  personalities  as  Gautama  (the  Bud- 
dha), Krishna  and  Shankara.  In  the  case  of  Jesus  the  growth 
of  the  legend  may  have  been  facilitated  by  the  common  early 
Christian  practice  of  searching  the  Jewish  scriptures  for  pas- 
sages which  might  seem  to  admit  of  a  Messianic  interpretation, 
and  applying  these  to  Jesus.  The  prediction  made  by  Isaiah 
to  King  Ahaz  (Isa.  7:14),  that  a  virgin  (the  Hebrew  word  means 
simply  a  young  woman)  should  bear  a  son  and  call  his  name 
Immanuel,  obviously  referred  to  an  event  expected  within  the 
lifetime  of  the  king,  since  it  was  to  be  "a  sign"  to  him;  but  the 
interpretation  of  the  passage  in  a  Messianic  sense  would  lend 
distinct  support  to  the  natural  tendency  to  account  for  the 
fitness  of  Jesus  to  be  the  long-expected  Messiah  by  ascribing  to 


54  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

him  a  supernatural  origin.  In  view  then  of  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  scientific  knowledge  of  parthenogenesis,  even  under  special 
conditions,  higher  up  in  the  animal  kingdom  than  the  sea-urchin 
and  the  frog,  we  seem  warranted  in  assuming  the  improbability 
of  the  virgin-birth  of  Jesus,  or  of  any  other  religious  leader. 

If  we  follow  a  similar  course  in  dealing  with  the  other  miracle- 
stories  of  the  gospels,  we  shall  find  it  possible  to  account  for 
them  in  a  fairly  plausible  way  without  having  to  depart  from 
laws  which  are  already  known  or  are  in  process  of  being  dis- 
covered and  formulated.  That  is,  following  the  critical  pro- 
cedure characteristic  of  science  and  good  common  sense,  we 
shall  find  it  possible  either  to  relate  the  event,  viewed  as  an 
historic  fact,  to  laws  of  nature  or  of  mind,  or  to  explain  the 
story  of  the  event,  viewed  as  more  or  less  legendary,  in  ac- 
cordance with  well-known  laws  of  individual  and  social  mind. 

Thus,  to  begin  with,  the  imperfectly  understood  but  well- 
authenticated  present-day  phenomena  of  mental  healing  make 
it  comparatively  easy  to  accept  as  essentially  accurate  the 
stories  of  the  cure  of  ailments  of  a  fundamentally  nervous 
character,  such  as  mental  derangement,  paralysis,  epilepsy, 
" infirmity,"  and  certain  cases  of  (probably  nervous)  blindness, 
deafness  and  dumbness  or  stuttering  (all  of  which  functional 
disorders  were  interpreted  as  due  to  demon-possession).  Possi- 
bly the  same  should  be  said  of  the  instances  of  hemorrhage, 
withered  hand,  "dropsy"  (neurotic  oedema?)  and  "leprosy" 
(if  not  the  real  leprosy,  but  the  more  evanescent  malady  of 
similar  appearance).  (Compare  the  record  of  Paul's  works  of 
healing  in  what  seems  to  be  the  document  of  an  eye-witness, 
Acts  28:8,  9.)  That  the  healings  were  according  to  law  is  sug- 
gested by  the  admission  that  where  scepticism  prevailed  instead 
of  faith,  Jesus  could  accomplish  little  in  the  way  of  cure. 

An  interesting  instance  of  what  looks  like  a  legendary  accre- 
tion to  the  original  non-miraculous  narrative  is  Luke's  story  of 
the  restoring  of  the  ear  cut  off  by  Peter;  the  earlier  Mark,  like 
Matthew,  in  recording  the  disciple's  exploit,  has  nothing  to 
say  of  any  such  healing.  Possibly  in  other  cases  also  we  ought 
to  accept  this  hypothesis  of  a  gradual  addition  of  legendary 
details  to  the  story  of  what  was  originally  simply  a  remarkable 
but  natural  event;  for  example,  the  feeding  of  the  four  or  the 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES         55 

five  thousand,  the  stilling  of  the  tempest,  the  walking  on  the 
water,  the  coin  in  the  fish's  mouth,  the  withered  fig-tree,  and 
possibly  the  healing  of  the  ten  lepers  at  once.  (The  more  radical 
critics,  however,  would  dismiss  all  such  stories  as  purely  myth- 
ical, and  having  no  foundation  in  fact.)  The  story  of  the 
resurrection  of  the  saints  at  the  time  of  the  crucifixion  is  pretty 
generally  recognized  as  being  a  clear  case  of  legendary  embellish- 
ment. 

Certain  other  events  which  were  evidently  regarded  as 
miraculous  by  the  narrator  may  be  taken  almost  as  they  are 
described  and  interpreted  as  quite  natural  occurrences.  Exam- 
ples are  the  drowning  of  the  swine,  the  great  draught  of  fishes, 
and  the  restoration  of  Jairus'  daughter  from  her  trance  (Jesus  is 
recorded  to  have  said  she  was  not  dead).  If  accepted  as  au- 
thentic, the  case  of  the  widow's  son  at  Nain  may  be  similarly 
explained.  Other  instances  in  the  same  group  are  the  falling 
back  of  the  soldiers  sent  to  arrest  Jesus,  and  perhaps  the  dark- 
ness at  the  time  of  the  crucifixion.  (A  sidelight  on  these  narra- 
tives is  to  be  found  in  the  eye-witness's  story  of  Paul's  expe- 
rience with  the  serpent,  interpreted  as  miraculous  by  the 
barbarians  of  Melita,  Acts  28:3-6;  cf.  also  Acts  14:8-19.)  In 
the  same  class  also  would  come  the  instances  of  extraordinary 
psychical  experience,  such  as  the  mystical  experiences  at  the 
baptism  and  the  transfiguration,  unless,  as  some  think,  these 
experiences  have  been  read  back  into  the  Gospel  narratives  on 
dogmatic  grounds,  in  view  of  the  prevalence  of  similar  expe- 
riences in  the  primitive  church.  Under  the  same  category  we 
might  put  the  instances  of  remarkable  insight,  including  the 
prediction  of  such  events  as  the  betrayal,  Peter's  denial,  the 
crucifixion  and  the  resurrection;  also  the  answering  of  oppo- 
nents' unspoken  objections.  (Compare  the  interpretation  of 
Caiaphas'  rather  commonplace  remark  about  one  man  dying  for 
the  nation,  as  being  a  miraculous  prediction,  Jn.  11:49-51.) 

In  some  instances  several  alternative  explanations  are  sug- 
gested. For  example,  the  recovery  of  the  centurion's  servant 
may  have  been  a  mere  chance  coincidence;  or,  without  going  so 
far  as1  to  regard  the  whole  story  as  purely  mythical,  one  might 
hold  that  the  exactness  of  the  agreement  as  to  the  time  of  the 
servant's  improvement  has  been  exaggerated ;  or  again,  short  of 


56  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

appeal  to  the  supernatural  one  might  raise  questions  as  to  a  law 
of  telepathy  or  clairvoyance.  Something  similar  may  be  said  of 
the  case  of  the  Syrophcenician  woman's  daughter,  only  that 
here  there  is  the  difference  that  the  cure  is  not  reported. 

Yet  another  class  of  the  stories  in  question  is  to  be  found  in 
the  accounts  which  may  possibly  have  had  their  origin  in  the 
transformation  of  metaphorical  teaching  or  parables,  in  the 
course  of  oral  tradition,  into  stories  of  miracle.  Here  one  might 
include  the  story  of  the  cursing  of  the  fig-tree,  as  derived  from 
the  parable  of  the  barren  fig-tree,  and  the  generalized  state- 
ments as  to  healing  the  blind,  deaf,  lame  and  leprous,  derived 
from  Jesus'  possibly  metaphorical  description  of  the  effects  of 
the  preaching  of  the  gospel  in  his  message  to  John  the  Baptist. 
(Compare  his  announcement  of  his  program  in  the  synagogue 
at  Nazareth.) 

Finally,  some  narratives,  especially  those  found  in  the  fourth 
gospel,  represent  the  miracle  as  being  performed  in  order  to 
establish  the  claims  of  Jesus  to  the  Messiahship  and  to  divinity. 
Such  are  the  accounts  of  the  changing  of  water  into  wine,  the 
reading  of  the  Samaritan  woman's  past  history,  the  healing  of 
the  man  born  blind,  and  the  resurrection  of  Lazarus.  But  in 
view  of  the  tradition  preserved  in  the  synoptics,  to  the  effect 
that  Jesus  refused  to  give  a  sign  to  prove  any  claims,  but  was 
actuated  simply  by  compassion  in  his  works  of  healing,  and  keep- 
ing in  mind  the  fact  that  the  fourth  gospel  is  very  late  as  com- 
pared with  the  other  three,  the  thoroughly  historical  character 
of  these  stories,  improbable  enough  on  internal  grounds,  is 
rendered  still  more  doubtful. 

One  other  miracle-story,  that  of  the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  we 
reserve  for  discussion  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  im- 
mortality. 

Many  will  doubtless  feel  that  this  way  of  dealing  with  the 
miracles  of  the  Gospel  story  raises  about  as  many  questions  as  it 
solves.  If  the  records  are  to  be  taken  as  critically  as  the  con- 
clusions just  drawn  would  seem  to  imply,  what  basis  have  we 
for  any  positive  opinion  as  to  the  sort  of  person  Jesus  was,  or  as 
to  his  ideas,  purposes  and  achievements?  We  would  suggest 
the  following  procedure.  Having  adopted  such  an  attitude  as 
we  think  the  unbiassed  scientific  historian  might  justly  demand, 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES          57 

let  us  first  pursue  a  radical  course  and  eliminate  from  the 
narrative  and  teaching  all  that  we  can  reasonably  interpret  as 
having  been  read  back  into  the  records  by  virtue  of  the  dog- 
matic presuppositions  of  the  original  writers  or  later  editors. 
Then  let  us  take  the  conservative  course,  giving  the  records  the 
benefit  of  the  doubt  as  far  as  we  can  consistently  with  the 
scientific  principles  we  have  adopted.  And  finally,  let  us  com- 
pare results  by  the  two  methods  and  see  what  conclusions  are 
common  to  both. 

The  radical  method  emphasizes  the  extent  to  which  the  New 
Testament  idealizes  the  person  of  Jesus.  This  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  that  it  represents  him  as  having  been  more  truly 
ideal  than  he  actually  was,  but  that  the  writers,  as  representa- 
tive early  Christians,  all  had  their  ideas  and  ideals  as  to  what  the 
Christ  or  Messiah  must  be;  and  when  they  accepted  Jesus  as  the 
Messiah,  they  tended  to  form  their  opinions  as  to  his  person  and 
work  from  their  Messianic  preconceptions  and  beliefs,  rather 
than  from  a  careful  investigation  of  the  facts. 

In  seeking  to  separate  the  nucleus  of  practically  indubitable 
fact  from  the  overgrowth  of  Messianic  idealization  we  shall  not 
make  much  use  of  the  fourth  gospel.  Its  discussions  reflect  the 
situation  confronting  the  Christian  church  two  or  three  gen- 
erations after  the  lifetime  of  Jesus.  The  writer,  evidently 
undertaking  to  prove  that  the  historic  Jesus  of  the  synoptic 
gospels  and  the  eternal  Christ  of  the  Pauline  epistles  are  one 
and  the  same,  is  helped  toward  this  end  by  the  Stoic  doctrine 
of  the  eternal  Logos,  or  divine  Reason,  the  immanent  "  Light 
which  lighteth  every  man."  This  Logos  is  declared  to  have 
become  incarnate  in  the  historic  Jesus.  And  so,  in  the  settled 
belief  that  the  Logos-Christ  indwells  the  Christian  church  as 
the  Spirit  of  Truth,  the  writer  of  the  gospel  feels  warranted  in 
expressing  his  own  mj^stical  Christian  convictions  as  the  teach- 
ing of  the  historic  Jesus.*  Despite  its  great  religious  value, 
therefore,  the  fourth  gospel  cannot  be  regarded  as  of  primary 
value  as  a  source  of  historical  information. 

But  even  in  our  earliest  sources,  viz.,  Paul,  the  original  (or 
Petrine)  element  in  Mark,  and  "Q,"  it  is  not  difficult,  it  may  be 
maintained,  to  discover  evidences  of  an  idealizing  process. 
*  See  E.  F.  Scott,  "  The  Fourth  Gospel." 


58  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

According  to  Paul  the  earthly  life  of  Jesus  was  the  incarnation 
of  a  pre-existent  heavenly  Being,  the  well  beloved  Son  of  God, 
who  humbled  himself  to  become  man,  the  suffering  Servant 
of  the  Lord  foreshadowed  in  the  law  and  the  prophets.  Be- 
cause of  his  faithfulness  even  unto  death,  God  raised  him  from 
the  dead  and  made  him  the  exalted  Messiah,  through  whom  he 
should  grant  forgiveness  to  the  repentant  and  believing,  and  an 
entrance  into  the  glorious  Messianic  kingdom.  And  so  through- 
out Paul's  writings  we  find,  instead  of  a  recounting  of  the 
details  of  the  earthly  career  of  Jesus,  an  exposition  of  the  qual- 
ities and  functions  of  the  suffering  Servant  of  the  Lord. 

In  Mark  we  find  that  Jesus  is  thought  of  as  having  been  the 
Messiah  not  simply  from  the  time  of  his  resurrection  and  exal- 
tation, but  throughout  his  earthly  ministry  as  well,  having 
been  adopted  as  such  by  the  Father  at  the  baptism.  The  interest 
in  Mark's  account  consequently  centers  in  the  picture  of  the 
strong  Son  of  God,  clothed  with  Messianic  authority  and  power 
over  men  and  nature,  over  angels  and  demons. 

In  the  "Q"  material  of  Matthew  and  Luke,  in  keeping  ap- 
parently with  the  notion  that  Jesus  was  virtually  Messiah,  not 
simply  from  the  time  of  his  baptism,  but  from  the  time  of  his 
birth  we  find  him  pictured  as  the  one  in  whom  dwelt  the  spirit 
of  Divine  Wisdom,  whose  teachings  were  a  revelation  of  the 
mind  and  will  of  God.  (See  Mt.  23:34;  Lu.  11:49.) 

And  so,  with  reference  to  the  synoptic  gospels,  although  they 
are  ostensibly  a  record  of  what  Jesus  said  and  did,  the  question 
arises  as  to  whether  they  are  not  in  the  main  on  the  one  hand  a 
compilation  of  more  or  less  legendary  traditions,  selected  be- 
cause they  agreed  with  the  ideal  of  the  strong  Son  of  God  doing 
his  work  with  full  Messianic  authority  and  power,  and  on  the 
other  hand  a  compilation  of  the  accumulated  wisdom  of  the 
Jews,  ascribed  to  Jesus  under  the  supposition  that  this  must 
have  been  his  teaching,  since  he  was  the  incarnation  and  mouth- 
piece of  the  Divine  Wisdom. 

But  whatever  may  be  our  opinion  as  to  the  truth  of  Paul's 
particular  dogmas,  or  as  to  the  historicity  of  particular  events 
narrated  in  Mark,  or  as  to  the  authenticity  of  particular  sayings 
recorded  in  "Q,"  one  thing  is  clear.  As  Professor  Bacon  has 
pointed  out  ("  Christianity  Old  and  New"),  these  three  pictures 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES          59 

of  Jesus  as  the  suffering  Servant  of  the  Lord,  the  strong  Son  of 
God  clothed  with  authority  and  power,  and  the  one  in  whom 
dwelt  the  spirit  of  heavenly  Wisdom,  distinct  and  independent 
of  each  other,  as  they  are,  and  yet  not  incompatible  with  each 
other,  must  each  be  essentially  correct.  Otherwise  they  would 
not  have  been  accepted  as  true  by  a  generation  many  of  whom 
had  known  Jesus  during  the  period  of  his  public  ministry. 

From  this  radical  point  of  view,  however,  since  even  the 
writer  of  the  original  Petrine  core  of  the  Gospel  of  Mark  was 
obviously  interested  in  accentuating  the  Messianic  conscious- 
ness and  functions  of  Jesus,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  the  presence  of  this  Messianic  element  in  the  narrative 
from  the  beginning  of  the  public  ministry  may  be  due  to  its 
having  been  read  into  the  traditional  records  as  an  interpreta- 
tion based  upon  dogmatic  considerations.  Following  out  this 
suggestion,  then,  the  mystical  experience  at  the  baptism,  with 
the  voice  from  heaven,  like  the  similar  experience  of  the  three 
disciples  at  the  transfiguration,  would  be  eliminated  as  unhis- 
torical.  Both  would  be  explained  as  the  product  of  the  writer's 
reasoning  that  since  such  experiences  were  characteristic  of  the 
early  Christian  communities  and  of  Paul  himself,  and  since 
they  were,  according  to  the  accepted  interpretation,  caused  in 
the  Church  by  the  indwelling  Spirit  of  the  risen  and  exalted 
Jesus  as  Messiah,  they  must  surely  have  had  a  place  in  the 
experience  of  Jesus  himself,  and  if  so,  at  what  time  more  appro- 
priately than  at  the  very  outset  of  the  public  ministry?  Simi- 
larly the  story  of  the  temptation  in  the  wilderness  would  be 
regarded  simply  as  a  picturesque  presentation  of  the  considera- 
tions which  the  writer  supposed  must  have  occupied  the  mind 
of  Jesus  in  view  of  his  consciousness  of  Messianic  mission.  So, 
too,  of  the  idea  that  during  practically  the  whole  of  his  public 
ministry  Jesus  took  pains  to  hide  his  Messiahship  from  the 
people,  forbidding  demons  to  make  him  known,  enjoining  on 
those  healed  the  maintenance  of  strict  secrecy,  not  revealing 
his  true  dignity  even  to  the  disciples  at  first,  and  then  adopting 
the  method  of  teaching  publicly  in  parables,  whose  true  Mes- 
sianic import  he  afterwards  disclosed  to  his  little  circle  of  sym- 
pathetic but  very  obtuse  disciples.  All  this  the  more  radical 
critic  would  discredit  as  being  obviously  an  interpretative 


60  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

device,  framed — albeit  in  good  faith — to  explain  the  actual 
silence  of  Jesus  on  the  subject  of  his  Messiahship  until  the  time 
of  his  trial  in  Jerusalem.  Even  Peter's  confession  of  faith  at 
Csesarea  Philippi  would  be  eliminated,  leaving  only  Jesus' 
question,  Whom  do  men  say  that  I  am?  together  with  the  dis- 
ciples' reply,  as  credibly  historical.  On  similar  grounds  the 
assertion  of  Messianic  authority  in  forgiving  sins  committed 
against  God  is  reduced  to  a  mere  assertion  of  God's  forgiveness 
of  the  repentant  sinner,  or  else  eliminated  altogether.  The 
healing  of  the  sick  on  the  Sabbath  day  is  held  to  have  been 
defended,  not  by  asserting  that  as  Messiah  he  is  lord  of  the 
Sabbath,  but  by  enunciating  the  universal  principle  that  the 
Sabbath  is  to  be  used  in  whatever  way  will  be  most  conducive 
to  human  well-being,  so  that  man  is  to  be  regarded  as  lord  of 
the  Sabbath.  But  on  the  other  hand,  even  this  anti-legalistic 
attitude  on  the  part  of  Jesus,  which  is  made  so  prominent 
in  the  Synoptics,  would  be  interpreted,  from  the  point  of  view 
under  consideration,  as  having  been  exaggerated  or  overac- 
centuated  under  the  influence  of  the  Wisdom  literature  and 
of  the  anti-legalism  of  Paul.  However,  as  if  by  way  of  compen- 
sation, the  highly  legalistic  utterance  about  the  jot  and  tittle 
in  Matthew  5:17-20,  would  also  be  explained  away  in  large 
part,  as  expressing  ideals  which  were  probably  not  so  much 
those  of  Jesus  as  they  were  those  of  the  Jewish  Christian  editor 
of  the  material  that  makes  up  the  Matthean  Gospel. 

This  more  radical  principle  of  criticism  would  not  necessarily 
lead,  however,  to  the  total  elimination  of  the  Messianic  idea 
from  the  self-consciousness  of  Jesus.  Since  it  would  not  be 
easy  to  account  for  the  crucifixion  on  the  supposition  that  Jesus 
made  no  Messianic  claims,  it  is  admitted  that  during  his  final 
visit  to  Jerusalem  he  probably  did  make  some  such  assertion 
as  the  records  ascribe  to  him.  This  is  explained  as  follows: 
Jesus,  a  Galilean  artisan  of  simple  unaffected  faith  in  God  and 
devotion  to  his  will  and  to  the  welfare  of  men,  came  before  the 
public  under  a  sense  of  a  divine  mission  to  champion  the  cause 
of  the  common  people  against  the  oppression  of  the  religious 
aristocracy,  calling  to  repentance  and  proclaiming  a  gospel 
of  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity  in  the  Kingdom  of  God.  He 
failed,  however,  to  secure  any  very  intelligent  or  whole-hearted 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES          61 

response  on  the  part  of  the  masses,  earning  instead  only  the  sus- 
picion and  hostility  of  the  religious  leaders  of  his  people.  Then, 
it  may  be,  as  he  came  face  to  face  with  that  apparent  failure  of 
his  divinely-appointed  mission  which  was  the  burden  upon  his 
mind  and  heart  in  Gethsemane  and  even  on  the  cross,  the 
Messianic  ideas  and  the  apocalyptic  hopes  of  his  people  assumed 
new  meaning  for  him.  Might  it  not  be  that  God  would  inter- 
vene to  save  from  failure  this  enterprise  for  his  righteous  king- 
dom? Might  it  not  be  that  God  would  yet  bring  triumph  out 
of  apparent  defeat,  and  even  though  the  enemies  of  Jesus  should 
compass  his  crucifixion,  might  not  God  be  trusted  to  vindicate 
the  righteousness  of  his  cause,  and  perhaps  even  send  him  back 
to  be  his  Messiah  and  representative  on  earth?  Perhaps  some- 
thing of  this,  some  forecast  of  his  crucifixion,  some  declaration 
of  faith  in  the  triumph  of  his  cause  through  the  power  of  God, 
was  communicated  to  the  disciples  during  his  last  talks  with 
them  (although  neither  so  early  in  his  ministry  nor  so  often 
as  the  gospels  assert) ;  perhaps,  too,  something  of  this  confidence 
was  uttered  at  his  trial  before  the  Jewish  authorities.  At  any 
rate  he  was  crowned  with  thorns  and  crucified  in  derision  of 
what  was  interpreted  as  his  claim  to  be  King  of  the  Jews;  and 
after  he  was  dead,  so  strong  was  the  impression  his  personality 
had  made  on  those  who  had  known  him  best,  that  they  could 
eagerly  seize  upon  whatever  encouraged  the  faith  that  though 
he  had  died,  he  was  alive  forevermore  and  had  indeed  become 
the  Messiah,  as  he  had  suggested  during  those  last  tragic  days, 
and  that  he  would  return  to  judge  his  enemies  and  establish  his 
kingdom  of  righteousness  throughout  the  world. 

But  alongside  of  this  more  radical  view  of  the  character,  con- 
sciousness and  career  of  Jesus,  we  would  suggest  consideration 
of  a  more  conservative  view,  which  seems  tenable  without  any 
abandonment  of  strictly  scientific  presuppositions  and  a  critical 
attitude  toward  the  literary  sources  of  our  information.  What 
is  suggested  is  simply  that  we  recognize  how  inconclusive  are 
the  considerations  on  the  basis  of  which  certain  recorded  events 
and  teachings  are  ruled  out  by  the  more  radical,  as  having  been 
read  back  into  the  history  on  dogmatic  grounds.  Then  we  may 
ask  what  would  result  if  we  were  to  give  the  records  in  more 
generous  measure  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  as  to  whether  many 


62  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

elements  that  have  been  plausibly  explained  as  later  interpre- 
tations may  not  still  be,  in  spite  of  all,  truly  historical.  For  it 
is  true  that  much  that  may  be,  so  far  as  we  know,  untrue,  may 
also  be,  so  far  as  we  know,  quite  true.  Pursuing  this  more 
conservative  (but  equally  critical)  course,  we  should  reach  some 
such  results  as  the  following: 

The  one  glimpse  we  are  given  of  the  personality  of  Jesus  be- 
fore the  beginning  of  his  public  ministry,  viz.,  at  the  threshold 
of  his  adolescence,  shows  him  to  have  been,  even  at  that  early 
period,  deeply  moral  and  religious,  as  well  as  keenly  intellectual. 
As  he  grew  to  manhood  he  felt,  it  would  seem,  a  divine  call  to 
minister  to  his  fellow-men;  but,  his  father  having  died,  it  was 
not  until  his  younger  brothers  were  able  to  take  his  place  in  the 
support  of  the  family  that  he  felt  free  to  give  up  his  trade  and 
leave  his  parental  home.  When  finally  he  did  go  forth,  there 
was  only  one  contemporary  party  with  which  he  could  whole- 
heartedly affiliate  himself.  The  Pharisees  advocated  a  system 
of  pleasing  God  and  securing  the  substantial  benefits  of  the 
expected  Messianic  kingdom  by  means  especially  of  an  extremely 
punctilious  observance  of  the  details  of  the  ceremonial  law  and 
the  traditions  of  the  elders,  while  as  a  class  they  ignored  the 
most  obvious  principles  of  social  righteousness.  The  Sadducees 
were  worldly  and  irreligious  self-seeking  politicians.  The 
Zealots,  or  Nationalists,  appealed  to  violence  and  rebellion 
as  preliminary  to  the  setting  up  of  an  earthly  Messianic  king- 
dom in  Jerusalem.  Even  the  Essenes,  notwithstanding  their 
moral  idealism  and  religious  zeal,  were  hopelessly  unsocial  and 
committed  to  a  life-program  that  was  wholly  unpractical,  so 
far  as  the  masses  of  the  people  were  concerned.  But  there  was 
one  contemporary  movement  which,  in  its  essentials,  Jesus  could 
endorse,  viz.,  that  headed  by  John  the  Baptist,  who  called  upon 
all  to  repent  of  their  sins  and  amend  their  lives  as  the  indis- 
pensable preparation  for  participation  in  the  expected  kingdom 
of  God.  Accordingly  Jesus  went  to  John  and  was  baptized 
by  him  in  Jordan  as  an  act  of  identification  of  himself  with 
John's  propaganda  and  of  dedication  of  himself  to  the  task  of 
going  out  as  a  shepherd  to  find  and  bring  back  to  the  fold  "the 
lost  sheep  of  the  house  of  Israel." 

The  baptism  of  Jesus  was  accompanied  by  a  very  distinct 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES         63 

religious  experience.  There  was  a  deep  consciousness  of  the 
reality  and  presence  of  the  Father,  together  with  a  renewed  sense 
of  mission,  coupled  now  more  definitely  with  the  thought  of 
doing  work  of  a  Messianic  nature  in  connection  with  the  King- 
dom of  God.  Possibly  too  there  was  a  profound  mystical  ex- 
perience— unless  the  form  in  which  we  have  the  story  is  due  to 
the  narrator  having  read  back  into  the  event  the  normative 
mystical  experience  of  the  early  Christian  communities.  In 
any  case  the  thought  of  his  discharging  a  Messianic  function 
of  some  sort  in  connection  with  the  coming  Kingdom  of  God — 
a  thought  which  had  probably  occurred  to  him  before,  only  to 
be  suppressed — now  broke  through  the  inhibiting  forces  and 
came  to  him  as  the  voice  of  God  summoning  him  to  be  a  Messiah 
to  the  people. 

But  this  new  experience  precipitated  in  the  mind  of  Jesus  a 
new  and  insistent  problem,  and  he  retired  to  the  wilds  of  Judea 
to  reflect  upon  it.  If  he  was  to  be  a  Messiah  to  his  people,  what 
sort  of  a  Messiah  should  he  be?  Indeed  there  was  a  temptation 
to  him  in  the  thought,  not  dissimilar  in  kind,  though  on  an 
immeasureably  higher  level  than  that  which  came  to  Macbeth 
when  he  was  told,  "Thou  shalt  be  king  hereafter!"  There  was 
the  danger  lest  he  should  be  unduly  concerned  to  win  a  following 
by  trying  to  meet  the  popular  expectations  of  the  Messiah,  in- 
stead of  simply  seeking  to  win  the  people  to  God  and  to  right- 
eousness, leaving  it  to  God  to  make  him  Messiah,  or  to  the 
people  to  recognize  him  as  such.  As  it  would  be  presumptuous 
to  suppose  that  because  he  was  called  to  be  a  Messiah  to  Israel, 
God  would  miraculously  provide  for  his  needs  or  preserve  him 
from  danger  and  death,  so  it  would  be  presumptuous  to  expect 
God  to  crown  with  true  success  any  attempt  to  shorten  the  road 
to  influence  with  the  people  through  compromise  with  their 
mistaken  notions  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  even  though  the 
motive  underlying  such  compromise  might  be  thoroughly  un- 
selfish. His  decision  accordingly  was  that  he  would  simply  de- 
vote himself  to  the  promotion  of  the  principles  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God.  He  would  not  begin  by  announcing  himself  as  the  Mes- 
siah, but  would  let  the  people  become  acquainted  with  his  ideals 
and  purposes;  then,  if  they  recognized  him  as  Messiah,  well  and 
good.  It  would  be  at  his  own  ethical  and  religious  definition  of 


64  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

the  Messianic  function,  not  at  their  present  crude  materialistic 
definition.  Under  such  circumstances  recognition  as  Messiah 
could  only  enhance  his  power  for  good.  And  so  he  went  forth, 
befriending  the  outcast,  criticizing  the  professional  religionists, 
preaching  to  all  the  necessity  of  repentance  and  a  turning  to 
righteousness  as  the  condition  of  divine  forgiveness  and  as  a 
preparation  for  participation  in  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Conscious 
of  the  power  of  God  available  for  man  through  faith,  he  went 
about  doing  good,  ministering  to  the  needs  of  body,  mind  and 
spirit.  This  program  of  ministration  to  the  needs  of  men  he 
announced  in  the  home-synagogue  at  Nazareth,  as  well  as 
elsewhere. 

But  throughout  the  early  period  of  the  public  ministry  there 
was  a  growing  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  people,  encouraged 
by  his  personality  and  teachings,  and  especially  by  his  remark- 
able works  of  healing,  to  think  of  him  as  possibly  the  Messiah, 
and  that  very  largely  in  terms  of  the  current  materialistic  no- 
tions of  the  Messianic  Kingdom.  "The  people  were  in  expec- 
tation," we  are  told;  and  even  with  reference  to  John  the  Bap- 
tist, although  he  "did  no  miracle/'  the  question  had  been  raised 
as  to  whether  he  might  not  be  the  Messiah.  Even  the  insane 
raved  about  the  Messiah,  and  some  of  them  hailed  Jesus  as  the 
promised  son  of  David.  (Compare  the  experience  of  Paul  and 
Silas  with  the  damsel  "possessed  with  a  spirit  of  divination"  at 
Philippi,  Acts  16 :16-18.)  But  any  such  unintelligent  acceptance 
of  him  as  Messiah  could  only  be  a  hindrance  to  the  real  work  of 
the  Messianic  Kingdom  to  which  Jesus  had  been  called,  and  so 
he  consistently  discouraged  all  outbursts  of  this  sort. 

Moreover  there  was  another  factor  that  was  becoming  a  grow- 
ing hindrance  to  his  work,  viz.,  the  increasing  opposition  of  the 
Scribes  and  Pharisees.  He  soon  clashed  with  them  over  the 
petty  rules  of  their  legalistic  system,  in  connection  with  such 
matters  as  the  Sabbath,  ceremonial  washings  and  fasting;  and 
the  suspicion  and  hostility  of  these  religious  leaders  was  all  the 
more  accentuated  by  their  knowledge  of  the  popular  tendency 
to  acclaim  the  great  new  teacher  and  healer  as  the  long-awaited 
Messiah.  Indeed  Jesus  came  to  think  of  their  hatred,  which  was 
daily  becoming  more  murderous,  as  more  than  likely,  in  view  of 
the  total  situation,  to  accomplish  its  deadly  purpose.  He  began 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES          65 

therefore  to  concentrate  his  attention  more  particularly  upon  the 
training  of  a  select  group  of  his  followers,  that  they  might  be 
able  to  continue  his  work  without  him,  if  he  should  be  taken 
from  them.  In  one  of  his  talks  with  these  disciples,  one  of  them 
expressed  the  conviction  that  Jesus  was  the  Messiah.  This  ap- 
preciation and  intuitive  insight  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  inner 
circle  of  his  friends,  who  had  begun  to  understand  in  some  meas- 
ure what  he  was  really  aiming  to  accomplish,  was  highly  gratify- 
ing and  encouraging;  it  was  an  approach  to  being  recognized  as 
Messiah  in  the  only  sense  in  which  he  could  be  Messiah.  But 
there  was  still  much  for  the  disciples  to  learn;  and  so  Jesus  felt 
justified  in  revealing  to  them  his  forebodings  as  to  his  own  fate, 
and  at  the  same  tune  his  unshaken  confidence  in  God  and  in  his 
own  divinely-appointed  mission. 

Finally  Jesus  resolved  upon  an  open  appeal  to  the  people, 
assembled  as  they  would  be  in  Jerusalem  at  the  feast  of  the 
Passover.  The  nature  of  his  message  and  mission,  it  might  be 
supposed,  ought  by  this  time  to  be  fairly  well  known;  and  if  the 
people  chose  to  acclaim  him  as  their  spiritual  leader,  he  would 
accept  the  position  and  challenge  the  blind  leaders  of  the  blind 
who  had  misguided  them  too  long  already.  He  would  not  com- 
promise with  them,  even  to  save  his  life  and  to  win  at  least  the 
appearance  of  success. 

The  result,  at  least  for  the  time  being  and  as  far  as  appear- 
ances went,  was  a  dismal  failure.  The  first  day  the  masses  of 
the  people,  including  hosts  of  pilgrims  to  the  feast,  their  im- 
aginations stirred  by  the  spectacle  of  the  famous  Galilean 
teacher  and  wonder-worker  riding  into  the  Holy  City  seated  on 
an  ass's  colt,  as  the  prophet  had  predicted  of  the  Messiah,  were 
wildly  enthusiastic.  But  no  apocalyptic  wonder  ensued;  noth- 
ing was  done  save  the  clearing  of  the  temple-area,  that  the 
people  might  have  opportunity  to  worship.  And  so  the  popu- 
lace, characteristically  fickle,  unintelligent  and  clinging  to  their 
materialistic  religious  ideals,  felt  bitterly  disappointed  and  not 
a  little  resentful. 

Now  was  the  opportunity  of  Jesus'  enemies.  Working 
through  the  office-holding  and  socially  conservative  (though 
theologically  liberal)  Sadducees,  who  had  probably  lost  ex- 
pected profits  through  the  clearing  out  of  the  traders  from  the 


66  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

temple-area;  working  also  through  a  disaffected  disciple,  whose 
selfish  ambition  had  been  disappointed  by  the  course  events  had 
taken;  also  through  the  easily  misguided  and  excitable  mob 
which  thronged  the  city  streets  *;  through  the  Roman  governor, 
who  desired  both  to  conciliate  the  influential  Jews  and  to  nip 
in  the  bud  any  incipient  revolution;  and  finally,  through  the 
brutalized  professional  soldiery,  who  executed  the  governor's 
commands,  the  Scribes  and  Pharisees  succeeded  in  securing  the 
arrest  of  the  trouble-maker  and  in  having  imposed  upon  him 
the  extreme  penalty  of  the  law  against  traitors  and  the  worst  of 
criminals,  f 

And  throughout  this  bitter  experience  the  heaviest  burden 
upon  the  heart  of  Jesus  was  his  disappointment  in  his  apparently 
almost  total  failure  to  win  his  people  to  God  and  the  way  of 
righteousness,  a  failure  which  he  had  now  to  face  more  fully 
than  at  any  time  before.  He  had  gathered  his  little  band  of 
disciples  about  him  at  his  last  supper  with  them,  and  had  acted 
out  a  parable  with  them  pledging  them  to  united  loyalty  to  him- 
self and  his  cause,  the  Kingdom  of  God;  but  even  they  had  now 
forsaken  him  and  fled  in  the  hour  of  danger;  one  of  them  had 
betrayed  him,  and  the  boldest  of  them  all  had  denied  with  an 
oath  that  he  knew  anything  about  him.  This  apparent  failure 
of  his  enterprise  for  God  and  man  was  what  made  the  cup  he 
drank  in  Gethsemane  so  bitter,  and  no  doubt  it  was  what  led 
him  to  utter  that  tragic  cry  on  the  cross,  "My  God,  my  God, 
why  hast  thou  forsaken  me?"  But  through  faith  he  was  en- 
abled to  gain  victory  in  this  last  great  struggle,  and  to  say, 
before  the  end  came,  "Thy  will  be  done;  my  work  is  finished; 
into  Thy  hands  I  commend  my  spirit." 

Then  the  little  band  of  disciples,  smitten  with  grief  and  re- 
morse, and  at  first  despairing,  finally  became  (through  a  proc- 
ess which  we  shall  examine  more  fully  in  another  connection) 
more  firmly  convinced  than  ever  that  he  who  had  been  the  in- 

*  Perhaps,  however,  the  populace  remained  more  favorable  to  Jesus 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  The  arrest  took  place  at  night,  when  the 
people  were  sleeping,  and  the  noisy  mob,  clamoring  for  the  spectacle  of  the 
Galilean's  crucifixion, — hired,  perhaps,  to  do  so, — may  not  have  been  truly 
representative  of  the  majority  of  the  people  in  Jerusalem  at  the  time. 

fSee  Rauschenbusch:  "A  Theology  for  the  Social  Gospel,"  pp.  248-258. 


PERTINENT  RESULTS  OF  OTHER  SCIENCES         67 

spiration  of  their  lives  was  all  that  they  had  ever  believed  him 
or  that  he  had  ever  claimed  to  be. 

We  have  thus  sketched  in  outline  two  views  of  the  historic 
Jesus,  either  of  which  seems  tenable  within  the  limits  of  critical 
methods  of  investigation.  But  the  more  conservative  view, 
while  perhaps  equally  tenable  theoretically,  will  seem  to  many 
to  be  preferable  on  practical  grounds,  for  the  twofold  reason 
that  it  enables  us  to  regard  as  authentic  a  much  larger  portion 
of  the  traditional  Gospel  story,  and  that  it  avoids  the  anticlimax 
of  the  other  view,  according  to  which  Jesus,  in  the  dismay  of 
his  final  experience,  lapsed  into  a  fundamentally  mistaken  view 
of  his  own  person  and  mission.  In  either  case,  however,  we  are 
left  with  practically  the  same  sort  of  picture  of  the  personality 
and  character  of  Jesus,  and  practically  the  same  conclusions 
as  to  his  spiritual  outlook  and  life-purpose  and  as  to  his  relig- 
ious experience  and  service  to  the  world.  The  difference  is 
almost  exclusively  one  as  to  his  relation  to  the  Messianic  scheme 
of  thought.* 

*  It  will  be  noted  that  we  have  eliminated,  as  not  fairly  tenable,  the  view 
that  Jesus'  thought  of  himself  and  the  Kingdom  of  God  was  of  the  most 
pronounced  apocalyptic  and  eschatological  sort.  Nor  can  we  go  to  the 
opposite  extreme,  and  say  that  he  gave  no  place  whatever  to  this  series  of 
thoughts  in  his  belief.  Moreover,  it  is  with  a  high  degree  of  assurance  that 
we  are  able  to  assert  the  essential  historicity  of  Jesus.  We  are  probably 
entitled  to  be  quite  as  sure  that  Jesus  existed  and  as  to  what  he  was,  as 
we  are  to  make  the  corresponding  assertions  about  Socrates  or  the  Buddha. 


CHAPTER  III 
HUMAN  FREE  AGENCY 

MAN  is  a  free  agent.  This,  we  would  claim,  is  a  legitimate 
presupposition  of  theology.  To  establish  this,  we  must  deal 
with  the  topic  of  human  freedom  under  three  heads:  its  signifi- 
cance, its  theoretical  possibility  and  its  moral  certainty. 

What  is  meant  by  saying  that  man  is  a  free  agent  is  not  that 
in  any  given  situation  he  is  free  to  perform  any  act  whatsoever, 
provided  only  that  he  has  sufficient  physical  energy  for  it. 
Neither  does  it  mean  that  in  every  instance  in  which  he  has 
acted  he  has  been  as  free  to  pursue  an  alternative  course.  If  he 
is  free,  it  is  within  limits,  psychical  as  well  as  physical.  His 
freedom  is  not  "liberty  of  indifference";  it  does  not  mean  that 
there  can  be  conscious  action  toward  which  no  determining 
influence  at  all  has  been  exerted  by  character  or  by  any  con- 
siderations which  may  be  occupying  the  attention  at  the  mo- 
ment. Conduct,  which  tends  to  determine  character  thereafter, 
is  also  a  more  or  less  complete  expression  of  character,  and 
ordinarily  of  character  previously  achieved.  This  is  the  only 
rational  basis  of  praise  or  blame,  of  reward  or  punishment. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  what  is  meant  by  the  assertion  of 
human  freedom  is  not  simply  that  one  is  free  to  express  his 
character  in  his  action,  or  to  act  out  the  idea  that  may  be  oc- 
cupying his  attention.  Unless  one  might  have  done  somewhat 
differently,  he  deserves  neither  praise  nor  blame  for  his  action. 
Neither  is  it  enough  to  say  that  man  may  become  "free,"  in 
that  he  may  begin  to  act  out  adequate  ideas  and  valid  ideals, 
instead  of  being  in  bondage  to  evil  impulses  and  inadequate 
ideas.  This  is  to  becloud  the  issue  by  speaking  of  morality 
(right  action)  as  if  it  were  synonymous  and  exactly  coincident 
with  free  action. 

What  is  meant  by  the  assertion  of  freedom  or  free  agency  is 
that  the  agent  is  not  necessarily  at  the  mercy,  absolutely,  of 

68 


HUMAN  FREE  AGENCY  69 

what  was  his  character  at  the  moment  immediately  preceding 
the  moment  of  his  activity.  It  may  be  granted  that,  other 
circumstances  being  the  same,  the  action  tends  to  be  swayed 
in  this  direction  or  in  that,  according  to  the  motive,  that  is,  by 
the  idea  of  a  chosen  possible  future.  It  may  be  granted  further 
that  an  idea  of  a  possible  future  becomes  the  motive  by  being 
simply  held  long  enough  and  with  sufficient  concentration  of 
mind  in  the  focus  of  attention.  But  the  question  of  freedom, 
as  William  James  has  pointed  out,  is  the  question  as  to  whether, 
in  any  given  situation,  the  subject  might  have  given  more  or 
less  attention  to  the  idea  than  he  did  give  as  a  matter  of  fact. 

In  other  words,  the  free  act,  if  there  is  any,  is  not  completely 
predetermined,  even  by  character  and  ideas,  in  addition  to 
heredity  and  environment.  The  act  may  have  been  determined 
to  some  extent  (i.  e.,  influenced)  by  hereditary  and  environing 
factors.  It  may  have  been  determined  largely  by  previous 
character  and  by  the  ideas  present  in  the  mind.  If  this  were 
not  so,  no  praise  or  blame,  no  attempted  education  or  disci- 
pline, would  be  rationally  defensible.  But  if  the  degree  and 
duration  of  attention  given  to  an  idea  are  not  necessarily  abso- 
lutely and  completely  predetermined,  there  is  ample  room  for 
moral  freedom.  The  giving  or  withholding  of  further  attention 
then  becomes  a  creative  act,  determining  at  the  time  both  the 
action  itself  and,  to  some  extent,  not  simply  the  resultant  char- 
acter but  the  character  of  which  the  act  is  the  expression.  This 
would  mean  that  to  a  certain  extent  the  character  of  the  moment 
of  action  might  be  at  variance  with  and  transcend  the  character 
of  the  immediately  preceding  moment,  and  this  by  virtue  of  an 
unpredetermined  effort  of  attention,  which,  within  certain  limits, 
creatively  determines  conduct  and  character  together. 

The  question  of  freedom  is  not  exactly  the  question  as  to  the 
theoretical  predictability  of  conduct.  The  possibility  of  com- 
plete prediction  would  involve  a  denial  of  any  real  creative 
freedom;  but  the  impossibility  of  predicting  it,  even  given 
complete  knowledge  of  antecedent  conditions,  would  not  nec- 
essarily mean  freedom  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have  used  the 
term.  For  an  event  might  be  unique  and  its  product  some- 
thing absolutely  novel,  so  as  to  be,  humanly  speaking  at  any 
rate,  unpredictable;  and  yet  it  might  conceivably  have  been 


70  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

made  inevitable  by  antecedent  conditions.  What  we  mean  by 
freedom  involves  some  measure  of  not  completely  predeter- 
mined determination. 

Now  freedom,  in  the  sense  just  defined,  is  theoretically 
possible.  It  is  legitimate  and  perhaps  even  necessary  to  hold 
that  change,  becoming,  is  an  ultimate  fact.  It  is  not  to  be 
reduced  to  a  mere  succession  of  different  static  conditions  at 
different  instants  of  time;  there  is  a  changing  *  between  any 
two  different  "states,"  or  cross-sections  of  a  process,  however 
close  together  in  time  the  two  may  be.  The  flying  arrow  is 
never  at  rest  in  any  of  the  different  locations  which  it  occupies 
at  successive  instants  of  its  flight;  it  is  always  going.  And  so  it 
may  be  with  human  conduct  and  character.  There  will  always 
be  a  correspondence  between  the  action  of  any  moment  and 
the  character  of  the  same  moment.  The  character  will  be  the 
inside  of  the  conduct — and  more.  The  conduct  will  be  the 
outside  of  the  character,  or  of  some  phase  of  it.  But  the  con- 
duct and  character  of  any  given  moment  are  not  necessarily  in 
every  case  the  inevitable  outcome  of  the  character  of  the  imme- 
diately previous  moment.  One  of  the  instances  of  change  as 
an  ultimate  fact  may  very  well  be  the  change  in  which,  in  spite 
of  a  large  measure  of  continuity  in  the  character  of  successive 
moments,  the  acting  subject  transcends  (or  falls  below)  its 
past  self,  and  produces  by  and  in  the  creative  act  itself,  and  not 
as  its  mere  after-effect,  a  certain  appreciable  difference  of  char- 
acter. Thus,  along  with  the  continuity  of  character  which 
psychology  is  interested  in  tracing  through  successive  moments 
in  the  life  of  the  individual,  there  may  very  well  be  difference 
enough  to  admit  of  a  genuine  creative  freedom. 

And  this  human  freedom  of  action,  real  and  creative,  how- 
ever limited  in  scope,  is  not  only  theoretically  possible;  it  is 
morally  certain.  The  consciousness  of  freedom  is  involved  in 
the  normal  human  consciousness  of  moral  responsibility.  "I 
ought,"  said  Kant,  "therefore  I  can."  We  are  immediately 
aware  of  moral  obligation.  We  may  come  to  doubt  our  former 
judgments  as  to  what  our  duty  was;  but  we  cannot  rid  ourselves 
of  the  consciousness  that  we  have  some  duty.  There  is  some 
"ought"  which  is  binding  upon  us.  But  logically  we  should 
*  Compare  H.  Bergson:  "La  perception  du  changement." 


HUMAN  FREE  AGENCY  71 

have  to  deny  the  validity  of  this  consciousness  of  moral  obli- 
gation, if  we  could  not  believe  in  freedom  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  have  here  defined  it. 

For  let  us  suppose  all  the  factors  which  enter  into  each  and 
every  human  action — environment,  predispositions,  character, 
thought  and  other  psychical  content — to  be  absolutely  and 
completely  predetermined.  This  would  mean  that  the  action 
was  made  inevitable  by  factors  which  were  themselves  made 
inevitable  by  previous  events,  and  so  on  in  the  regress  to  earlier 
determining  conditions  and  causes,  until  it  could  be  said  that 
everything  the  individual  ever  did  or  could  do  had  been  abso- 
lutely predetermined,  made  inevitable,  by  events  which  had 
taken  place  before  he  began  his  conscious  life  at  all.  This 
would  mean  that  man  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  having  in 
reality  any  responsibility  whatsoever  for  any  event  which  may 
have  taken  place  within  his  life.  He  himself  has  not  been  the 
real  doer  of  the  deed;  he  has  simply  been  in  the  presence  of  the 
event,  an  observer  suffering  from  the  delusion  of  supposing 
that  he  is,  in  some  measure  at  least,  its  responsible  originator. 
But  it  is  neither  morally  right  nor  psychologically  possible 
thus  to  repudiate  all  moral  responsibility  for  all  our  actions. 
Wherefore  we  are  entitled,  on  the  ground  of  an  inescapable 
consciousness  of  moral  obligation,  not  only  to  postulate  as 
morally  imperative,  but  to  presuppose,  as  involved  in  what  is 
intuitively  certain,  a  genuine  and  creative  human  freedom. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY 

SOME  justification  may  be  required  for  the  inclusion  of  an 
assertion  about  immortality  among  the  presuppositions  of 
theology.  If,  it  may  be  asked,  any  assured  knowledge  on  the 
subject  is  obtainable  at  all,  must  it  not  be  by  deduction  from 
a  well-established  empirical  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God? 
This  may  be;  but  there  is  a  reason  for  introducing  some  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject  at  this  point.  In  our  treatment  of  the 
empirical  data  of  theology  (to  which  we  must  turn  after  our 
statement  of  its  presuppositions)  some  definite  position  with 
reference  to  the  consequences  of  moral  evil  will  have  to  be 
presupposed;  and  this  topic  in  turn,  if  it  is  to  be  at  all  ade- 
quately treated,  necessarily  presupposes  some  definite  position 
with  reference  to  the  question  of  a  life  after  death.  We  may 
not  find  ourselves  able  to  presuppose  immortality  with  cer- 
tainty; but  if  we  can  establish  the  thesis  that  a  future  life  is 
possible,  or  at  any  rate  that  its  impossibility  has  not  been 
established,  and  that  belief  in  it  is  morally  imperative  and  not 
unreasonable,  it  will  be  legitimate  enough  to  presuppose  the 
possibility  of  a  future  life,  not  in  order  to  base  upon  it  as  yet 
any  final  conclusions,  but  simply  that  we  may  have  in  mind, 
as  nearly  as  may  be,  essentially  all  that  may  possibly  be  in- 
volved in  religious  experience. 

But  more  fundamental  than  the  question  as  to  whether  ifc  is 
reasonable  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  future  life  is  the 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  such  a  life  is  desirable.  Some 
people,  apparently,  do  not  desire  it,  and  among  these  are  in- 
cluded some  of  the  worst  and  some  of  the  best — or  second  best. 
The  suggested  prospect  of  living  again  some  persons  find  un- 
attractive, because  the  present  life  has  not  been  lived  in  such  a 
way  as  to  promise  to  be  a  good  foundation  for  a  satisfactory 
experience  in  the  next;  others,  because  the  ideas  and  imagery 

72 


THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY  73 

they  have  learned  to  associate  with  the  thought  of  a  future 
life  do  not  appeal  to  their  deepest  interests. 

But  even  if  not  always  desired,  an  extension  of  conscious 
existence  beyond  physical  death  might  still  be  desirable.  If 
an  individual  were  given  the  option  of  immortality  or  annihila- 
tion, it  might  be  his  duty  to  choose  the  former,  even  if  he  felt 
inclined  to  choose  the  latter. 

The  desire  for  an  individual  future  existence  is  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  "petty  selfishness"  (G.  B.  Shaw);  but  this  is  true 
only  where  the  future  life  is  desired  for  unduly  selfish  purposes. 
When  the  missionary-physician  whose  life  has  been  one  of 
considerable  privation  and  hardship,  endured  in  ministering 
to  the  general  well-being  of  a  people  living  in  the  inhospitable 
climate  of  a  bleak  and  barren  northern  seacoast,  has  this  to 
say,  "I  am  very  much  in  love  with  life.  I  want  all  I  can  get 
of  it.  I  want  more  of  it  after  the  incident  called  death,  if  there 
is  any  to  be  had,"  the  desire  expressed  is  neither  petty  nor 
selfish;  it  is  a  moral  desire  for  a  continuation  of  the  sort  of  thing 
life  has  meant  to  him,  viz.,  opportunity  for  unselfish  service. 

Moreover,  the  values  of  moral  personality  are  absolute;  they 
are  not  measurable  in  terms  of  material  or  any  non-moral 
values.  A  morally  good  will,  with  life  and  opportunity  for 
action  indefinitely  prolonged,  would  be  an  instrument  of  an 
incalculable  sum  of  good,  besides  being  all  the  while  an  abso- 
lute value  or  end  in  itself.  No  one,  it  would  seem,  could  morally 
annihilate  such  a  will,  supposing  it  were  possible.  Nor  can  any 
one  morally  consent  to  the  final  cessation  of  any  morally  good 
will,  his  own  or  that  of  any  one  else.  Indeed,  one  can  morally 
consent  to  the  physical  death  of  a  person  of  morally  good  will, 
only  on  the  understanding  that  that  individual  will,  as  an 
absolute  good  and  an  instrument  of  incalculable  good,  is  to  be 
continued  in  existence  and  activity  after  death.*  It  seems  to 
have  been  only  on  this  condition  that  Jesus  of  Nazareth  could 
consent  to  die. 

But  we  may  go  further  and  say  that  even  in  the  case  of  a 
will  that  is  not  morally  good,  if  there  is  reasonable  ground  for 
the  hope  that  after  further  experience  and  discipline  it  will 

*  The  author  acknowledges  indebtedness  to  a  not  yet  published  paper 
by  G.  A.  Coe,  entitled  "The  Will  to  Die." 


74  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

become  good,  no  one  can  morally  consent  to  its  annihilation. 
No  one,  indeed,  would  be  justified  in  refusing  immortality  if 
it  were  offered  him,  except  perhaps  one  who  felt  absolutely 
sure  that  he  would  do  more  harm  than  good  by  continuing  to 
exist.  But  anyone  who  could  refuse  a  future  life  on  such  grounds 
would  thereby  show  his  moral  right  to  have  it,  for  a  will  so 
considerate  of  the  well-being  of  others  would  surely  do  more 
good  than  harm.  To  completely  express  all  that  is  potential 
in  a  morally  good  will,  or  all  the  good  that  is  potential  in  a 
will  that  is  capable  of  becoming  morally  good,  is  then  an  abso- 
lute and  unconditional  imperative,  the  force  of  which  must 
ever  be  upon  the  side  of  the  further  extension  of  personal  life. 

And  the  converse  of  all  this  is  that  to  view  human  individuals 
as  essentially  immortal  means  to  enhance  indefinitely  their 
worth  and  significance.  It  means  that  under  no  circumstances 
is  it  rational  or  right  to  treat  any  human  being  as  if  he  were  a 
mere  animal.  When  death  is  believed  to  end  all,  there  is  not 
only  a  psychological  tendency,  but  a  logical  reason  also  to 
regard  the  individual  as  of  less  value  than  he  would  be  if  im- 
mortal, and  to  act  accordingly. 

Such  considerations  as  these  furnish  the  basis  for  what  is 
probably  the  most  effective  critique  of  the  idea  of  a  merely 
conditional  immortality.  When  it  is  asserted  that  there  are 
persons  whose  existence  is  not  worth  being  made  immortal, 
there  is  either  a  failure  to  appreciate  the  absolute  value  of  a 
moral  will,  or  else  a  failure  to  grasp  the  possibilities  of  moral 
development  under  education  and  discipline.  As  William 
James  suggests,  the  fact  that  we  have  no  use  for  these  persons 
is  no  proof  that  they  may  not  be  very  interesting  to  one  who 
more  fully  knows  them.  Nor  is  it  any  proof,  we  may  add,  that 
they  may  not  become  of  incalculable  actual  value,  as  they  are 
now  of  incalculable  potential  value. 

On  these  grounds  one  might  postulate  immortality  as  not 
only  desirable,  but  imperative.  However,  it  is  not  our  purpose 
to  construct  a  theology  of  mere  postulates,  no  matter  how 
imperative  they  may  be.  Our  objective  is  theology  as  an  em- 
pirical science;  hence  our  presuppositions  must  be  in  the  form 
of  what  is,  not  of  what  merely  ought  to  be.  But  this  may 
mean,  as  already  intimated,  that  we  must  not  presuppose 


THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY  75 

immortality,  but  only  the  possibility  of  immortality,  or,  more 
exactly,  that  the  idea  of  immortality  is  to  be  taken  seriously, 
as  a  "live  hypothesis." 

To  be  sure,  we  could  include  among  the  presuppositions  of 
our  empirical  theology  the  assertion  of  immortality  as  a  fact, 
if  we  could  depend  upon  any  of  the  "demonstrations"  offered 
by  speculative  philosophy.  But  all  such  "demonstrations" 
fail  to  demonstrate,  from  the  classical  argument  that  the  soul 
is  simple,  therefore  indivisible,  therefore  indestructible,  to  the 
recent  argument  of  Royce,  that  the  individual,  as  the  only  one 
of  a  type,  requires  unending  time  for  its  adequate  definition, 
and  so  presumably  also  for  the  expression  and  experience  in 
time  of  all  that  it  really  is,  from  the  supertemporal  point  of 
view;  or  to  the  argument  of  McTaggart,  that  persons,  as  funda- 
mental differentiations  of  the  Absolute  (interpreted  as  a  Com- 
munity of  persons),  are  necessarily  as  eternal  as  Absolute 
Reality  itself.  All  such  "proofs"  are  either  fundamentally 
dogmatic  in  begging  the  question,  or  else  there  is  equivocation 
in  the  course  of  the  argument,  or  a  non  sequitur  at  the  end.  If 
there  is  to  be  any  proof  of  immortality,  or  even  of  a  future  life, 
it  must  be  empirical,  not  merely  speculative. 

When  we  turn  to  look  for  empirical  proof,  we  find  three 
conceivable  methods.  First,  the  personal  experience  of  con- 
tinuing to  exist  consciously  after  the  death  of  the  material  body 
would  obviously  be  adequate  empirical  proof;  but  in  the  nature 
of  the  case  this  is  not  an  available  method  in  the  present  life. 
Second,  there  would  be  the  method  of  receiving  an  adequately 
authenticated  communication  from  some  one  who  is  having 
the  experience  of  living  after  physical  death;  and  third,  the 
method  of  finding  an  empirical  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  Being 
who  may  be  depended  upon  to  guarantee  a  future  existence  to 
persons,  who  are,  as  such,  capable  of  unending  moral  develop- 
ment. This  last  is  the  course  which  we  intend  to  take  in  our 
empirical  theology;  but  for  that  very  reason  it  cannot  at  this 
point  be  presupposed.  Let  us  return,  then,  to  a  consideration 
of  the  second  method. 

The  great  difficulty  in  all  cases  of  alleged  communications 
from  discarnate  spirits  is  in  eliminating  all  other  possible  ex- 
planations of  the  phenomena.  Even  after  we  have  eliminated 


76  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

cases  of  possible  fraud  and  made  due  allowance  for  chance 
coincidences,  there  remain,  at  least  for  the  explanation  of  most 
instances  of  the  phenomenon,  some  plausible  alternative  hy- 
potheses. It  is  possible  to  appeal  to  the  idea  of  obscure  and 
not  fully  understood  psychical  or  neural  processes  on  the  part 
of  the  medium.  And  if  this  hypothesis  should  prove  inadequate 
to  the  fact,  it  would  still  be  possible  to  advance  the  theory 
(as  yet  somewhat  dubious,  perhaps)  of  a  telepathic  communi- 
cation from  the  mind  of  some  living  person  who  possesses,  con- 
sciously or  "subconsciously,"  the  information  imparted.  And 
beyond  this  again  appeal  might  be  made  to  the  still  more  du- 
bious hypothesis  of  a  telepathic  message  sent  before  death,  but 
received  only  subconsciously,  and  later  rising  to  consciousness, 
or  being  read  off  telepathically  by  the  medium.  These  explana- 
tions may  seem  highly  artificial  and  far-fetched,  as  compared 
with  the  simple  hypothesis  of  genuine  spirit-communications, 
which  the  phenomena  ostensibly  are;  but  it  is  a  fair  question 
whether,  until  at  least  one  instance  of  spirit-communication 
has  been  indubitably  established,  the  scientific  "principle  of 
parsimony"  does  not  require  us  to  give  the  benefit  of  the  doubt 
to  one  of  these  alternative  explanations,  rather  than  to  that  of 
bona  fide,  post-morten  communication. 

This  leads  us  to  consider  in  connection  with  the  idea  of  an 
empirical  argument  for  a  future  life,  the  one  instance  of  alleged 
spirit-communication  which  many  conservative  minds  are  will- 
ing to  accept  as  genuine,  viz.,  the  appearances  and  messages 
ascribed  in  the  New  Testament  to  the  "risen  Christ."  It 
should  be  recognized,  however,  that  in  this  instance  the  re- 
corded phenomena  are,  psychologically  speaking,  essentially 
similar  to  those  of  modern  spiritism  and  psychical  research. 
Ecclesiastical  tradition  of  long  standing,  and  especially  the  great 
worth  of  the  personality  of  Jesus  and  of  the  spiritual  outlook 
associated  with  the  "resurrection,"  impart  to  this  instance  a 
dignity  and  impressiveness  which  even  the  most  convincing 
modern  instances  of  the  phenomenon  largely  lack;  but  in  the 
end  both  may  be  expected  to  stand  or  fall  together.  To  es- 
tablish either  would  tend  to  establish  the  other;  to  discredit 
either  is  partially  to  discredit  the  other. 

In  taking  up  this  historical  form  of  the  empirical  argument 


THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY  77 

for  immortality  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  interpreta- 
tion of  the  alleged  appearances  and  communications  as  veridical 
and  consequently  as  an  argument  for  human  survival  of  bodily 
death,  is  supported  more  or  less  by  two  associated  elements 
in  the  tradition,  viz.,  the  story  of  the  empty  tomb,  and  the 
record,  which  there  seems  no  good  reason  for  disbelieving,  that 
Jesus  before  his  crucifixion,  and  his  disciples  after  that  event, 
achieved  on  a  religious  basis  as  assured  belief  in  an  immortal 
life.  This  religiously  grounded  conviction  of  Jesus  and  his  dis- 
ciples we  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  in  our  later  theological 
construction,  but  the  tradition  of  the  empty  tomb  demands  some 
comment  in  the  present  connection.  In  the  first  place  there  is 
great  difficulty  encountered  in  the  attempt  to  harmonize  the 
various  stories  of  the  finding  of  the  empty  tomb.  It  seems  not 
unreasonable  to  suppose  that  in  the  course  of  the  years  before 
our  records  were  written  there  accrued  to  the  original  account 
of  what  happened  a  certain  legendary  element.  But  the  theory 
that  Jesus  revived  in  the  tomb  and  was  kept  in  hiding  by  Joseph 
of  Arimathea  presents  too  many  psychological  difficulties  to  be 
plausible.  Moreover,  we  are  scarcely  in  a  position  to  disprove 
that  it  was  believed  by  the  primitive  Christian  community  that 
the  tomb  in  which  Jesus  had  been  buried  was  left  mysteriously 
empty,  or  that  the  enemies  of  the  little  band  of  disciples  had  no 
other  way  of  meeting  the  obvious  challenge  to  produce  the  body 
of  Jesus  than  by  making  a  charge  of  fraud  against  the  disciples 
themselves.  This  charge,  however,  it  seems  unreasonable  even 
to  entertain  seriously,  in  view  of  the  apostles7  manifest  sin- 
cerity and  enthusiasm,  even  to  the  point  of  martyrdom.  It  is 
noteworthy,  nevertheless,  that  Paul  makes  no  use  whatever  of 
the  story  of  the  empty  tomb;  indeed  his  argument  for  the  "resur- 
rection" seems  to  preclude  any  such  appeal.  Moreover,  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  accepting  the  ordinary  traditional 
notion  of  the  "resurrection"  of  Jesus,  as  a  reanimation  of  the 
dead  body,  its  miraculous  transformation  and  final  ascension 
to  "heaven,"  are,  to  the  scientific  habit  of  thought,  practically 
insuperable.  What  became  of  the  atoms  of  carbon,  oxygen, 
nitrogen,  hydrogen  and  other  elements  which  composed  the 
earthly  body  of  Jesus?  What  are  we  to  think  of  a  visible  "as- 
cension into  heaven,"  in  view  of  the  fact  that  according  to  our 


78  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

Copernican  astronomy  the  particular  place  to  which  he  could 
ascend  would  depend  upon  the  time  of  day  at  which  the  ascen- 
sion took  place?  If,  however,  we  first  try  to  explain  events 
and  records  according  to  the  laws  of  nature  and  mind,  we  find 
it  by  no  means  inconceivable  that  the  disciples  may  have  been 
(as  Kirsopp  Lake  suggests)  mistaken  as  to  the  tomb  in  which 
Jesus  was  buried,  even  if  we  accept  the  tradition  about  Joseph 
of  Arimathea,  instead  of  supposing  (with  A.  Loisy)  that  the 
body  was  simply  thrown  into  the  common  pit  reserved  for  male- 
factors. In  fact  we  do  not  know  in  detail  what  became  of  the 
body  of  Jesus;  but  an  undischarged  burden  of  proof  still  rests 
upon  those  who  maintain  that  it  did  not  suffer  disintegration, 
like  the  bodies  of  all  others  who  have  died. 

With  reference  to  the  alleged  appearances  of  Jesus  to  his  dis- 
ciples, it  seems  unnecessary  to  deny  that  some  such  experiences 
took  place,  although  there  is  no  close  correspondence  between 
the  appearances  to  which  Paul  refers  and  those  recorded  in  the 
gospels.  But,  granted  the  historicity  of  these  experiences,  in 
attempting  to  interpret  them  we  encounter  the  same  difficulty 
as  in  the  case  of  the  phenomena  of  modern  spiritism.  Was 
there  a  genuine  objective  communication?  Perhaps  so;  but 
the  critical  historian  would  be  inclined  to  explain  at  least  some 
of  the  not  readily  reconcilable  accounts  as  purely  legendary, 
while  the  conservative  psychologist  would,  undoubtedly,  favor 
the  hypothesis  of  collective  hallucination  under  the  influence 
of  suggestion,  similar  to  what  often  occurs  under  hypnotic 
conditions,  the  original  hallucination  (possibly  that  of  Peter) 
having  been  the  explosive  expression  of  a  peculiarly  insistent 
repressed  desire.  This  interpretation  is  strengthened  by  the 
fact  of  Paul's  experience  of  the  "risen  Christ/'  which  was  prob- 
ably similar  to  that  of  Peter  and  to  those  of  many  mystics  since 
the  days  of  the  apostles.  It  may  be  plausibly  contended,  there- 
fore, that  the  subconscious  repressed  but  protesting  faith  of  the 
disciples  in  Jesus  caused  the  experiences,  and  that  the  experi- 
ences in  turn  confirmed  the  faith  and  made  it  easy  to  acknowl- 
edge it  openly. 

It  would  seem,  then,  that,  apart  from  each  individual's  ex- 
perience of  a  future  life  (if  there  is  one)  when  the  time  comes, 
and  apart  also  from  the  appeal  to  religious  experience,  the  em- 


THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY  79 

pirical  argument  for  immortality,  however  impressive  it  may 
seem  to  some,  still  falls  considerably  short  of  complete  demon- 
stration. This  simply  means,  however,  that  in  undertaking 
an  empirical  theology  we  are  not  able  to  presuppose  a  future 
life  as  fully  established.  But  the  strong  practical  considerations 
already  noted  in  favor  of  belief  in  the  continued  existence  of  the 
human  person  justify  our  taking  the  idea  seriously,  particularly 
as  no  disproof,  either  apriori  or  empirical,  is  forthcoming.  What 
some  affect  to  regard  as  amounting  to  an  empirical  disproof, 
viz.,  the  well  known  facts  of  physiological  psychology,  amount 
to  nothing  of  the  kind.  That  mind  is  the  mere  product  of  the 
developing  nervous  system  is  pure  assumption.  It  is  quite  as 
defensible  an  interpretation  of  the  psycho-physiological  facts 
to  regard  the  brain  and  nervous  system  as  the  developing  in- 
strument of  the  developing  mind — a  view  which  is  not  precluded 
by  the  obvious  fact  that  the  mind  has  important  services  to 
render  to  the  body.  The  instrumental  function  which  the  brain 
has  is  its  bringing  of  the  mind  into  such  relations  with  a  par- 
ticular material  environment  as  will  enable  it  to  learn  therefrom, 
express  itself  therein,  and  communicate  with  other  "embodied" 
minds  similarly  related  to  the  same  environment.  And  there  is 
strong  support  for  this  view  in  certain  special  considerations, 
some  of  which  may  be  briefly  mentioned.  For  example,  if  we 
accept  as  valid  the  normal  human  consciousness  of  human 
freedom,  we  must  hold  that,  within  whatever  limits,  man  is  a 
free  agent;  for  if  he  were  not  free  at  all,  he  would  not  be  morally 
responsible.  But  if  he  is  free,  this  must  mean,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  his  mental  or  spiritual  self  is  an  originating  and  even  crea- 
tive factor  in  certain  changes  which  take  place,  first  of  all  in  the 
brain,  and  ultimately,  through  the  nerves  and  muscles,  in  the 
external  world.  If  the  mind  is  independent  enough  to  create 
changes  in  the  brain,  is  it  unreasonable  to  suppose  it  may  be 
independent  enough  to  survive  the  dissolution  of  the  brain? 
And  if  it  be  true,  as  many  scientifically  trained  special  investi- 
gators maintain,  that  the  hypothesis  of  telepathy  is  the  neces- 
sary alternative  explanation  of  certain  instances  of  alleged 
communications  from  discarnate  spirits,  this  is  important  in  the 
present  connection.  For  telepathy  itself  would  mean  such  a 
view  of  mind  as  would  make  it  seem  not  unreasonable  to  sup- 


80  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

pose  that  it  might  very  well  be  able  to  persist  without  the  brain 
as  its  instrument. 

So  then,  it  must  be  held  that  the  continuation  of  the  life  of 
the  spirit  after  the  death  of  the  body  is  theoretically  possible. 
That  is,  we  know  of  no  consideration  which  can  disprove  or 
even  seriously  discredit  the  belief;  consequently,  in  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  subject,  and  in  anticipation  of  its  further 
discussion  under  theological  theory,  we  would  suggest  that  an 
empirical  theology  has  the  right  tentatively  to  assume  as  a 
possibility  the  indefinite  or  even  endless  continuation  of  the 
conscious  existence  of  the  human  individual,  after  and  in  spite 
of  the  inevitable  dissolution  of  the  body. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  FACT  OF  SIN,  WITH  ITS  EVIL  CONSEQUENCES 

AMONG  the  presuppositions  of  empirical  theology  we  must  also 
include  the  fact  of  evil,  for  the  reason  that,  as  we  shall  find,  the 
empirical  data  for  theology  afforded  by  experimental  religion  are 
largely  centered  about  the  experience  of  "salvation,"  i.  e.,  of 
deliverance  from  evil,  and  more  particularly  from  what  is  taken 
to  be  the  supreme  evil.  Moreover,  in  the  higher  developments  of 
experimental  religion  the  supreme  evil  has  as  its  principal 
content  sin  and  its  evil  consequences.  Now  the  term  "sin"  is 
commonly  understood  to  have  certain  religious  or  theological 
implications,  as  when  it  is  said  that  sin  is  Godlessness,  or 
transgression  of  the  law  of  God,  or  moral  evil  viewed  as  antag- 
onistic to  the  will  of  God.  But  in  setting  forth  the  presupposi- 
tions of  theology  we  must  not  include  what  theology  has  to 
investigate,  and  so  in  this  connection  we  must  abstract  from  all 
relation  to  a  divine  law  or  will,  as  well  as  ignoring  for  the  time 
being  the  question  whether,  in  addition  to  sins  against  one's  self 
and  one's  neighbor,  there  may  not  also  be  a  sin  which  is  pecu- 
liarly a  sin  against  God. 

For  our  present  purposes,  then,  we  may  begin  with  the  pre- 
liminary and  incomplete  definition  of  sin  as  some  sort  of  wrong 
conduct,  together  with  the  character  which  results  from  it  and 
which  tends  to  express  itself  in  a  repetition  of  similar  wrong 
conduct.  Character  in  this  connection  may  be  taken  to  mean 
relatively  fixed  habits,  principles,  and  likes  or  dislikes.  Conduct 
is  action  for  the  sake  of  consequences,  the  conscious  employ- 
ment of  means  to  realize  an  end  or  ends;  and  whatever  further 
qualification  completely  right  conduct  may  have,  it  must  be 
the  use  of  right  means  to  realize  good  ends.  The  question  as 
to  what  end  is  for  the  acting  subject  in  a  given  situation  the 
good  end  must  be  answered  ultimately  by  moral  intuition,  i.  e., 
by  an  immediate  but  not  uncritical  appreciation  of  absolute  or 

81 


82  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

ultimate  values,  and  an  adequate  appreciation  of  the  relative 
worth  and  mutual  compatibility  of  various  goods.  (This 
"intuition,"  or  appreciation,  it  should  be  stated,  is  a  matter  of 
feeling  and  will,  and  not  of  reason  alone.)  If  the  good  end  is  to 
be  intelligently  chosen,  then,  there  must  be  an  appreciation  of 
the  superior  worth  of  absolute  and  permanent  values,  as  com- 
pared with  such  as  are  but  instrumental  and  temporary.  But 
more  than  this  is  necessary.  On  the  basis  of  an  appreciation  of 
the  absolute  value  (potential,  if  not  actual)  of  all  personal  life, 
the  goods  appreciated  as  absolute  must  be  desired  for  all  per- 
sons, and  their  greatest  possible  ultimate  well-being  made  the 
end  of  individual  action.  That  is  wrong  conduct  in  which  some- 
thing less  than  the  greatest  total  true  good  of  all  persons  is  made 
the  end  of  action.  Lack  of  appreciation  of  the  highest  (i.  e.,  the 
absolute  and  eternal)  goods,  as  compared  with  those  the  appre- 
ciation of  which  calls  for  less  spiritual  development,  may  be 
called  sensuousness.  It  is  being  guided  by  animal  impulse, 
rather  than  by  the  highest  ideals.  On  the  other  hand,  lack  of 
appreciation  of  the  equal  rights  of  others  to  be  regarded  as 
ends,  instead  of  being  used  as  mere  means,  is  selfishness. 

But  fully  right  conduct  must  not  only  aim  at  the  highest 
possible  good  of  all  concerned ;  it  must  employ  the  best  available 
means  for  realizing  these  imperative  ends.  What  the  best  means 
are  must  be  discovered  ultimately  by  empirical  methods — 
observation  and  experiment.  For  conduct  is  sometimes  wrong 
through  ignorance  of  the  best  means  to  employ  in  order  to 
realize  ends  rightly  recognized  as  valid. 

But  it  often  happens  that  wrong  conduct  is  not  due  to  ig- 
norance alone  or  principally,  Socrates  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding. Even  when  there  is  correct  information  as  to  the 
sequence  of  cause  and  effect,  and  therewith  as  to  the  right  means 
to  employ  in  order  to  realize  desired  ends,  often  the  right  action 
does  not  follow.  It  is  not  that  the  intellect  is  mistaken,  but  that 
the  will  is  bad.  Nor  is  this  always  due  to  the  individual's  nature 
having  not  yet  learned  to  appreciate  the  higher  values,  although 
this  is  often  a  factor.  Neither  is  it  enough  in  all  cases  to  point 
to  an  unfortunate  inheritance  of  instinct,  or  to  the  fact  of  long 
habituation  to  an  inadequate  way  of  acting,  or  to  the  individual 
will  being  overborne  by  social  pressure,  i.  e.,  temptation  of  one 


SIN  AND  ITS  EVIL  CONSEQUENCES  83 

sort  or  another,  such  as  custom,  conventionality,  fads  and 
fashions,  institutionalized  thought  and  procedure,  the  influence 
of  mob  mind,  or  personal  persuasion.  Commonly  some  of  these 
are  factors  which  enter  into  the  causation  of  the  wrong  conduct, 
but  there  is  generally,  if  not  always,  a  failure  to  exert  moral 
effort  to  the  utmost  possible,  a  spiritual  indolence  which  leads 
one  to  neglect  to  give  sufficient  attention  to  the  ascertaining  of 
values.  Or  this  spiritual  inertia  or  laziness  may  even  lead  one  to 
consent  to  recognized  evil,  rather  than  to  choose,  if  necessary, 
the  line  of  greatest  resistance,  in  order  to  overcome  the  influence 
of  inheritance  or  habit  or  social  pressure,  or  to  lead  to  an  ad- 
equate knowledge  of  good  ends  and  right  means.  Of  course  it 
must  be  recognized  that  many  times  the  bad  will  expressed  in 
individual  wrong  conduct  is  not  simply  or  perhaps  chiefly  the 
bad  will  of  the  individual  agent;  it  is  often  that  of  some  social 
group  as  well,  and  perhaps  in  much  the  larger  part.  But 
wherever  there  is  less  attention  given  to  determining  con- 
siderations than  is  needed  and  might  well  be  given,  there  the 
will  is  bad,  whether  it  be  the  will  of  a  particular  individual,  or 
that  of  a  social  group,  or  both. 

If  then  we  define  sin  more  narrowly  than  before  as  wrong 
conduct  and  character  for  which  the  subject,  whether  in- 
dividual or  social,  is  responsible,  blameworthy,  it  remains  to 
state  more  methodically  the  criteria  of  the  degree  of  this  blame- 
worthiness,  or  guilt.  The  problem  of  responsibility  is  the  ques- 
tion of  free  conscious  causation.  There  can  be  no  transfer  of 
the  guilt  of  wrong  action  from  the  conscious  and  consenting 
doer  to  any  other  person.  But  the  solution  of  the  problem  as  to 
just  how  far  the  wrongdoer  is  responsible,  and  so  as  to  just  how 
guilty  he  is,  involves  a  somewhat  intricate  analysis  of  the  factors 
entering  into  the  act.  Defining  intention  as  the  idea  of  all  the 
consequences  expected  to  follow  from  the  act,  and  consented  to, 
whether  willingly  or  reluctantly,  in  deciding  to  perform  it,  it  is 
easily  seen  that,  other  things  being  equal,  guilt  for  a  wrong  ac- 
tion varies  directly  as  the  evil  intention  (El)  and  inversely  as 
the  good  intention  (GI).  Motive  being  the  idea  of  the  expected 
consequence  for  the  sake  of  which  the  act  is  decided  upon,  guilt 
is  seen  to  vary  again  directly  as  the  evil  motive  (EM)  and 
inversely  as  the  good  motive  (GM).  "Good"  and  "evil"  in 


84  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

these  instances  are  determined,  of  course,  by  means  of  the  idea  of 
the  greatest  possible  genuine  good,  or  well-being,  of  all  persons. 
Sometimes  there  is  little  actual  foresight  of  consequences,,  but 
if  the  action  is  wrong,  the  guilt  varies  directly  as  the  possible 
foresight  (PF),  and  also  directly  as  the  signs  of  the  desirability 
(SD)  of  gaining  further  knowledge  of  consequences.  In  these 
two  factors  are  included  both  the  accessibility  of  the  facts  and 
the  native  sagacity  of  the  agent.  Again,  if  the  wrong  act  is 
committed  against  good  instincts  (gi),  or  inherited  impulses, 
the  guilt  is  greater;  if  in  accord  with  evil  instincts  (ei),  it  is, 
other  things  being  equal,  less.  Similarly,  if  the  wrong  act  is 
committed  in  opposition  to  the  good  mores  (gm),  or  customary 
morality  of  the  community,  the  doer  is  the  more  guilty  on  that 
account;  if  in  harmony  with  the  evil  mores  (em),  he  is  the  less 
guilty.  Again,  if  the  wrong  deed  is  committed  against  good 
habits  unconsciously  formed  (GHU),  the  guilt  is  greater;  if  in 
accord  with  evil  habits  unconsciously  formed  (EHU),  it  is  less. 
But  if  committed  in  accord  with  evil  habits  consciously  formed 
(EHC),  or  against  good  habits  consciously  formed  (GHC),  the 
case  is  somewhat  ambiguous.  Because  he  acts  according  to 
habit,  he  seems  less  guilty;  but,  because  the  habit  was  con- 
sciously formed,  more  guilty  if  the  habit  was  bad,  and  deserving 
credit  in  the  light  of  the  past  if  the  habit  was  good.  The  solution 
of  the  problem  is  found  in  deciding  whether  to  judge  the  single 
act,  or,  as  is  now  approved  in  scientific  penology,  to  judge  the 
man  for  this  act,  but  in  the  light  of  his  whole  relevant  record. 
In  the  former  case,  i.  e.,  judging  the  single  act,  we  should  have  to 
say  that  the  guilt  was  greater,  according  as  there  was  a  good 
habit,  making  it  easier  to  avoid  the  wrong  act;  or  that  the  guilt 
was  less,  according  as  there  was  an  evil  habit,  making  it  hard  to 
avoid  the  evil  act.  But  in  judging  the  man  in  the  act  instead  of 
the  act  in  its  isolation  we  should  have  to  say  that  the  guilt  was 
greater  in  view  of  the  underlying  evil  habit  having  been  con- 
sciously formed,  but  that  it  would  have  been  less,  if  it  had  taken 
place  in  spite  of  habitual  good  action  in  this  connection  in  the 
past.  There  remains  the  social  factor,  or  temptation,  to  be 
considered.  Using  the  term  broadly,  so  as  to  include  social 
pressure,  or  temptation,  toward  good,  as  well  as  toward  evil, 
we  should  have  to  make  the  following  distinctions:  the  guilt  is 


SIN  AND  ITS  EVIL  CONSEQUENCES  85 

greater  according  as  the  wrong  act  is  committed  against  tempta- 
tion toward  good,  if  this  social  influence  came  unsought  (GTU) ; 
but  less,  if  in  accord  with  temptation  to  evil,  coming  unsought 
(ETU).  Again,  having  sought  temptation  to  evil  (ETS)  leaves 
the  man,  judged  for  the  act,  but  in  the  light  of  its  antecedents, 
the  more  guilty;  while  having  sought  temptation  to  good  (GTS) 
leaves  the  man,  in  view  of  his  record,  the  less  guilty.  But  if  it  be 
insisted  that  the  final  wrong  act  alone  be  judged  in  its  isolation, 
we  may  say  that  the  additional  guilt  incurred  by  one  who  yields 
to  a  temptation  which  he  was  previously  induced,  whether  by 
inner  or  outer  pressure,  to  seek,  is  less  in  view  of  this  seeking. 
But  in  the  case  of  one  who  commits  the  wrong  by  turning  in  the 
opposite  direction  to  that  in  which  he  was  going  just  before, 
when  he  was  seeking  good  social  influences,  the  additional  guilt 
incurred  by  the  final  act  is  greater  by  reason  of  this  sudden  lapse 
from  good. 

The  results  of  our  analysis  of  the  chief  factors  that  enter  into 
guilt,  or  responsibility  for  wrong  conduct,  may  then  be  set  forth 
in  the  two  following  diagrams,  the  former  of  which  represents 
the  judgment  to  be  passed  upon  the  isolated  wrong  act,  and  the 
latter  that  to  be  passed  upon  the  man  as  a  whole,  in  view  of  this 
last  wrong  action.  The  numerator  of  the  fraction  represents 
in  each  case  the  factors  according  to  which  the  guilt  varies 
directly,  and  the  denominator  the  factors  according  to  which 
it  varies  inversely. 

(1)  (El) .  (EM) .  (PF) .  (SD) .  (gi) .  (gm) .  (GHTJ) .  (GHC) .  (GTU) .  (GTS) 
(GI) .  (GM) .  (ei) .  (em) .  (EHU) .  (EHC) .  (ETU) .  (ETS) 

(2)  (EI) .  (EM) .  (PF) .  (SD) .  (gi) .  (gm) .  (GHU) .  (EHC) .  (GTU) .  (ETS) 
(GI) .  (GM) .  (ei) .  (em) .  (EHU) .  (GHC) .  (ETU) .  (GTS) 

Before  accepting  any  such  result  as  final,  we  ought,  perhaps, 
to  consider  a  view  which  has  been  advanced  more  than  once  in 
the  history  of  thought,  viz.,  that  all  guilt  on  account  of  wrong- 
doing is  infinite.  This  has  been  maintained  in  view  of  the  con- 
viction of  the  moral  consciousness  that  neither  can  any  amount 
of  pleasure  or  pecuniary  advantage  to  be  gained,  justify  the 
doing  of  wrong,  nor  can  the  desire  to  avoid  any  amount  of 
suffering,  however  great.  Assuming,  then,  that  the  guilt  of  all 
sin  is  infinite,  the  idea  of  different  degrees  of  guilt  loses  all 


86  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

practical  significance.  But  the  truth  is  not  that  there  are  no 
degrees  of  guilt,  or  of  moral  good  and  evil;  rather  is  it  that  moral 
values  are  so  absolute  as  to  be  incommensurable  with  non- 
moral  and  merely  sensuous  values.  There  are  different  degrees 
of  guilt,  but  the  exact  degree  of  guilt  attaching  to  any  individual 
for  a  wrong  action  is,  as  we  have  seen,  exceedingly  difficult  to 
ascertain,  even,  it  may  be  added,  when  that  individual  is  one's 
self.  And  so  great  is  the  difficulty  of  estimating  the  degree  of 
blameworthiness  to  attach  to  another  for  his  wrong  conduct, 
that  there  is  suggested  once  more  the  propriety  of  the  injunc- 
tion, "judge  not.'7  This  is  very  far,  however,  from  meaning 
that  to  know  all  would  be  to  forgive  all.  We  are  intuitively 
conscious  that  such  is  not  true  of  much  of  our  own  wrong  con- 
duct, and  the  "intuition,"  unlike  some  others,  is  one  which  is 
well  able  to  stand  the  test  of  criticism.  Indeed  the  guilt  of  con- 
scious and  deliberate  sin  is  immeasurably  great;  in  strict  justice 
it  "hath  never  forgiveness."  But  even  the  man  who  has  thus 
sinned  may  not  only  be  forgiven  without  a  violation  of  justice, 
but  must,  according  to  strict  justice,  be  forgiven,  provided  that, 
by  sincere  repentance,  he  becomes  so  essentially  different  in  will 
that  that  sinful  act  no  longer  expresses  his  true  character.  And 
in  any  case,  judgment  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  diagnosis  and 
attempted  remedy  will  generally  be  found  possible,  if  one  will 
but  take  the  necessary  pains;  it  is  an  absolute  and  infallible 
judgment  as  to  the  exact  degree  of  guilt,  such  as  would  be  re- 
quired as  a  basis  of  perfectly  just  retribution,  that  may  well  be 
regarded  as  transcending  the  capacities  of  the  human  mind. 

But  it  is  not  sinful  conduct  alone  which  constitutes  the  evil 
from  which,  in  the  experimental  religion  fundamental  to  em- 
pirical theology,  deliverance  is  sought.  The  evil  consequences, 
or  "  penalties,"  of  sinful  action  are  also  included.  As  the  criteria 
of  right  and  wrong  conduct  are  to  be  found  in  the  consequences, 
so  too  the  penalties  are  to  be  found  in  the  consequences.  There 
is  this  difference,  however,  that  the  criteria  are  the  consequences 
considered  according  to  the  weight  they  ought  to  have,  and  do 
have  for  the  thoughtful  and  moral,  whereas  the  "penalties" 
are  the  evil  consequences  of  wrong  action,  considered  according 
to  the  weight  which  they  have  or  will  have  for  the  doer,  who 
is,  as  such,  to  begin  with  at  least,  a  person  of  sinful  mind  and 


SIN  AND  ITS  EVIL  CONSEQUENCES  87 

will.  Not  all  evil  consequences  are  felt  by  the  evil-doer  to  be 
penalties.  Indeed  the  most  serious  of  the  evil  consequences,  viz., 
the  evil  consequences  to  others  and  in  his  own  character,  may 
scarcely  be  felt  by  the  hardened  evil-doer  to  be  penalties  or 
evils  at  all.  Physical  suffering  is  almost  the  only  penalty  which 
some  people  are  able  to  appreciate  as  such.  It  is  perhaps  well 
that  sooner  or  later  there  are  generally  painful  consequences 
to  make  those  who  are  indifferent  to  considerations  of  character 
and  the  welfare  of  others  aware  of  the  mistaken  course  they  have 
been  pursuing.  For  such  persons  to  be  able  permanently  to  sin 
without  discomfort  would  be  to  suffer  hopeless  perdition. 

In  undertaking  to  set  forth  the  main  penalties  of  sin,  the 
method  will  be  that  of  empirical  observation,  so  far  as  evil  conse- 
quences in  the  present  life  are  concerned.  But  then,  assuming 
tentatively  that  there  is  a  future  life,  i.  e.,  taking  account  of 
it  as  a  possibility,  and  assuming  also  that  with  the  continuity  of 
personal  existence  the  laws  of  mind  still  obtain,  certain  inferences 
may  be  drawn  with  reference  to  the  evil  consequences  of  sin  in 
that  future  state. 

First,  then,  with  reference  to  the  present  life,  observation 
shows  that  certain  forms  of  wrong  conduct  are  followed  by  loss 
of  energy,  economic  loss,  dread  forms  of  painful  and  loathsome 
disease,  and  premature  death.  But  even  more  serious,  and 
following  without  fail  are  such  consequences  as  deterioration 
of  character,  bondage  to  evil  habit,  loss  of  moral  power,  and 
deadness  to  the  higher  spiritual  appeals.  Moreover,  these  more 
immediate  consequences  have  as  their  natural  sequel,  on  the 
one  hand,  an  increasing  alienation  from  the  privilege  of  the  most 
desirable  personal  relationships,  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  the 
nature  has  not  become  so  degraded  as  to  be  insensible,  a  painful 
sense  of  guilt,  with  shame,  remorse,  fear  of  detection  and  of 
further  evil  consequences,  and  many  times  a  despair  such  as 
would  covet  annihilation.  And  all  the  time  there  is  another 
penalty  which  would  be  torture  to  a  more  moral  will,  viz.,  the 
consciousness  that  others  whom  one  has  influenced  to  sin  may 
be  going  on  in  the  wrong  direction  as  a  consequence  of  one's 
evil  influence,  being  further  corrupted  and  corrupting  others. 
Oftentimes,  too,  in  addition  to  the  natural  evil  consequences, 
the  individual  has  to  endure  artificial  penalties,  rightly  or 


88  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

wrongly  imposed,  for  remedy  or  for  retribution,  in  the  home, 
the  school,  the  state  and  society  in  general. 

But  not  only  does  the  individual  suffer  the  evil  consequences 
of  his  own  wrong  conduct.  Much  more  tragic  is  the  way  in 
which  the  social  group,  such  as  the  community,  suffers  the  con- 
sequences of  its  wrong-doing  or  of  that  of  its  representatives  or 
rulers,  or  of  the  governments  of  other  peoples.  In  particular, 
war  with  its  attendant  evils  is  the  "hell"  which  tends  to  fol- 
low as  the  natural  consequence  of  international  unrighteous- 
ness. 

With  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  penalties  of  sin  in  a  future 
existence,  it  may  be  said  that  here  again  the  inevitable  con- 
sequences constitute  the  penalty.  Assuming  the  same  laws  of 
character-formation  in  a  future  existence  as  obtain  in  this,  we 
may  mention  increasing  moral  degradation  as  the  most  dreadful, 
if  not  the  most  dreaded,  of  these  personally  experienced  con- 
sequences. There  is  nothing  arbitrary  about  this  penalty;  he 
who  knew  better,  but  did  wrong,  shall,  so  far  as  corruption  of 
character  is  concerned,  be  beaten  with  "many  stripes,"  as  com- 
pared with  the  one  who  did  wrong  ignorantly.  Moreover,  there 
is  not,  so  far  as  we  can  say,  any  absolute  limit  to  the  possible 
degradation  that  may  take  place  in  an  indefinitely  prolonged 
future  existence;  this  is  the  really  to  be  dreaded  "bottomless 
pit."  Besides,  as  a  consequence  of  this  increasing  degradation 
there  must  ensue  an  alienation  from  the  most  desirable  personal 
relationships;  so  far  as  these  are  concerned  the  individual  be- 
comes "a  castaway,"  "lost"  in  "  outer  darkness."  Indeed  the 
persistent  sinner  would  find  himself,  not  arbitrarily  but  nat- 
urally and  inevitably,  cast  out,  as  it  were,  upon  the  refuse-heap 
of  the  universe,  to  suffer  the  mental  pains  of  remorse  amd  shame 
and  tormenting  fear  in  the  "Gehenna  of  fire,"  the  spiritual 
counterpart  of  that  defiled  place  in  the  valley  of  Hinnom  (Ge- 
henna) outside  the  walls  of  Jerusalem  where  the  refuse  of  the  city 
was  thrown,  and  where  the  fire  that  devoured  it  was  kept  con- 
tinually burning.  In  fine,  if  war  is  a  present  "hell,"  is  it  not 
likely  that  the  future  hell  will  be,  with  its  inevitable  conflict  of 
selfish  wills,  a  state  of  war,  and  that  without  promise  of  either 
victory  or  peace? 

In  answer  to  the  question  as  to  the  duration  of  these  future 


SIN  AND  ITS  EVIL  CONSEQUENCES  89 

evil  consequences  of  evil-doing,  not  much  can  be  said,  at  least 
in  the  present  connection,  i.  e.,  among  the  presuppositions  of 
theology,  where  of  course  there  must  be  no  dependence  upon  the 
idea  of  a  Divine  Being.  There  is  something  which  may  be  said, 
however.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  fact  that  character  tends 
to  permanence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  continuation  of  con- 
scious existence  would  seem  to  involve,  theoretically  at  least, 
the  continued  possibility  of  a  change  of  will.  Where  there  is 
consciousness,  there  seems  always  to  be  some  power,  however 
slight,  of  alternative  possibilities  in  the  directing  of  the  atten- 
tion, which  may  therefore,  so  far  as  we  can  say,  be  turned  at 
some  future  time  toward  a  better  way  than  that  which  has  been 
followed  hitherto.  Perhaps,  too,  the  evil  consequences  of  the 
wrong  course  of  action  will  be  realized  to  such  an  extent  that  a 
desire  for  a  change  of  will  may  be  engendered.  Even  remorse 
and  despair,  the  moods  traditionally  supposed  to  be  char- 
acteristic of  the  mental  state  of  those  who  have  died  un- 
repentant, would  be  far  from  being,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  observer,  the  most  truly  hopeless  states;  a  hardened  in- 
difference would  argue  a  much  more  hopeless  condition.  But 
even  if  we  may  be  inclined  to  cherish  the  hope  that  it  will  never 
be  absolutely  too  late  for  some  change  for  the  better,  we  should 
not  close  our  eyes  to  the  truth  that  it  is  always  too  late  for  the 
realization,  at  any  particular  time,  not  only  for  one's  self  but 
for  others  as  well,  of  all  the  good  that  might  have  been  realized 
had  the  evil  action  not  been  committed.  Both  on  this  account, 
and  because  of  what  every  moral  failure  is  in  itself,  it  must 
remain  forever  regrettable  that  in  any  particular  instance  the 
evil  rather  than  the  good  was  chosen.  And  of  the  actual  evil 
consequences  of  sin  in  the  future  life,  there  is  no  better  prospect 
than  that  they  will  be,  to  use  the  New  Testament  word,  "  age- 
long/' 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PRESUPPOSITION  PECULIAR  TO  THEOLOGY:  THE  EXIST- 
ENCE OF  GOD 

IN  the  case  of  each  of  the  special  descriptive  sciences  there  is 
one  presupposition  which  is  peculiar  to  that  science  alone.  It 
is  the  assumption  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  science  exists 
and  is  accessible  to  human  experience  in  such  a  way  that  knowl- 
edge of  it  is  possible.  Thus  chemistry  presupposes  the  existence 
of  matter  and  its  accessibility  to  human  experience;  biology 
assumes  the  same  with  reference  to  life,  as  does  psychology  with 
reference  to  consciousness  and  sociology  with  reference  to 
society.  Similarly  theology  as  an  empirical  science  presup- 
poses the  existence  of  the  divine  Object  and  its  sufficient  acces- 
sibility to  experience  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of  at 
least  some  of  its  qualities  and  relations.  Of  course  what  is 
assumed  here  is  not  the  existence  of  God,  or  the  divine  Object, 
as  fully  defined  and  described.  That  can  be  affirmed,  according  to 
scientific  procedure,  only  at  the  end  of  our  empirical  investigation. 
As  in  other  empirical  sciences,  what  is  presupposed  is  that  the 
object  is,  while  what  the  object  is  is  what  has  to  be  discovered. 

But  in  assuming  that  God,  or  the  divine  Object  as  the  spe- 
cial subject-matter  of  theology,  exists,  a  preliminary  definition 
of  that  object  is  presupposed.  That  is,  the  object  must  be 
defined  sufficiently  to  mark  it  off  from  other  possible  objects  of 
study.  Such  a  preliminary  definition  would  be  "the  necessary 
objective  Factor  in  experimental  religion,"  or  "the  Object  of 
religious  dependence,"  or  "the  Source  of  religious  deliverance 
from  evil. "  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  person  who  is  able  to  as- 
sume, at  the  outset  of  his  methodical  theological  investigations, 
that  this  divine  Object  exists,  will  already  commonly  be  in  a 
position  to  make  the  definition  closer  and  more  detailed.  Thus, 
he  may  be  in  a  position  to  affirm  the  existence  of  "a  Power,  not 
ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteousness/'  or,  more  accurately, 

90 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  91 

a  Power,  not  identical  with  our  empirical  selves,  which  makes 
for  some  dependable  result  (e.  g.,  righteousness)  in  and  through 
us,  when  we  relate  ourselves  to  that  Power  in  a  certain  dis- 
coverable way.  Or,  once  more,  the  theological  beginner  may  even 
be  in  a  position  to  affirm  the  existence  of  a  Being  great  enough 
and  good  enough  to  enable  us,  when  rightly  related  thereto,  to 
be  spiritually  prepared  for  whatever  experience  we  may  have 
to  meet.  These  more  detailed  definitions  of  God  should  not 
be  insisted  upon  as  presuppositions,  however.  Whether  or 
not  such  characteristics  are  to  be  attributed  to  God  is  part 
of  the  problem  which  empirical  theology  has  to  investigate. 

Now  the  basis  for  this  initial  special  presupposition  in  theol- 
ogy, as  in  other  sciences,  is  pre-scientific  experience  of  the 
object.  There  is  a  pre-botanical  experience  and  knowledge  of 
plants  which  is  the  necessary  preliminary  to  starting  upon 
scientific  botanical  investigation.  And  there  is  a  pre-theological 
experience  and  knowledge  of  the  divine  Reality,  preliminary  to 
the  science  of  theology.  On  the  basis  of  a  religious  intuition, 
a  cognitive  religious  experience  which  is  able  to  stand  the  test 
of  practical  and  intellectual  criticism,  there  has  been  achieved 
a  pre-theological  assurance  that  the  divine  Being  exists.  This 
religious  intuition  is  a  special  instance  of  perception  in  a  complex, 
other  examples  of  which  are  the  intuitive  awareness  of  one's 
own  existence  (in  conscious  experience),  of  the  existence  of 
other  persons  (in  social  experience),  and  of  physical  objects 
(in  sense  experience).  In  the  complex  of  religious  experience, 
at  least  of  religious  experience  at  its  best,  the  religious  subject 
is  aware,  in  an  empirical  intuition,  of  the  existence  of  the  relig- 
ious Object,  an  Object  of  religious  dependence  which  proves 
to  be  a  Source  of  religious  deliverance.  The  detailed  develop- 
ment and  defense  of  this  view  belong  to  the  epistemological 
part  of  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

If,  then,  we  are  conscious  of  having  had  personal  experience 
of  the  divine  Reality,  we  know  that  God  exists,  although  what 
God  is  can  only  be  properly  determined  in  detail  through  a 
scientific  theological  procedure,  dependent  always  upon  verifi- 
cation in  religious  experience.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  that  the 
only  conclusive  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  ultimately, 
is  the  empirical  argument.  An  indication,  even  if  in  bare  out- 


92  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

line,  of  the  grounds  for  this  statement  will  involve  reference  to 
the  classical  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God. 

The  classical  theistic  arguments  are  the  moral,  the  cosmolog- 
ical  or  setiological,  the  teleological  and  the  ontological.  To 
these  has  been  added  the  epistemological,  or  idealistic.  This 
idealistic  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  is  to  the  effect  that 
physical  objects  are  mere  ideas,  capable  of  existing,  therefore, 
only  in  some  mind,  but  inasmuch  as  physical  objects  existed 
before  there  were  any  human  minds  and  exist  now  independ- 
ently of  all  human  minds,  they  must  exist  and  have  existed  in 
a  superhuman  or  divine  mind.  In  criticism  of  this  argument 
it  may  be  said  in  the  first  place  that  the  "  divine  mind,"  the 
existence  of  which  is  said  to  be  established  by  this  argument, 
would  not  necessarily  be  the  divine  Power  in  which  experi- 
mental religion  is  interested. 

But,  unless  the  idealistic  position  itself  can  be  established, 
this  idealistic  argument  for  theism  of  course  falls  to  the  ground. 
And  indeed  there  is  good  ground  for  a  radical  distrust  of  ideal- 
istic speculation.  Of  opposition  to  practical  idealism  there  is 
here  no  thought;  that  ideals  are  valid  and  practically  efficient, 
and  that  the  universe  must  be  interpreted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
allow  for  this,  is  unquestioned.  But  with  theoretical  idealism, 
the  doctrine  that  all  reality,  or  the  physical  universe  at  least, 
is  essentially  idea,  the  case  is  obviously  different.  That  we 
represent  things  in  our  judgments  by  means  of  ideas,  does  not 
prove  that  the  represented  things  are  ideas.  And  that  all 
things  of  which  we  are  conscious  are  necessarily  related  to  the 
conscious  subject,  does  not  prove  that  all  things  of  which  we 
are  or  can  be  conscious  are  dependent  for  their  existence  upon 
their  relation  to  some  conscious  subject,  even  if  there  are  some 
contents  of  experience  (illusory  elements,  hallucinatory  ob- 
jects, etc.)  that  are  thus  dependent.  Nor  will  it  do  to  reason 
as  follows:  (Some)  knowledge  is  possible  (since  the  contradic- 
tory of  this  proposition  is  self-contradictory) ;  therefore  reality 
(as  a  whole,  or  in  general)  is  intelligible,  i.  e.,  rational,  i.  e., 
spiritual,  mental,  or  ideal.  The  fallacies  of  this  typical  argu- 
ment for  idealism  are  obvious.* 

*  Illogical  conversion,  or  illicit  minor  in  the  proposition,  "Reality  is 
intelligible,"  and  equivocation  in  the  use  of  the  term  "rational." 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  93 

But  if  the  idealistic  "proof"  of  theism  must  be  regarded  as 
wholly  discredited,  the  same  can  hardly  be  said  of  the  above 
mentioned  " classical"  arguments.  Elements  of  value  are  to 
be  found  in  the  moral,  the  cosmological  and  the  teleological 
"  proofs,"  and  even  the  ontological  argument,  or  what  remains 
of  it  after  its  many  transmutations  in  the  history  of  philosophy, 
may  be  said  still  to  have  the  first  and  final  word  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  theism.  Only  it  must  not  be  the  old,  purely  apriori 
form  of  the  ontological  argument,  but  its  modern  empirical 
form.  Similarly  the  moral,  cosmological  and  teleological  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God  have  their  full  value  only  when 
brought  into  association  with  the  argument  from  religious 
experience. 

The  essential  element  in  the  ontological  argument  is  the 
conviction  that,  given  the  true  idea  of  God,  the  existence  of 
God  ought  to  be  readily  proved.  But  in  its  older  form,  as  an 
attempt  to  deduce  the  existence  of  God  from  the  idea  of  God  as 
a  perfect  Being,  it  amounts  simply  to  the  most  glaring  instance 
on  record  of  the  common  fallacy  of  begging  the  question.  As 
W.  E.  Hocking  has  said,  "No  proof  of  God  can  be  deduc- 
tive .  .  .  the  ontological  argument  in  its  true  form  is  a  report 
of  experience."  The  procedure,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  as 
follows:  There  are  some  ideas  which  we  never  could  have  had 
without  first  having  had  an  experience  of  the  realities  of  which 
they  are  the  ideas.  In  such  cases  one  can  pass  immediately, 
without  doubt  or  difficulty,  from  the  idea  to  an  affirmation  of 
the  existence  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  idea.  Such  an  idea  is 
that  of  Absolute  Reality,  or  Reality  as  a  Whole.  We  should 
never  have  had  the  idea,  if  we  had  never  been  in  immediate, 
experiental,  and  therefore  cognitive  relations  with  Absolute 
Reality,  and  if  we  had  not  been  in  that  experience  intuitively 
conscious  that  the  Reality  in  the  presence  of  which  we  were 
was  one  Reality,  a  Whole.  In  so  far,  then,  as  Reality  as  a 
Whole  has  significance  as  an  object  of  experimental  religion, 
we  may  be  said  to  have  here  the  ontological  argument  in  a 
convincing,  because  empirical  form.  And  it  is  in  the  experience 
that  the  proof  of  the  existence  is  to  be  found. 

But  this  does  not  carry  us  very  far.  Practical,  experimental 
religion  is  interested  in  making  a  distinction  within  Reality  as 


94  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

a  Whole;  it  seeks  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  Power  operating 
somewhere  within  Reality  as  a  Whole,  a  Power  which  can  be 
regarded  as  divine  and  made  the  Special  Object  of  religious 
dependence.  And  here,  whether  we  approach  the  question 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  moral,  the  cosmological,  or  the 
teleological  argument,  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  God  in 
which  religion  is  interested  can  only  be  empirical,  the  verifi- 
cation of  the  right  idea  of  God  in  the  right  religious  experience. 

The  moral  argument  is  commonly  associated  with  the  Kant- 
ian point  of  view,  but  it  is  also  the  essentially  pragmatic  argu- 
ment. It  consists  in  the  postulate  of  the  reality  of  God,  on  the 
ground  that  his  existence,  or  belief  in  his  existence,  is  morally 
necessary;  not  simply,  as  Kant  seems  to  have  felt,  to  guarantee 
immortality  and  the  adequate  happiness  of  the  virtuous  in  a 
future  life,  but  rather  for  the  gaining  of  that  special  experience 
of  deliverance,  of  liberation,  of  moral  uplift  through  religious 
dependence,  which  in  the  language  of  moral  religion  itself  is 
called  "salvation."  It  is  thus  the  feeling  that  there  ought  to 
be  a  God,  transformed  by  the  "will  to  believe"  into  the  asser- 
tion that  there  must  be  and  is  a  God.  But  to  be  convinced  of 
the  moral  need  of  God  is  not  to  escape  religious  agnosticism. 
Belief  based  upon  the  mere  will  to  believe,  even  when  that 
belief  is  thoroughly  moral,  does  not  amount  to  knowledge.  It 
is  still  an  unverified  hypothesis.  It  is  only  when  the  God  whom 
man  needs  for  the  realization  of  his  highest  possibilities  is 
experienced,  found  "revealed/'  in  an  experience  which  can  be 
called  "salvation,"  that  man  knows  "that  God  is,  and  that  he 
is  the  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek  him."  Thus  the 
moral  or  pragmatic  argument  needs  to  be  supplemented  by 
the  empirical  argument,  the  argument  from  practical  religious 
experience,  before  it  is  adequate  as  a  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God. 

The  cosmological  argument  to  the  effect  that  we  must  posit 
an  adequate  first  cause  of  the  universe,  and  that  this  adequate 
first  cause  is  God,  is  commonly  supposed  to  have  been  left  by 
Kant  dilapidated  beyond  repair.  Of  his  two  main  criticisms, 
that  the  argument  involves  an  unjustifiable  use  of  the  category 
of  causality  beyond  all  possible  human  experience,  and  that 
in  any  case  we  could  not  know  that  the  first  cause  so  inferred 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  95 

was  what  we  mean  by  God,  it  is  the  second  only  that  should 
be  regarded  as  valid.  When  we  note  that  as  a  matter  of  fact 
we  can  and  must  use  our  most  fundamental  categories,  includ- 
ing that  of  causality,  beyond  the  realm  within  which  direct 
human  experience  is  ever  possible,  and  that  even  Kant  himself 
constantly  did  so,  we  are  ready  to  see  the  point  of  the  argument 
that  the  affirmation  of  an  adequate  first  creative  cause  is  at 
once  legitimate  and  necessary,  any  alternative  involving  the 
self-contradictory  notion  of  an  actual  infinite  number  of  causes 
and  effects  up  to  date.  Indeed  it  may  be  maintained  that  the 
only  real  cause,  as  distinguished  from  mere  antecedents,  must 
be  a  first  or  creative  cause.  But  the  other  objection  to  the 
cosmological  argument  remains.  We  are  still,  so  far  as  religion 
is  concerned,  upon  the  ground  of  agnosticism.  All  that  the 
argument  proves  is  that  there  must  be  some  adequate  creative 
first  cause  of  the  universe.  What  further  that  first  cause  is, 
and  whether  or  not  it  is  the  God  of  religious  faith,  are  questions 
which  the  argument  leaves  unanswered. 

There  is  a  causal  argument,  however,  which  does  reach  to 
the  God  of  religion  as  the  ultimate  cause.  This  again  is  the 
argument  from  religious  experience.  When  a  man  learns  from 
his  practical  religious  experience  that  there  is  a  Factor  in  Abso- 
lute Reality  upon  which  he  can  depend  to  produce,  in  response 
to  the  proper  religious  adjustment,  a  certain  needed  religious 
experience — not  an  emotional  experience,  except  incidentally, 
but  an  uplift  toward  the  ideal,  especially  the  moral  ideal,  and 
an  inner  preparedness  for  anything  that  can  befall  him, — he 
has  come  to  know  God  as  the  cause  of  the  essential  thing  in  his 
religious  experience,  that  is,  as  the  "Author"  of  his  "salva- 
tion." Whether  this  creative  Cause  of  man's  "salvation"  is  to 
be  identified  or  regarded  as  organically  connected  with  the 
creative  First  Cause  of  the  universe,  is  a  question  for  theologi- 
cal and  metaphysical  theory;  but  in  the  developed  religious 
consciousness  there  is  an  anticipatory  intuition — not  to  be 
taken  uncritically — that  some  such  idea  will  prove  to  be  the 
truth. 

The  teleological  argument,  by  means  of  which  it  was  sup- 
posed that  one  might  prove  the  existence  of  God  as  the  designer 
of  the  adaptations  occurring  in  nature,  has  suffered  much  at 


96  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

the  hands  of  its  critics.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  Kant,  with 
his  objection,  already  noted,  to  the  application  of  the  causal 
category  beyond  possible  experience,  and  his  remark  that  the 
teleological  argument  would  prove  only  a  great  Architect,  and 
not  God.  Then  come  Darwin  and  his  followers,  showing, 
through  their  theories  of  natural  and  germinal  selection,  how 
unnecessary  is  the  conception  of  this  external  Architect  with 
Ms  detailed  plan  according  to  which  all  adaptations  are  pre- 
determined. And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  in  recent 
vitalism  the  plausible  but  perhaps  not  fully  established  theory 
of  a  non-mechanical  factor  in  life-processes,  directing  the 
development  of  structure  and  the  discharge  of  function,  and 
the  impressive  doctrine  of  a  creative  and  directive  life-impulse 
underlying  the  facts  of  evolution  and  giving  rise  to  an  increas- 
ingly elaborate  and  even  dangerous  complication  of  living 
forms.  Rejecting  as  before  Kant's  rather  dogmatic  agnosti- 
cism, we  would  maintain  that  the  facts  of  physical  life  strongly 
suggest,  not  indeed  design  in  any  such  sense  as  would  involve 
complete  predetermination,  but  an  adequate  and  therefore  not 
purely  mechanical  creative  cause  fundamental  to  the  life- 
history  of  the  individual  organism  and  to  those  factors  in  evo- 
lution which  operate  prior  to  natural  and  even  germinal  selec- 
tion. Besides,  the  vitalistic  interpretation  of  human  freedom 
lends  color  to  this  supermechanical  theory  of  life  in  general. 
Moreover,  the  highly  complex  fitness  of  the  environment  to  be 
the  abode  of  physical  life  in  its  developing  forms  strongly 
suggests  a  teleological  interpretation  of  the  constitution  of  the 
inorganic  world.  It  must  be  maintained,  however,  that  the 
argument  does  not  thus  far  conduct  us  out  of  religious  agnosti- 
cism. We  do  not,  apart  from  further  light,  know  that  this 
adequate  and  seemingly  creative  cause  of  evolution  or  of  other 
possibly  teleological  processes  in  nature  is  the  God  of  experi- 
mental religion. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  a  teleological  argument  which  does 
directly  indicate  the  existence  of  the  God  in  which  the  developed 
religious  consciousness  is  interested.  This  again  is  the  empiri- 
cal argument,  the  argument  from  the  practical  religious 
experience  of  spiritual  " salvation."  Through  a  critical  and 
sufficiently  sympathetic  study  of  the  history  of  practical  re- 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  97 

ligious  experience  there  arises  an  understanding  of  what  it  is 
that  the  religious  Object  really  can  be  depended  upon  to  pro- 
duce, the  religious  Object  being  defined  as  that  Factor  in  human 
experience  which  produces,  on  occasion  of  man's  continued 
right  relation,  a  definite  and  qualitatively  predictable  result. 
The  result  in  question  is  found  to  be  what  religion  itself  has 
called  "  sanctification  "  or  "growth  in  grace, "  a  growing  con- 
formity of  the  religious  individual  or  community  to  the  ideal 
or  "divine"  type.  As  this  Factor  which  can  be  depended  upon 
to  guide  the  spiritual  development  of  those  who  attain  to  a 
certain  religious  adjustment,  the  God  of  practical  religious 
experience  may  be  said  to  have  been  shown  to  exist.  Whether 
the  creative  Cause  of  this  spiritual  evolution  of  the  man  or  the 
community  that  has  found  the  right  religious  adjustment  is 
also  the  creative  cause  of  biological  evolution,  is  a  question  to 
be  dealt  with  further  by  theological  and  metaphysical  theory; 
but  here  again  the  developed  religious  consciousness  intuitively 
surmises  that  there  is  either  an  identity  or  a  close  organic  con- 
nection between  the  directive  causal  factor  in  the  one  set  of 
instances  and  in  the  other. 

Finally  we  come  once  more  to  the  ontological  argument. 
Here  again  it  is  in  connection  with  the  empirical  argument  that 
it  has  its  true  place.  It  is  not  from  the  mere  idea  of  God  that 
we  can  prove  the  existence  of  God,  but  from  a  consciousness  of 
God  which  is  at  the  same  time  an  experience  of  God.  But  it 
should  be  recognized  that  this  experience  of  God  must  be  a 
practical  religious  experience,  or,  if  a  mystical  intuition,  one 
that  stands  the  test  of  practice  as  well  as  of  reflection.  The 
mystic  does  not  really  know  on  sufficiently  critical  grounds 
that  the  object  of  his  mystical  contemplation  is  a  really  existent 
divine  Being,  unless  back  of  the  mystical  experience  there  has 
been  the  practical  religious  experience  of  "salvation,"  with  its 
"revelation"  of  the  presence  and  power  of  God,  making  the 
human  spirit  ready  for  anything  that  may  have  to  be  endured 
or  done,  and  bringing  deliverance  from  sin  and  all  absolute  evil. 
This  God  of  practical  religion  is  not  known  in  the  religious  ex- 
perience as  the  Whole  of  Absolute  Reality,  but  rather  as  a 
Factor  in  the  Whole,  sufficient  to  be  the  cause  of  the  religious 
experience  of  s&J\vation.  Just  what  God  is,  is  to  be  learned,  as 


98  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

we  have  already  suggested,  through  a  scientific,  empirical, 
theological  procedure,  making  use  of  observation  and  experi- 
ment in  the  practical  religious  life. 

And  here  we  come  upon  the  true  place  of  the  ontological 
argument.  When  man's  practical  religious  experience  is  what 
it  ought  to  be,  and  his  idea  of  God  has  become  sufficiently  em- 
pirical and  scientific,  he  will  know  that  the  God  of  which  he  has 
an  idea  really  exists.  He  will  be  assured,  not  only  that  there  is  a 
total  Absolute  Reality,  but  that  the  God  of  his  theology  is  a 
fact  of  his  practical  religious  experience,  and  so  an  absolute  ob- 
jective reality.  Thus  we  see  that  while  ability  to  use  the  on- 
tological argument  in  its  most  rudimentary  form,  i.  .e.,  with 
reference  to  Absolute  Reality,  ought  to  be  one  of  the  easiest  and 
earliest  achievements  of  reflective  thought,  ability  to  use  the 
argument  in  its  final  form,  i.  e.,  with  reference  to  the  completely 
defined  Object  of  practical  religious  dependence,  is  an  ideal, 
not  fully  realized  as  yet,  perhaps,  by  anyone.  On  the  one  hand 
our  experience  of  God  is  not  deep  or  definite  enough,  and  on  the 
other  hand  our  idea  of  God  is  not  yet  empirical  or  scientific 
enough;  and  each  of  these  defects  is  aggravated  by  the  other. 

The  speculative  theologian  undertakes  to  say  what  God  is, 
but  finds  it  difficult  to  show  that  God  is;  the  mystic,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  assured  that  God  is,  but  hesitates  to  say  what  God  is. 
But  neither  achievement  avails  much  without  the  other.  A 
theology  scientifically  constructed  upon  the  basis  of  experience 
of  the  divine  Reality  should  add  to  our  knowledge  of  what  God 
is  and  to  our  certainty  that  he  is.  It  should  normally  culminate, 
then,  in  the  assured  reaffirmation  of  the  existence  of  God  in 
immediate  connection  with  a  detailed  description  of  the  divine 
attributes  and  relations.  And  when  in  this  way  the  so-called 
ontological  argument  can  be  used  as  unhesitatingly  at  the  end 
of  the  theological  construction  as  at  its  beginning,  it  will  tend 
to  confirm  the  view  that  God  has  been  truly  described  as  well 
as  really  experienced.  When  these  two  conditions  are  ade- 
quately met,  further  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  will  have 
become  unnecessary.* 

*  Several  of  the  immediately  preceding  paragraphs  have  been  repro- 
duced, with  slight  modifications,  from  an  article  by  the  author  in  the 
'"Philosophical  Review  "  for  January,  1914. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD  99 

For  the  present,  however,  in  setting  forth  the  presuppositions 
of  theology,  we  cannot  assert  the  existence  of  God  as  part  of  a 
theory  constructed  upon  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  empirical 
theology.  We  may  affirm  it,  however,  in  either  one  of  two  ways. 
We  may  assume  the  existence  of  an  Object  of  religious  depend- 
ence and  Source  of  religious  deliverance  as  already  intuitively 
and  practically  certain  on  the  basis  of  normal  religious  experi- 
ence, leaving  it  to  be  seen  whether  this  intuition  and  practical 
certainty  will  or  will  not  stand  the  test  of  a  more  methodical 
empirical  investigation.  Or,  if  the  would-be  empirical  theologian 
finds  himself  lacking  in  the  desired  assurance  of  the  reality  of  the 
divine,  he  may  still  employ  as  a  fundamental  working  hypothe- 
sis the  idea  of  the  God  whose  existence  religious  need  would 
lead  him  to  postulate.  By  acting  intelligently  upon  the  re- 
ligious hypothesis,  he  will  best  fulfill  the  conditions  of  the  ex- 
perience in  the  light  of  which  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of 
God  can  be  made  with  adequate  assurance. 

It  should  be  understood,  however,  that  this  initial  supposition 
of  the  existence  of  a  divine  Reality  is  not  to  be  made  the  basis 
of  any  other  presuppositions  of  theology;  nor  is  it  to  be  used  as 
an  assumption  from  which  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn  beyond 
what  is  supported  by  religious  experience  itself.  In  stating  it 
explicitly  as  a  presupposition,  we  are  simply  recognizing  an 
instance  of  that  common  pre-scientific  knowledge  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  special  sciences  without  which  the  special 
methodical  investigation  which  we  call  science  could  scarcely 
have  begun  at  all. 


PART  II 

THE  EMPIRICAL  DATA  AND  LAWS  OF 
THEOLOGY 


CHAPTER  I 
REVELATION  IN  GENERAL 

IF  there  is  to  be  a  scientific  empirical  theology,  there  must  be 
empirical  data  for  it  to  be  based  upon.  That  is,  there  must  be 
facts  of  the  recognizable  presence  of  the  divine  within  the 
human,  or,  at  any  rate,  within  the  field  of  human  experience. 
In  other  words,  there  must  be  revelation  of  the  divine.  Ex- 
perimental religion  has  been  able  to  maintain  its  vitality,  only 
as  it  has  been  able  to  point  to  facts  that,  for  the  time  being  at 
least,  could  be  regarded  as  revelation,  i.  e.,  as  manifestation  of 
the  presence  of  the  divine  Being,  or  of  the  present  activity  of  the 
divine  Power. 

In  primitive  religion  the  content  of  "revelation"  tended  to 
consist,  for  the  most  part,  of  certain  spectacular  and  as  yet  oc- 
cult occurrences  in  nature  and  in  mind,  which,  as  especially 
awe-inspiring,  or  "holy,"  or — in  some  crude  adumbration  of 
the  religious  rather  than  philosophical  sense  of  the  term — "mi- 
raculous," were  ascribed  to  the  mysterious  power  or  powers  with 
which  man  believed  himself  to  be  surrounded,  and  upon  which 
he  felt  that  he  was  ultimately  dependent.  At  the  same  time 
the  community  had  its  recognized  social  values — certain  pos- 
sessions, persons,  times,  places,  natural  objects  and  events, 
and  human  acts  that  were  (originally  because  of  their  real  or 
supposed  practical  value  to  the  community)  "sacred."  It 
was  only  natural  for  optimistic  religious  faith  to  look,  if  not  for 
a  complete  coincidence,  at  least  for  a  working  harmony  between 
the  mysteriously  "holy"  and  the  socially  "sacred."  Through 
adjustment  to  the  mysterious  Power  "revealed"  in  the  "holy," 
it  was  thought  to  conserve  and  promote  the  "sacred."  Often, 
through  coincidence  or  crude  anticipation  of  scientific  proce- 
dure, success  was  achieved,  and  the  devotee  was  "saved," 
supposedly  by  the  divine  power,  from  some  experienced  or 
threatening  evil.  But  many  times  religious  faith  was  disap- 

103 


104    i   TKEOEG&Y.AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 


pointed.11  : The'' "ditTihe,v,' or  supposedly  favorable  mysterious 
power,  to  which  prayers  and  gifts  were  offered  and  other  re- 
ligious adjustments  made,  was  not  always  "revealed"  as  acting 
as  a  reasonable  deity,  it  was  supposed,  ought  to  act.  Indeed 
so  perverse  and  uncontrollable  did  the  mysterious  power  often 
appear,  that  it  is  not  surprising  that  certain  events  came  to  be 
interpreted  as  revealing  not  a  divine  but  a  diabolical  power,  or 
a  conflict  of  divine  beings. 

But  the  occult  and  awe-inspiring  events  in  the  realm  of  mind 
seemed  to  be  somewhat  more  controllable  than  those  in  the 
realm  of  external  nature.  Certain  individuals — the  shamans, 
for  instance — developed  a  technique  for  inducing  experiences 
in  which  visions,  auditions  and  vocal  automatisms  had  part, 
and  which  were  interpreted  as  instances  of  divine  "inspiration," 
producing  "revelation"  of  the  divine  mind  and  will.  Moreover, 
this  supposed  revelation  was  regarded  as  having  divine  authority, 
by  virtue  of  the  process  of  inspiration.  Thus  there  began  to  be 
laid  the  foundation  for  a  system  of  religious  belief  which  should 
be  empirical,  and  therefore  at  the  same  time  a  "natural"  and 
"revealed"  theology.  But  in  its  primitive  form  it  rested  upon 
such  an  identification  of  the  divine  with  the  occult,  that  it  could 
not  be  made  scientific.  The  best  that  could  ever  be  developed 
on  this  basis  was  a  one-sided  and  extreme  mystical  religion  and 
theology,  in  which  the  values  of  everyday  practical  life  would 
be  denied  and  the  ordinary  religious  individual  be  left  under 
the  external  authority  of  the  mystic.  In  its  original  shamanistic 
form,  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  religious  experience  was  not 
for  the  common  individual,  there  was  the  still  greater  difficulty 
that  even  when  the  supposed  inspiration  had  been  induced,  the 
resultant  "revelation"  was  often — probably  oftener  than  not — 
misleading.  There  were  multitudes  of  "false  prophets,"  whose 
predictions  were  not  fulfilled,  and  whose  teachings  ran  counter 
to  the  best  interests  and  ideals  of  the  social  group.  (Psychol- 
ogists of  religion  commonly  use  the  words  "inspiration"  and 
"revelation"  in  this  original  sense,  as  referring  to  these  occult 
experiences  and  their  noetic  content — without,  of  course,  at- 
taching any  notion  of  objective  validity  to  the  terms.) 

The  unsatisfactoriness  of  this  primitive,  occult  phase  of  the 
inspiration  and  revelation  faith  led  in  time  to  the  attempt  to 


REVELATION  IN  GENERAL  105 

standardize  these  religious  notions,  so  that  there  might  be  a 
universally  accessible  revelation,  the  same  for  all,  and  one  which 
would  embody  what  had  been  already  tested  and  found  satis- 
factory. Thus  the  canon  of  sacred  scriptures  was  formed,  the 
various  parts  of  which  on  the  whole  may  be  said  to  have  been 
selected  because  of  their  experienced  value.  These  were  set  up 
as  embodying  the  authoritative  revelation,  and  in  support  of 
this  dogma  there  was  developed  the  theory  of  the  inspiration 
of  the  Scriptures,  according  to  which  even  the  words  employed 
were  dictated  by  the  divine  Spirit  ("verbal  inspiration").  Or 
if,  as  was  felt  by  some,  so  much  as  that  could  not  well  be  main- 
tained in  view  of  the  marks  of  individual  human  authorship, 
at  least  all  the  thoughts,  it  was  claimed,  were  divinely  imparted 
("  plenary  inspiration  ") .  In  either  case  the  documents  resulting 
from  this  process  of  " inspiration"  were  held  to  be,  or  at  least 
to  have  been  in  their  original  form,  a  perfect  "revelation,"  the 
pure  "Word  of  God,"  and  an  absolutely  inerrant  and  infallible 
"rule  of  faith  and  practice."  The  fact  of  inspiration  itself  was 
supposed  to  be  adequately  guaranteed  by  the  miracles  recorded 
in  the  same  infallible,  because  inspired,  because  miraculously 
attested  Scriptures! 

Thus  the  basis  was  laid  for  a  "revealed  theology,"  sharply 
contrasted  with  "natural  theology"  (which  might  still  be  em- 
ployed to  establish  the  existence  of  God  and  the  reasonableness 
of  the  expectation  of  revelation).  This  "revealed  theology" 
was  not,  however,  properly  speaking,  empirical;  on  the  con- 
trary it  was  traditionalistic  and  dogmatic,  and  thus  precluded 
from  the  outset  from  ever  becoming  really  scientific.  More- 
over, certain  difficulties  arose  when  ordinary  scientific  methods 
of  historical  and  literary  criticism  were  applied  in  the  study  of 
the  sacred  writings.  It  became  evident  that  with  all  their 
value  and  whether  in  any  sense  "divine"  or  not,  they  were 
unmistakably  fallible,  human  documents.  They  might  in  some 
sense  "contain"  the  word  of  God,  but  they  could  no  longer  be 
regarded  as  the  divine  Word  in  the  sense  claimed  in  the  doc- 
trines of  verbal  and  plenary  inspiration. 

Parallel  with  the  taking  up  of  a  critical  attitude  toward  the 
traditionalistic  notion  of  revelation  and  inspiration,  there  grew 
up  the  rationalistic  notion,  according  to  which  the  ultimate 


106          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

authority  in  religion  as  elsewhere  is  the  "dry  light  of  reason." 
According  to  rationalism  the  only  revelation  is  that  of  discovery 
through  the  rational  intellect,  interpreted  as  the  progressive 
self-manifestation  of  divine  Reason  in  and  through  the  devel- 
oping human  reason.  Here  all  theology  becomes  natural 
theology,  the  chief  difficulty  being  to  find  any  ultimate  distinc- 
tion between  religious  truth  and  any  other.  For  while  ra- 
tionalism adopts  a  more  or  less  patronizing  attitude  toward 
empirical  science,  its  own  procedure  is  not  scientific  in  the 
empirical  sense,  but  simply  speculative.  It  finds  no  more  value 
for  knowledge  of  the  divine  in  religious  experience  than  in  any 
other  type  of  experience.  Any  experience  will  do  well  enough  as 
a  basis  for  the  dialectic,  which  leads,  it  is  claimed,  to  the  Abso- 
lute, or  Absolute  Reason,  as  the  only  true  God,  and  one  which 
may  thus  be  known  without  any  aid  from  experimental  religion. 
The  ideas  and  intuitions  of  historical  religions  are  ignored,  as 
containing,  presumably,  comparatively  little  that  has  real 
revelation-value. 

The  untenability,  from  a  critical  point  of  view,  of  the  tradi- 
tionalistic  notion  of  revelation,  inspiration  and  authority,  and 
the  barren  abstractness  of  the  rationalistic  view,  are  driving 
theology  back  to  the  more  original,  yet  possibly  more  permanent 
religio-empirical  approach,  the  hope  being  that  it  will  be  found 
feasible  to  substitute  for  the  occult  notions  of  primitive  thought 
the  scientific  principles  and  methods  of  modern  investigation. 
What  is  imperatively  needed  for  the  well-being  of  religion  is  a 
basis  in  experience  for  a  theology  which  shall  again  be  at  once 
both  natural  and  revealed.  Such  a  theology  might  well  retain 
the  vitality  of  historic  religion  even  while  it  was  achieving  the 
validity  of  scientific  method. 

Now  the  data  for  such  a  scientific  theology  must  be  the  facts 
revealed  in  religious  perception.  For  it  is  not  enough  to  ap- 
preciate the  divine  qualities  as  ideal;  there  must  be  perception 
of  the  divine  as  real.  What  we  mean  here,  or  a  part  of  it,  is 
sometimes  called  " faith";  but  the  term  is  objectionable,  for  the 
reason  that  as  commonly  used  it  connotes  mere  belief.  On  the 
contrary  the  religious  consciousness,  at  least  at  its  best,  involves 
experience  and  recognition  of  the  religious  Object,  the  Divine,  as 
in  some  real  sense  present.  Revelation  and  religious  perception 


REVELATION  IN  GENERAL  107 

are  thus  correlative  terms,  the  objective  and  subjective  poles, 
respectively,  of  normal  religious  experience.  They  are,  within 
the  cognitive  religious  situation,  the  stimulus  and  the  response. 
And  these  biological  terms  are  not  to  be  used  simply  in  the  sense 
of  the  older  idea  of  the  "reflex  arc,"  according  to  which  in  the 
stimulus  only  the  object  is  active,  while  the  subject  remains 
passive,  and  vice  versa  in  the  response.  Stimulus  and  response 
are  to  be  understood,  rather,  in  the  sense  of  Dewey's  revised 
notion  of  co-ordinated  reciprocal  activities,  according  to  which 
in  the  "stimulus"  there  is  some  sort  of  selective  activity  on  the 
part  of  the  organism,  while  in  the  "response"  there  is  an  objec- 
tive factor  still  operative.  Applied  to  revelation  and  religious 
perception  this  will  mean  that  there  is  in  religious  experience  a 
series  of  co-ordinated  reciprocal  activities  of  the  divine  Being 
(the  religious  Object)  and  the  religious  subject;  there  can  be  no 
"revelation"  without  religious  perception  constituting  it  such, 
and  even  throughout  the  later  phases  of  the  response  to  this 
"revelation"  there  is  an  objective  factor  still  functioning  as 
revelation,  or  the  presence  and  activity  of  the  Divine. 

Religious  perception,  like  perception  generally,  involves 
apperception.  And  religious  apperception,  as  has  been  sug- 
gested in  another  connection,  includes  two  main  elements,  viz., 
appreciative  apperception  of  religious  value,  and  realistic  or 
substantial-causal  apperception  of  the  religious  Object  as  an 
existent  Being.  Now  religious  value,  some  would  contend, 
should  be  denned  in  such  a  way  as  to  include  all  spiritual  and 
therefore  absolute  and  eternal  values,  all  absolutely  valid 
ideals.  And  ultimately,  from  the  point  of  view  of  "fundamental 
religion,"  this  may  very  well  be  true.  But  here  we  are  dealing 
with  religion  in  the  sense  of  experimental  religion;  we  are  con- 
cerned not  simply  with  a  divine  Object  of  devotion,  but  with  a 
responding  Power  as  well.  Hence  we  have  a  definite  objective 
control  of  the  selection  of  values  as  religious.  Religious  value  is 
the  kind  of  value  which  experimental  religion  (or,  more  accu- 
rately, the  religious  Object,  through  experimental  religion)  can  be 
depended  upon  to  promote,  when  this  experimental  religion  has 
become  adequately  critical  and  scientific  without  ceasing  to  be 
adequately  vital  and  practical.  As  a  name  for  positive  religious 
value  we  may  still  use  the  term  "holiness";  but  it  must  now  be 


108  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

with  that  particular  modification  of  its  meaning  which  it  bears 
when  it  is  what  is  really  important  for  human  well-being  that 
is  regarded  as  "sacred/'  and  when  it  is  with  this  that  the  idea 
and  feeling  of  religious  value  have  been  associated.  Now  it 
is  a  well-known  fact  of  history  that  in  the  course  of  religious 
progress  the  content  of  holiness  has  been  becoming  almost 
steadily  less  and  less  occult  and  magical  and  more  and  more 
human  and  ethical.  Religious  value,  we  may  now  say,  is  holi- 
ness in  the  human  spirit,  the  holy  spirit  in  man;  it  is  the  spiritual, 
fundamentally  the  moral,  and  perhaps  ultimately  all  true  value, 
especially  (and  for  experimental  religion,  exclusively)  as  pro- 
moted by  the  right  adjustment  to  the  religious  Object.  It  is  in 
this  ethically  holy  human  spirit,  and  in  the  process  of  making  it 
more  so,  that  we  find  the  presence,  or  revelation,  of  the  divine. 
Or,  to  use  still  other  expressions  of  advanced  experimental 
religion,  it  is  in  the  experience  of  "salvation"  (i.  e.,  deliverance 
from  sin  and  its  evil  consequences),  in  "miracle"  (interpreted  as 
the  divine  production  of  "holiness"  or  "salvation"),  in  the  uni- 
versally experienced  or  experienceable  "answer  to  prayer" 
(when  it  is  true  prayer),  that  this  "special  providence"  of 
"revelation"  is  to  be  found. 

For,  as  has  been  noted,  religious  perception  is  realistic,  and 
not  simply  appreciative.  Not  only  does  it  find  a  religious  value 
attaching  to  a  content  of  experience;  it  finds  presented  within 
the  field  of  experience  a  phase  of  the  activity  of  the  Reality  to 
which  the  religious  adjustment  has  been  made.  It  is,  like  other 
realistic  cognition,  perception  in  a  complex.  As  matter,  that 
independently  real  mass-energy  or  manifold  of  energetic  things 
which  stimulates  us  in  sense-experience,  is  revealed  as  present 
and  operative  within  the  field  of  sense-perception,  in  such  a  way 
that  it  can  be  attended  to  and  made  the  object  of  immediate 
knowledge,  so  is  it  with  the  divine  Reality  in  mature  and  expert 
religious  perception.  The  independent  Reality  or  Power  to 
which  the  persevering  experimental  religionist  finally  learns  to 
adjust  himself  successfully  is  perceived  (experienced  and 
therewith  intuitively  known)  as  a  present  Reality,  active  within 
the  religious  experience  of  the  subject,  both  stimulating  him  and 
responding  to  his  religious  adjustments.  In  other  words, 
revelation  is  the  central  and  most  significant  fact  of  religious 


REVELATION  IN  GENERAL  109 

experience  at  its  best;  it  is  the  consummation  of  experimental 
religion.  It  is  another  instance  of  the  immanence  of  the  Tran- 
scendent— the  immanence,  within  the  spiritual  life  of  man,  of 
the  transcendent  Object  of  religious  dependence.  Subjectively 
expressed,  it  is  man's  discovery  of  God,  i.  e.,  of  the  divine 
Reality,  the  question  as  to  whether  this  Reality  is  personal  or 
not,  and  similar  matters  being  reserved  for  later  discussion. 
It  is  the  experiencing  of  the  recognizable  presence  of  the  Object 
of  religious  dependence.* 

Now  in  a  scientific  theology,  naturally,  other  religions  besides 
the  Christian  may  present  whatever  universally  valid  empirical 
revelation  they  possess,  and  their  contributions  will  be  wel- 
comed. Revelation  is  presumably  as  universal  as  experimental 
religion  of  any  spiritual  value,  f  But  our  attention  will  be 
directed  chiefly  to  the  data  made  available  in  the  Christian 
religion.  Within  the  limits  of  experimental  religion  the  most 
normative  revelation  of  the  divine  is  to  be  found,  apparently, 
in  the  personal  life  and  character  of  Jesus,  "the  Christ,"  in  his 
' '  atoning "  work,  in  the  resultant  Christian  experience  of 
"salvation,"  and  in  the  developing  "kingdom  of  God."  And 
for  much  of  our  information  as  to  these  data,  we  must  go  to  the 
Christian  Bible.  This  collection  of  writings  is  the  most  original 
available  record  of  what  seems  undoubtedly  to  be  the  most 
significant  progressive  revelation  in  the  history  of  experimental 
religion,  leading  up  to  and  culminating  in  the  revelation  in  the 
"Christ"  and  in  Christian  religious  experience.  Moreover,  the 
Bible  was  written,  speaking  broadly,  under  the  inspiring  in- 
fluence of  that  progressive  and  culminating  revelation.  This 
gives  us  the  true  relation  between  revelation  and  inspiration. 
It  is  not  so  much  the  inspiration  that,  as  has  commonly  been 
supposed,  produces  the  revelation,  as  it  is  the  revelation  that 

*  As  has  been  intimated  in  another  connection,  the  complete  justifica- 
tion of  the  position  taken  here  is  a  matter  for  religious  epistemology.  The 
writer  hopes  to  discuss  it  more  fully  in  a  work  to  be  entitled  "The  Problem 
of  Religious  Knowledge" — a  companion  volume  to  "The  Problem  of 
Knowledge,"  already  published. 

t  Revelation  is  relative,  however.  As  a  candle  reveals  much  to  one  who 
is  without  sunlight,  but  little  to  one  who  is  already  in  the  enjoyment  of 
the  sunshine,  so  is  it,  perchance,  with  much  non-Christian  as  compared  with 
Christian  revelation. 


110          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

produces  the  inspiration.  Certainly  it  was  not  the  inspiration  of 
the  Christian  scriptures  that  first  produced  the  Christian  revela- 
tion; but  since  in  the  main  the  New  Testament  was  written 
under  the  inspiring  influence  of  the  revelation  of  the  divine  in 
the  person  and  work  of  Jesus  and  in  the  Christian  experience  of 
salvation  from  sin,  it  becomes  more  than  a  mere  record  of 
revelation;  when  properly  used  it  is  a  source  of  revelation  as 
well.  In  itself  it  is  not  revelation,  or  the  Word  of  God,  but  it 
mediates  the  Christian  experience  of  God,  i.  e.,  the  Christian 
revelation;  it  provides  the  permanent  possibility  of  this  Word  of 
God  in  the  soul  of  man.  Moreover,  the  inspiration  of  the  writers 
of  the  documents  which  make  up  our  Christian  scriptures  was 
essentially  similar  to  that  inspiring  influence  of  divine  revelation 
which  led  them  to  live  better  lives  than  formerly,  to  preach  the 
gospel,  to  endure  hardships  for  the  extension  of  the  "Kingdom," 
and  to  do  many  things  besides  writing  the  books  which  have  been 
gathered  into  our  Bible.  And  as  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  they  made  no  mistakes  of  any  sort  in  their  lives  or  their 
preaching,  so  we  should  not  insist  that  the  pamphlets  and  letters 
they  wrote  must  be  regarded  as  absolutely  inerrant  in  every 
particular.  Whether  it  may  be  possible  to  speak  of  the  in- 
spiration itself  as  divine,  or  even  as  supernatural  in  any  sense 
of  the  word,  or  not,  as  a  psychical  process  it  was  without  doubt 
thoroughly  natural. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  discuss  the  nature  of  valid  relig- 
ious authority.  Commonly  it  has  been  associated  directly  with 
inspiration,  as  when  it  is  said  that  this  inspired  person  or 
church  or  book  has  rightful  authority  over  the  individual. 
But,  as  Julius  Kaftan  has  remarked,  it  is  much  better,  because 
truer,  to  relate  the  idea  of  religious  authority  directly  to  revela- 
tion, than  to  make  it  depend  upon  supernatural  "inspiration." 
It  is  the  divine  as  revealed  to  the  individual  that  has  rightful 
authority  over  the  individual,  rather  than  the  mere  outcome  of 
some  other  individual's  having  been  inspired  by  a  religious 
experience  of  his  own.  In  other  words,  in  religion  as  in  logic 
and  in  morals,  the  ultimate  authority  is  objective  without 
being  purely  external,  and  internal  without  being  purely  sub- 
jective. We  are  not  obliged  to  infer,  to  decide,  or  to  respond 
religiously,  save  as  our  own  reason,  our  own  conscience,  or  our 


REVELATION  IN  GENERAL  111 

own  religious  nature  finds  what  appeals  to  it  as  logical,  or  right, 
or  divine.  But  on  the  other  hand,  we  ought  not  to  feel  free  to 
infer,  to  decide  or  to  respond  religiously  just  as  we  please, 
without  regard  to  logic,  or  moral  principle,  or  revelation.  It 
is  not  our  own  empirical  self,  whatever  it  may  chance  to  be, 
that  is  the  valid  .authority,  but  the  universally  valid,  when  we 
come  to  be  conscious  of  it  as  such.  It  has  rightful  authority 
over  us,  because  when  we  realize  its  true  value,  we  feel  and  know 
that  we  cannot  be  true  to  the  best  that  is  in  us,  or  realize  our 
highest  possible  ideal,  if  we  fail  to  respond  to  its  appeal.  It  is 
significant  that  of  him  who  is  recorded  to  have  taught  "as  one 
having  authority,  and  not  as  the  scribes"  (who  merely  quoted 
authorities),  the  story  is  told  that  when  he  was  challenged  to 
produce  some  authority  (presumably  external,  whether  Scrip- 
tural, or  in  some  other  way  traditional,  or  even  by  external 
"miracle"),  by  means  of  which  he  should  justify  his  doing 
what  must  have  appealed  to  every  right-thinking  person  who 
understood  the  circumstances,  as  justified  on  moral,  religious, 
and  general  humanitarian  grounds,  he  refused  to  comply  with 
the  demand  or  to  recognize  its  validity.  He  would  not  cheapen 
what  he  had  done  by  trying  to  justify  it  by  the  mere  appeal 
to  "chapter  and  verse,"  when  it  rested  upon  the  obvious  inter- 
nal but  objective  authority  of  recognizable  duty  and  unmis- 
takeable  human  need.  Similarly,  where  revelation  of  the 
divine  has  been  experienced,  the  appeal  to  proof-texts  is  "to 
seek  with  taper  light  the  beauteous  eye  of  heaven  to  garnish." 


CHAPTER  II 

REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST 

IN  undertaking  to  set  forth  the  special  theological  data 
offered  by  Christianity,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  it  is 
better  to  proceed  from  an  appreciation  of  the  person  of  Christ 
as  "divine"  to  a  consideration  of  his  "atoning"  life-worfc,  to- 
gether with  its  results  in  the  Christian  experience  of  "salva- 
tion, "  or  to  adopt  the  opposite  order.  An  adequate  evaluation 
of  either  logically  presupposes  essential  information  about  the 
other.  This,  however,  is  not  reasoning  in  a  circle,  just  because 
our  procedure  is  not  deductive  but  inductive.  We  learn  to 
appreciate  the  person  and  the  work  together,  but  we  can  con- 
veniently give  an  exposition  of  the  two  only  a  certain  order, 
first  the  one  and  then  the  other.  We  shall  begin,  then,  with 
the  person,  anticipating  as  far  as  necessary  the  essential  facts 
as  to  the  work  and  its  results. 

Before  undertaking  a  constructive  statement  on  this  topic, 
let  us  glance  at  the  history  of  thought  and  teaching  concerning 
"Jesus,  who  is  called  the  Christ."  We  are  told  that  when  he 
was  crucified  there  was  set  over  his  head  his  accusation  written 
in  Hebrew,  in  Greek  and  in  Latin.  This  is  interesting  to  note, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  of  all  the  interpretations  and  specula- 
tions concerning  his  person  which  have  entered  into  "orthodox" 
Christology,  some  are  essentially  Hebrew,  others  Greek,  and 
the  remainder  Latin. 

First  let  us  consider  the  virgin-birth  story,  which  is  probably 
Jewish-Christian  in  origin,  though  possibly  not  without  some 
extraneous  influence.  It  is  a  legend,  i.  e.,  a  bit  of  unconscious 
social  fiction  about  an  historical  personage,  and  as  such  it 
expresses  in  this  instance  at  once  an  appreciation  of  Jesus  and 
an  attempt  to  explain  the  religious  value,  the  holiness  and  di- 
vineness,  of  his  personality.  But  even  for  one  who  may  doubt 
or  disbelieve  in  the  actual  historicity  of  the  alleged  fact  of  the 

112 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST         113 

virgin-birth,  the  story  may  yet  have  much  the  same  sort  of 
truth  as  often  belongs  to  poetry  and  parable,  although  these  are 
commonly  more  deliberate  and  individual  in  their  composition 
than  legends,  and  correspondingly  less  deeply  significant. 
But  the  strongest  protest  should  be  made,  and  that  on  religious 
grounds,  against  the  tendency  in  certain  quarters  to  identify 
belief  in  the  virgin-birth  of  Christ  with  belief  in  (or  apprecia- 
tion of)  the  divineness  of  Jesus. 

Again,  and  still  in  the  main  within  the  limits  of  Jewish- 
Christian  thought,  we  find  the  Messianic  predicate  applied  to 
Jesus.  This  idea  of  the  Messiahship  of  Jesus  was  common  to 
all  primitive  Christians,  but  it  existed  in  the  early  church  in 
several  more  or  less  distinct  and  different  forms.  One  of  the 
most  significant  of  these  was  what  appears  to  have  been  the 
view  of  the  apostle  Paul,  according  to  which  a  pre-existent 
celestial  being  voluntarily  humbled  himself  to  become  incarnate 
and  live  and  suffer  arid  die  in  the  person  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth, 
in  order  that,  having  been  raised  from  the  dead  by  the  power 
of  God,  he  might  not  only  become,  at  his  second  advent,  the 
acknowledged  Messiah  of  Israel,  but  also  be  the  one  who,  as 
the  "second  Adam"  of  the  race,  should  redeem  first  certain 
elect  individuals  from  all  nations,  then  the  elect  nation,  Israel, 
and  ultimately  the  whole  world,  from  the  power  of  "Satan,"  as 
manifested  in  the  universal  prevalence  of  sin  and  its  sequel, 
death.  Now  this  Pauline  Christology  seems  to  be  not  only  the 
result  of  the  apostle's  reflection  on  the  facts  of  his  own  expe- 
rience in  the  light  of  the  Christian  tradition,  but  also  at  the 
same  time  the  product  of  a  not  fully  deliberate  or  conscious 
merging  of  Jewish  and  Jewish-Christian  Messianic  notions  with 
current  Greek  and  Oriental  thoughts  of  a  dying  and  reviving 
god;  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  discover  here  a  mythical  element. 
Myth,  like  legend,  is  an  unconscious  social  fiction;  but,  unlike 
legend,  it  centers  immediately  in  a  supramundane  being, 
rather  than  in  an  historical  personage.  Like  legend,  however, 
it  may  have  the  kind  of  truth  which  great  poetry  has;  and  inas- 
much as  this  myth  of  "the  man  from  heaven"  is  attached  to 
the  figure  of  the  historic  Jesus,  it  becomes,  even  from  the  point 
of  view  of  a  critical  understanding  of  its  largely  mythical  char- 
acter, a  most  significant  expression  of  appreciation  of  the 


114          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

supreme  religious  value  of  a  personality  and  career,  the  salient 
facts  with  respect  to  which  were  still  matters  of  recent  expe- 
rience and  ready  memory  to  many  within  the  Christian  com- 
munity. 

When  we  come  to  the  fourth  Gospel,  with  its  notion  of  a 
Logos-Messiah,  we  begin  to  pass  from  the  Jewish-Christian  to 
the  Greek-Christian  world  of  thought,  where  we  find  myth  sup- 
plemented and  to  some  extent  supplanted  by  metaphysics.  In 
Greek  experimental  religion  interest  centered  ultimately  in  de- 
liverance of  the  individual  man  from  the  mortality  which,  ac- 
cording to  Greek  philosophical  presuppositions,  was  inherent  in 
humanity.  Only  the  divine,  it  was  maintained,  was  inherently 
immortal,  so  that,  if  any  member  of  the  human  race  were  to 
have  after  death  any  life  worthy  of  the  name,  he  must  first  have 
become  partaker  of  the  divine  nature.  Hence  the  message  of  a 
divine  humanity  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ  was  from  this 
point  of  view  profoundly  interesting.  Assuming,  then,  that 
unless  it  could  be  maintained  that  in  one  and  the  same  person 
humanity  and  deity  were  so  united  that  humanity  was  made  to 
participate  in  the  immortality  of  deity,  there  could  be  no  gospel 
of  salvation,  Greek-Christian  thought,  rejecting  as  heretical 
all  views  that  failed  to  make  this  provision,  set  to  work  to  con- 
struct and  defend  philosophically  such  a  statement  concerning 
the  eternal  Logos,  incarnate  in  Jesus,  as  would  fulfil  the  required 
condition.  Hence  it  was  declared  that  Jesus  Christ  was  not 
only  genuinely  and  completely  human,  but  also  the  second  Per- 
son of  the  eternal  Trinity,  "very  God  of  very  God,"  and  that 
in  him  as  one  person  the  two  natures  were  inseparably  but  in- 
confusedly  united.  Now  the  doctrine  of  the  three  persons  in 
one  substance,  it  may  be  remarked,  can  be  adequately  defended 
philosophically  only  from  a  "Platonic"  point  of  view,  while 
the  idea  of  the  two  natures  in  one  person  required  for  its  ration- 
alization the  essentially  antagonistic  Aristotelian  philosophical 
doctrine.  Moreover,  apart  from  the  question  whether  we  mod- 
erns can  be  either  "Platonists"  or  Aristotelians  (not  to  speak 
of  trying  to  be  "Platonic"  in  one  part  of  our  theology  and 
Aristotelian  in  another),  it  is  a  fact  that  the  religious  presup- 
positions of  the  modern  Christian  are  not  and  cannot  be  alto- 
gether the  same  as  those  of  the  early  Greek  Christian.  Hence 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST         115 

the  religious  imperativeness  of  the  ancient  orthodox  Christ- 
ology  no  longer  obtains  for  us.  But  whether  we  can  accept  it 
as  literally  true  or  not,  we  may  at  least  find  in  it  another  sig- 
nificant expression  of  that  supreme  religious  value  which  in  so 
many  different  ways  at  different  times  has  been  ascribed  to  the 
revelation  of  God  in  the  Jesus  of  history. 

The  Greek  orthodox  formulation  was  accepted  throughout 
the  Latin  Christian  world  (where  the  intricacies  of  Greek  met- 
aphysics were  not  understood)  as  a  practically  indispensable 
dogma  resting  upon  the  authority  of  the  Church.  Besides,  for 
the  Latin  mind  considerations  of  sin  and  guilt  were  central, 
rather  than  those  of  substance  and  mortality.  It  is  not  surpris- 
ing, therefore,  that  eventually  there  arose  in  the  Western  Church 
a  thinker  (Anselm)  who  substituted  for  the  Aristotelian  meta- 
physical notion  of  the  union  of  the  divine  and  the  human  in  the 
person  of  Jesus  the  pragmatic  argument  that  there  was  and  is  a 
God-man,  fully  God  and  fully  man,  simply  because  such  a  God- 
man  was  needed  in  order  to  make  satisfactory  payment  to  God 
for  man's  sin,  if  there  was  to  be  any  way  of  salvation  for  man 
from  the  infinite  penalty  due  for  the  infinite  offence  of  insulting 
God,  an  infinite  Being.  The  savior  must  be  God,  for  only  God, 
as  infinite,  could  endure  an  infinite  suffering  in  a  finite  time;  and 
yet  he  must  be  man,  for  only  man  could  rightfully  bear  the  pen- 
alty of  man's  sin.  Now  the  modern  mind  cannot  accept  certain 
presuppositions  of  this  argument,  particularly  the  feudal  notion 
of  the  guilt  of  an  offence  varying  with  the  actual  dignity  of  the 
person  offended,  and  the  crude  commerical  idea  of  justice  in- 
volved in  the  thought  of  a  transfer  of  guilt  and  merit  back  and 
forth  for  external  considerations,  supported  by  the  "Platonic" 
notion  that  as  the  "universal"  (e.  g.,  humanity)  is  the  ultimate 
reality,  it  is  a  matter  of  no  consequence  which  individual  man 
bears  the  penalty.  And  yet,  in  this  characteristically  Latin  de- 
fence of  the  doctrine  of  the  God-man,  we  have  still  another  in- 
stance of  the  expression  of  religious  appreciation  of  the  revelation 
value  of  the  historic  Jesus.  Still,  on  the  other  hand,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Greek  Christology,  so  in  the  case  of  the  Latin,  the 
supposed  religious  need  which  the  God-man  was  believed  to 
satisfy  must  appear  to  the  modern  consciousness  as  in  the  main 
artificial  and  only  supposititious. 


116          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

As  a  matter  of  fact  we  seem  to  be  much  nearer  to  permanently 
valid  concepts  in  the  Johannine  attempt  to  combine  the  con- 
cepts of  Messiah  and  Logos.  If  we  take  the  idea  of  the  Messiah 
to  be  essentially  that  of  the  one  who  is  the  Savior  of  men  by  vir- 
tue of  his  being  the  Revealer  and  in  some  sense  the  Representa- 
tive of  God,  and  the  idea  of  the  Logos  as  essentially  the  divine 
Reason,  or  Principle  of  enlightenment,  manifested  in  the  ra- 
tional order  of  the  universe,  increasingly  in  the  spiritual  prog- 
ress of  the  race,  and  most  fully  in  any  one  individual  in  Jesus 
of  Nazareth,  we  find  that  these  New  Testament  interpretative 
concepts  are  still  among  the  best  that  the  modern-minded 
Christian  can  employ. 

We  have  referred  to  the  Hebrew,  Greek  and  Latin  roots  of 
the  older  orthodox  Christology.  As  transitional  to  the  char- 
acteristically modern  attempts  at  christological  construction, 
we  may  mention  the  doctrine  of  the  Unitarians,  who  have  been 
in  the  main  the  pioneers  in  the  rather  thankless  task  of  criticiz- 
ing the  older  orthodoxy  on  rational  grounds  before  popular 
audiences.  Much  of  their  polemic  against  the  older  dogmas  may 
be  regarded  as  having  been  largely  successful,  but  no  gospel  can 
be  constructed  out  of  negative  criticisms,  however  valid  they 
may  be.  And  too  often  the  impression  encouraged  by  the  Uni- 
tarian negative  emphasis  has  been  that  Jesus  was  not,  in  any 
important  sense  of  the  word,  divine.  They  commonly  object  to 
the  distinction  between  deity  and  divinity,  and  insist  that  since 
it  is  absurd  to  say  that  Jesus,  a  dependent  human  being,  was 
God,  it  remains  that  he  was  mere  man,  and  not  divine  at  all. 
This  negation  does  violence  to  the  intuitive  (but  not  necessarily 
uncritical)  appreciation  of  the  unique  value  for  religion  of  the 
historical  revelation  of  the  divine  presence  in  the  person  of 
Christ. 

Of  characteristically  modem  attempts  to  express  the  revela- 
tion-value of  the  person  of  Christ,  there  are  three  which  claim 
our  attention,  viz.,  that  of  rationalistic  monism,  that  of  empir- 
ical pluralism,  and  that  of  critical  agnosticism. 

Rationalistic  monism  is  represented  by  Hegelianism,  with 
its  doctrine  that  the  immanence  of  rational  thought  in  man  is 
the  presence  of  the  divine,  so  that  the  claims  made  for  the  unique 
divineness  of  Jesus  would  have  to  be  substantiated  by  showing 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST         117 

his  supremacy  in  the  realm  of  intellect  and  as  the  revealer  of  a 
true  philosophy.  This,  however,  does  not  give  us  quite  the  cor- 
rect criterion  either  for  what  experimental  religion  chiefly  looks 
for  in  revelation,  or  for  what  is  most  unique  and  valuable  in  the 
historic  Jesus. 

Empirical  pluralism  is  represented  by  the  recent  attempt  of 
Professor  Sanday  to  apply  to  Christology  William  James'  notion 
of  a  divine  communication  with  man  through  the  subconscious 
life.  According  to  this  view  the  divine  nature  of  Jesus  was 
ordinarily  in  the  subconscious  realm,  but  occasionally  it  made 
itself  manifest  in  the  fully  conscious  department  of  his  life. 
Then  he  was  enabled  to  think,  speak  and  act  with  a  more  than 
human  insight  and  power.  The  trouble  here  too  is  that,  as  in 
the  case  of  rationalistic  monism,  justice  is  done  neither  to  the 
needs  of  religion  nor  to  the  unique  value  of  Jesus.  The  revela- 
tion which  man  most  needs  in  religion,  and  which  he  can  find 
best  in  the  historic  Jesus,  is  primarily  neither  an  infallible  in- 
tellectual guidance  nor  a  mysterious  contact  in  the  "  subcon- 
scious"; rather  is  it  experience  of  a  divinely  uplifting  power  in 
the  realm  of  the  moral  spirit. 

The  Christology  of  critical  agnosticism,  which  is  represented 
by  Ritschlianism,  recognizes  the  practical  nature  of  the  religious 
interest  in  revelation,  and  of  the  revelation  which  is  mediated 
to  us  through  the  historic  Jesus.  Assuming  that  independent 
reality  is  inexperienceable  and  therefore  unknowable,  so  that 
any  metaphysical  theology  of  the  transcendent  God  is  imprac- 
ticable, the  Ritschlians  claim  that  the  true  religious  Object 
must  be  found  in  history,  if  it  is  to  be  found  at  all.  In  the  person 
of  the  historic  Jesus  they  find,  they  claim,  an  Object  which  ful- 
fils the  function,  has  the  practical  value  of  God,  enabling  the  re- 
sponding human  individual  to  rise  out  of  sin  and  despair  into  a  life 
of  triumph  over  all  that  would  bring  him  into  subjection  to  the 
world.  All  statements  as  to  the  divinity  or  deity  of  Christ  are 
therefore,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  be  interpreted  as  religious 
value-judgments,  expressions  of  appreciation  of  the  practical 
spiritual  and  particularly  religious  value  of  the  historic  Jesus. 
Through  him  our  experience  is  as  if  there  were  a  Christlike, 
independently  existing  God,  actually  revealed  as  immanent  in 
the  life  and  activity  of  Jesus;  and  we  may  believe  that  such  a 


118          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

power  as  we  might  call  divine  was  really  in  some  way  present 
with  him.  But  all  we  know  is  that  through  the  historic  Jesus 
we  experience  spiritual,  particularly  moral,  salvation,  and 
accordingly  evaluate  him,  the  historic  source  of  this  salvation- 
experience,  as  divine,  " Godlike."  But  the  main  criticism  of 
this  view  is  that  its  notion  of  revelation  is  inadequate  for  ex- 
perimental religion.  We  feel  the  need  of  dependence  ultimately 
upon  the  independently  existing  God,  rather  than  simply  upon 
a  man  who  achieved  his  own  spiritual  triumph  through  de- 
pendence upon  a  God  not  identical  with  but  greater  than  him- 
self; and  we  want  revelation  in  the  sense  of  the  actual  experi- 
enced presence  and  activity  of  this  ultimate  divine  Reality. 

Turning  now  to  a  constructive  statement  with  regard  to  the 
person  of  Christ,  we  must  undertake  to  do  what  Unitarianism 
attempted,  viz.,  to  formulate  such  a  view  as  the  modern  mind 
can  accept  as  rational;  but  at  the  same  time  we  must  seek  to 
conserve  the  religious  values  bound  up  with  a  responsive  atti- 
tude toward  this  historic  leader  of  men  much  more  adequately 
than  historic  Unitarianism  was  able  to  do.  First  of  all  then, 
it  may  be  noted  that  from  a  spiritually  cultured  point  of  view 
the  divine  quality  of  the  personality  of  Jesus  is  readily  appre- 
ciated. His  will  was  devoted  to  the  moral  ideal,  and  the  con- 
tent of  that  ideal  was  throughly  social.  His  ambition  was  to 
minister  as  effectively  as  possible  to  the  highest  well-being  of 
his  fellow-men,  with  due  regard  to  the  supremacy  of  moral, 
social  and  religious  values.  He  began  where  he  was,  and  per- 
severed faithfully  in  the  midst  of  increasing  opposition,  until 
at  last,  rather  than  compromise  with  those  who  were  not  only 
his  personal  enemies  but  the  enemies  of  the  "  Kingdom  of  God," 
to  which  he  had  devoted  himself,  he  left  his  enterprise  with 
God,  and  chose  for  himself  the  way  of  death  and  apparent 
failure.  His  was  the  life  which  realized  (set  forth  concretely) 
the  essentials  of  the  Hebrew  ideal  of  holiness  and  of  the  Greek 
ideal  of  wisdom,  courage,  self-control  and  justice,  and  added 
to  these  what  has  become  the  most  distinctive  quality  in  the 
Christian  ideal,  viz.,  unselfish  love.  Between  the  opposite 
extremes  of  the  Buddhist  ideal  of  self-repression  and  the  utter 
annihilation  of  desire,  with  the  inevitable  human  stagnation 
to  which  it  would  lead,  and  the  Nietzschean  ideal  of  remorseless 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST         119 

assertion  of  the  desire  for  power,  with  the  world-wide  warfare 
which  is  its  logical  outcome,  the  ideal  of  Jesus  was  that  of 
absolute  self-devotion  to  the  true  well-being  of  humanity, 
having  as  its  sequel  progress  instead  of  stagnation,  and  righteous 
peace  and  social  welfare  in  place  of  war — in  short,  the  Kingdom 
of  God  on  earth.  The  spirit  expressed  in  the  self-devotion  of 
Jesus  to  the  true  ideal  of  the  well-being  of  humanity  is  worthy 
of  supreme  admiration,  and  this  supreme  admiration,  it  may  be 
remarked,  is,  from  the  standpoint  of  what  we  have  called 
"fundamental  religion,"  itself  a  religious  attitude,  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  "divineness,"  i.  e.,  religious  or  revelation- value  of 
the  person  and  life-work  of  Jesus.  Supreme  admiration  for 
the  human  Jesus  and  loyal  responsiveness  to  his  appeal  is  truer 
faith  in  his  divinity  than  acquiescence  in  all  the  most  extreme 
formulations  of  the  dogma  of  his  deity. 

But  to  appreciate  the  ideal  quality  of  the  personality  and 
life  of  Jesus  is  not  all  that  is  possible  to  the  modern  man  in  the 
way  of  recognition  of  his  divinity.  The  attitude  of  fundamental 
religion  may  well  be  supplemented  by  that  of  experimental 
religion,  for  in  the  religious  life  man  needs  not  .only  a  supreme 
Ideal,  but  also  a  supreme  Being,  a  "living  God."  To  be  sure, 
even  from  the  point  of  view  of  fundamental  religion  one  might 
say  that  the  divine  quality  is  thought  of  as  such  only  by  virtue 
of  a  process  of  abstraction  from  the  immanent  spiritual  Life, 
or  divine  Power.  (A  one-sidedly  intellectualistic  variety  of 
this  view  is  exemplified  in  the  rationalistic  monism  to  which  we 
have  referred.)  But  any  such  intuition  would  be  felt  very 
generally  to  be  insufficiently  supported.  It  is  when  we  interpret 
the  personality  and  life  of  Jesus  with  special  reference  to  his 
own  experimental  religion  that  we  get  what  is  perhaps  the  most 
fruitful  view  of  his  divine  character.  He  was  a  man  of  deep 
personal  religion;  he  had  learned  to  depend  upon  God,  and 
not  in  vain,  for  that  reinforcement  of  the  moral  will  which 
critical  experimental  religion  finds  to  be  the  sort  of  "special 
providence"  or  "answer  to  prayer"  which  can  be  depended 
upon  as  the  divine  response  to  the  human  religious  adjustment. 
And  in  the  light  of  what  is  empirically  known  of  the  value  of 
moral  experimental  religion  in  general,  the  assertion  is  justified 
that  the  achievements  of  Jesus  in  the  spiritual  life  and  in  his 


120  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

work  for  the  world  were  decidedly  enhanced  through  his  de- 
pendence upon  God  for  support  and  uplift  in  the  life  of  the 
spirit.  That  is,  more  and  more  the  divine  power  for  the  spirit- 
ual life  became  immanent  within  the  life  of  Jesus,  in  response 
to  his  opening  up  of  his  life  to  God.  Here  we  find  the  key, 
doubtless,  to  the  unique  degree  of  divine  quality  in  the  charac- 
ter of  this  man,  and  to  the  unique  function  which  he  was  and 
has  been  able  to  discharge  in  the  spiritual  history  of  mankind, 
by  having  been  adequately  prepared  for  the  perhaps  unique 
opportunity  which  the  time  and  circumstances  of  his  life  af- 
forded. We  find  here  not  only  the  presence  of  the  divine  power, 
but  a  "  progressive  incarnation,"  to  use  Dorner's  phrase,  mean- 
ing thereby,  however,  that  the  divinity  of  Jesus  was  much  more 
an  achievement  of  his  religious  experience  than  a  native  en- 
dowment, however  fortunate  in  his  heredity  he  may  have  been. 
Moreover,  this  view  of  the  divineness  of  Jesus  is  especially 
encouraging,  since  it  shows  us  that  some  degree  of  essentially 
the  same  sort  of  achievement  is  within  the  range  of  present 
possibility  for  every  sincere  and  aspiring  individual  who  will 
begin  to  cultivate  the  same  sort  of  personal  religion.  The  view 
is  one  which  suggests  the  interpretation  of  the  person  of  Christ 
according  to  empirical  pluralism  to  which  we  have  referred, 
but  it  is  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  any  such  view,  since, 
while  empirical,  it  does  not  center  the  religious  experience  of 
man  primarily  in  the  subconscious,  but  primarily  in  the  realm 
of  conscious  moral  decision  and  action. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  differentiate  our  view  of  the 
revelation-value  of  the  historic  Jesus  from  the  somewhat  similar 
emphasis  upon  religious  value-judgments  in  the  critical  agnosti- 
cism of  the  Ritschlians.  In  the  Ritschlian  theology  the  doc- 
trine of  the  divinity  (or  deity)  of  Christ  is  a  religious  value- 
judgment,  meaning  not  that  God,  or  the  divine  Spirit,  was 
actually  present  and  operative  in  the  life  of  Jesus,  but  rather 
that  the  moral  quality  of  his  will  was  Godlike  (i.  e.,  what  we  may 
believe  to  be  the  character  of  the  transcendent  God  whose  ex- 
istence we  believe  in)  and  that  the  function  discharged  by  the 
person  of  the  historic  Jesus  in  the  lives  of  his  followers  is  the 
divine  or  God-like  function  of  saving  them  from  sin  and  its 
evil  consequences.  But  if  we  are  entitled  to  evaluate  the  per- 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST        121 

sonality  and  life-work  of  Jesus  as  God-like,  we  are  entitled  to 
go  further  and  draw  some  important  deductions.  If  Christ  is 
characteristically  God-like,  God  is  characteristically  Christ- 
like;  the  Christ-like  is  the  norm  of  the  divine  character  and 
purpose.  In  other  words,  we  have  support  here  for  the  Christo- 
centric  theological  principle,  according  to  which  there  is  to  be 
included  in  our  view  of  God  all  that  is  deducible  from  the 
proposition  that  the  spirit  of  Jesus  is  a  revelation  of  what  God 
is  like,  while  there  is  to  be  excluded  from  it  all  that  contradicts 
this  view.*  Thus  far  the  most  constructive  of  the  Ritschlians 
have  ventured  to  go,  but  no  farther,  because  of  their  fear  of 
the  introduction  of  metaphysics  into  theology.  But,  we  may 
ask,  if  God  is  Christ-like,  i.  e.,  if  he  has  a  Christ-like  will,  must 
he  not  be  doing  a  Christ-like  work  for  the  salvation  of  men  from 
sin?  And  yet  nowhere  do  we  find  any  satisfying  evidence  that 
God  is  doing  this  as  Christ  did  it,  unless  we  can  say  that  God 
was  doing  it  in  and  through  Christ,  and  is  doing  it  in  and  through 
the  Christ-like  in  human  life  everywhere.  And  so,  ultimately, 
if  we  are  entitled  to  say  that  God  is  Christ-like,  we  are  entitled 
to  say  that  God  was  in  Christ,  reconciling  the  world  unto  him- 
self, f  In  other  words,  the  divinity  of  Christ  was  not  merely 
"ethical,"  nor  even  "functional"  alone;  it  was  a  real  and 
"essential"  divinity  as  well.  This  does  not  mean,  of  course, 
that  we  ascribe  "deity"  to  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  He  was  divine — 
uniquely  divine,  it  would  seem,  for  it  was  largely  the  difference 
in  the  degree  of  the  presence  of  the  divine  quality  in  his  person- 
ality and  life  that  gave  him  his  uniquely  divine  function  in  reve- 
lation and  salvation — and  God  was  in  him;  but  this  does  not 
mean  that  Jesus  was,  or  is,  the  God  upon  whom,  as  thoroughly 
human  and  a  religious  man,  he  himself  was  dependent  in  such 
a  way  as  to  be  the  true  pattern  for  his  fellowmen. 

Before  leaving  this  topic  of  the  divine  man,  passing  attention 
may  be  given  to  two  or  three  special  questions  which  are  often 
asked  in  this  connection.  One  of  these  is  as  to  the  pre-existence 

*We  are  here  anticipating  theological  theory  to  some  extent,  but  we 
are  not  building  any  new  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  data  of  theology 
upon  what  is  anticipated. 

t  A  somewhat  ambiguous  approach  to  the  position  taken  here  and  in  the 
preceding  paragraph  is  to  be  found  in  Herrmann's  characterization  of  God 
as  "the  Power,  greater  than  the  world,  which  was  with  Christ." 


122          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

of  the  personal  being  whom  we  have  come  to  know  as  the  Jesus 
of  history.  To  this  the  answer  seems  to  be  that  while  God, 
who  was  manifested  as  immanent  within  the  historic  Jesus, 
must,  of  course,  be  thought  of  as  having  existed  prior  to  the 
beginning  of  Jesus'  earthly  life,  we  have  no  positive  basis  for 
asserting  the  same  of  the  personal  spirit  whom  we  know  as 
Jesus.  If  we  do  not  care  to  go  so  far  as  to  deny  it  on  grounds 
of  the  observable  natural  genesis  of  all  human  personality,  we 
must  remain  on  this  point  critically  agnostic.  The  appeal  to 
traditional  belief  gets  us  nowhere. 

Another  question  is  as  to  whether  we  may  not  believe  that 
the  present  status  of  Jesus  as  the  divine  and  " risen  Christ" 
is  such  that  in  prayer  and  the  sense  of  divine  fellowship  we  are 
holding  direct  personal  communication  with  him,  and  not  simply 
with  "God,  the  Father,"  or  "the  Holy  Spirit."  With  reference 
to  this,  from  the  modern  point  of  view  two  things  may  be  said. 
In  the  first  place,  no  one  is  able  to  show  that  the  divine  Being 
with  whom  he  has  religious  communion  is  Jesus  Christ,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  "the  Father,"  or  "the  Holy  Spirit,"  even 
though  he  may  call  this  divine  Being  "Christ."  In  the  second 
place,  if  we  can  have  communion  with  "the  God  and  Father 
of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ"  (to  use  the  Pauline  expression),  we 
have  at  least  all  the  values  that  we  could  have  from  personal 
communion  with  the  historic  Jesus — except  perhaps  a  purely 
sentimental  value.  Direct  communication  with  Jesus  under 
present  conditions  is  not  an  imperative  religious  need.  It 
would  be  a  spiritual  luxury,  and  it  can  be  affirmed  only  as  a 
personal  "over-belief,"  impossible  of  verification  by  the  meth- 
thods  of  empirical  theology — unless  it  can  be  done  somewhat 
as  the  "spirit-controls"  of  mediums  are  claimed  by  some  in- 
vestigators of  psychic  phenomena  to  have  established  their 
identity.  With  regard  to  this  second  question,  then,  we  also 
seem  to  find  good  reason  for  remaining  critically  agnostic. 

Once  more,  the  question  is  often  asked  in  these  days,  whether 
we  ought  to  expect  Jesus  to  be  equalled  or  transcended  by  any- 
one in  the  future  history  of  the  human  race  on  earth.  In  reply 
we  may  point  out  at  once  that  there  is  at  least  one  respect  in 
which  Jesus  must  be  expected  to  remain  forever  unique,  viz., 
in  the  unique  role  which  he  played  in  the  founding,  once  for  all 


REVELATION  IN  THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST         123 

time,  of  the  specifically  Christian  experience  of  salvation.  But 
we  should  cherish  no  prejudice  against  the  possibility  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  another  spiritual  personality  equally  great — or 
even  greater,  for  that  matter,  unless,  indeed,  this  is  practically 
inconceivable.  If  it  did  occur,  it  would  be  a  revelation  of  the 
divine  to  be  profoundly  grateful  for;  and  it  would  seem  to  be 
equally  desirable  beforehand.  But  as  to  whether  or  not  it  will 
take  place,  who  can  say?  No  doubt  the  divine  Reality  would 
have  been  revealed  as  fully  as  it  was  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth  long 
before  the  beginning  of  our  era,  had  there  been  a  human  being 
of  equal  native  endowment  who  fulfilled  equally  well  all  the 
other  conditions  of  the  incoming  of  the  divine  power,  and  had 
the  social  environment  been  equally  capable  of  receiving  the 
revelation;  and  no  doubt  the  same  thing  would  happen  again 
under  the  same  conditions.  The  only  necessary  further  quali- 
fication of  this  statement  is  that  which  should  be  made  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  revelation,  as  actual  revealing,  or  presenting  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  new  knowledge  possible,  is  always  rela- 
tive to  what  was  there  before,  as  the  actual  illumination  due  to 
a  new  source  of  light  is  inversely  proportional  to  the  quantity 
of  light  preceding  its  appearance.  But  beyond  these  statements 
we  must  remain  again  critically  agnostic.  Practically  speaking, 
however,  it  would  seem  that  our  chief  need  is  not  for  the  appear- 
ance of  a  greater  spiritual  leader  than  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  but  for 
the  social  propagation  of  the  spirit  of  Jesus  and  the  social  ap- 
plication of  his  principles — in  other  words,  for  a  modern  social 
adaptation  of  what  he  himself  called  "the  Kingdom  of  God." 


CHAPTER   III 
REVELATION  IN  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST 

WE  shall  now  examine,  as  likely  to  furnish  us  with  further 
empirical  data  for  a  scientific  theology,  the  revelation  of  the  di- 
vine in  the  work  of  atonement.  We  shall  deal  primarily  and 
especially  with  the  atoning  work  of  the  historic  Jesus,  whom 
we  have  evaluated  and  interpreted — partly  in  anticipation  of 
what  is  to  be  said  of  his  work — as  divine. 

It  may  be  felt  that  what  we  are  here  undertaking  to  consider  is 
properly  a  subject-matter  for  theological  theory,  rather  than  a 
datum.  It  is  true  enough  that  we  shall  have  to  postpone  our 
discussion  of  certain  aspects  of  the  subject  until  we  come  to 
deal,  under  theological  theory,  with  the  relation  of  God  to  man. 
But  we  would  maintain  that  all  service  to  humanity  such  as 
that  performed  by  the  historic  Jesus  is  primarity  an  empirical 
datum,  rather  than  a  topic  for  speculation,  and  that  no  theologi- 
cal "theory  of  the  atonement"  can  be  established,  save  upon 
the  basis  of  an  adequate  knowledge  and  proper  evaluation  of 
empirical  facts.  But  where  the  work  of  atonement  is  supposed 
to  have  been  primarily  a  transcendent  transaction,  a  change 
wrought  in  the  transcendent  God,  or  in  his  attitude  toward 
men,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  essentially  a  matter  for  empirical 
investigation.  A  preliminary  part  of  our  task  will  be  therefore 
to  clear  the  way  for  a  scientific  treatment  of  the  work  of  atone- 
ment as  a  theological  datum,  by  briefly  criticizing  the  principal 
theories  which  have  sought  to  gain  plausibility  for  the  notion 
that  the  work  of  Christ  had  its  primary  effect  in  the  realm  of 
the  transcendent. 

Most  "theories  of  the  atonement"  have  assumed  that  the 
"saving  work  of  Christ"  has  primary  reference  to  a  future  life, 
rather  than  to  the  present,  that  it  does  not  immediately  under- 
take to  make  available  the  divine  power  for  deliverance  from 
actual  sinning,  but  rather  to  secure  a  divine  judicial  pardon 

124 


REVELATION  IN  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST          125 

by  virtue  of  which  the  sinner  may  be  assured  of  escaping  all  the 
post-mortem  penalties  of  his  transgression.  Moreover,  they 
practically  identify  this  atoning  or  saving  work  of  Christ  with 
his  death.  The  problem  then  comes  to  be  how  to  interpret  the 
death  of  Christ  so  as  to  account  for  such  a  change  in  God  as 
would  provide  for  the  possibility  of  the  sinner's  pardon  and  con- 
sequent escape  from  "hell."  No  doubt  the  theories  would 
have  been  very  different,  had  the  problem  been,  How  has  the 
life  of  Jesus,  which  culminated  in  his  crucifixion,  been  instru- 
mental toward  such  a  change  in  man  as  brings  about  atonement 
(at-one-ment,  reconciliation,  unification  between  God  and  man 
and  between  man  and  man)  and  salvation  (divine  deliverance 
of  man  from  evil,  especially  from  sin)? 

Let  us  first  consider  the  interpretation  of  the  death  of  Christ 
as  a  sacrifice  for  the  sin  of  man,  offered  to  propitiate  an  angry 
God.  The  early  history  of  the  idea  is  instructive.  In  the  early 
days  of  the  primitive  church,  the  death  of  Jesus  seems  to  have 
been  thought  of  by  the  disciples  for  the  most  part  simply  as  a 
monstrous  crime — the  crime  of  the  murder  of  the  one  whom  God 
had  designed  to  be  the  Messiah,  the  promised  deliverer  and  ruler 
of  his  people.  As  such,  it  could  not  permanently  succeed; 
the  purposes  of  God  could  not  be  more  than  temporarily  de- 
feated by  the  wickedness  of  men;  but  unless  the  people  repented, 
the  crime  of  the  crucifixion  would  be  severely  punished  on  the 
return  of  the  risen  and  exalted  Messiah  to  judge  and  rule  the 
world.  It  began  to  be  felt,  however,  especially  in  the  light  of 
Isaiah  LIII,  interpreted  as  Messianic  prediction,  that  the  suf- 
fering of  the  innocent  Servant  of  the  Lord  was  surely  divinely 
intended  for  some  good  reason,  and  would  surely  redound  to 
the  benefit  of  others.  Moreover,  incidentally  the  death  of 
Christ  was  the  necessary  preliminary  to  the  resurrection,  of 
which  the  early  church  was  firmly  convinced,  and  which  was 
regarded  as  an  earnest  of  greater  things  to  follow.  It  remained 
for  Paul  to  develop  the  interpretation  of  the  death  as  definitely 
sacrificial. 

What  Paul  was  especially  concerned  to  find  an  explanation 
for,  in  view  of  the  unquestioned  doctrine  of  the  overruling 
providence  of  God,  was  the  unexpected  fact  of  a  crucified  Mes- 
siah— a  fact  which  had  been  to  him,  as  it  still  was  to  many 


126          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

other  well-informed  Jews,  "a  stumbling-block."  But  there 
were  other  problems  for  Paul  to  solve.  What  was  the  explana- 
tion of  this  fact  of  his  own  experience,  that  keeping  the  letter 
of  the  traditional  law  of  God  with  regard  to  the  sacrifices  and 
other  ceremonial  matters  had  not  brought  him  peace  of  mind, 
whereas  the  acceptance  and  public  proclamation  of  the  crucified 
Jesus  as  the  Messiah  had  done  so?  (The  primary  explanation 
of  this  fact  of  experience,  is,  of  course,  psychological;  but  Paul 
was  looking  for  an  objective  rather  than  a  subjective  explana- 
tion, for  a  theological  and  even  christological  rather  than  a 
psychological  account  of  the  matter.)  Again  there  was  the 
problem,  emerging  later,  as  to  how  to  justify  theoretically  the 
leaving  of  Gentile  converts  to  Christianity  free  from  what 
would  have  been,  practically  considered,  the  intolerable  burden 
of  having  to  keep  the  presumably  divinely-given  Jewish  law 
of  sacrifices  and  other  rites?  By  one  happy  thought  Paul 
solved  to  his  own  satisfaction  all  three  problems.  The  sacrifices 
of  the  Jewish  law,  it  occurred  to  him,  did  not  really  propitiate 
God;  they  were  but  signs  pointing  forward  to  the  death  of  the 
Messiah  as  the  propitiatory  offering  for  sin,  bringing  peace  to 
the  repentant  sinner  who  accepted  it  as  such,  and  rendering 
any  further  keeping  of  the  law  of  sacrifices  meaningless. 

But  Paul  had  difficulty  with  this  conception,  fruitful  as  it 
was.  Under  the  old  economy  man,  the  offending  party,  took 
the  initiative  to  secure  reconciliation  (atonement);  it  was  he 
who  provided  the  sacrificial  offering  which  was  to  render  an 
outraged  and  angry  God  propitious.  But  under  the  new  econ- 
omy it  was  God  who  himself  provided  the  sacrificial  offering 
which  was  supposed  to  propitiate  himself!  This  could  only 
mean  God  was  already  propitious  enough,  and  always  had  been; 
that  the  real  problem  was  not,  and  never  had  been,  how  to 
reconcile  God  to  man,  but  how  to  reconcile  man  to  God.  And 
in  the  great  Pauline  Christian  doctrine  that  God  was  in  Christ 
reconciling  the  world  to  himself,  we  see  the  hopeless  break- 
down of  the  theory  of  the  death  of  Christ  as  a  propitiatory 
sacrifice  or  offering  to  God.  It  is  not  that  the  New  Testament 
fact  did  not  fulfil  the  Old  Testament  idea  of  sacrifice;  it  more 
than  fulfilled  it,  it  overflowed  it!  And  yet,  when  the  atoning 
work  of  Christ  is  spoken  of  as  a  sacrifice,  naturally  but  un- 


REVELATION  IN  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST          127 

fortunately  what  has  usually  been  meant  has  been  the  crude 
idea  of  the  legalistic  parts  of  the  Old  Testament,  according  to 
which  if  the  sinner  is  to  escape,  an  angry  God  must  be  propiti- 
ated by  the  death  of  an  innocent  victim!  This  notion,  against 
which  the  greatest  of  the  Old  Testament  prophets  them- 
selves protested,  is  already  virtually  overcome,  although  not 
always  expressly  repudiated,  in  the  religion  of  the  New 
Testament. 

In  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  another  attempt  is  made  to 
mediate  between  the  old  idea  of  propitiatory  sacrifice  and  the 
facts  of  the  new  religion.  Jesus  is  represented  as  the  Priest 
who  offers  himself  as  the  propitiatory  sacrifice.  But  surely  the 
true  priest  is  the  one  who  brings  the  people  to  God,  not  the 
shaman  who  claims  to  work  behind  the  scenes  some  quasi- 
magical  change  in  God  for  the  benefit  of  credulous  believers ! 

There  were  other  analogies  used  by  New  Testament  writers 
to  throw  light  upon  the  crucifixion  of  the  Messiah.  Such,  for 
example,  was  the  shedding  of  blood  for  the  ratification  of  the 
covenant,  which  came  to  be  the  symbolic  interpretation  at- 
tached to  the  last  supper  of  Jesus  with  his  disciples,  in  which 
the  Master,  with  the  acted  parable  of  the  bread  and  the  cup, 
sought  to  bind  his  little  band  of  followers  more  closely  to  each 
other  and  to  the  cause  of  the  Kingdom,  before  he  should  be 
taken  from  them.  Again,  there  was  the  striking  but  not  very 
fruitful  idea  that  the  death  of  the  testator  is  the  indispensable 
condition  of  his  will  going  into  effect;  and  once  more,  the  very 
appropriate  analogy  of  a  ransom  paid  to  liberate  prisoners 
from  bondage.  This  last  comparison,  which  like  all  analogies 
and  parables,  can  be  properly  applied  only  within  definite 
limits,  was  used  by  writers  in  post-apostolic  times  as  a  basis 
for  inference  as  to  the  nature  of  the  transcendent  transaction 
in  which  it  was  supposed  the  atonement  consisted.  It  was  held 
that  the  person  of  Christ  was  paid  over  by  God  to  Satan  as  a 
ransom  for  the  liberation  of  sinners  from  their  bondage  to  that 
evil  spirit,  but  that  Satan  was  not  powerful  enough  to  keep  the 
divine  Son,  and  so  had  to  let  him  go.  God  had  misled  Satan 
by  means  of  the  human  form  of  Jesus;  but  it  was  regarded  as 
quite  permissible  for  God  to  drive  a  sharp  bargain  with  the 
devil,  whose  business  it  was  to  deceive  others!  And  this  was 


128  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

the  God  who  was  extolled  as  worthy  of  absolute  trust  and 
adoration! 

Less  obviously  absurd,  perhaps,  but  still  unacceptable  from 
any  rational  modern  point  of  view,  were  the  later  theories 
according  to  which  "the  atonement"  was  a  primarily  trans- 
cendent transaction,  designed  to  make  it  possible,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  to  provide  sinners  with  a  pardon  which  would 
give  them  immunity  from  "the  wrath  to  come."  One  of  the 
most  important  of  these  theoretical  constructions  was  Anselm's 
interpretation  of  the  death  of  Christ  as  the  payment  of  an 
infinite  price  to  cancel  the  infinite  debt  incurred  by  man's  sin 
against  the  infinite  Being,  a  debt  which  would  otherwise  have 
involved  the  inevitable  penalty  of  an  imprisonment  in  hell  of 
infinite  duration.  Among  other  objectionable  features  of  its 
doctrine,  this  view  assumes  that  as  a  debt  may  be  paid  by 
another  than  the  one  who  incurred  it,  so  the  debt  of  guilt  in- 
curred by  sin  can  be  transferred  arbitrarily  from  the  individual 
who  sinned  to  another,  whereas  any  enlightened  moral  con- 
sciousness knows  very  well  that  guilt  is  inseparable  from  the 
sinful  will  which  was  the  cause  of  the  evil  deed.  (The  alterna- 
tives here  seem  to  be  that  either  Christ  did  not  die  for  all,  in 
which  case  there  has  been  the  rankest  conceivable  instance  of 
favoritism  to  some  and  wanton  cruelty  to  others,  or  else  the 
debt  of  all  has  been  paid,  so  that  in  justice  it  must  not  be  col- 
lected again — in  other  words,  either  a  "  limited  atonement " 
or  universalism.* 

Similar  criticisms  may  be  made  against  the  closely  similar 
view  that  the  death  of  Christ  was  the  penal  (rather  than  com- 
mercial) equivalent  of  the  eternal  death  of  all  sinners  (or, 
according  to  some,  of  the  elect  only).  Even  if  it  were  the 
equivalent  in  suffering,  it  could  not  justly  be  penal  without  a 
transfer  of  guilt;  and  this  we  have  seen  to  be  in  the  nature  of 
the  case  impossible. 

The  Grotian  theory  sought  to  avoid  the  objectionable  fea- 
tures of  the  older  views  by  representing  the  death  of  Christ  not 
as  an  actual  enduring  of  the  full  punishment  of  human  sin,  but 
as  a  mere  expedient  of  the  divine  government,  meant  to  impress 
the  sinner  with  God's  abhorrence  of  sin.  But  here  the  expedient 

*  For  further  criticisms  of  Anselm's  doctrine  see  the  preceding  chapter. 


REVELATION  IN  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST          129 

becomes  ineffective  as  soon  as  its  real  nature  is  understood,  for 
then  it  appears  that  the  suffering  of  Jesus  was  not  really  on 
account  of  man's  sin,  but  because  of  the  supposed  exigencies 
of  the  divine  government,  which  are  not  as  such,  properly 
speaking,  a  matter  of  human  concern  at  all. 

Once  more,  the  theory  that  Jesus  satisfied  the  righteousness 
of  God  with  respect  to  human  sin  by  presenting  vicariously  an 
adequate  repentance  for  all  human  transgression  rests  upon 
the  confused  notion  that  a  person's  regret  for  another's  sin  is, 
or  ever  can  be,  the  repentance  which  is  the  necessary  condition 
of  moral  forgiveness.  Like  the  older  theories,  it  assumes  that 
a  wrong  can  be  "made  right"  in  some  artificial  way,  before  the 
person  who  committed  it  has  actually  come  to  be  right  in  mind 
and  will. 

Let  us  now  turn  from  these  theories  of  the  atonement,  all  of 
which  view  it  as  the  reconciling  of  God  to  man  by  some  obscure 
and  artificial  transcendent  process  and  the  providing  thereby 
for  pardon  and  escape  from  unending  future  punishment,  and 
let  us  try  to  learn  what  sort  of  atoning  and  saving  work  was 
actually  undertaken  by  the  historic  Jesus,  and  what  has  been 
and  is  being  accomplished  as  a  result  of  his  self-sacrificing 
labors  and  the  early  death  in  which  they  culminated.  And  in 
doing  so  let  us  take  note  of  the  fact — and  not  be  disconcerted 
by  it — that  the  evangelical  interest  is  rapidly  coming  to  be 
centered  in  the  securing  of  divine  guidance  and  spiritual  power 
for  the  winning  of  moral  victory,  rather  than  in  the  obtaining 
of  pardon  as  a  guarantee  of  safety  in  the  life  after  death. 

Jesus  of  Nazareth  has  so  vivid  a  consciousness  of  the  reality 
and  goodness  of  God  and  of  the  value  of  man  that  he  felt  called 
to  bring  others — as  many  as  possible — to  share  his  point  of 
view  and  experience.  He  knew  at  first  hand  what  it  was  to 
love  God  with  his  whole  heart,  and  his  neighbor  as  himself; 
and,  moved  by  holy  love,  he  undertook  to  win  his  people  to 
what  was  deepest  and  best  in  their  own  traditional  ideals,  as 
contained  in  the  law  and  the  prophets.  It  was  his  ambition 
to  save  men  from  evil  and  bring  them  to  the  greatest  good. 
Especially  was  he  concerned  that  they  should  enjoy  an  inner 
revelation  of  the  divine,  and  be  saved  from  sin  and  its  evil 
consequences.  He  desired  to  bring  men  into  fraternal  relations 


130  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

with  each  other,  as  well  as  into  the  filial  relation  toward  God. 
In  short,  what  he  sought  was  at-one-ment,  reconciliation  of 
man  with  God,  and  at  the  same  time,  on  the  highest  moral 
plane,  the  reconciliation  of  man  with  his  brother-man.  This 
being  his  ambition,  it  is  self-evident  that  the  sin  of  the  world, 
and  the  evil  consequences  to  which  it  was  leading,  lay  as  a 
heavy  burden  upon  his  heart.  As  the  mother  hates  the  sin 
which  is  ruining  her  beloved  son,  and  is  heavily  burdened  by 
it,  so  it  was  with  Jesus  as  related  to  his  people  and  to  the  great 
world  beyond,  all  of  whom  he  would  have  gathered  into  a  great 
kingdom  of  God,  a  human  brotherhood  under  the  divine  father- 
hood. 

To  accomplish  this  aim  he  taught  the  principles  of  the 
morality  and  religion  which  he  himself  lived  by.  Purity  and 
unselfish  service,  as  made  possible  through  surrender  to,  com- 
munion with  and  dependence  upon  the  God  of  holy  love — 
this  was  his  message  and  this  was  his  life.  Thus  in  example  as 
well  as  in  teaching  his  function  was  that  of  the  prophet,  to 
bring  revelation  of  the  Divine  to  men.  But  he  was  more  than 
prophet.  He  was  priest  as  well.  Not  that  he  sought  by  sacer- 
dotal ritual  to  work — or  to  seem  to  work — behind  the  scenes 
some  magical  change  in  God  or  in  the  attitude  of  God  toward 
men.  He  did  not  feel  called  to  reconcile  God  to  the  world  in 
its  sin.  His  priestly  function  was  moral  and  rational.  It  was 
to  change  man  rather  than  God,  to  win  men  to  repentance  and 
faith,  and  thereby  to  forgiveness  and  reconciliation — at-one- 
ment — with  God. 

But  he  was  doomed  to  the  disappointment  of  having  to  face 
the  imminent  fact  of  death  while  as  yet  there  were  practically 
no  visible  results  of  his  efforts.  This  is  the  cup  that  he  would 
have  chosen  not  to  have  been  required  to  drink.  Religious 
and  political  leaders  were  openly  hostile,  the  people  fickle  and 
unintelligent,  and  even  the  disciples  timid  and  unreliable.  But 
adhering  consistently  to  his  ideal,  he  scorned  even  the  slight 
compromise  which  would  have  won  for  him  continued  life  and 
opportunity  for  service.  He  remained  faithful  unto  death, 
supported  by  his  faith  in  God  and  in  the  ultimate  success  of 
his  own  divine  mission  to  the  world,  all  appearances  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 


REVELATION  IN  THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST          131 

When  we  understand  Jesus,  and  contemplate  his  personality 
and  work,  we  must  be  won  not  only  to  admiration,  but  if  we 
are  true  to  our  own  best  impulses,  to  devotion  in  active  response 
to  his  appeal.  And  in  being  won  to  him  we  are  brought  into 
an  essentially  right  relation  to  God  and  man.  For  it  is  not 
simply  to  him  as  an  individual  that  we  are  won,  but  to  him  as 
the  divine  man,  the  revealer  of  the  divine  in  human  life,  the 
revealer  too  of  the  divine  potentialities  of  human  nature  and 
of  every  human  life.  Thus  he  saves,  not  simply  by  moral  and 
religious  teaching  and  example,  but  by  revealing  God.  His 
work  of  atonement  is  primarily  at-one-ment,  spiritual  unifica- 
tion with  himself,  with  the  divine  as  revealed  in  himself,  with 
the  divine  in  his  work  as  well  as  in  his  person.  His  work  of 
reconciliation  is  God's  work;  "God  was  in  Christ  reconciling 
the  world  unto  Himself. " 

This  interpretation  of  the  atoning,  saving  work  of  Christ  as 
divine  is  not  so  much  a  theory  as  it  is  an  appreciation  and  relig- 
ious perception.  From  the  standpoint  of  fundamental  religion 
such  work,  as  supremely  worth  while,  is  readily  evaluated  as 
divine.  But  even  from  the  standpoint  of  experimental  religion 
we  may  say  the  same  thing,  for  Jesus  himself  was  saved  from  sin 
through  religious  dependence — saved  by  way  of  prevention, 
it  would  seem,  rather  than  by  way  of  cure — and  the  quality 
which  was  promoted  in  Christ  by  his  experimental  religion,  viz., 
his  holy  love,  was  the  quality  which  led  him  to  live  and  die  for 
others,  that  they  might  be  reconciled  to  God  and  to  their  fellow- 
men.  Moreover,  such  reconciling  work  is  what  is  promoted  in 
us  through  dependence  upon  the  God  revealed  in  Christ.  In 
the  life  and  death  of  Jesus,  then,  in  his  activity  and  suffering, 
we  see  the  divine — unselfishly  loving  man,  working  for  his 
well-being,  suffering  in  his  affliction  and  burdened  by  his  sin. 

In  this  evaluation  or  apperception  of  the  atoning  work  of 
Christ  as  divine,  the  actual  work  of  God  in  and  through  him, 
we  have  gone  about  as  far  as  we  can  in  the  consideration  of 
this  topic  without  passing  over  from  the  realm  of  empirical 
data  into  that  of  theory,  except  that  we  can  go  on  to  trace  the 
empirical  result  of  the  atoning  work  of  Christ  in  the  Christian 
experience  of  salvation;  and  to  this  we  now  turn. 


CHAPTER  IV 

REVELATION  IN  THE  CHRISTIAN  EXPERIENCE  OF  SALVATION 

"SALVATION,"  or  "redemption/7  is  always,  from  the  stand- 
point of  experimental  religion,  deliverance  from  evil,  actual  or 
potential,  through  the  divine  agency.  To  have  God,  i.  e.,  to  be 
in  such  a  relation  to  the  divine  that  its  power  is  being  revealed 
and  to  be  revealed  continuously  on  one's  behalf,  is  virtually  to 
be  saved,  redeemed,  even  though  the  actual  deliverance  from 
evil  may  be  a  process  extending  over  a  lifetime.  In  an  abso- 
lutely satisfactory  experimental  religion,  to  be  "reconciled"  to 
and  "at  one"  with  God,  and  so  to  "have  God"  in  the  sense 
just  explained,  will  be  to  be  prepared,  or  at  least  to  be  in  a 
position  to  be  thus  ready,  for  whatever  experiences  the  future 
may  possibly  bring. 

Now  it  soon  becomes  manifest  that  no  mere  providing  of  one's 
self  with  external  means  of  security,  whether  with  or  without 
the  aid  of  religion,  can  provide  one  with  this  true  preparedness 
for  whatever  the  future  may  bring.  The  preparedness  must  be 
internal,  spiritual,  and  essentially  and  fundamentally  moral, 
a  preparation  in  character  and  attitude  of  will  and  in  access  to 
an  inexhaustible  source  of  spiritual  power.  To  be  brought  into 
such  an  attitude  of  will  and  into  such  a  relationship  to  an 
absolutely  dependable  source  of  spiritual  power  is  virtually  to 
be  saved.  To  meet  thus  the  vicissitudes  of  life  and  of  the  future 
life,  if  there  be  one,  with  moral  triumph,  and  to  develop  thereby 
the  character  which  habitually  experiences  moral  triumph,  is 
actually  to  be  saved  (delivered  from  absolute  evil).  Of  this 
actual  experience  of  salvation,  "reconciliation"  or  "atonement" 
is  little  more  than  the  beginning. 

In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  of  revelation  in  the  person 
and  work  of  Christ,  the  position  may  be  taken  that  salvation 
consists  in  becoming  essentially  "Christlike"  in  character  and 
work.  This  is  the  essentially  Christian  experience  of  salvation. 

132 


REVELATION  IN  SALVATION  133 

It  is  the  making  of  the  human  spirit  holy,  in  the  critical  sense 
of  that  term,  through  the  immanent  operation  of  the  divine 
power.  This  divine  Presence  and  Power,  operating  within 
human  life  and  experience  and  producing  the  Christlike  or 
holy  human  spirit,  is  called  the  "  Holy  Spirit."  The  Christian 
salvation  is  thus  the  Christian  revelation — revelation  of  the 
presence  and  activity  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Further  definition 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  discussion  of  its  relation  to  God  and  to 
Jesus  Christ  may  be  postponed  until  we  come  to  treat  of  the 
idea  of  the  "Trinity"  under  theological  theory. 

The  preliminary  phase  of  this  Christian  experience  of  salva- 
tion is,  ordinarily  at  least,  what  may  be  called,  to  use  an  old 
phrase,  "conviction  of  sin."  Under  the  older  evangelicalism 
this  often  meant  being  oppressed  with  the  feeling  that  one  was 
"under  the  curse  of  a  broken  law/'  and  doomed  to  everlasting 
punishment  by  an  angry  God.  As  the  modern  mind  has  been 
revising  its  views  of  God  and  of  sin  and  its  punishment,  the  com- 
plaint has  arisen  that  there  is  now  little  conviction  of  sin  in 
connection  with  religious  experience.  This  is  doubtless  due  in 
part  to  the  fact  that  the  normal  conviction  of  sin,  from  the  best 
modern  point  of  view,  is  rightly  enough  essentially  different, 
intellectually,  volitionally  and  emotionally,  from  that  which 
formerly  was  the  standard  experience. 

From  the  present  point  of  view,  then,  normal  conviction  of  sin 
may  be  said  to  be  moral  self-dissatisfaction,  together  with  the 
more  or  less  explicit  sense  of  the  need  of  at-one-ment  with  God 
and  man.  Reconciliation  with  God  is  sought,  however,  not  for 
the  sake  of  external  pardon  and  future  safety,  but  rather  for  the 
sake  of  being  in  harmony  with  the  divine,  and  for  the  sake  of 
moral  power  and  triumph  over  sin.  It  is  important  to  note, 
also,  that  this  modern  conviction  of  sin  may  be,  and  doubtless 
ought  to  be,  social  or  corporate  as  well  as  individual.  That  is, 
it  ought  to  include  dissatisfaction  with  the  society  of  which  one 
is  a  member,  for  the  evils  which  are  traceable,  not  so  much  to 
one's  own  individual  delinquency,  as  to  that  of  the  group  with 
which  one  is  associated.  The  judgment  of  moral  disapproval 
passed  upon  the  individual  or  corporate  subject  will,  moreover, 
be  accompanied  normally  by  feelings  of  sorrow  and  shame,  and 
by  impulses  toward  a  fundamentally  different  sort  of  life.  Mod- 


134          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

ern  conviction  of  sin,  then,  is  of  this  sort;  and  for  religious  cogni- 
tion, once  more,  the  whole  experience  is,  as  a  revelation,  the 
divine  process  of  salvation  in  its  preliminary  phase,  an  operation 
of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

The  transition-experience,  in  which  the  essentially  right 
religious  attitude  for  the  sake  of  moral  victory  is  consciously  and 
definitely  taken  up,  is  conversion.  The  term  itself  means  a 
turning  or  change  from  one  attitude  or  course  to  another;  but 
here  it  is  used  as  meaning  the  definite  and  decisive  beginning  of 
an  essential!}'  Christian  life,  religiously  and,  as  a  consequence, 
morally.  There  is  a  normal  emotional  accompaniment  of  the 
experience,  as  well  as  certain  preliminary  intellectual  condi- 
tions; but  the  essential  and  crucially  important  phase  of  the 
experience  is  the  volitional.  When  conversion  is  from  another 
religion,  the  intellectual  element  is  generally  prominent.  When 
it  takes  place  under  social  influence  (as  in  a  "revival"),  emo- 
tional elements  may  be  pronounced.  But  the  conversion  itself 
is  essentially  and  primarily  a  decision,  put  into  practice.  The 
psychologist  of  religion  is  generally  inclined  to  use  the  term 
"conversion"  for  only  such  religious  experiences  of  transition  as 
are  highly  emotional  and  are,  as  such,  particularly  interesting 
from  the  psychological  point  of  view.  But  from  the  point  of 
view  of  theology,  genuine  conversion  is,  as  has  been  intimated, 
the  experiential  beginning  of  the  recognizably  Christian,  or 
saved,  or  holy  life;  however  emotional  the  experience,  it  is  not 
Christian  conversion  until  there  has  been  the  taking  up  of  the 
Christian  religious  and  moral  attitude.  Under  favorable  condi- 
tions of  religious  education  there  may  be  no  outwardly  very 
noticeable  transition,  nor  any  very  memorable  experience, 
psychologically  speaking;  but  such  features  are  only  incidental 
anyway.  The  essential  element  is  the  having  come  to  be  a 
decided  Christian,  morally  and  religiously. 

There  are  different  forms  of  thought  in  which  one  may  ex- 
press the  nature  of  this  transition-experience,  but  one  of  the 
readiest  and  most  practical  is  in  terms  of  discipleship  to  Christ. 
When  one  begins  affirmatively  and  decisively  to  respond  to  the 
essential  appeal,  moral  and  religious,  of  Jesus,  i.  e.,  when  it 
becomes  a  matter  of  principle  with  him  to  respond  to  whatever 
practical  meanings  the  personality  and  work  of  the  historic 


REVELATION  IN  SALVATION         135 

Jesus,  interpreted  as  revelation  of  God,  may  have  for  his  life, 
he  has  experienced  conversion.  Many  qualities  of  his  character 
and  conduct  may  previously  have  been  largely  Christian,  and 
as  yet  he  is  doubtless  in  many  ways  far  from  being  as  Christian 
as  he  may  yet  become;  but  he  is  now  Christian  in  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  his  life,  and  so  he  is  a  Christian. 

The  main  elements  into  which  the  genuine  conversion- 
experience  may  be  analyzed  are  repentance  and  faith.  And  as 
genuine  conversion  is  more  fundamentally  and  essentially  a 
volitional  than  an  intellectual  or  emotional  experience,  so  true 
repentance  is  essentially  volitional,  moral,  rather  than  emo- 
tional, although  normally  it  has  its  emotional  accompaniment; 
and  true  faith  is  also  essentially  volitional,  rather  than  in- 
tellectual, although  normally  it  has  its  characteristic  intellec- 
tual antecedents  and  sequel.  Repentance  is  not  mere  regret,  or 
sorrow  for  sin,  but  a  decisive  turning  away  from  sin  and  from 
the  sinful  principle  of  life.  Faith  is  the  affirmative  response  of 
the  will  to  God  as  revealed,  i.  e.,  to  the  appeal  of  the  divine  as 
presented  in  history  (racial  experience)  or  within  the  experience 
of  the  individual.  There  may  be  intellectual  "faith"  without 
true  repentance,  because  there  may  be  intellectual  faith  without 
true  (saving)  faith.  And  there  may  be  emotional  "repentance" 
before  and  without  true  faith,  because  there  may  be  emotional 
repentance  without  true  repentance.  But  it  may  be  surmised 
that  there  can  be  no  truly  Christian  repentance  without  the 
beginnings  of  Christian  faith,  as  there  can  be  no  truly  Christian 
faith  without  at  least  the  beginnings  of  Christian  repentance. 
Christian  conversion  is  turning  from  sin  to  God,  and  turning  to 
God  in  order  to  be  turned  effectually  from  sin;  and,  as  phases  of 
this  experience,  repentance  or  turning  effectually  from  sin,  and 
faith  or  turning  effectually  to  God,  are  mutually  involved  and 
ultimately  inseparable.* 

This  definite  and  overt  beginning  of  the  Christian  attitude 
and  way  of  willing  as  a  new  life  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  "the 
new  birth"  or  being  "born  again";  and  viewed  as  such  and  as  a 
manifestation  of  the  divine  within  the  human,  i.  e.,  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  it  is  with  apparent  appropriateness  characterized  as 

*  Here  we  seem  to  have  the  solution  of  the  controversy  as  to  whether  re- 
pentance precedes  faith  or  faith  precedes  repentance. 


136  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

being  "born  of  the  Spirit,"  or  as  a  divine  process  of  "regenera- 
tion." 

The  normal  accompaniment  of  the  conversion-experience  is 
the  assurance  of  atonement,  or  reconciliation  with  God  (and 
ultimately  with  man  also),  including  a  sense  of  forgiveness  with 
reference  to  past  sin  (and  a  readiness  to  grant  forgiveness  to 
those  who  have  sinned  against  one's  self).  The  reconciliation 
with  God  is  very  commonly  thought  of  as  being  "adopted" 
into  a  specially  filial  relationship  with  God,  and  being  brought 
into  a  specially  brotherly  relation  to  fellow-Christians  and 
indeed  to  all  men.  There  is  involved  in  the  whole  experience  a 
consciousness  of  access  to  the  divine  power  needed  for  the 
various  experiences  of  the  present  life  and  whatever  life  to  come 
there  may  be;  in  other  words,  there  is  all  that  is  essential  in 
what  is  called  "the  assurance  of  salvation."  This  phase  of  the 
experience  is  largely  emotional,  but  belief  is  also  influenced, 
and  in  the  new  relation  toward  God  and  the  new  appreciation 
of  the  divine  and  of  the  potentialities  of  the  divine  within 
the  human  there  are  at  the  same  time  a  new  motive  and 
a  new  power  for  the  maintenance  of  a  high  standard  of  personal 
morality  and  for  co-operating  in  the  work  of  atonement  and 
salvation. 

In  going  on  to  speak  of  the  further  realization  of  the  essen- 
tially Christian  experience  of  salvation,  or,  in  other  words,  to 
trace  the  further  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  or  progress  of  the 
divine  within  the  human,  we  may  isolate,  as  phases  of  the  sub- 
ject, the  continuation  of  the  Christian  life,  the  health  of  that 
life,  and  the  growth  of  Christian  character. 

In  traditional  theology  there  was  division  of  opinion  and 
controversy  as  to  whether,  once  the  new  divine  life  had  been 
begun  in  a  human  soul,  it  was  sure  to  be  continued  to  the  end  of 
the  present  life  and  to  issue  ultimately  in  spiritual  perfection. 
Some,  choosing  apriori  processes  and  emphasizing  religious 
considerations,  upheld  the  affirmative,  while  the  negative  was 
supported  mainly  on  moral  and  empirical  grounds.  Both  sides 
tried  to  make  use  of  the  appeal  to  authoritative  scriptures,  and 
each  side  claimed  greater  practical  advantages  for  its  view  than 
for  its  rival.  The  question  was  of  course  especially  acute  when 
salvation  was  thought  of  as  mainly  external,  as  having  to  do 


REVELATION  IN  SALVATION  137 

with  a  future  state  (eschatological),  and  as  related  in  a  more  or 
less  arbitrary  way  to  the  will  of  God.  But  when  salvation  is 
interpreted  as  primarily  present  and  internal,  and  so;  as  funda- 
mentally moral,  the  question  largely  answers  itself,  and  the 
" perseverance  of  the  saints"  controversy  disappears.  The 
individual  is  saved  to  the  extent  to  which  he  is  actually  brought 
into  an  experience  of  the  divine  life  and  delivered  from  evil 
conduct  and  character  and,  incidentally,  from  what  would 
have  been  the  consequences  of  the  sins  he  might  otherwise  have 
committed.  As  to  the  conditions  of  the  continuation  of  the 
experience  of  salvation,  whether  these  conditions  are  human  or 
divine,  we  shall  have  more  to  say  when  we  come  to  formulate 
the  laws  of  empirical  theology;  but  for  the  present  it  may  be 
surmised  (both  in  view  of  what  we  have  felt  justified  in  pre- 
supposing concerning  human  freedom,  and  in  the  light  of  what 
we  have  discovered  as  to  the  fundamental  place  of  revelation 
of  the  divine  in  salvation),  that  these  conditions  are  neither 
exclusively  human  nor  exclusively  divine. 

The  health  of  the  regenerate  life  and  the  growth  of  Christian 
character  may  be  discussed  in  large  part  together,  since  the 
former  is  the  condition  of  the  latter.  A  healthy  condition  of 
the  religious  or  spiritual  life  is  sometimes  regarded  as  being 
essentially  a  state  of  emotional  exaltation,  characterized  not 
only  by  the  feelings  of  love  to  God  and  man,  but  perhaps  even 
more  conspicuously  by  an  unspeakable  peace  and  joy;  and  to 
such  states  are  often  applied  such  New  Testament  terms  as 
"the  baptism  of  the  Holy  Spirit"  and  "the  fulness  of  the 
Spirit."  Now  these  feelings,  as  accompaniments  of  states  of 
increased  moral  efficiency,  are  not  to  be  despised;  they  may 
even  be  regarded  as  signs  of  spiritual  health;  but  they  are  not 
the  most  essential  phases  of  the  fulness  of  the  divine  Spirit  in 
human  life.  Truly  perfect  health  of  the  regenerate  life,  true 
fulness  of  the  Spirit,  would  be  to  be  so  indwelt  by  the  divine 
Life  as  always  to  will  the  right  as  fully  as  it  was  known,  and 
to  do  it  as  effectively  as,  under  existing  bodily,  mental  and 
external  conditions,  it  could  be  done.  Action  of  this  sort  would, 
by  repetition,  build  up  the  character  in  the  direction  of  the 
spiritual  goal  of  holiness,  divineness,  or  ideal  character.  This 
process  of  moral  development  under  favorable  religious  con- 


138          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

ditions  is,  in  the  language  of  religion,  "sanctification,"  and  in 
religious  cognition  it  is  attributed  to  the  Holy  Spirit. 

What  in  detail  the  religious  or  other  conditions  of  sanctifica- 
tion  are,  will  be  discussed  when  we  come  to  speak  of  the  laws 
of  empirical  theology;  but  at  this  point  we  may  consider  the 
question  of  the  validity  and  feasibility  of  the  ideal  of  perfection 
in  conduct  and  character.  If  we  define  complete  morality  of 
conduct  as  an  achievement  of  will  and  of  actual  performance 
such  as  is  equal  to  the  highest  possibility  for  the  individual  at 
the  time,  there  still  remain  further  questions  as  to  this  highest 
possibility.  A  distinction  should  be  made  between  what  is 
actually  possible  and  what  would  have  been  possible  at  the  time, 
if  in  the  past  the  actions  had  been  ideal,  and  if  all  opportunities 
that  might  have  been  utilized  for  gaining  further  knowledge 
and  power  for  right  action  had  actually  been  so  utilized.  It 
should  be  recognized,  however,  that  the  perfect  outward  real- 
ization of  a  perfectly  good  will  would  require,  in  many  in- 
stances, a  body  perfectly  responsive  to  such  a  will,  a  society 
perfectly  responsive  to  the  appeal  of  moral  ideals,  and  other 
instruments  perfectly  fitted  for  the  work  to  be  done.  And  it 
should  be  noted  further  that  a  sense  of  moral  incompleteness 
is  not  incompatible  with  the  absence  of  a  consciousness  of 
guilt;  for,  however  far  one  may  have  progressed  in  the  moral 
life,  a  further  ideal  can  be  set  for  the  future.  Moreover,  there 
may  come  increased  insight  into  duty  or  an  increased  facility 
in  action  as  the  result  of  conscientious  and  persevering  effort. 
In  any  case,  no  person  ought  to  expect  ever  to  reach  a  state  in 
which  the  moral  ideal  has  been  so  fully  realized  that  no  further 
progress  will  be  possible.  In  view  of  such  considerations,  then, 
we  would  suggest  that  while  no  one  should  go  so  far  as  to  deny 
that  perfectly  moral  action  is  humanly  possible,  one  ought  to 
be  very  slow  to  claim  that  any  acts  of  his  own  have  been  of  this 
sort,  while  to  speak  of  one's  own  character  as  morally  perfect 
would  be  simply  to  make  oneself  ridiculous.  On  the  one  hand 
it  is  demonstrably  true  that  doing  what,  under  the  existing  limi- 
tations to  action,  the  individual  or  society  ought  to  do,  is  al- 
ways possible;  for  if  it  were  not  in  any  way  possible,  there 
would  be  no  guilt  involved  in  not  doing  it.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  no  one  is  doing  his  full  duty  who  is  not  doing  what  would 


REVELATION  IN  SALVATION  139 

be  his  best  with  the  help  of  the  best  available  experimental 
religion,  or,  objectively  stated,  with  the  help  of  God,  the  Holy 
Spirit,  revealed  in  his  life.  For  on  the  basis  of  induction  from 
religious  experience,  it  may  be  asserted  that  the  highest  moral 
possibilities  with  the  aid  of  the  best  experimental  religion  are, 
other  things  being  equal,  higher  than  the  highest  moral  possi- 
bilities without  it.  With  the  morally  uplifting  revelation  of 
the  power  of  God,  the  Holy  Spirit,  developed  as  far  as  may  be, 
it  seems  not  too  much  to  say  that  there  is  no  present  duty 
which  cannot  be  done;  that  it  is  always  possible  to  refuse  to 
yield  to  recognized  sin;  that  there  is  no  temptation  to  the  will 
which  may  not  be  conquered,  and  that  there  is  no  moral  weak- 
ness which  may  not  be  progressively  outgrown.  This  in  the 
case  of  the  individual;  and  for  society,  that  there  is  no  evil 
resting  upon  individual  or  corporate  delinquency  which  may 
not  also  be  finally  uprooted  and  destroyed. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY 

IN  undertaking  to  formulate  the  laws  of  empirical  theology 
we  naturally  presuppose  both  the  general  fact  of  revelation  and 
particular  facts  of  revelation,  such  as  have  been  discussed  in  the 
preceding  sections.  In  accepting  such  facts  as  empirical  data 
for  our  science,  we  are  taking  the  position,  as  indicated  above, 
that  in  experimental  religion  at  its  best  there  is  objectively 
valid  religious  perception.  A  more  detailed  exposition  and  de- 
fense of  our  position  than  we  have  offered  above  would  lead  us 
into  the  philosophy  of  religion,  and  so  beyond  the  intended 
scope  of  the  present  volume. 

In  experimental  religion,  as  in  all  experiential  life,  there  are 
factors  which  are  constant  and  others  which  are  variable.  Now 
the  possibility  of  formulating  empirical  laws  depends  upon  the 
discovery  of  constant  relations  in  the  midst  of  experienced  va- 
riations. Among  the  constants  involved  in  the  present  instance 
are  nature  with  its  laws,  and  certain  aspects  of  the  social  en- 
vironment and  of  human  nature  in  general.  The  most  impor- 
tant constant  for  theology,  however,  is  the  being  and  character 
of  God.  This  is  the  Constant  of  empirical  theological  laws.  The 
God  whose  existence,  in  the  light  of  permanently  successful  re- 
ligious experience,  we  are  justified  in  assuming,  has  been  defined 
above  as  the  necessary  objective  Factor  in  religious  experience, 
or  the  Object  of  active  religious  dependence,  or  the  Source  of 
salvation,  i.  e.,  of  religious  deliverance  from  evil.  Other  pre- 
liminary definitions,  sufficient  to  mark  off  the  religious  Object 
from  other  objects  are  the  following:  the  objective  Source  of  that 
inner  or  spiritual  preparedness  for  whatever  the  future  may 
bring  which  is  achieved  through  the  right  sort  of  religious  ad- 
justment; or  again,  the  Power,  not  identical  with  our  empirical 
selves,  nor  with  the  merely  physical  or  merely  human  environ- 
ment, which  makes  for  righteousness  in  a.nd  through  us  according 

140 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  141 

as  we  relate  ourselves  to  it  in  a  certain  discoverable  way.  This  is 
the  Reality  which  we  have  called  the  Holy  Spirit.  Beyond  what 
is  here  involved  we  do  not  attempt  to  anticipate  the  results  of 
theological  theory;  the  character  of  God  is  what  we  have  to  in- 
vestigate by  our  empirical  procedure.  We  simply  assume  (in 
the  scientifically  tentative  or  empirical  way)  that  God  has  char- 
acter and  will  therefore  be  found  to  be  dependable,  when  we 
have  found  out  what  we  ought  to  depend  upon  the  religious 
Object  for.  It  is  involved  in  what  we  have  already  said,  that 
God  is  a  constant  Source  of  unfailing  spiritual  power.  Of  course 
to  assert  dependable  character  is  not  necessarily  to  deny  free 
agency.  Moreover,  even  with  all  the  constants  involved,  we 
do  not  claim  that  theology  is  or  ever  can  become  an  exact  sci- 
ence. We  may  not  be  able  to  make  an  exact  quantitative  pre- 
diction of  the  results  of  experimental  religion  in  any  individual 
case,  because  of  the  many  more  or  less  unknown  factors  and 
at  least  one  factor  which  is  not  completely  predetermined.  But 
the  quality  and  direction  characteristic  of  the  Constant's  action 
may  be  learned  through  empirical  investigation. 

Among  the  variables  which  tend  to  enter  as  factors  into  relig- 
ious experience  are  certain  phases  of  the  social  environment  and 
of  the  individual  training  and  outfit  of  ideas.  Often  these  are 
constants  relatively  to  some  collections  of  religious  data,  and 
variables  relatively  to  others.  But  the  two  most  important 
variables,  at  least  within  the  individual  religious  subject,  are  the 
quality  and  degree  of  responsiveness  of  nature  or  constitution, 
and  the  particular  religious  adjustment  adopted.  According 
to  the  variation  from  individual  to  individual,  and  from  one 
time  to  another  within  the  same  individual,  the  results  of  the 
religious  adjustment  come  quickly  or  slowly,  and  steadily  or 
unsteadily.  For  example,  the  conditions  of  right  religious  ad- 
justment being  fulfilled  and  persisted  in,  there  are  some  persons 
into  whose  lives  there  will  be  a  gradually  increasing  incoming  of 
the  divine,  and  others  in  whose  cases  the  incoming  may  be  de- 
layed for  some  time,  and  then,  when  the  constitutional  resistance 
has  been  overcome,  it  may  manifest  itself  suddenly.  However, 
the  influence  of  the  social  religious  environment  may  counteract 
the  tendency  to  slowness  and  unsteadiness.  But  in  general 
there  would  seem  to  be  at  least  four  possible  types,  due  to  con- 


142          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

stitutional  and  environmental  differences,  viz.  (1)  that  of  quick 
but  unsteady  returns,  (2)  that  of  slow  but  steady  returns,  (3) 
that  of  quick  and  steady  returns,  and  (4)  that  of  slow  and  un- 
steady returns. 

But  the  most  important  variable,  especially  for  our  present 
purpose,  is  the  particular  religious  adjustment  adopted  by  the 
individual.  What  we  are  interested  in  formulating  is  the  right 
religious  adjustment,  i.  e.,  the  one  which  is  at  the  same  time 
critically  justifiable  and  most  effective  for  good.  It  is  that  ad- 
justment to  the  religious  Object  which  is  necessary  in  order  to 
realize  those  values  for  the  sake  of  which  individuals  are  and 
ought  to  be  experimentally  religious. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  point  out  the  mistaken  nature  of  the 
notion  often  entertained  that  the  adjustment  is  primarily  or  even 
exclusively  intellectual,  i.  e.,  that  there  is  a  law  of  religious  ex- 
perience the  sole  and  sufficient  human  condition  of  which  is 
correct  religious  opinion,  or  belief.  Experience  has  long  ago 
and  time  after  time  refuted  this  idea.  To  be  sure,  among  the 
Jews  in  the  days  of  primitive  Christianity  belief  in  Jesus  as  the 
Messiah  seemed  the  condition  of  the  Christian  experience  of 
salvation;  but  this  was  because,  under  the  special  circumstances 
of  that  people  at  that  time,  such  a  belief  was  the  cue  to  a  whole 
series  of  practical  attitudes,  which  were  the  real  condition  of  the 
religious  experience.  But  for  most  people  in  " Christian"  com- 
munities to-day,  the  doctrine  that  Jesus  was  the  Messiah,  or 
Christ,  is  a  commonplace  of  traditional  teaching  and  belief;  it 
has  practically  no  spiritual  dynamic  at  all.  The  "right  religious 
adjustment"  must  be  sought  primarily  in  the  volitional  rather 
than  in  the  intellectual  realm. 

According  to  scientific  empirical  procedure,  in  seeking  to  de- 
termine the  most  effective  intellectually  justifiable  religious  ad- 
justment, we  should  first  go  as  far  as  we  can  in  deducing  theo- 
logical hypotheses  from  the  general  presuppositions  of  theology 
and  the  special  theological  assumption  of  the  existence  of  the 
religious  Object  (as  defined  in  preliminary  fashion),  together 
with  the  general  principle  of  the  dependableness  of  that  Object. 
We  should  then  supplement  the  rather  bare  and  abstract  con- 
tent of  these  hypotheses  by  having  recourse  to  the  scientific  im- 
agination, with  its  suggestions  drawn  from  prescientific  religious 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  143 

experience.  Finally  the  hypotheses  thus  constructed  and  spec- 
ulatively  elaborated  should  be  used  as  working  hypotheses  and 
submitted  to  the  test  of  practical  experience,  and  in  the  light  of 
the  result  classified  as  refuted  or  partially  verified  or  completely 
verified.  One  would  do  well,  however,  definitely  to  compare 
his  tentative  results  with  those  of  others,  paying  special  atten- 
tion to  testimonies  of  those  most  expert  in  securing  successful 
religious  adjustments. 

But  the  process  of  the  discovery  of  empirical  laws  may  be 
greatly  facilitated  if  we  remember  that  in  the  religious  life  and 
experience  of  Jesus  we  find  the  supreme  instance  of  success  in 
experimental  religion.  We  have  already  referred  to  the  three 
main  factors  in  Jesus'  spiritual  ministry  as  the  presenting  in 
his  teaching  and  perhaps  even  more  in  the  spirit  discernible 
in  his  action,  of  (1)  the  true  moral  ideal  for  man,  (2)  the  true 
religious  ideal  for  man,  and  (3)  the  true  revelation  of  God. 
Here  we  are  concerned  with  all  three  of  these,  but  especially 
with  the  second.  The  religious  example  of  Jesus  has  its  sig- 
nificance and  value  largely  because  of  the  chief  end  for  the 
sake  of  which  he  was  religious,  viz.,  the  promotion  of  moral 
efficiency  in  the  interests  of  true  human  welfare.  For  Jesus 
has  his  transcendent  greatness  chiefly  through  the  fact  that  he 
was  at  once  a  social  and  a  religious  genius;  he  discovered  the 
true  worth  of  man  and  the  true  way  to  God.  It  is  true  that  in 
Jesus  Christ  as  revelation  of  God,  we  have  the  objective  Factor 
to  which  religious  adjustment  has  to  be  made,  not  only  better 
represented  but  better  presented  than  elsewhere,  and  thus  at  the 
same  time  giving  us  a  greater  certainity  of  the  divine  Reality 
than  we  should  otherwise  have  been  able  to  have  in  systematic- 
ally beginning  our  own  religious  experience.  But  it  is  the  reli- 
gious example  of  Jesus  which  we  find  especially  illuminating  at 
this  point.  It  is  not  without  ample  justification  that  an  expe- 
rienced and  well-known  religious  worker  has  expressed  the  first 
definite  step  toward  the  essentially  Christian  religious  experience 
in  the  following  declaration:  "It  is  my  purpose,  with  the  help  of 
God,  to  pay  what  it  costs  to  be  a  sincere  follower  of  Jesus 
Christ" 

Assisted  by  these  considerations  we  may  analyze  into  the 
following  chief  elements  what  has  been  found  to  be  at  once  the 


144  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

most  effective  and,  we  would  claim,  a  critically  justifiable  re- 
ligious adjustment.  First,  then,  there  must  be  concentration  of 
attention,  with  the  aid  of  appropriate  guiding  ideas,  upon  the 
Object  of  religious  dependence,  identified  with  the  Source  of 
religious  deliverance,  with  special  reference  to  a  thoroughly 
moral  end  which  represents  "the  soul's  sincere  desire."  There 
must  also  be  a  whole-hearted  or  absolute  self-surrender  to  the 
divine  Being,  a  consecration  and  abandon  of  one's  self  to  be 
worked  upon  and  through  by  the  divine  Power;  and  at  the  same 
time  an  absolute  dependence  upon  God  with  reference  to  the 
thoroughly  moral  and  sincerely  desired  end  which  is  to  be  real- 
ized with  the  assistance  of  the  divine  Power.  It  is  also  impor- 
tant that  there  be  a  willed  responsiveness,  or  readiness  for  active 
expression,  as  the  divine  Being  may  seem  to  guide  and  impel. 
This  is  the  really  essential  thing  in  faith.  It  involves  trusting 
God;  it  is  venturing  to  go  ahead  with  one's  own  part  in  the 
process,  counting  upon  God  for  adequate  grace  and  power  for 
the  fulfilment  of  the  duty  before  us.  It  is  well,  to  be  sure,  to 
cultivate  the  habit  of  waiting  before  God  for  the  necessary 
"enduement  with  power";  but  one  should  not  be  too  dilatory 
any  more  than  he  should  be  too  precipitate.  And  finally,  there 
should  be  a  steady  persistence  in  the  religious  attitude  just 
described.  What  is  to  be  maintained  here,  then,  is  that  the 
laws  of  empirical  theology  may  be  thrown  into  generalized 
form  in  a  statement  to  the  effect  that,  on  condition  of  the 
above-described  religious  adjustment  on  man's  part,  God 
produces  in  human  life  and  character  certain  moral  experi- 
ences and  qualities,  with  tendencies  toward  certain  further 
consequences. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  detailed  statement  of  the  principal 
theological  laws,  however,  some  further  general  observations 
may  be  recorded.  It  would  seem  that  there  may  be,  and  are, 
within  the  limits  of  a  "right  religious  adjustment,"  various  dif- 
ferentiations of  the  faith  attitude.  The  most  important  factor 
in  this  variation,  perhaps,  is  the  nature  of  the  moral  objective 
entertained.  For  example,  the  faith-attitude  which  seeks  pa- 
tience under  affliction  will  be  somewhat  different  from  that 
which  aims  at  power  for  service;  and  so  where  the  objectives 
are  firmness  and  gentleness  respectively. 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  145 

Again,  it  may  be  remarked,  the  laws  of  empirical  theology, 
if  they  are  to  keep  close  to  the  facts,  will  frequently  have  to 
embody  a  sliding  scale  of  results  varying  in  proportion  to  the 
earnestness  and  persistence  of  the  individual  will  with  reference 
to  religious  adjustment.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  growth 
of  spiritual  character  under  religious  influence,  and  of  the  emo- 
tional phases  of  religious  experience.  But  it  is  not  always  pos- 
sible to  formulate  a  uniformly  sliding  scale.  The  most  notable 
exception  is  bound  up  with  the  fact  that,  so  far  as  special  en- 
duement  with  power  for  service  and  for  the  overcoming  of 
temptation  is  concerned,  there  are  no  results,  comparatively 
speaking,  until  the  consecration  or  self-surrender  is  at  least 
intended  to  be  total  and  absolute.  Again,  this  condition  having 
been  fulfilled,  the  results  tend  to  vary  with  attention  and  prayer, 
and  so  to  fall  into  a  sliding  scale,  but  only  up  to  a  certain  point; 
for  there  seems  to  be,  in  the  case  of  persons  of  ordinary  constitu- 
tions, a  "law  of  diminishing  returns"  after  a  certain  point  has 
been  reached.  For  example,  for  most  people  it  is  probably  not 
true  that  two  hours  spent  continuously  in  prayer  will  produce 
twice  as  much  in  the  way  of  spiritual  uplift  and  power  as  would 
result  from  a  single  hour  thus  occupied.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  persons  of  mystical  temperament  who  seem  to  get 
very  slight  returns  until  they  have  persisted  in  their  devotions 
far  beyond  what  is  customarily  regarded  as  a  reasonable  time. 
And  probably  nobody  is  ever  justified  in  saying  that  he  has  at 
any  time  exhausted  the  possibilities  of  spiritual  uplift  bound  up 
with  the  right  sort  of  experimental  religion.  There  seems  always, 
in  spite  of  any  law  of  diminishing  returns,  an  inexhaustible 
possibility  of  more  of  the  divine. 

In  undertaking  to  formulate  the  principal  laws  of  empirical 
theology,  we  shall  take  them  up  in  the  following  order: 

I.  Primary  theological  laws  (or  the  laws  of  volitional  expe- 
riences). 

1.  The  laws  of  elemental  experiences. 

2.  The  laws  of  composite  experiences. 
II.  Secondary  theological  laws. 

1.  The  laws  of  emotional  experiences. 

2.  The  laws  of  intellectual  experiences. 

3.  The  laws  of  physiological  experiences. 


146  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

4.  The  laws  of  social  experiences. 

a.  Ecclesiastical. 

b.  General. 

First,  then,  we  turn  to  a  consideration  of  the  laws  of  theology 
in  the  volitional  sphere,  or,  as  we  may  call  them,  the  primary 
theological  laws.  Under  this  division,  in  turn,  we  shall  first 
consider  the  laws  of  elemental  experiences,  as  distinguished  from 
those  of  composite  experiences — on  the  principle,  as  useful  in 
scientific  investigation  as  in  military  tactics,  of  "  divide  and 
conquer."  These  laws,  which,  like  all  theological  laws,  are  in 
their  psychological  aspects  laws  of  successful  religious  depend- 
ence, and  in  their  epistemological  aspect  laws  of  divine  revela- 
tion, may  also  be  characterized  more  particularly  as  laws  of 
special  providence,  this  term  being  understood  in  the  sense  of 
special  provision  made  for  the  supply  of  spiritual  need  in  re- 
sponse to  the  right  religious  adjustment.  Or  again,  they  may  be 
called  laws  of  the  answer  to  prayer,  understanding  by  true 
petitionary  prayer  what  we  have  described  under  the  caption 
of  "the  right  religious  adjustment."  This  right  religious  ad- 
justment is,  of  course,  psychologically  impossible  save  on 
the  supposition  that  God  is  real  and  will  respond  favorably 
to  those  who  diligently  cultivate  the  relation;  but  it  is  never 
spiritually  fruitless.  There  is  no  law  of  the  answer  to  prayer  for 
rain;  nor  does  it  seem  possible  to  formulate  any  law  of  the  answer 
to  prayer  for  physical  events,  save  as  these  may  be  the  natural 
effect  of  the  prayer's  more  immediate  outcome  in  the  petitioner's 
own  life — or,  perhaps,  telepathically  in  the  lives  of  others.  For 
as  yet  it  seems  questionable  whether  there  can  even  be  any  law 
of  the  answer  to  intercessory  prayer,  except  in  terms  of  the 
better  equipment  of  the  petitioner  to  be  used  in  answering  his 
own  prayer;  at  any  rate  no  such  empirical  law  has  yet  been 
made  out.  With  reference  to  prayer  for  the  dead,  it  may  be  said 
that  there  seems  no  consideration  against  expressing  in  God's 
presence  the  soul's  sincere  desire  for  the  spiritual  welfare  of  the 
departed,  any  more  than  against  praying  for  those  still  living, 
except  that,  because  of  our  ignorance  of  the  events  in  question, 
exaggerated  ideas  may  be  formed  as  to  what  can  be  accomplished 
by  such  prayers,  and  duties  to  the  living  be  neglected  in  favor 
of  the  saying  of  "masses  for  the  dead."  On  the  other  hand,  the 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  147 

expression  of  such  a  desire  in  the  presence  of  God  is  all,  be  it 
little  or  much,  that  we  can  do  for  the  dead.  However,  there  is 
prayer  which  we  know  to  be  answered.  With  respect  to  the 
realization  of  right  moral  ends  in  and  through  one's  own  voli- 
tional life,  there  are  such  laws  of  the  answer  to  prayer  as  make 
the  prediction  of  results  possible  to  a  certain  extent,  even  from 
the  point  of  view  of  our  limited  experience  and  knowledge. 
The  religious  expert  who  is  qualified  to  guide  others  to  the  most 
desirable  religious  experience  always  assumes  ability  thus  to 
predict  the  future,  whether  on  a  consciously  empirical  basis, 
or  on  the  traditional  foundation  of  the  "promises"  (which  are 
in  the  main  themselves  empirical  generalizations).  As  taught 
on  the  basis  of  personal  religious  experience  in  the  parables  of 
the  importunate  widow  and  the  midnight  borrower,  in  due  sea- 
son he  who  has  found  the  right  religious  adjustment  will  surely 
reap,  if  he  faints  not.  He  will  find  God  revealed  in  the  special 
providence  of  moral  uplift,  when  he  seeks  thus  "with  all  his 
heart." 

It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  the  ideal  religious  attitude  is  so 
to  trust  God  as  to  leave  everything  to  his  will,  without  trying 
to  get  anything  by  praying  for  it.  We  may  express  our  desires 
to  God,  it  is  said,  but  we  ought  always  to  submit  our  wills  to  the 
will  of  God,  until  finally  we  simply  trust  God  to  do  his  will, 
which  is  always  best,  and  ask  for  nothing.  Thus  the  culmina- 
tion of  true  prayer  would  be,  as  F.  W.  Robertson  has  put  it, 
to  "cease  to  pray  altogether."  But,  without  undertaking  at 
this  point  to  anticipate  the  constructions  of  theological  theory, 
we  can  say  that  this  highly  speculative  suggestion  is  surely 
wrong.  Prayer  is  the  soul  and  essence  of  experimental  religion; 
and  rather  than  ceasing  to  pray  for  the  reason  assigned,  we 
should  pray  and  critically  observe  the  results,  until  we  learn 
what  true  prevailing  prayer  is,  and  what  may  and  what  may 
not  be  looked  for  as  a  possible  direct  and  immediate  answer  to 
prayer.  In  the  end  it  will  be  borne  in  upon  us  by  experience 
that  what  we  have  called  the  right  religious  adjustment  is  true 
prayer,  and  this  will  become  a  habitual  attitude  with  us.  And 
so,  instead  of  praying  until  we  "cease  to  pray,"  we  shall  have 
prayed  until,  as  Paul  puts  it,  we  "pray  without  ceasing." 
(Paul's  own  experience  is  illuminating  in  this  connection.  Thrice 


148          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

he  "besought  the  Lord"  that  the  "thorn  in  the  flesh"  might 
be  taken  away.  The  "  thorn  "  remained ;  but  the  apostle  learned 
that  what  he  could  be  sure  of  obtaining  in  response  to  the  right 
religious  adjustment  was  "grace  sufficient"  to  enable  him  to 
carry  on  his  work  effectively  in  spite  of  this  and  other  handi- 
caps.) 

Among  the  elemental  religious  experiences  of  a  volitional 
sort  which  may  be  predicted  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  of  the 
theological  law  or  laws  of  such  experiences  are  the  following: 
the  receiving  of  moral  power  for  repentance  (as  the  turning 
away  of  the  will  from  moral  evil) ;  the  receiving  of  the  same  for 
moral  aspiration;  for  self-control  and  courage  (in  so  far  as 
these  are  moral,  as  distinct  from  physiological) ;  for  victory  over 
temptation  (in  so  far  as  the  problem  is  a  moral  rather  than  an 
intellectual  one,  such  as  it  would  be,  if  it  were  simply  that  of 
knowing  the  most  effective  means  of  putting  an  end  to  the 
tempting  suggestion);  and  further,  for  faithful  service  to  one's 
fellows  and  for  the  steadfast  endurance  of  affliction  and  the 
overcoming  of  obstacles.  And  the  laws  of  such  elemental 
religious  experiences  may  be  stated  in  abbreviated  form  as 
follows:  On  condition  of  the  right  religious  adjustment  with 
reference  to  desired  truly  moral  states  of  the  will  (such  as 
repentance,  moral  aspiration,  and  the  moral  elements  in  self- 
control,  courage,  victory  over  temptation,  faithful  service  and 
patient  endurance),  God  the  Holy  Spirit  produces  the  specific 
moral  results  desired. 

But  among  the  volitional  theological  laws  there  are  also  laws 
of  certain  composite  experiences,  of  which  the  most  important 
are,  to  use  the  traditional  terms,  "regeneration,"  "persever- 
ance," "fulness  of  the  Spirit,"  and  "sanctification."  Expressed 
in  language  more  acceptable  to  modern  ways  of  thinking,  these 
experiences  are  respectively  the  divine  beginning,  continuation 
(or  maintenance)  and  health  of  the  essentially  Christ-like  or 
Christian  life,  and  the  divine  development  of  essentially  Christ- 
like  or  Christian  character. 

The  theological  law  of  regeneration,  or  of  the  genesis  of  the 
new  or  essentially  Christian  life  may  be  formulated  thus:  On 
condition  of  the  right  religious  adjustment  with  a  view  to  being 
turned  permanently  from  sin  and  to  God  and  the  Christian 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  149 

way  of  life,  God  the  Holy  Spirit  works  primarily  in  the  will 
and  ultimately  in  the  nature  more  generally  the  definite  and 
manifest  beginning  of  a  new  and  specifically  Christian  spiritual 
life.  This  is  the  scientific  law  of  regeneration,  as  opposed  to 
the  superstition  of  an  essentially  magical  regeneration  through 
the  performance  of  a  ritual  act.  It  may  be  pointed  out,  and  it 
is  true  enough,  that  in  the  turning  of  the  human  will  from  sin 
to  God  with  a  view  to  regeneration  there  are  already  present 
the  beginnings  of  repentance  and  faith,  and  thus  of  regenera- 
tion itself.  Fundamental  religion  would  surmise  that  even 
this  initial  repentance  and  faith  are  the  work  of  the  divine  Life 
in  the  soul  of  man;  but  even  from  the  point  of  view  of  experi- 
mental religion  as  much  may  be  admitted.  The  life  is  divinely 
regenerated,  i.  e.,  a  life  which  is  essentially  Christian  in  prin- 
ciple definitely  begins  to  be  lived,  through  the  immanent  opera- 
tion of  the  Holy  Spirit,  on  condition  of  the  individual's  right 
religious  adjustment  being  for  the  sake  of  making  the  repent- 
ance and  faith  thoroughgoing  and  permanent. 

The  law  of  perseverance,  or  of  the  continuation  of  the  new  or 
essentially  Christian  life  may  be  formulated  thus:  On  condition 
of  the  persistence  of  the  right  religious  adjustment,  God  the 
Holy  Spirit  maintains  in  the  individual  the  new  and  essentially 
Christian  life.  The  true  Christian  is  "kept  by  the  power  of 
God  through  faith." 

The  law  of  the  health  of  the  Christian  life,  or  of  what  has 
been  called  "baptism  in  the  Spirit,"  "the  fulness  of  the  Spirit," 
and  "life  abundant,"  is  as  follows:  On  condition  of  a  sufficiently 
whole-hearted  cultivation  of  the  right  religious  adjustment, 
God  the  Holy  Spirit  so  brings  our  action  and  experience  under 
the  divine  control  that  we  are  enabled  to  do  what  we  ought 
to  do,  and  to  have,  subject  to  the  conditions  of  the  environ- 
ment and  of  our  constitution  and  past  history,  the  normal 
accompaniment  of  emotional  and  intellectual  experience. 

The  law  of  the  development  of  essentially  Christian  character, 
or  of  the  Christianizing  of  the  Christian  (one  who  has  become 
Christian  in  principle),  i.  e.,  the  law  of  what  has  been  called 
" sanctification "  and  "growth  in  grace,"  is  as  follows:  On 
condition  of  continued  cultivation  of  the  right  religious  adjust- 
ment, especially  when  it  is  so  constant  and  whole-hearted  as 


150  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

to  lead  to  the  permanent  health  and  healthful  activity  of  the 
Christian  life,  and  when  the  individual  has  adequate  informa- 
tion for  right  conduct,  God  the  Holy  Spirit  produces  in  him  the 
Christ-like  or  Christian  character,  with  its  habitual  readiness 
and  equipment  for  right  action.  In  other  words,  "what  we 
consecrate,  God  will  sanctify."  This  character-formation  is 
no  sudden  process,  but  is  here  as  everywhere  the  gradually 
accumulating  deposit  of  conduct;  and  yet  it  need  not  be  the 
slow  process,  with  repeated  disasters  and  setbacks,  that  it 
usually  is.  If  the  conditions  of  health  of  the  new  life  are  ful- 
filled, we  need  not  worry  about  the  continued  existence  of  that 
life,  nor  should  we — apart  from  a  justifiable  concern  to  be  rightly 
guided  in  our  activity — be  anxious  about  the  development  of 
our  spiritual  stature. 

In  addition  to  these  primary  theological  laws,  which  are 
concerned  with  the  most  immediate  results  of  the  right  religious 
adjustment,  i.  e.,  with  volitional  religious  experiences,  we 
must  set  forth  the  theological  laws  of  various  other  phases  or 
effects  of  religious  experience.  These  may  be  designated  second- 
ary, inasmuch  as  they  depend  upon  the  above-mentioned  voli- 
tional religious  experiences,  and  also  in  part  upon  other  circum- 
stances, such  as  special  mental  processes,  the  mental  or  physical 
constitution  of  the  individual,  and  the  character  of  the  social 
environment. 

First  among  the  secondary  theological  laws  we  shall  under- 
take to  state  the  laws  of  emotional  religious  experiences.  We 
shall  deal  with  the  feeling  accompaniment  of  the  conviction  of 
sin  and  with  those  additional  "fruits  of  the  Spirit"  which  we 
may  distinguish  by  the  terms  Christian  peace,  Christian  joy 
and  Christian  love. 

The  theological  law  of  the  feeling  of  repentance,  or  of  the 
feeling-accompaniment  of  the  conviction  of  sin,  may  be  stated 
as  follows:  On  condition  of  (1)  volitional  repentance  and  (2)  a 
sufficiently  steady  and  continued  contemplation  of  the  contrast 
between  one's  own  past  life  and  action  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  ideal  principle  of  life,  such  as  receives  particular  expression 
in  the  historic  Jesus,  on  the  other,  God  the  Holy  Spirit  produces 
(as  the  accompaniment  of  intensified  volitional  repentance) 
the  feeling  of  sorrow  for  sin.  Moreover,  not  only  within  the 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  151 

limits  of  the  experience  of  the  Christian  but  also  as  preliminary 
to  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  life,  there  occurs  the  experi- 
ence, partly  emotional,  partly  intellectual,  and  incipiently 
volitional,  which  is  ordinarily  called  "the  conviction  of  sin." 
Fundamental  religion  would  evaluate  this  process  as  divine, 
and  even  experimental  religion  may  surmise,  on  the  basis  of 
its  congruity  with  the  qualities  of  the  regenerate  life,  that  it 
also  is  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  In  any  case  it  may  be 
pointed  out  that  here  as  in  the  less  debatable  instance,  a  potent 
factor  in  producing  the  experience  is  self-measurement  with 
"the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fullness  of  Christ." 

The  theological  law  of  the  experience  of  Christian  peace  may 
be  formulated  thus:  On  condition  of  (1)  the  reconciliation  or 
atonement  with  God  which  is  involved  in  a  truly  Christian  faith, 
and  (2)  a  steady  contemplation  of  the  fact  that  one  is  at  peace 
with  God,  there  is  produced  within  the  individual  by  God  the 
Holy  Spirit,  within  such  limits  as  may  be  set  by  constitutional 
and  other  conditions,  a  feeling  of  peace.  This  is  what  has  been 
called  "the  peace  of  God,"  or  "the  peace  which  passeth  under- 
standing." It  is  important,  practically  speaking,  to  note  that 
the  rebel  against  the  divine  (whether  the  ideal  Law  or  the  ideal 
Being)  is  not  in  a  position  to  have  this  particular  feeling  of 
peace,  until  the  fact  of  peace  has  been  established;  and  this 
can  take  place  only  if  he  surrenders  absolutely  to  that  divine 
authority  against  which  he  has  been  in  rebellion.  (But  it  is 
peace  through  victory,  as  well  as  through  surrender;  it  is  peace 
through  victory  over  sin.)  However,  once  the  fact  of  peace 
has  been  established,  the  more  one  meditates  upon  the  fact, 
the  more  (other  conditions  being  the  same)  the  feeling  of  peace 
will  be  experienced. 

The  theological  law  of  Christian  joy  is  to  the  effect  that  on 
condition  of  (1)  success  in  the  Christian  life  and  in  Christian 
work  for  others  through  the  right  religious  adjustment,  and  (2) 
a  contemplation  of  this  success,  especially  in  the  lives  of  others, 
God  the  Holy  Spirit  produces  the  experience  of  Christian  joy. 
This  is  the  Pauline  "joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost."  Christian  cheer- 
fulness and  Christian  thankfulness  are  closely  related  to  Chris- 
tian joy,  and  are  somewhat  similarly  conditioned. 

The  theological  law  of  Christian  love  is  somewhat  complex 


152  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

in  its  formulation.  Christian  love  is  the  normal  Christian  re- 
lation of  unselfish  devotion  toward  God  and  man.  As  the  right 
feeling  toward  God  and  man,  it  is  conditioned  upon  right  think- 
ing about  God  and  man,  and  especially  upon  right  conduct 
toward  God  and  man,  i.  e.,  upon  thinking  of  God  as  perfect 
Father,*  ever  pursuing  us  with  his  tireless  love,  and  thinking 
of  one's  fellowmen  as  brothers  and  as  potentially  divine  in 
quality,  and  in  acting  in  a  filial  way  toward  God  and  in  a 
fraternal  way  toward  men.  In  all  this  would  be  involved,  of 
course,  essential  at-one-ment  with  God  and  man.  The  law, 
then,  may  be  formulated  as  follows:  On  condition  of  right 
thought  and  action  toward  God  and  man,  God  the  Holy  Spirit 
produces  in  us  ("sheds  abroad  in  our  hearts")  the  feeling  of 
unselfish  love  toward  God  and  man. 

A  second  group  of  secondary  theological  laws,  dependent 
upon  primary  or  volitional  religious  experiences,  and  also  upon 
other  conditions,  is  made  up  of  what  we  may  call  intellectual 
theological  laws.  Among  these  " other  conditions"  are  included 
certain  intellectual  processes  and  in  some  instances  some  of 
the  emotional  religious  experiences  to  which  reference  has  just 
been  made.  We  shall  deal  here  with  the  theological  laws  of 
two  intellectual,  or  largely  intellectual  experiences,  viz.,  "divine 
guidance"  and  "assurance,"  or  "the  witness  of  the  Spirit." 

In  undertaking  to  state  the  process  of  divine  guidance  in  the 
form  of  a  law  we  must  repudiate  the  common  notion  that  any 
insistent  suggestion  or  impulse  ensuing  upon  prayer  or  con- 
secration is  to  be  taken  as  an  instance  of  God's  leading.  Such 
suggestions  do  not  always  tend  toward  results  which  we  can 
evaluate  as  divine.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  on  condition  of  the 
right  religious  adjustment  God  produces  or  promotes  in  us 
fundamentally  right,  or  Christ-like,  or  Christian  volition;  and 
this  divinely  produced  or  divinely  promoted  right  will  inevitably 
influences  the  judgment  as  to  what  one  ought  or  ought  not  to 
do.  And  so,  granted  adequate  information  as  to  the  effects  of 
possible  courses  of  conduct,  and  correct  thinking  on  the  basis 

*  The  apparent  anticipation  of  theological  theory  in  this  designation  of 
God  is  not  a  violation  of  our  empirical  procedure.  We  simply  use  the 
language  of  religion  for  the  sake  of  psychological  clearness,  without  using 
the  ideas  as  a  basis  for  inference. 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY    ;153 

of  this  adequate  information,  it  can  be  said  that,  through  the' 
divinely  influenced  will,  divine  guidance  is  a  fact.  The  law 
is  as  follows:  On  condition  of  the  right  religious  adjustment, 
God  the  Holy  Spirit  produces  a  fundamentally  right  direction 
of  the  will,  and  this,  together  with  adequate  information  and 
logical  thinking,  leads  to  right  judgment  as  to  the  course  which 
ought  to  be  pursued.  It  must  not  be  assumed,  however,  that 
in  all  action  there  is  only  one  of  the  possible  alternatives  which 
can  be  right,  or  that  divine  guidance  would  always  predetermine 
absolutely  which  one  will  be  chosen  from  the  several  possible 
alternatives.  As  in  the  matter  of  Christian  belief  there  is  a 
neutral  realm  for  opinions  which  are  neither  necessarily  to  be 
included  nor  necessarily  to  be  excluded,  so  in  the  matter  of 
Christian  duty  it  may  be  that  there  are  some  projected  actions 
which  can  neither  be  said  to  be  required  nor  on  the  other  hand 
to  be  necessarily  excluded  by  the  Christian  principle.  In  such 
cases  the  divine  guidance  does  not  require  the  one  choice  rather 
than  the  other. 

But  what  we  have  said  fails  to  give  a  complete  statement  of 
what  God  does,  in  and  through  experimental  religion,  for  the 
guidance  of  the  individual.  Since  good  character  is  favorable 
to  intellectual  progress,  and  so  to  correct  information,  and 
since  the  right  religious  adjustment  is  favorable  to  good  char- 
acter, there  is  basis  for  a  further  law  of  divine  guidance  in  this 
more  fundamental  and  far-reaching  way. 

The  theological  law  of  religious  assurance  has  to  do  with 
experimental  assurance  of  God  and  of  reconciliation,  rather 
than  with  the  reasoned  assurance  by  means  of  which  this  may 
be  partially  anticipated  or  supported.  It  may  be  stated  as 
follows:  On  condition  of  the  right  religious  adjustment  so  per- 
sisted in  as  to  lead  to  the  characteristic  Christian  experiences 
of  ''regeneration"  and  "fulness  of  the  Spirit,"  and  consequently 
in  some  measure  to  the  Christian  feelings  of  peace,  joy  and  love, 
God  enables  us,  through  an  intuition  which  naturally  arises  out 
of  our  religious  experience,  to  "feel  sure"  that  he  is  real  and 
that  we  are  reconciled  to  him.  This  is  "the  witness  of  the 
Spirit" — the  Holy  Spirit  "bearing  witness  with  our  spirits  that 
we  are  the  sons  of  God. "  The  "  intuition, "  it  may  be  remarked, 
is  one  which  seems  well  able  to  stand  the  test  of  fair  criticism. 


154          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

Thus  experimental  assurance  is  the  reward  of  fulfilling  the 
conditions  of  a  deeply  vital  religious  experience. 

A  third  class  of  secondary  theological  laws  is  the  physiological. 
Here  the  experiences  are  not  only  dependent  (at  least  ordinarily) 
upon  the  primary  or  volitional  religious  experiences,  and  closely 
associated  with  the  emotional  religious  experiences,  especially 
those  of  peace,  cheerfulness  and  joy;  they  are  also  conspicu- 
ously dependent  upon  constitutional  and  general  physiological 
conditions.  Reference  is  made,  of  course,  to  the  effects  of  re- 
ligious experience  upon  the  human  body.  In  the  earlier  and 
less  critical  days  of  experimental  religion  it  was  customary  to 
interpret  various  physiological  effects  of  such  highly  emotional 
experiences  as  were  common  in  religious  circles  as  being  the 
direct  and  evidential  products  of  the  divine  action.  But  these 
effects  have  often  been  so  valueless,  judged  from  a  spiritual 
point  of  view,  that  it  has  come  to  be  intuitively  felt  that  they 
are  not  so  much  a  revelation  of  divine  power  as  they  are  a 
manifestation  of  human  weakness.  They  are  now  regarded  as 
mere  surplus-effects  or  by-products  of  religious  emotion,  coupled 
with  the  influence  of  suggestion;  ordinarily,  the  divine  direction 
is  not  discernible  in  them  at  all.  Indeed,  even  Paul,  who  recog- 
nized that  they  had  originated  in  a  religious  experience  which 
was  fundamentally  divine,  and  who  consented  accordingly  to 
speak  of  them  as  being,  at  least  under  some  conditions,  "gifts 
of  the  Spirit,"  spoke  disparagingly  of  such  phenomena  as  the 
much-coveted  "speaking  with  tongues,"  and  laid  down  the 
principle  that  God  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  the  author  of  dis- 
order and  confusion.  But  there  seems  to  be  at  least  one  phys- 
iological phenomenon  related  to  religious  experience  which  can 
be  reduced  to  law,  viz.,  the  phenomenon  sometimes  spoken  of 
as  "divine  healing."  What  is  meant  here  is  not  so  much  mere 
"mental  healing"  or  "faith  healing,"  when  dependent  upon 
mere  suggestion,  without  any  vital  religious  experience;  but 
rather  those  beneficial  physiological  effects  of  normal  religious 
consciousness  which  amount  in  some  instances  to  the  cure  of 
pronounced  bodily  ills.  Even  here,  however,  a  certain  respon- 
siveness of  nervous  constitution  seems  to  be  a  necessary  con- 
dition of  any  very  conspicuous  effects.  The  law  may  be  stated 
thus:  On  condition  of  an  adequate  cultivation  of  the  right 


THE  LAWS  OF  EMPIRICAL  THEOLOGY  155 

religious  adjustment  and  its  normal  consequences  in  will  and 
feeling  and  thought,  the  indwelling  divine  Life,  or  Holy  Spirit, 
tends  to  bring  even  the  life  of  the  body  into  a  mere  normal  and 
healthful  condition,  and  where  certain  physiological  conditions 
are  fulfilled,  even  to  cure  certain  species  of  bodily  ills. 

One  other  class  of  secondary  theological  laws  may  be  men- 
tioned, viz.,  the  social,  or  sociological.  These  are  of  two  sorts, 
those  which  formulate  the  effects  of  the  right  sort  of  religious 
experience  upon  the  life  and  character  of  the  religious  commu- 
nity itself,  and  those  which  formulate  the  effects  upon  society  in 
general  or  the  world  at  large.  The  ecclesiastical  social  laws  of 
theology  can  be  formulated  readily  on  the  basis  of  the  above 
individualistic  formulations,  the  only  difference  being  that 
instead  of  being  in  terms  of  the  individual  they  will  be  in  terms 
of  the  church — meaning  by  "church"  the  community  unified  on 
the  basis  of  vital  religious  experience  shared  in  common.  Thus 
one  might  formulate  the  law  of  special  providence  in  the  life 
of  the  church,  or  of  answer  to  the  prayer  of  the  church,  laws  of 
the  genesis  of  a  truly  spiritual  social  life  (or  of  the  true  church), 
and  of  the  continuation  and  health  of  that  life,  and  of  the  devel- 
opment of  a  Christian  social  character  in  the  church.  There 
might  also  be  formulated  laws  of  the  production  of  the  Christian 
feelings  in  the  religious  meeting  and  within  the  religious  com- 
munity. Here  account  would  have  to  be  taken  of  the  Christian 
activities  of  the  church  and  its  consequent  spiritual  and  even 
economic  well-being,  as  conditions  of  the  "peace,"  "joy"  and 
"love"  experienced  within  the  church. 

But  among  the  most  important  of  the  ecclesiastical-social 
laws  of  theology  are  the  law  of  the  divine  guidance  of  the  church 
and  the  law  of  the  (divinely  given)  assurance  of  being  a  true 
church.  The  former  may  be  put  thus:  On  condition  of  such  a 
cultivation  of  the  right  religious  adjustment  in  the  church- 
meeting  that  the  individual  members  are  brought  by  the  Holy 
Spirit  into  a  Christian  state  of  willingness  to  do  what  is  eternally 
right  and  for  the  greatest  good  of  mankind,  they  will  in  this 
way  have  been  brought  by  the  divine  Spirit,  other  conditions 
being  equal,  into  the  best  possible  frame  of  mind  for  coming  to 
a  correct  decision  as  to  what  they  ought  to  do.  The  law  of 
ecclesiastical  assurance  would  be  to  the  effect  that  when  a 


156  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

church,  through  persisting  as  a  church  in  the  right  religious 
adjustment,  is  brought  by  the  Holy  Spirit  into  the  normal 
Christian  condition  of  health  and  efficiency,  it  will  tend  to  be 
sufficiently  assured  that  it  is  essentially  Christian  in  character, 
or  in  other  words,  that  is  it  one  of  the  true  churches  of  God,  or 
of  Jesus  Christ. 

The  more  general  social  laws  of  empirical  theology  under- 
take to  formulate,  and  to  refer  to  the  operation  of  God,  the 
processes  of  making  right  or  "Christian"  the  general  com- 
munity life,  local,  national,  and  international,  at  least  in  so  far 
as  these  processes  are  traceable  ultimately  to  what  takes  place 
on  condition  of  the  right  religious  adjustment  on  the  part  of 
individuals  and  churches.  The  data  to  be  formulated  into 
these  general  social  laws  of  theology  are  those  of  the  "leavening 
influence"  of  the  "kingdom  of  God"  in  the  world — an  influence 
which  is  to  go  on,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  "until  all  is  leavened,"  or, 
in  other  words,  until  "the  kingdoms  of  this  world  have  become 
the  kingdoms  of  God  and  of  his  Christ."  The  lines  of  causal 
connection  here  are  very  complex,  of  course,  the  social  progress 
being  in  some  instances  immediately  traceable  to  religious 
missions,  while  in  some  other  cases  it  is  conditioned  upon  pub- 
lic opinion  which  is  the  effect,  but  only  remotely,  of  vital  ex- 
perimental religion.  Indeed,  it  must  be  said  that  if  we  are 
interested  in  anything  beyond  the  most  general  and  abstract 
statements,  we  shall  find  the  formulation  of  these  laws  a  very 
complicated  and  difficult  problem.  The  process  of  the  Chris- 
tianization  of  communities,  nations,  and  the  world,  is  only 
being  worked  out;  and  so  what  we  are  likely  to  find  out  is  that 
most  of  what  the  empirical  theologian  can  find  at  this  point  is 
working-hypothesis,  rather  than  fully  verified  law.  Something, 
however,  in  the  direction  of  theological  laws  of  the  redemption 
or  Christianization  of  the  local  community  ought  to  be  possible. 
They  would  be  primarily  laws  of  community  "regeneration," 
of  the  preservation  and  health  of  the  community  spiritual  life, 
and  of  the  development  of  a  Christian  community-character. 


PART  III 
THEOLOGICAL  THEORY 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  MORAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  AND  THE  RELATION  OF  GOD 

TO  MAN 

IN  theology  as  an  empirical  science,  theory  has  to  do  mainly 
with  the  a  posteriori  definition  of  God.  Our  initial  minimum 
definition  of  God,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  sufficient  only  to  mark 
off  the  subject-matter  of  our  empirical  investigation.  Being 
based  upon  experiential  although  pre-scientific  awareness  of 
the  existence  and,  in  a  very  general  way,  the  nature  of  the 
religious  Object,  this  initial  definition  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
select  the  empirical  data  of  theology,  and  to  discover  their  laws. 
Upon  these  laws  we  are  now  to  base  our  conclusions  as  to  the 
attributes  and  relations  of  the  divine  Being. 

Our  procedure  is  thus  the  reverse  of  that  of  deductive  dog- 
matic theology,  which  starts  with  the  concept  of  perfect  Being 
and  undertakes  to  analyze  this  concept  and  deduce  conclusions, 
not  only  as  to  the  existence,  attributes  and  relations  of  God,  but 
even  as  to  what  religious  experience  ought  to  be,  thus  enabling 
the  theologian  to  proceed  with  his  speculations,  unembarrassed 
by  any  dependence  upon  the  facts  of  religious  experience.  His 
reward  is  to  be  able  to  say  what  a  God  would  be,  or  might  be. 
Ours  will  be  to  discover  what  God  is. 

In  undertaking  thus  to  set  forth,  on  the  basis  of  religious 
experience,  the  main  elements  of  theological  theory,  it  will  be 
well  at  the  outset  to  refer  once  more  and  in  some  detail  to  the 
method,  or  methods,  of  making  the  transition  from  empirical 
laws  to  theoretical  construction.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that 
there  are  three  more  or  less  different  ways  of  determining  and 
critically  justifying  the  theoretical  part  of  empirical  science. 
We  shall  consider  each  of  these  in  turn  with  reference  to  our 
contemplated  transition  to  theological  theory. 

As  a  first  method,  then,  we  may  begin  with  our  "intuitions  " 
as  to  the  reality  in  question,  i.  e.,  with  those  unreasoned  certi- 

159 


160  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

tudes  which  are  firmly  rooted  in  immediate  experience,  treating 
them  critically  and  even  sceptically,  deducing  hypotheses  from 
them,  refuting  them  in  the  light  of  experience  where  this  is 
possible,  but  otherwise  letting  them  stand  for  what  they  still 
seem  to  be  worth.  On  the  basis  of  religious  experience  at  what 
we  feel  to  be,  or  have  found  to  be,  its  best,  there  is  an  intuitive 
assurance  that  the  Object  of  religious  dependence  is  absolutely 
sufficient  for  our  absolutely  imperative  needs.  It  is  felt  that 
God  most  assuredly  is  all  that  man  needs  the  Object  of  his 
dependence  to  be,  if  there  is  to  be  maintained  in  his  life  that 
"best"  type  of  experimental  religion;  that  there  is  a  Being,  or 
Power,  great  enough  and  favorable  enough  to  man  to  enable  the 
one  rightly  adjusted  thereto  to  be  prepared  for  whatever 
situation  he  may  have  to  face.  Or,  stated  more  concretely,  in 
apprehending  the  divine,  as  manifested  in  the  spirit  of  the 
historic  Jesus  and  in  the  truly  "Christlike"  everywhere,  we  are 
identifying  the  divine  with  certain  qualities,  some  of  which 
depend  upon  this  absolute  sufficiency  of  an  Object  of  religious 
dependence  to  enable  one  to  be  prepared  in  spirit  for  whatever 
he  may  have  to  experience.  From  this  point  of  view  our  develop- 
ment of  the  theoretical  part  of  our  theology  would  consist  in  a 
detailed  deductive  elaboration  of  what  is  involved  in  this  un- 
refuted  and  highly  defensible  intuition  of  the  presence  of  the 
divine  within  the  human.  Ultimately  this  method  would  lead 
us  to  essentially  the  same  conclusions  as  would  result  from  the 
"  Christocentric "  method,  which  deduces  the  moral  character 
and  relations  of  God  from  the  assumption  or  postulate  of  the 
divine  Christlikeness.  But  employed  in  the  way  we  have  just 
suggested,  as  the  elaboration  of  what  is  involved  in  a  carefully 
criticized  intuition,  or  empirical  certitude,  the  Christocentric 
principle  would  be  relieved  in  large  part  of  the  dogmatism  which 
attaches  to  it  in  its  ordinary  form.  It  would  be  based  upon 
religious  perception,  the  cognition  involved  in  a  universally 
valid  and  presumably  universally  accessible  religious  experience, 
rather  than  being  a  dogmatic  assumption,  for  which  no  claim  is 
made  that  it  is  valid,  save  from  the  point  of  view  of,  and  for,  an 
essentially  subjective  "Christian  consciousness." 

As  a  second  way  of  proceeding  to  determine  and  critically 
justify  the  contents  of  the  theoretical  part  of  theology  as  an 


GOD  AND  MAN  161 

empirical  science,  there  is  the  method  of  beginning,  not  with  the 
religious  man's  certainties,  but  with  his  needs.  Taking  as  a 
fundamental  working  hypothesis  the  practically  necessary  pos- 
tulate that  God  is  absolutely  sufficient,  absolutely  dependable 
with  reference  to  man's  religious  needs,  and  testing  and  progres- 
sively verifying  in  practical  religious  life  the  minor  hypotheses 
logically  involved  in  this  fundamental  supposition,  one  would 
find  growing  up  a  body  of  doctrine  concerning  God,  of  which  he 
was  practically  certain,  i.  e.,  certain  enough  to  keep  on  acting 
upon  it  with  steady  or  even  increasing  satisfaction,  intellectual 
as  well  as  practical.  Or,  in  other  words,  being  convinced  of  the 
imperative  moral  necessity  of  a  certain  sort  of  experimental 
religion,  and  therefore  of  the  practical  necessity  of  believing  at 
least  that  minimum  of  doctrine  which  is  necessary  to  enable  him 
to  keep  up  the  attitude  toward  God  characteristic  of  this 
religion,  and  finding,  moreover,  in  the  light  of  experience,  that 
this  is  possible  with  increasing  satisfaction,  he  gains  practical 
certainty  of  the  essentials  of  theological  theory. 

But  there  is  a  third  procedure  which  is  more  characteristic  of 
scientific  method,  perhaps,  than  either  of  those  just  described. 
This  is  the  framing,  with  the  help  of  the  scientific  imagination, 
of  a  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  the  constant  objective  Factor  in 
religious  experience  in  such  a  way  as  to  account  for  the  laws  of 
empirical  theology.  This  procedure  rests  upon  the  principle 
that  we  can  learn,  to  a  certain  extent,  what  things  and  persons 
are,  beyond  what  they  are  immediately  perceived  to  be,  by 
observing  what  they  do.  The  religious  Object,  whatever  else 
it  may  be,  must  be  absolutely  sufficient  to  produce,  in  response 
to  the  right  religious  adjustment  on  man's  part,  the  experience 
of  adequate  salvation,  or  deliverance  from  evil,  which  man  not 
only  needs,  but  which,  when  he  fulfills  certain  possible  condi- 
tions, he  is  always  ultimately  enabled  to  experience.  In  other 
words,  God  must  be  great  enough  and  favorable  enough  to  man 
to  enable  the  person  who  finds  the  right  religious  adjustment  to 
meet  without  moral  failure  or  any  absolute  disaster  whatever 
he  may  be  called  upon  to  face. 

What  we  propose  to  do  here  is  to  make  use  of  all  three  of  these 
procedures,  using  each  as  a  check  upon  and  supplement  to  the 
Others.  Thus  our  method,  in  undertaking  to  be  empirically 


162          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

scientific,  is  able  to  do  full  justice  to  both  the  Christocentric  and 
the  pragmatic  procedures.* 

In  the  light  of  what  has  already  been  said  it  will  appear  that 
the  one  fundamental  attribute  of  God,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
experimental  religion  and  empirical  theology,  is  absoluteness. 
This  term,  it  will  be  evident,  is  to  be  interpreted  in  a  pragmatic 
and  empirical  sense,  as  meaning  absolute  satisfactoriness  as 
Object  of  religious  dependence,  absolute  sufficiency  for  man's 
religious  needs.  In  religious  experience  at  its  best,  this  is  in- 
tuitively certain,  and  this  empirical  certitude  is  such  as  will 
stand  the  test  of  further  practice  and  rational  criticism.  It 
is  also  absolutely  imperative,  the  indispensable  minimum  from 
a  practical  point  of  view.  And  finally,  that  pragmatic  absolute- 
ness is  true  of  the  Object  of  religious  dependence  which  is  the 
ultimate  Source  of  religious  deliverance  is  the  most  obvious  and 
satisfactory  theory  to  account  for  the  facts  of  religious  expe- 
rience at  its  best,  as  formulated  in  the  laws  of  empirical  theology. 
However  we  might  be  able  to  support  and  supplement  our 
theory,  if  we  were  to  undertake  an  exhaustive  description  of  the 
religious  Object  from  the  point  of  view  of  fundamental  religion, 
we  are  already  in  a  position  to  define  God  as  the  Absolute  of 
experimental  religion. 

We  shall  now  apply  this  conception  of  the  pragmatic  absolute- 
ness or  absolute  sufficiency  of  the  religious  Object  in  connection 
with  questions  as  to  the  character,  or  moral  attributes,  of  God. 
Since  God,  on  practical  religious  grounds  must  be,  and  so  far  as 
fair  rational  criticism  is  concerned,  may  be,  and  in  religion  at  its 
best  is  found  to  be  absolutely  sufficient  for  man's  religious  needs, 
we  are  entitled  to  affirm,  in  view  of  what  man's  needs  are,  that 
the  character  of  God  is  morally  ideal  and,  relatively  to  our 
practical  religious  needs,  perfect.  This  should  not  be  inter- 
preted as  meaning  that  there  is  no  progress  in  the  life  of  God, 
that  there  is  for  God  himself  no  moral  ideal,  or  that  the  activity 
involved  in  the  realization  of  his  ideals  means  nothing  for  what 
he  is  and  is  becoming.  What  it  does  mean  is  that  God's  char- 
acter, or  will,  is  always  all  that  it  ought  to  be,  and  is  never  what 

*  Of  course,  for  theology,  as  for  any  other  descriptive  science,  the  final 
intellectual  test  of  theory  will  be  found  in  metaphysics.  For  further  dis- 
cussion of  this  point,  see  the  appendix  to  this  volume. 


GOD  AND  MAN  163 

it  ought  not  to  be.  Nothing  less  than  this  would  be  adequate  in 
the  Object  of  religious  dependence;  nothing  less  would  con- 
stitute an  absolutely  trustworthy  Being,  or  one  worthy  of 
absolute  reverence  and  worship. 

This  moral  absoluteness  of  God  is  analyzable  into  the  "  im- 
manent" attributes  of  holiness  and  love,  to  which  correspond 
the  "transitive"  attributes  (i.  e.,  qualities  expressing  relations 
to  others)  of  justice  and  mercy,  or  righteousness  and  grace. 
Holiness  and  justice,  or  righteousness,  stand  for  the  severer 
aspect,  and  love  and  mercy,  or  grace,  for  the  gentler  aspect  of 
moral  perfection.  These  pairs  of  attributes  have  been  repre- 
sented sometimes  as  so  antithetical  to  each  other  that  the 
greatest  of  all  problems  is  supposed  to  be  the  devising  of  some 
way  whereby  both  the  holiness  and  the  love,  both  the  justice 
and  the  mercy  of  God  might  be  adequately  expressed  in  dealing 
with  sinful  man.  But  there  is  in  reality  no  conflict.  Perfect 
holiness  includes  love,  and  perfect  love  is  holy.  God  would  not 
be  dealing  justly  with  the  sinner,  if  he  refused  to  be  merciful 
to  him;  nor  would  it  be  true  mercy  to  grant  an  unjust  forgive- 
ness, or  indulgence. 

This  absolute  moral  sufficiency  of  the  Object  of  religious 
dependence  is  summed  up  in  the  pictorial  language  of  religion 
in  the  expressions,  "God,  the  Father"  and  "your  Father  in 
heaven,  who  is  perfect."  The  term  "Father,"  as  applied  to 
God,  like  the  term  "King,"  is  more  or  less  metaphorical,  and 
the  failure  to  take  this  sufficiently  into  account  has  been 
responsible  in  part  for  controversy  as  to  whether  the  "father- 
hood of  God"  is  to  be  taken  as  universal  or  restricted  in  its 
scope.  Is  God  the  Father  of  all  men,  or  only  of  the  "regener- 
ate," who  have  come  into  a  definitely  and  consciously  filial 
relation  to  him?  Let  us  get  beyond  figures  of  speech  to  literal 
views  of  actual  relationships.  In  view  of  the  perfect  love  of 
God,  we  may  be  assured  of  this  much  at  least,  viz.,  that  he  is 
fatherly  toward  all.  Indeed,  from  the  point  of  view  of  funda- 
mental religion  there  is  ground  for  surmising  that  God  is  even 
more  intimately  related  to  human  beings  than  an  earthly 
father  to  his  children — that  the  life  of  God  is  "nearer  to  us 
than  breathing,"  indwelling  the  lives  of  all  men  and  impelling 
them  toward  the  true  ideal.  But,  be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  im- 


164  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

portant  to  note  that  while  God  is  fatherly  toward  all,  not  all 
are  filial  toward  him.  The  "divine  fatherhood"  can  be  ade- 
quately experienced  only  by  those  who  have  learned  to  recipro- 
cate the  divine  love,  who  have  received  "the  spirit  of  adoption," 
whereby  we  call  God  "Father,"  and  so  become  experientially 
"sons  of  God."  And  in  the  work  of  bringing  men  into  this 
filial  relationship  the  most  invaluable  service  has  been  rendered 
by  him  who  is,  by  general  consent,  the  Son  of  God.  He  has 
succeeded'  in  communicating  in  considerable  measure  to  his 
followers  his  filial  consciousness  of  God  as  the  "perfect  Father." 
Indeed,  to  one  who  has  come  at  all  fully  under  the  influence  of 
Jesus,  God  is  "the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ," 
perfect  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  moral  ideal  and  the  re- 
ligious need  and  experience  of  Jesus  himself,  or,  in  other  words, 
of  humanity  at  its  individual  best.  Ultimately,  we  must  have 
a  perfect  God,  or  we  can  have  no  God  at  all.  And  it  is  signifi- 
cant that  such  a  man  as  Jesus  was  did  not  have  to  become  an 
atheist,  but  was  assured  not  only  of  the  existence,  but  also  of 
the  entire  adequacy  of  God. 

When  we  go  on  to  inquire  into  the  practical  significance  for 
us  of  this  moral  perfection  of  God,  we  find  that  it  necessarily 
involves,  to  begin  with,  opportunity.  Even  in  human  relations 
justice  is  coming  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  a  fair  opportunity, 
and  in  the  relation  of  God  to  man  it  can  mean  no  less.  God,  as 
perfectly  holy  and  just,  must  give  every  individual  a  fair  op- 
portunity of  ultimately  realizing  the  true  ideal.  As  perfect  in 
love  and  mercy,  he  must  give  further  opportunity  even  to  those 
who  have  not  made  the  best  use  of  their  original  opportunity. 
This  will  mean  the  presence  of  external  conditions  which  can 
be  reacted  to,  either  as  stimulating  obstacles  or  as  helpful 
instruments;  it  will  also  mean  genuine  free  agency  on  man's 
part,  without  which  there  would  be  no  opportunity  worthy  of 
the  name.  This  idea  of  "a  fair  deal"  from  God  for  every  man 
will  also  involve  that  any  judgment  God  may  pass  upon  man 
will  be  according  to  truth  and  justice;  that  all  will  have  ample 
opportunity  for  repentance  and  forgiveness,  and  even  that  God 
will  have  taken  the  initiative  to  bring  about  reconciliation  with 
man;  and  finally,  that  provision  of  adequate  power  will  be  made 
to  enable  everyone  who  is  really  in  earnest  about  it  to  maintain 


GOD  AND  MAN  165 

steady  progress  toward  the  perfect  ideal.  Let  us  look  further 
into  some  of  these  aspects  of  the  relation  of  God  to  men. 

It  is  important  to  dwell  upon  the  consideration  that  bound 
up  with  the  justice  of  God  is  the  moral  freedom  of  man.  Here 
we  have  confirmation  on  grounds,  ultimately,  of  religious 
experience,  of  what,  on  grounds  of  the  moral  consciousness,  we 
included  among  the  presuppositions  of  theology.  And  these 
two  fundamental  and  adequately  established  convictions — viz., 
that  God  is  perfectly  just  and  that  man  is  morally  free,  logically 
determine  the  position  to  be  taken  with  regard  to  the  traditional 
doctrines  of  predestination  and  election.  It  has  been  held  by 
many  that  the  final  destiny  of  each  individual  has  been  fixed 
by  an  eternal  decree  of  God,  comparatively  few  being  among 
those  chosen — quite  arbitrarily,  it  would  seem — to  be  saved 
by  the  irresistible  grace  of  God  from  the  everlasting  torture  to 
which  all  others  will  be  consigned,  this  eternal  suffering  being 
the  supposedly  just  penalty  of  the  sin  from  which  they  never 
could  have  been  saved,  since  it  was  not  the  purpose  of  God, 
although  it  was  in  his  power,  to  grant  them  regenerating  grace! 
According  to  many  adherents  of  the  doctrine,  no  provision  was 
made  for  any  but  the  comparatively  few  elect  in  the  vicarious 
and  supposedly  expiatory  atoning  work  of  Christ.  Such  a 
course  on  the  part  of  God  we  should  obviously  have  to  regard 
as  not  only  unmerciful  but  unjust;  it  would  be  the  action  of  a 
fiend!  In  our  recognition  of  the  divine  in  Christ  and  the 
"Christlike,"  and  in  our  sufficiently  critical  intuitive  and 
practical  certainty  of  the  moral  sufficiency  of  God  as  Object  of 
religious  dependence  and  worship,  we  know  that  this  once 
prevalent  view  of  God  is  a  gross  caricature. 

There  is,  however,  a  divine  predestination  which  can  be 
inferred  from  the  moral  perfection  of  God,  viz,  his  conditional 
predestination  of  all  persons  to  be  "conformed  to  the  image  of 
his  Son" — if  they  can  be  induced  to  come,  of  their  own  free 
will,  into  the  filial  relation,  the  right  religious  adjustment,  to 
"the  Father."  God's  choice  would  exclude  none  from  the 
benefits  of  his  grace.  He  would  "have  all  to  be  saved,  and  to 
come  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth."  The  government  of  the 
universe  is  not  an  arbitrary  and  cruel  despotism,  but  more  akin 
to  a  constitutional  monarchy:  the  individual  has  the  privilege 


166          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

of  electing  God  to  be  his  monarch;  and  the  race,  if  it  chooses, 
can  have  this  world  transformed  into  the  kingdom  of  God. 
There  does  seem  to  be  a  divine  election  of  particular  individuals 
and  peoples  to  have  the  privilege  and  corresponding  responsi- 
bility of  performing  special  services  to  their  fellows;  but  there 
is  nothing  in  this  to  conflict  with  the  justice  and  love  of  God. 
Indeed  it  is  without  doubt  the  sort  of  election  that  God  would 
bestow  upon  all  individuals  and  peoples,  were  they  but  alert 
to  their  opportunities. 

Included  also  in  the  perfectly  moral  relation  of  God  to  men 
is  his  judgment  of  the  acts  and  moral  character  of  men.  His 
judgment  is  always  fair  and  true.  He  never  justifies  the  un- 
just, or  any  one  whose  will  is  not  at  the  time  essentially  right. 
He  neither  imputes  sin  to  the  sinless,  nor  the  righteousness  of 
the  righteous  to  the  unrighteous;  any  such  judgment  would 
be  untrue  and  immoral.  Moreover,  the  phrase,  "  after  death, 
the  judgment,"  does  not  convey  the  whole  truth.  Rather  is  it 
to  be  believed  that  every  day  is  a  day  of  judgment — a  day  in 
which  God  judges  the  individual  according  to  his  true  knowl- 
edge of  what  that  individual  really  is.  He  whose  will  is  not 
essentially  right,  up  to  the  limit  of  his  possible  light,  is  "con- 
demned already"  in  the  just  judgment  of  God — as  he  would 
be  in  the  judgment  of  any  thoroughly  moral  person  who  knew 
what  manner  of  man  he  was.  No  doubt  every  day  the  "books 
are  opened" — the  books  of  individual  character — and  the 
living  are  being  judged  out  of  those  things  which  covert  thoughts 
and  cherished  desires  as  well  as  overt  words  and  actions  have 
been  writing  day  by  day  in  those  books. 

And  yet,  granting  all  this,  it  remains  that  the  judgment 
passed  upon  man  by  the  God  of  holy  love  is  not,  in  its 
primary  intention,  an  appraisal  of  guilt  with  a  view  to  ret- 
ribution, but  something  more  akin  to  diagnosis  with  a  view 
to  effecting  a  cure.  God  is  not  so  much  the  Great  Judge  as 
he  is  "the  Great  Physician." 

So  then,  in  his  relation  to  men,  God  is  not  to  be  thought  of 
solely,  or  even  chiefly,  as  constitutional  Sovereign  and  Judge,  but 
as  Redeemer  and  Savior,  or,  to  use  more  unconventional  lan- 
guage, as  Friend  and  Helper.  God  sent  his  own  Son  into  the 
world  for  its  salvation,  we  are  told.  God  has  indeed  from  the  be- 


GOD  AND  MAN  167 

ginning  of  the  race  been  causing  his  divine  Word,  or  revealing 
Presence,  "the  Light  which  lighteth  every  man,"  to  come  into 
the  lives  of  men;  and  by  virtue  of  the  "fulness"  of  this  divine 
spirit  of  truth  and  righteousness  and  love  in  the  Man  of  Naz- 
areth, God  sent  him — not  from  some  "  pre-existent "  state  in 
"heaven,"  so  far  as  we  know,  but  from  the  village  home  and  car- 
penter-shop— to  do  his  redemptive,  his  atoning  and  saving  work 
in  the  world.  This  work,  as  we  have  seen,  was  a  work  of  self- 
sacrificing  love,  and  "hereby  perceive  we  the  love  of  God."  The 
relation  of  God  the  Father  to  Jesus,  his  well-beloved  Son,  is  not 
difficult  to  make  out.  Jesus  was  called  upon  to  endure  much 
undeserved  suffering;  but  it  was  nothing  but  natural  that  this 
should  have  happened,  as  incidental  to  the  sort  of  work  he  set 
himself  to  do  in  the  situation  as  it  then  existed.  Moreover,  it  is 
a  justifiable  conclusion  that  God  must  have  been  as  satisfied 
with  the  obedience  of  his  "Suffering  Servant"  and  Son  as  he  was 
dissatisfied  with  the  disobedience  of  the  sinful.  But  just  here 
many  interpreters  have  been  misled  into  supposing  that  God 
is  satisfied  with  the  undeserved  vicarious  suffering  of  Jesus 
as  a  substitute  for  the  punishment  which  the  disobedience  of 
others  deserves.  Obviously  this  is  mere  confusion  of  thought. 
As  Schleiermacher  puts  it,  "The  sufferings  of  Christ  were 
vicarious,  but  they  do  not  make  satisfaction;  the  obedience  of 
Christ  made  satisfaction,  but  it  was  not  vicarious."  On  the 
contrary,  viewing,  as  we  have  suggested,  the  whole  atoning, 
redeeming  work  of  Jesus  as  our  best  individual  revelation  of 
what  God  is  doing  and  seeking  to  do  for  man,  we  are  led  to  infer 
that  God  (who,  as  the  Holy  Spirit,  was  in  Christ  and  is  in  the 
Christlike,  reconciling  the  world  unto  himself)  loves  the  sinner 
while  hating  his  sin,  and  is  in  some  deep  sense  burdened  by  it. 
The  unselfish  love  and  self-devotion  of  Jesus  to  the  redemption 
of  the  world  from  sin  and  its  evil  consequences,  and  what  he 
suffered  on  behalf  of  those  whom  he  sought  to  help,  and  even 
at  the  hands  of  some  of  them,  give  us  a  glimpse  into  what  is 
going  on  constantly  in  the  life  of  God. 

In  the  redeeming  work  of  Jesus  we  have  the  supreme  illus- 
tration of  "prevenient  grace."  God  takes  the  initiative  toward 
reconciliation  with  men  who  have  been  alienated  from  him, 
their  best  Friend,  by  their  own  repeated  acts  of  disobedience. 


168  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

The  normal  effect  of  this  revelation  of  the  love  of  God,  when  it 
is  duly  considered,  is  to  bring  the  sinner  to  repentance  and  the 
desire  for  forgiveness.  Moreover,  even  man's  response  to  the 
divine  appeal,  as  a  definite  awakening  of  the  divine  life  within 
the  soul  of  man,  may  very  well  be  interpreted  as  achieved  by 
means  of  the  " assisting  grace"  of  God,  even  as,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  never  is  on  God's  part  any  " effectual  calling"  of 
man  to  repentance  and  faith  which  is  not  made  effectual  by 
an  ultimately  free  response  of  the  human  will. 

When  thus  under  the  divine  influence  man  freely  and  whole- 
heartedly responds  in  repentance  and  faith  to  the  moral  and 
religious  appeal  of  the  divine  as  revealed  in  Christ  and  the 
Christlike,  he  fulfills  the  indispensable  condition  of  receiving 
God's  forgiveness  of  his  past  sin.  Jesus  could  declare  God's 
forgiveness  of  sin,  and  so  can  anyone  who  is  able  to  discern 
the  marks  of  true  repentance,  and  who  understands  that  in 
genuine  repentance  the  will  is  so  turned  from  the  sin  that  it  is 
not  right  to  impute  to  the  person  at  present  the  moral  evil 
which  he  once  indulged  in,  but  which  is  not  now  characteristic 
of  his  will.  By  repenting  he  has  not  earned  forgiveness;  re- 
pentance alone  does  not  make  the  wrong  entirely  right;  it  does 
not  make  objective  amends  for  injury  done.  Forgiveness  is 
still  an  act  of  grace  on  the  part  of  the  one  who  forgives,  thereby 
refusing  to  let  the  past  sin  be  a  barrier  to  present  fellowship. 
And  yet  the  sincerely  repentant  ought  to  be  granted  forgive- 
ness; to  withhold  it  would  be  wrong. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  no  sin  is  unpardonable,  once  it  is  re- 
pented of;  and  yet  all  sin,  so  long  as  it  is  not  turned  away  from,  is 
unforgiveable.  Failure  to  repent,  persistent  refusal  to  turn  from 
sin,  is  sin  against  the  manifestation  of  the  divine  Life  within 
the  human,  i.  e.,  against  the  Holy  Spirit;  and  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  as  long  as  it  lasts  it  makes  genuine  forgiveness  morally 
impossible.  Indeed,  strictly  speaking,  one  may  go  farther  and 
say  that  all  sin  is,  as  such,  unforgiveable.  And  yet  the  one  who 
has  been  sinful  fulfills  the  condition  of  forgiveness  when  at  heart 
he  turns  from  his  sin.  The  sinner  is  rightly  urged  to  come,  "just 
as  he  is,"  to  God,  without  delaying  to  make  himself  any  better 
in  the  effort  to  earn  forgiveness;  but  when  he  does  turn  to  God 
in  order  to  be  turned  from  sin,  he  is  not  just  as  he  was  when  he 


GOD  AND  MAN  169 

was  sinning.  Indeed  he  has  become  incipiently  and  in  will 
"a  new  man";  and  it  is  only  as  such  that  there  can  be  between 
him  and  the  one  against  whom  he  has  sinned  any  reconciliation 
or  forgiveness  worthy  of  the  name.  Until  this  has  taken  place, 
God  can  only  be  graciously  ready  to  forgive  whenever  man  shall 
have  fulfilled  the  necessary  moral  condition. 

God's  forgiveness  of  the  converted  sinner,  translated  into 
forensic  terms,  is  spoken  of  as  justification.  Like  the  enlight- 
ened human  judge,  who  sees  that  the  true  function  of  justice  is 
not  fulfilled  in  the  mere  dealing  out  of  a  prescribed  retribution 
for  the  sake  of  upholding  an  abstract  law,  but  that  true  justice 
requires  a  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  moral  condition 
of  the  person  concerned,  and  an  intelligent  adaptation  of  means 
to  his  future  well-being,  so  the  divine  Judge,  seeing  that  he  who 
has  turned  to  God  in  order  to  be  turned  from  sin  is  now  essenti- 
ally right  so  far  as  the  attitude  of  his  will  is  concerned,  judges 
accordingly.  Thus  God  can  be  just  and  the  justifier  of  him  who 
has  been  unjust,  simply  because  the  true  penitent  is  no  longer, 
at  heart,  unjust;  his  former  trespasses  cannot  be  justly  imputed 
to  his  present  self. 

This  is  not  "justification  by  works,"  if  by  works  we  mean  the 
perfunctory  performance  of  external  acts.  Neither  is  it  "jus- 
tification by  faith/ '  if  by  "faith"  we  mean  intellectual  assent 
to  doctrinal  teaching.  It  is  justification  by  right  decision,  jus- 
tification by  the  good  will.  But  this  good  will  is  involved  and 
initially  expressed  in  true  or  "Christian"  faith,  which  is  the 
turning  to  God  in  order  to  be  turned  from  sin.  And  it  is  also 
involved  and  finds  ultimate  expression  in  true  or  Christian  works, 
i.  e.,  in  right  conduct  toward  God  and  man.  The  human  observer 
who  generally  "looks  upon  the  outward  appearance,"  and  not 
"upon  the  heart,"  must  ordinarily  wait  for  the  fruitage  of  good 
works  before  he  can  judge  the  will  to  be  moral;  but  in  true 
faith  the  discerning  Judge  can  discover  the  moral  will,  as  it 
were,  in  the  germ,  so  that,  anticipating  its  further  expression, 
he  is  in  a  position  to  justify  the  individual  in  view  of  his  faith. 
Thus  God's  justification  of  man  is  not  a  "white-washing" 
process;  it  is  simply  treating  the  repentant  man  as  being  what 
he  essentially  is.  Even  if  we  grant  that  the  morally  deaden- 
ing influence  of  sinful  conduct  tends  to  make  a  theoretically 


170          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

adequate  emotional  realization  of  the  evil  of  sin  temporarily 
impossible  to  the  sinner,  it  is  nevertheless  possible,  surely,  for 
the  sinner  to  repent  as  fully  as  he  can!  And  this  it  is  which 
a  just  God  requires  of  him  as  the  condition  of  justification. 

Two  objections,  seemingly  antithetical  to  each  other,  are 
likely  to  be  urged  against  this  interpretation  of  forgiveness  and 
justification.  On  the  one  hand  it  will  be  said  that  this  makes  it 
too  easy  to  gain  forgiveness,  since  all  the  greatest  mischief- 
maker  has  to  do,  in  order  to  be  fully  forgiven,  is  to  repent,  while 
the  evils  he  has  initiated  may  still  be  sending  other  lives  to 
destruction.  On  the  other  hand  it  will  be  objected  that  the 
above  interpretation  would  make  it  very  difficult  for  any  scrupu- 
lous person  to  gain  a  satisfactory  assurance  of  forgiveness,  since 
its  necessary  condition  would  seem  to  be  the  achieving  and  per- 
sistent maintenance  of  an  attitude  of  perfect  repentance.  The 
answer  to  these  objections  is  found  in  a  better  understanding 
of  what  is  involved  in  God's  forgiveness  of  man  and  the  satis- 
faction of  God  with  reference  to  human  sin.  God's  forgiveness 
is  not  a  mere  legal  pardon,  remitting  a  future  external  penalty. 
It  is  reconciliation,  at-one-ment,  restoration  of  moral  fellow- 
ship; and,  so  interpreted,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  either 
expect  or  desire  more  of  it  than,  with  the  help  of  God  the  Holy 
Spirit,  we  fulfil  the  conditions  of  receiving.  And  we  ought  not 
to  want  to  be  misled  by  having  more  assurance,  either  as  to  our 
present  relation  to  God,  or  as  to  our  future  destiny,  than  the 
facts  themselves  are  sufficient  to  warrant. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  be  forgiven,  reconciled  to  God,  on  con- 
dition of  our  repentance;  it  is  quite  another  thing  for  God  to  be 
completely  satisfied  with  respect  to  our  past  sin.  So  far  as  what 
is  now  any  longer  possible  at  the  moment  is  concerned,  God  is 
satisfied  with  a  sincere  turning  away  and  intention  to  turn  away 
forever  from  sin.  But  this  is  not  all  that  the  satisfaction  of  the 
divine  righteousness  can  mean.  What  we  mean  is  not  a  supposed 
satisfaction  of  God  in  the  suffering  and  death  of  his  Son.  No 
doubt  he  was  satisfied  with  the  moral  attitude  of  Jesus  in  being 
willing  to  suffer  and,  if  necessary,  to  die  in  the  fulfilment  of  his 
duty  to  his  fellowmen.  And  no  doubt,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
was  profoundly  dissatisfied  with  the  suffering  and  death  of  his 
Son,  as  the  evil  doing  of  sinful  men.  Indeed  it  is  incredible  that 


GOD  AND  MAN  171 

a  morally  perfect  God  should  ever  be  satisfied  that  this  sin,  or 
any  other,  should  ever  have  existed.  But  what  we  have  refer- 
ence to  particularly  is  such  further  satisfaction  of  God's  right- 
eous judgment  and  will  as  is  possible,  beyond  the  satisfaction 
he  has  in  the  repentance  of  the  sinner.  God  will  be  increasingly 
satisfied  as  sin  and  its  evil  consequences  are  progressively  de- 
stroyed, and  individuals  and  human  society  saved  therefrom. 
If,  then,  God  is  to  be  satisfied  as  completely  as  is  any  longer  pos- 
sible, now  that  sin  has  actually  been  committed,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary for  every  one  who  can  do  anything  toward  the  destruction 
of  sin  and  the  salvation  of  man  to  do  all  that  it  is  in  his  power 
to  do.  God  himself  must  undertake  to  do  all  he  can  toward  this 
end;  and  he  can  only  have  anything  like  complete  satisfaction 
as  he  anticipates  a  successful  outcome  of  his  activity.  And  the 
repentant  sinner,  for  the  further  satisfaction  of  God's  righteous- 
ness (or  for  the  satisfaction  of  his  own  or  any  other  righteous 
judgment  and  will,  for  that  matter),  must  also  undertake  to 
do  whatever  he  can  for  the  counteracting  of  the  evil  introduced 
by  his  own  past  sinful  life,  and  for  the  destruction  of  sin  and 
evil  in  the  world  generally.  Indeed  this  is  no  more  than  is  vir- 
tually implied  in  any  genuine  repentance.  Morever,  it  was  only 
on  condition  of  the  repentance  being  of  this  sort  (i.  e.,  the  be- 
coming as  completely  devoted  to  the  destruction  of  sin  as  was 
at  the  time  possible),  that  God  could  have  been  satisfied  to 
grant  him  full  forgiveness. 

The  question  is  often  raised  whether  some  great,  heroic  act 
of  self-sacrifice  for  the  good  of  others,  such  as  that  of  the  soldier 
on  the  field  of  battle  on  behalf  of  a  righteous  cause,  would  not 
" atone  for"  the  sins  of  the  previous  life.  To  this  the  answer 
ought  now  to  be  obvious.  There  is  no  atonement,  in  the  sense 
of  expiation,  save  repentance  and  its  consequences,  ceasing  to 
do  evil  and  learning  to  do  well.  The  brave  self-sacrificing  act, 
however,  is  "doing  well,"  and  it  means  much  for  the  character 
of  the  individual,  and  so  for  God's  judgment  of  him.  But  as  an 
act  it  means  no  more  (except  for  later  experiences  of  suffering 
and  the  like)  that  it  led  to  his  death,  than  if  he  had  expected  to 
give  his  life,  but  had  "fortunately"  escaped.  And  certainly 
not  all  who  have  expected  to  be  killed  in  battle  show  by  their 
later  lives  that  they  were  truly  reconciled  to  God. 


172  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

The  fundamental  aspects  of  the  divine  providence  also  come 
in  naturally  for  consideration  under  the  question  of  the  relation 
of  God  to  men.  God's  providence  has  commonly  been  subdi- 
vided into  "general"  and  " special.'7  "General  providence"  is 
held  to  include  all  that  happens  uniformly  to  men  in  general, 
viewed  as  due  to  the  action  or  permissive  will  of  God,  and  as 
designed  to  promote  the  ultimate  well-being  of  all,  or  at  least 
of  all  who  are  eventually  to  be  "saved."  "Special  providence," 
in  the  common  view,  covers  special  happenings  in  the  life  of  the 
individual  or  a  particular  group  of  individuals,  interpreted,  if 
not  as  due  to  a  divine  intervention  at  the  time,  at  least  as  being 
through  some  divinely  arranged  special  combination  of  natural 
or  human  agencies,  and  designed  to  promote  in  some  exceptional 
manner  or  degree  the  true  interests  of  the  individual  or  indi- 
viduals concerned.  Usually,  however,  a  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween "the  realm  of  providence"  and  "the  realm  of  grace,"  the 
former  excluding  and  the  latter  including  the  divine  work  of  re- 
demption through  Christ  and  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the 
inner  experience  of  the  individual. 

But  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  scientific,  empirical  attitude, 
with  its  critical  treatment  of  traditional  theological  concepts,  the 
above  definitions  and  distinctions  are  not  altogether  satisfactory. 
Part  of  what  we  shall  have  to  say  on  this  subject  must  be  de- 
ferred until  we  come  to  deal  more  specifically  with  the  relation 
of  God  to  the  universe,  and  to  the  human  race,  as  distinct  from 
his  relation  to  individuals  as  such.  But  the  essentials  of  this 
doctrine  of  the  providential  relation  of  God  to  men  are  already 
implied  in  what  we  have  said  about  revelation,  the  laws  of  em- 
pirical theology,  and  the  moral  attributes  of  God. 

In  the  first  place,  in  criticism  of  the  ordinary  doctrine  of 
general  providence  it  must  be  urged  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
interpret  everything  which  happens  to  man  as  taking  place  by 
the  express  choice  or  even  by  the  willing  permission  of  a  morally 
perfect  God.  If  it  were  God's  will  that  man  should  be  sinned 
against  by  his  fellow-man,  then  God  would  not  be  our  "perfect 
Father";  he  would  not  be  as  good  as  Jesus  was.  No  sinful  act, 
since  it  is,  as  sinful,  an  absolute  evil,  can  happen  except  in  op- 
position to  the  will  of  God ;  and  so  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  fall- 
ing within  the  field  of  the  divine  or  providential.  Not  even  the 


GOD  AND  MAN  173 

sin  of  crucifying  Jesus  was  providential.  It  would  have  been 
immeasurably  more  in  accord  with  the  will  of  God  if  those  re- 
sponsible for  this  outrage  had  been  more  appreciative  of  the  true 
worth  of  the  Galilean  prophet,  and  had  allowed  him  to  continue 
his  spiritual  ministry  and  finally  to  die  in  some  other  way  than 
through  the  sinful  acts  of  men. 

Again,  there  is  serious  objection  to  the  interpretation  of  such 
events  as  narrow  escapes  from  death  or  injury,  and  other  happy 
coincidences  as  "special  providences."  Violent  and  untimely 
deaths  and  countless  other  events  which  seem  just  as  unfortu- 
nate as  the  so-called  "special  providences"  seem  fortunate 
are  of  common  occurrence.  Nor  ought  we  to  expect  or  even 
desire  to  have  God  take  better  care  of  us  and  our  friends  than 
he  does  of  other  people.  Indeed,  a  God  who  had  special  fa- 
vorites, of  whom  he  took  special  providential  care,  would  be  so 
unfair  to  those  not  thus  favored  that  he  could  not  be  regarded 
as  morally  perfect  or  absolutely  sufficient  as  the  Object  of  re- 
ligious dependence  and  worship;  he  would  not  even  be  trust- 
worthy. The  only  consideration  which  could  conceivably  jus- 
tify special  providential  care  of  certain  lives,  as  contrasted  with 
others,  would  be  the  greater  usefulness  to  the  race  of  the  indi- 
viduals thus  provided  for.  But  there  are  considerations  which 
make  even  a  special  providence  of  this  sort  more  than  doubtful. 
In  the  first  place,  it  does  not  seem  that  it  can  be,  from  any  point 
of  view,  absolutely  certain  beforehand — in  view  of  the  ultimate 
freedom  of  the  human  will — that  the  "promising"  individual 
will  really  prove  more  serviceable  to  humanity  than  some  others 
who  may  be  comparatively  "unpromising."  Hence  all,  it  would 
seem,  ought  to  receive  equal  providential  care,  or  at  least  in  the 
long  run  equal  opportunity  of  availing  themselves  of  such  prov- 
idence. Moreover,  when  we  appeal  to  the  facts  of  experience, 
we  find  that  many  of  those  who  suffer  violent  and  untimely 
deaths  are  persons  of  whom  it  is  practically  certain  that  with 
continued  life  they  would  have  done  much  more  good  than  is 
being  done  by  many  others  whose  lives  have  been  spared  much 
longer. 

If,  when  we  come  to  treat  of  God's  relation  to  the  universe, 
it  should  seem  possible  to  regard  the  order  of  nature  as  in  any 
sense  divinely  provided,  it  will  then  be  possible,  one  would 


174  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

surmise,  to  defend  the  idea  of  general  providence,  as  being 
compatible  with  the  divine  perfection.  It  will  then  be  possible, 
one  would  judge,  to  interpret  the  natural  order,  viewed  as  a 
common  platform  for  the  acting  out  of  all  life-purposes,  as 
going  to  show  that  an  equitable  provision  has  been  and  is  being 
made  for  human  need.  Indeed  the  natural  order  might  be 
interpreted  as  designed  to  be  the  basis  for  man's  training  and 
learning  through  consequences  what  to  do  and  what  to  avoid. 
But  there  would  still  be  an  imperative  religious  demand  for  some 
provision  to  be  made  so  that  no  event  of  the  natural  order  could 
possibly  of  itself  work  absolute  and  irremediable  evil  to  any 
individual.  This  is  simply  one  aspect  of  the  universal  religious 
need  of  special  providence,  a  need  which  would  be  obvious 
enough,  if  for  no  other  reasons,  in  view  of  the  consideration 
that  a  God  who  did  not  take  any  special  interest  in  and  care  of 
the  individual  would  not  be  one  that  we  could  regard  as  morally 
perfect,  or  as  absolutely  satisfactory  as  an  Object  of  dependence 
and  worship. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  of  the  divine  providence  seems 
to  be  found  in  the  discarding  of  the  idea  of  a  rigid  opposition 
between  the  concepts  of  providence  and  grace.  Indeed  as 
much  has  already  been  implied  in  our  treatment  of  the  concepts 
of  revelation  and  the  answer  to  prayer,  the  latter  of  which  we 
subsumed  under  special  providence.  It  is  in  the  realm  of  grace 
that  the  special  providence  of  God  is  to  be  looked  for.  Special 
providence  is  spiritual  provision.  It  is  the  divine  provision  of 
sufficient  grace  to  enable  the  individual  who  enters  into  and 
persists  in  the  right  religious  adjustment  to  meet  in  the  right 
spirit  whatever  he  may  be  called  upon  to  face  while  travelling 
in  the  pathway  of  duty,  and  to  do  what  he  ought  to  do  in  spite 
of  all  that  may  be  against  him.  The  bringing  about  of  spiritual 
preparedness  for  whatever  may  come  is  the  true  instance  of 
special  providence,  and  it  is  most  readily  recognized  as  such 
when  it  occurs  in  response  to  the  attitude  of  religious  dependence. 
The  crucifying  of  Jesus,  then,  was  no  special  providence; 
neither  can  we  say  that  it  would  have  been  a  special  providence 
if  he  had  escaped  the  cross  and  had  consequently  been  in  a 
position  to  carry  on  his  spiritual  ministry  throughout  a  normal 
lifetime.  But  there  is  a  notable  instance  of  special  divine  prov- 


GOD  AND  MAN  175 

idence  in  the  fact  that,  in  response  to  his  right  religious  adjust- 
ment, that  son  of  man  was  enabled  to  meet  the  crucifixion  as 
he  did,  faithful  unto  the  end  to  the  cause  of  the  people  and  to 
the  will  of  the  divine  Father.  The  fact  is,  we  seem  to  know  no 
special  providence  other  than  the  provision  of  special  grace 
adequate  to  our  special  circumstances  and  our  special  spiritual 
need.  We  have  simply  got  to  learn  to  be  Christian  enough  to 
be  primarily  interested  in  "sufficient  grace"  to  enable  us  to 
do  the  will  of  God,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be,  in  the  best  sense 
of  the  term,  stoical  enough  to  recognize  with  satisfaction  that 
this  "sufficient  grace"  is  all  we  need  ever  look  for  in  the  way 
of  special  providence.  But  while  this  is  all  we  can  ever  get, 
it  is  what  we  can  always  get,  if  we  are  willing  to  fulfil  the  relig- 
ious conditions.  What  is  always  available  as  the  direct  and 
immediate  answer  to  the  right  sort  of  prayer  is  nothing  less 
than  God  himself,  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  all  that  is  involved  in 
having  God. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD 

WE  are  now  ready  to  proceed  further  with  the  a  posteriori 
definition  of  the  religious  Object.  We  have  already  seen  how 
good  God  is;  we  have  now  to  inquire  how  great  he  is.  Here 
again  our  dependence  may  be  upon  any  one  or  upon  all  three  of 
the  following  procedures:  (1)  intuition,  arising  out  of  vital 
religious  experience,  and  sufficiently  criticized  by  means  of 
logical  and  further  experiential  tests;  (2)  postulates,  imperative 
for  the  practical  life,  taken  as  working  hypotheses  and  verified 
sufficiently  for  all  valid  practical  purposes;  (3)  theoretical  con- 
struction, to  account  for  empirical  laws,  on  the  principle  that 
we  may  learn  something  of  what  a  thing  is  from  what  it  does. 
The  term  "metaphysical  attributes"  must  not  be  taken,  there- 
fore, as  implying  any  "high  and  dry"  metaphysical  method  of 
arriving  at  our  conclusions;  on  the  contrary  what  we  are  to 
attempt  is  to  express,  without  inner  contradiction  or  conflict 
with  established  fact,  the  view  of  the  greatness  of  God  which 
seems  to  be  involved  in  the  cognitive  aspects  of  experimental 
religion  when  it  is  at  its  best  spiritually,  and  more  particularly, 
in  the  laws  of  empirical  theology.  The  customary  term,  "meta- 
physical," is  not  inappropriate  here,  however,  inasmuch  as 
what  is  to  be  asserted  would,  in  our  philosophy  of  religion,  be 
offered  as  helping  to  constitute  an  hypothesis  for  a  fundamen- 
tally empirical  metaphysic. 

Proceeding  as  suggested,  then,  we  are  enabled  to  say  that 
God  is  not  only  sufficiently  good  to  meet  all  the  legitimate 
demands  of  experimental  religion,  but  sufficiently  great  as  well. 
He  is  great  enough  to  be  absolutely  dependable  and  the  ade- 
quate Source  of  inner  preparedness  for  anything  that  can  hap- 
pen, and  the  Source  of  actual  salvation,  deliverance  from  evil, 
for  all  who  persist  in  the  right  religious  adjustment.  Here 
again,  then,  we  find  that  the  fundamental  attribute  of  God  is 

176 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  177 

his  absoluteness,  his  absolute  sufficiency  and  satisfactoriness. 
Without  attempting  to  anticipate  the  findings  of  fundamental 
religion  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  the  religious  Object,  we 
may  again  refer  to  God  as  the  Absolute,  meaning  by  the  term, 
however,  as  before,  the  Absolute  of  experimental  religion  (the 
absolutely  dependable  Object  of  dependence  and  Source  of 
salvation). 

This  is  a  very  different  conception  of  the  Absolute  from  that 
which  has  been  more  or  less  prevalent,  especially  recently, 
among  speculative  philosophers,  who  as  a  rule  make  little  or 
nothing  of  the  cognitive  value  of  religious  experience.  In  cur- 
rent speculation  the  doctrine  of  the  " Absolute"  exists  in  a 
more  dogmatic  form,  and  in  other,  more  agnostic  forms.  In  its 
more  dogmatic  form  it  may  be  represented  by  the  view  that 
it  is  an  eternally  complete  and  completely  rational  and  experi- 
ential system,  in  which  are  included  all  things,  persons,  quali- 
ties and  relations,  which  ever  were,  are  now  and  ever  will  be. 
In  a  perhaps  less  dogmatic  form  of  absolutism  it  is  maintained 
that  not  all  separately  experienced  elements  can  be  present  with- 
out modification  in  one  rational  experienced  system,  but  that  the 
nature  of  the  one  all-inclusive  Absolute  is  that  of  an  experience  in 
which  all  reality,  together  with  all  appearances,  are  included,  al- 
though not  without  modification,  and  so,  not  as  they  appear!  We 
are  prepared  for  the  admission  that  such  an  Absolute  is  neither 
humanly  experienceable  nor  rationally  conceivable;  but  we 
cannot  appreciate  the  remaining  dogmatism  which  still  asserts 
that  it  is  real. 

Somewhat  akin  to  this  speculative  notion  of  the  "Absolute," 
especially  in  this  latter,  more  agnostic  form,  is  the  doctrine  of 
God  which  is  characteristic  of  extreme  mysticism.  God  is 
held  to  be  neither  properly  experienceable  in  the  practical  life, 
nor  positively  conceivable  by  the  rational  intelligence.  Only 
in  the  mystic  state  can  the  divine  Reality  be  experienced,  it  is 
claimed;  and  the  intellect's  closest  possible  approximation  to 
true  judgment  about  the  religious  Object  of  the  mystic  is  to 
say  that  it  is  not  what  we  think,  or  ever  can  think,  it  to  be. 
Thus  the  theology  characteristic  of  extreme  mysticism  is  funda- 
mentally negative. 

Now  the  theological  theory  of  experimental  (i.  e.,  practical 


178          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

experiential)  religion  has  its  negative  as  well  as  its  positive 
aspects.  God  as  the  Absolute  of  experimental  religion,  i.  e.,  as 
the  absolutely  sufficient  and  satisfactory  Object  of  religious 
dependence  and  Source  of  religious  deliverance  from  evil,  is  not 
only  empirically  known  to  be  what  man  imperatively  needs  him 
to  be;  he  is  also  empirically  known  not  to  be  what  man  impera- 
tively needs  him  not  to  be.  And  so  our  theological  theory  must 
be  expected,  as  suggested,  to  have  its  negative  elements.  More- 
over, we  find  that  traditional  theology,  which  has  perhaps  never 
in  its  formative  periods  been  completely  divorced  from  practical 
religious  experience,  has  its  list  of  " negative  attributes"  of 
God — incorporeality,  invisibility,  etc.,  incomprehensibility, 
impassibility,  immutability,  timelessness  and  infinity.  But 
this  list  suggests  an  altogether  undue  influence  of  extreme 
mysticism  and  a  too  purely  speculative  and  apriori  theological 
method.  We  shall  therefore  examine  the  attributes  in  question 
from  the  standpoint  of  practical  experimental  religion  and  our 
empirical  theological  method. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  must  we  think  of  God  as  incorporeal? 
It  would  be  absolutely  unsatisfactory,  of  course — fatal,  even,  to 
the  best  type  of  experimental  religion — to  think  of  God  in 
merely  corporeal  terms.  But  might  not  God  be  spiritual  and 
also  in  a  sense  corporeal,  somewhat  as  man,  who  is  spiritual,  is 
also  in  a  sense  corporeal?  In  other  words,  may  not  God  be 
Spirit,  and  yet  have  a  body?  What  this  is  meant  to  suggest  is 
not  the  crude  anthropomorphism  of  primitive  forms  of  religious 
thought  (or  of  present-day  Mormonism),  but  rather  the  idea 
that  the  physical  universe  may  perhaps  be  related  to  the  divine 
Spirit  somewhat  as  the  human  body  is  related  to  the  human 
spirit.  This  is  not  asserted  in  any  final  way  in  the  present 
connection;  an  adequate  discussion  of  the  point  would  require 
us  to  plunge  into  metaphysics.  But  what  we  seem  entitled  to 
say  here  is  that  the  laws  of  empirical  theology  do  not  exclude  the 
idea  that  there  may  be  a  divine  Body,  as  well  as  a  divine  Spirit. 

In  view  of  the  assumed  incorporeality  of  God,  traditional 
theology  has  drawn  the  obvious  conclusion  that  he  is  invisible. 
But,  we  may  ask,  if  the  physical  universe  is  God's  body,  is  God 
any  more  invisible  than  man  is?  Of  course  in  a  sense  the  real 
man,  the  spirit,  is  invisible.  There  is  no  visible  "ghost"  of 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  179 

either  man  or  God.  But  in  observing  the  activities  of  our  fellow- 
men  in  and  through  their  bodies,  as  well  as  our  own  activities  in 
and  through  our  own  body,  we  can  "see"  (perceive)  that  they 
and  we  exist  and  are  present  and  at  work  in  the  bodies  we  see. 
We  have  only  inferential  awareness  of  the  thought  of  others, 
but  we  can  observe  their  life  and  action.  And  so,  if  we  have 
achieved  religious  perception,  we  can  "see"  (perceive)  that 
God  exists  and  is  present  and  at  work  in  the  physical  universe 
which  we  see;  for  even  if  his  present  activity  is  most  readily 
recognizable  as  operating  in  human  spirits,  these  spirits  animate 
bodies  which  are  parts  of  the  visible  world.  We  have  nothing 
but  inferential  awareness  of  the  divine  intellection,  but  we  can 
observe  his  active  life  in  the  universe.  And  so  he  may  be  said 
to  be  in  a  sense  perceptibly  present  in  the  world  in  which  we 
live.  If  it  were  not  so,  experimental  religion  would  inevitably 
languish,  and  experimental  theology  would  be  impossible. 

As  to  incomprehensibility,  the  question  is  evidently  one  of 
degrees.  Doubtless  God  is  not  completely  comprehensible  by 
the  human  intellect;  but  neither  is  man,  nor  the  tiniest  atom  or 
electron  of  the  physical  universe.  On  the  other  hand,  if  God 
were  completely  incomprehensible,  as  extreme  mystics  and 
extreme  agnostics  try  to  maintain,  he  would  be  very  far  from 
being  that  absolutely  satisfactory  Object  of  dependence  and 
adoration  of  which  experimental  religion  at  its  best  is  assured. 

The  case  is  similar  with  regard  to  impassibility,  i.  e.,  the  sup- 
posed absence  of  suffering,  and  indeed  of  all  feeling,  or  emotional 
life.  This  negative  attribute  reflects  prejudices  of  Greek  philos- 
ophers against  the  whole  life  of  feeling,  as  originating  in  the 
earthly  constituent  of  human  nature,  in  distinction  from  the 
divine  reason.  It  was  taken  to  be  the  mark  of  being  acted  upon, 
and  so  of  not  being  the  Absolute.  But,  these  prejudices  against 
feeling  being  laid  aside,  it  becomes  obvious  that  a  God  who  was 
never  "touched  with  the  feeling  of  our  infirmities,"  who  never 
felt  love  for  man  nor  hatred  of  sin,  who  was  simply  cold  intellect 
and  will,  would  be  far  from  being  the  adequate  Object  of  devo- 
tion of  which  experimental  religion  at  its  best  is  assured. 

And  so  of  immutability.  The  adequate  Object  of  religious 
dependence  must  be  unchangeably  good  and  steadfastly  com- 
mitted to  the  realization  of  the  absolute  ideal.  But  to  deny 


180  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

absolutely  that  there  ever  is  any  sort  of  change  in  God  is  to 
deny  that  God  is  a  living  God.  It  is  not  only  to  deny  the  divine 
activity,  but  to  assert  that  there  are  no  changes  of  relation 
between  God  and  anything  or  anyone  else,  except  perhaps  in 
relations  which  make  absolutely  no  difference  to  God.  Mani- 
festly this  is  not  the  God  of  whom  he  who  has  experienced  atone- 
ment, reconciliation,  is  assured. 

The  timelessness  of  the  divine  Being  is  a  characteristic  doc- 
trine of  extreme  mysticism,  and  a  not  uncommon  tenet  of 
speculative  philosophers  and  theologians.  Now  it  may  be  true 
enough  (to  speak  once  again  from  the  point  of  view  of  fundamen- 
tal religion)  that  the  divine  Ideal  is  eternal;  its  validity  is  not 
dependent  upon  considerations  of  time,  nor  is  it  impaired  by 
the  lapse  of  time.  But  to  assert  the  timelessness  of  the  divine 
Being,  his  non-existence  in  the  time-order,  is  to  leave  experi- 
mental religion  not  only  without  any  adequate  Object  of  reli- 
gious dependence,  but  even  without  any  religious  Object  upon 
which  to  depend  for  a  response  to  the  "right  religious  adjust- 
ment." Or,  to  revert  to  what  was  said  of  immutability,  there 
must  be  change  enough  in  the  divine  Being  for  the  divine 
activity,  and  for  significant  relations  with  persons;  and  there 
must  be  time  for  this,  as  for  all  change.  God  is  not  to  be  thought 
of  as  timeless,  but  as  real  at  all  times. 

But  the  one  negative  attribute  of  God  which  is  generally  re- 
garded as  religiously  indispensable  is  infinity.  Now  as  applied 
to  God  in  ordinary  religious  speech  the  term  is  somewhat  loosely 
used  and  is  not  so  much  negative  as  positive  in  significance.  It 
often  means  simply  the  acme  of  greatness;  it  is  a  strong  ex- 
pression— hyperbole,  perhaps — for  the  absolute  sufficiency  of 
the  divine  Being.  As  such,  then,  it  may  be  allowed  to  stand. 
Moreover,  even  when  viewed  in  its  negative  aspect,  if  it  is 
understood  as  meaning  simply  that  the  religious  Object  is  free 
from  all  those  limiting  conditions  which  would  render  it  in- 
adequate as  the  Object  of  absolute  dependence  and  worship,  it 
is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  experimental  religion,  an  essential 
attribute  of  the  divine  nature.  But  if  the  term  is  used  in  the 
sense  of  absolutely  unconditioned,  or  unlimited  in  any  way, 
it  must  be  denied  of  the  God  of  experimental  religion,  who  is 
known  to  enter  into  such  relations  with  human  free  agents  as 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  181 

condition  the  divine  activity.  Moreover,  taken  in  any  quantita- 
tive sense,  as  involving  an  actual  sum  of  elements  of  any  sort  so 
great  that  it  could  not  be  made  greater  by  adding  to  it,  the 
notion  of  infinity,  besides  being  of  more  than  doubtful  appli- 
cability to  God,  becomes  inherently  self-contradictory. 

Still,  what  is  self-contradictory,  when  applied  to  actuality, 
may  nevertheless  be  free  from  contradiction  and  a  legitimate 
concept,  if  applied  to  possibility.  The  idea  of  God  as  the  actual 
Source  of  unending  future  development,  and  thus  as  infinitely 
potential,  seems  not  only  unobjectionable  intellectually  and 
religiously,  but  even  necessarily  involved  in  the  absolute  suffi- 
ciency of  the  Object  depended  upon  by  man  for  the  unending 
conservation  of  the  values  of  human  personality. 

Turning  now  to  the  positive  attributes  of  God,  we  shall  con- 
tinue to  use  as  a  touchstone  the  fundamental  attribute  of 
absoluteness,  interpreted  in  the  pragmatic  sense  required  by 
experimental  religion.  And  first  among  the  positive  attributes 
involved  in  this  postulated  and  experienced  absoluteness,  we 
shall  discuss  the  scholastic-sounding  attribute  of  aseity.  Wil- 
liam James  has  made  use  of  this  attribute  of  God  as  found  in  the 
scholastic  theology,  as  an  illustration  of  ideas — or  better, 
words — which  have  no  practical  significance  whatever.  It 
makes  no  difference  to  religious  experience,  he  declares,  whether 
God  is  thought  of  as  being  a  se}  or  not.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact 
this  attribute,  which  means  self-dependent  rather  than  de- 
pendent upon  some  more  ultimate  reality,  makes  all  the  differ- 
ence between  being  God  and  not  being  God.  If  the  Object  of 
our  religious  dependence  is  ultimately  self-dependent,  he  is  the 
one  beyond  whom  we  neither  need  nor  can  go,  in  seeking  power 
to  realize  the  true  ideal.  Moreover,  it  is  particularly  important 
to  stress  this  attribute  of  aseity  in  these  times,  when  the  Object 
suggested  for  our  religious  devotion  is  represented  as  so  limited  a 
being  as  to  be  very  far  from  coinciding  with  the  ultimate  Object 
of  our  religious  dependence. 

But  the  metaphysical  attribute  of  God  in  which  practical 
religious  interest  seems  to  center  is  omnipotence.  Effectual 
faith  involves  belief  in  "God,  the  Father  Almighty,"  the  Being 
absolute  in  power  as  well  as  in  goodness.  But  these  terms,  "the 
Almighty"  and  "absolute  power,"  must  be  interpreted  prag- 


182          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

matically,  after  the  manner  of  experimental  religion,  as  in- 
volving (to  state  the  indispensable  minimum)  absolute  suffi- 
ciency of  God's  power  for  all  the  imperative  religious  needs  of 
men.  No  religious  interest  would  be  served  by  ability  on  God's 
part  to  make  the  sum  of  two  and  two  equal  to  five,  or  to  cause 
a  door  to  stand  open  and  remain  shut  at  the  same  time,  or  to 
change  the  past,  or  to  do  any  of  the  absurd,  self-contradictory 
and  inherently  impossible  tasks  that  idle  thought  might  propose. 
Similar  objection  may  be  rightly  made  to  the  supposition  that 
God  could  have  left  man  a  free  agent,  so  as  to  be  in  a  position  to 
develop  moral  character,  and  at  the  same  time  unconditionally 
guarantee  that  he  would  never  make  any  sinful  use  of  this 
freedom;  or  that  God  is  able  to  grant  moral  salvation  to  anyone 
in  opposition  to  what  is  ultimately  willed  by  the  person  con- 
cerned. These  suppositions  may  not  be  as  obviously,  but  they 
are  as  really  self-contradictory  as  the  others.  But  it  is  idle  also 
to  ask  whether  God  can  do  wrong  or  excuse  moral  evil,  for  even 
if  he  could  he  would  not,  and  so  any  theoretical  freedom  on  his 
part  or  supposed  ability  to  do  so,  would  make  no  difference  to 
us  or  to  anyone  else.  Nor  is  it  desirable  that  any  such  things 
should  ever  be  done. 

At  this  point  we  are  on  the  verge  of  the  question  of  miracle,  the 
systematic  discussion  of  which  is  postponed  until  we  come  to 
deal  with  the  relations  of  God  to  the  universe.  For  the  present  it 
will  suffice  to  suggest  that  while  the  non-occurrence  of  interven- 
tions of  any  specified  sort  in  the  realm  of  nature  would  be  more 
safely  construed  as  meaning  that  God  cannot  wisely  do  such 
things  than  as  meaning  that  God  cannot  do  such  things  at  all, 
the  difference  between  the  two,  pragmatically  speaking,  is 
perhaps  not  great. 

What  is  of  chief  practical  concern,  however,  and  what  can  be 
affirmed  on  grounds  of  religious  experience  at  its  best  is  that 
with  God  all  things  that  faith  has  the  right  to  demand  are 
possible;  he  is  able  to  do  all  that  man  needs  to  have  done  for 
him  by  divine  power.  All  that  man  needs  of  God,  apart  from 
the  privilege  of  the  divine  fellowship,  is  an  orderly  universe  on 
which  to  stand,  freedom  of  action,  immortality,  and  salvation, 
individual  and  social;  and  God  is  able  to  give  him  all  these.  He 
is  able,  in  all  his  dealings  with  man,  to  conserve  the  free  agency 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  183 

of  the  human  spirit.  He  is  also  able,  we  may  surmise  in  antici- 
pation of  considerations  to  be  entered  into  at  a  later  stage  of  our 
discussion,  to  grant  a  continuation  of  the  personal  life  after 
the  incident  of  physical  death.  He  is  "almighty  to  save" — 
"able  to  save  to  the  uttermost"  those  who  are  desirous  enough 
of  moral  and  spiritual  salvation  to  enter  as  fully  as  they  can  into 
the  right  religious  adjustment.  He  can  enable  man  to  be 
inwardly  prepared  to  meet  with  moral  triumph  whatever  can 
happen  to  him,  and  to  be  continuously  and  progressively  de- 
livered from  moral  evil  and  developed  into  moral  good. 

It  may  thus  be  said  that  God  is  always  able  to  do  what,  in 
view  of  the  existing  circumstances,  he  chooses  and  decides  to  do, 
and  at  the  time  when  he  chooses  to  do  it;  and  yet,  it  would 
seem,  he  is  not  always  able  to  bring  to  pass  what  he  would 
have  chosen  to  have  take  place,  at  least  as  soon  as  he  would 
have  chosen  to  have  it  occur,  had  it  been  possible.  This  is 
because  the  free  co-operation  of  finite  spirits  is  essential  for  the 
realization  of  many  of  the  ends  toward  which  God  is  working. 
This  is  the  only  explanation  of  the  fact  that  not  all  are  saved 
from  sin,  either  by  prevention  or  even  by  cure,  in  spite  of  the 
existence  of  a  God  abundantly  willing  and  able  to  save.  But 
however  man  by  his  individual  or  collective  activities  may 
hinder  and  indefinitely  postpone  the  realization  of  the  divine 
ideal,  God  is  still  able  to  supply  further  educative  and  dis- 
ciplinary experience  in  the  task  he  has  set  himself  of  saving  the 
individual  and  the  world  without  over-riding  human  freedom. 
This  undertaking  will  never  be  abandoned  until  it  is  accom- 
plished, unless  man  should,  through  persistence  in  sin,  finally 
destroy  his  own  freedom  and  therewith  his  conscious  existence — 
and  this  we  do  not  know  to  be  even  possible.  Moreover,  while 
we  are  perhaps  not  in  a  position  to  say  that  in  spite  of  all  the 
opposition  which  the  will  of  God  could  ever  possibly  encounter 
from  wills  not  merely  immature  but  perverse,  his  own  good 
will  mil  finally  be  realized  in  the  moral  salvation  of  all,  faith 
may  still  surmise  that  perhaps  the  time  will  come  when,  in 
spite  of  all  the  opposition  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  God  will 
have  encountered,  his  will  to  conduct  all  existing  beings  through 
freedom  to  holiness  will  have  been  realized;  in  which  case  it 
would  be  true  that  God  always  was  able  to  win  over  every  other 


184  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

will  to  his  own  way.  One  could  then  say:  God's  love  was  omnip- 
otent ;  God  was  able  to  save  all  men  without  taking  away  their 
freedom,  and  the  proof  that  he  could  do  it  is  that  he  has  done 
it.  Or,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  present,  in  answer  to  the 
question,  Can  man  resist  the  will  of  God  forever?  one  may  say, 
Perhaps  man  will  not  do  so;  and  if  he  does  not,  who  then  will 
say  whether  or  not  he  could  have  done  so?  One  feels  the  ap- 
propriateness of  Charles  Wesley's  question,  "He  wills  that  I 
should  holy  be;  What  can  withstand  his  will?"  But  perhaps 
it  may  be  well  for  us  to  leave  the  question  unanswered  as  yet! 
Whether  God  knows  the  answer  to  this  question  or  not,  it  would 
seem  that  here  is  a  theological  question  which  man  cannot 
answer,  so  long  as  anyone  remains  unreconciled  to  God  and 
unsaved  from  sin. 

Like  the  attribute  of  omnipotence,  the  attribute  of  omnis- 
cience is  to  be  interpreted  pragmatically.  In  experimental  re- 
ligion at  its  best,  there  is  practical  and  intuitive  assurance  not 
only  that  God  has  sufficient  power  for  the  satisfaction  of  all 
man's  religious  need,  but  also  sufficient  knowledge  and  wisdom 
for  the  guidance  of  that  power.  His  knowledge  is  absolute — 
absolutely  sufficient.  He  knows,  sufficiently  for  all  his  purposes 
as  God,  all  present  reality,  all  that  has  existed  in  the  past,  and 
all  certainties,  possibilities  and  probabilities  with  reference  to 
the  future.  He  knows  adequately  the  life  and  inner  experience 
of  each  individual,  although  how  he  knows  this  may  perhaps 
have  to  be  left  as  a  question  for  metaphysics.  He  knows  all 
this  always,  or  at  least  always  when  necessary,  whether  it  be 
in  the  form  of  presentation  in  direct  experience,  or  of  repre- 
sentation in  thought,  or  as  having  the  power  to  present  or 
represent  it  at  will.  The  wisdom  of  God  is  his  adequate  knowl- 
edge in  the  service  of  the  purposes  of  his  absolutely  holy  will. 

The  question  is  sometimes  raised  as  to  whether  God  can 
know  beforehand  all  that  will  happen  in  the  future,  and  par- 
ticularly the  future  free  acts  of  men.  We  have  said  that  he 
can  forecast  the  future  sufficiently  for  all  his  purposes  as  God — 
i.  e.,  sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  work  in  the  best  way  for  the 
realization  of  his  purposes.  But  this  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  he  knows  before  the  time,  as  certain,  what  in  the  nature 
of  the  case  is  uncertain  until  the  moment  of  decision.  Such  sup- 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  185 

posed  knowledge  would  not  be  true  knowledge;  "a  thing  known 
for  certain  cannot  be  uncertain"  *  and  the  only  way  to  know 
human  decisions  beforehand  as  they  are,  is  to  know  them  as 
possible,  and  more  or  less  probable  (and  just  how  probable), 
but  still  uncertain.  Obviously,  this  is  no  imperfection  of  knowl- 
edge; and  if  we  can  say  that,  no  matter  what  possible  future 
man  makes  actual  by  his  decision,  God  always  knows  what  to  do 
(and  this  we  are  entitled  to  assert  on  grounds  of  the  assurance 
of  religion  at  its  best,  that  God  is  absolute),  it  is  clear  that 
God's  knowledge  is  just  what  it  ought  to  be,  if  he  is  to  be  a 
perfect  Object  of  religious  dependence. 

Let  it  be  granted,  then,  that  God  knows  it  to  be  uncertain 
beforehand  as  to  just  when  a  certain  individual  will  decide  to 
yield  to  the  will  of  God.  A  further  question  is  the  following: 
Given  unending  time  and  the  inexhaustible  resourcefulness  of 
God  in  knowledge  and  hi  power,  and  given  also  the  unending 
continuation  of  man's  freedom  of  choice,  will  God  ultimately 
succeed  in  persuading  all  men  to  yield  voluntarily  to  his  will? 
Granted  that  God  will  never  give  up  his  reconciling  work  so 
long  as  he  has  not  yet  succeeded,  is  it  possible  for  man  to  resist 
forever?  This  is  the  question  we  raised  in  connection  with 
God's  omnipotence,  and  very  possibly  we  may  not  know  the 
correct  answer  to  it;  but  our  present  interest  in  it  is  as  to  whether 
God  knows  the  true  answer?  To  this  question  the  answer  seems 
to  be  as  follows:  If  it  is  certain  beforehand  that  God  is  going  to 
fail  in  any  particular  undertaking,  evidently  he  does  not  know  it, 
for  he  would  not  be  what  he  is  known  to  be,  viz.,  the  adequate 
Object  of  religious  dependence,  if  he  persisted  in  working  for 
what  he  knew  could  not  be  obtained.  If  it  is  certain  beforehand 
that  God  is  not  going  to  fail,  or  in  other  words,  if  the  fact  is 
that  God's  failure  is  impossible,  God  may  perhaps  know  this, 
even  if  we  do  not.  If,  again,  it  is  possible  beforehand  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  that  he  may  fail,  and  possible  that  he  may 
succeed,  God  may  perhaps  know  this,  even  if  we  do  not.  That 
is,  we  may  be  right  in  believing  that  God  knows  whether  his 
partial  ultimate  failure  is  possible  or  impossible,  although  we 
may  not  ourselves  be  in  a  position  to  say  which  of  these  alter- 
natives is  correct.  But  in  any  case,  in  view  of  the  creative 
*  J.  Martineau:  "A  Study  of  Religion,"  Vol.  II,  p.  263. 


186  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

freedom  of  the  human  will,  it  would  seem  that  God  must  know 
that  the  time  of  his  future  success  in  winning  the  free  surrender 
of  any  rebellious  will  to  his  will  is  uncertain,  however  the  proba- 
bilities may  favor  one  time  rather  than  another.  And  in  all 
this  we  are  free  to  believe,  as  indeed  in  experimental  religion 
at  its  best  one  is  assured,  that  God  knows  future  certainties 
as  certain,  and  future  uncertainties  as  uncertain,  at  least  ade- 
quately for  his  being  the  absolutely  satisfactory  Object  of  re- 
ligious dependence.  And  we  may  be  sure  too  that  this  is  true, 
and  that  God  himself  knows  it :  that  so  long  as  the  future  moral 
salvation  of  any  individual  or  group  is  not  known  to  be  impossi- 
ble, God  will  never  give  up  doing  all  he  can  do  in  the  direction 
of  that  consummation  so  devoutly  to  be  wished. 

Supplementary  to  the  attributes  of  omnipotence  and  omnis- 
science  is  the  attribute  of  omnipresence.  The  intuitive  and 
practical  certainty  of  experimental  religion  in  its  moral  and 
rational  form  is  to  the  effect  that  God  has  not  only  sufficient 
power  to  be  absolutely  satisfactory  as  the  Object  of  religious 
dependence,  and  sufficient  knowledge  and  wisdom  for  the  abso- 
lutely satisfactory  guidance  of  that  power,  but  also  sufficient 
immediate  experience  of  reality  as  a  basis  for  this  adequate 
knowledge.  If  he  is  to  know  all,  he  must  have  empirical  con- 
tact (or  be  present)  with  all,  or  at  least  be  in  a  position  to  get 
this  empirical  contact  as  it  may  be  needed.  This  is  the  prac- 
tical essence  of  omnipresence. 

Moreover,  in  experimental  religion  at  its  best  there  is  the 
assurance  that  God  is  accessible  to  the  religious  individual 
wherever  he  may  go,  and  indeed  to  all  men  everywhere.  It  is 
impossible  to  flee  from  the  divine  presence;  one  may  abide  in 
his  own  land,  or  take  the  wings  of  the  morning  and  dwell  in  the 
uttermost  parts  of  the  sea,  and  he  will  find  God  there,  if  he 
turns  to  him  in  the  right  religious  attitude;  indeed  he  might 
conceivably  ascend  up  into  heaven  or  even  make  his  bed 
in  Sheol,  and  still  in  either  case  find  God  accessible  (Psalm 
139:7-10).  Wherever  there  is  a  human  spirit,  there  is  the  po- 
tentiality of  a  revelation  of  the  divine.  This  gives  us  further 
light  on  the  practical  significance  of  the  divine  omnipresence: 
man  can  get  into  touch  with  God  anywhere,  and  God  is  in 
touch  with  the  whole  universe  and  (actually  or  potentially) 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  187 

with  every  one  in  it  and,  as  far  as  necessary,  with  every  part 
of  it. 

At  this  point,  as  at  many  others,  while  theology  contains 
fruitful  suggestions  for  metaphysics,  it  has  need  of  metaphysics. 
A  need  is  felt  for  some  rational  conception  as  to  how  it  is  that 
God  is  accessible  to  all  human  spirits  and  at  the  same  time 
able  to  experience  at  will  any  phase  of  reality  he  may  have 
occasion  thus  to  present  within  the  field  of  his  direct  awareness. 
But  empirical  theology  has  further  suggestions  of  its  own  in 
this  connection,  the  discussion  of  which  leads  us  to  take  up 
what  may  be  regarded  either  as  an  attribute  of  the  divine  na- 
ture, almost  coincident  with  omnipresence,  or  as  a  phase  of  the 
relation  of  God  to  the  world,  viz.,  the  divine  immanence.  In 
this  immediate  connection  we  shall  consider  it  as  an  attribute 
of  God. 

According  to  experimental  religion  in  critical  form,  revelation 
takes  place  primarily  in  the  spiritual  experience  of  man  in  re- 
sponse to  the  right  religious  adjustment;  and  what  revelation  is, 
essentially,  is  the  perceptible  and  recognizable  incoming  and 
immanence  of  the  divine  within  the  human,  and  so  of  the  divine 
within  the  universe.  Now  it  may  be  that  the  divine  is  to  be 
found  in  the  human  more  widely  than  this,  as  is  claimed  from 
the  point  of  view  of  fundamental  religion.  Indeed  it  may  very 
well  be  that  the  divine  life  indwells  the  universe  beyond  the 
human  altogether,  as  many  mystics  and  speculative  theologians, 
and  some  others,  maintain;  such  a  view  is  not  contradicted  by 
anything  in  experimental  religion,  but  is  even  suggested  by 
what  has  just  been  said  in  the  discussion  of  omnipresence.  But 
even  granting  the  reality  of  this  wider  immanence,  the  point 
of  importance  just  here  is  that,  according  to  experimental 
religion  at  its  best,  there  are  degrees  of  the  immanence  of  the 
divine,  the  highest  degree  of  immanence  existing  where  revela- 
tion is,  objectively  speaking,  greatest — in  other  words,  where 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  most  fully  present  and  manifest  in  the  life. 
This  consideration  effectually  counters  the  pantheistic  sug- 
gestions of  the  doctrine  of  immanence  in  its  more  extreme  and 
one-sided  form,  according  to  which  God  is  as  fully  immanent 
in  the  material  as  in  the  spiritual,  and  as  truly  in  the  immoral 
as  in  the  moral.  Such  extreme  pantheism  is  almost  identical, 


188  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

practically  speaking,  with  atheism.  Experimental  religion,  on 
the  contrary,  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  God  is  not 
equally  present  in  all  phases  of  the  universe,  but  becomes  more 
fully  immanent  as  he  is  revealed  in  the  promotion  of  the 
spiritual  life  in  response  to  man's  right  religious  adjustment. 

However,  even  in  the  theoretical  part  of  a  theology  built 
upon  experimental  religion  the  suggestion  may  be  received 
with  favor  that  the  physical  universe,  within  which  the  divine 
Spirit  is  immanent,  may  be  the  divine  Body,  indwelt  by  the 
divine  Life,  somewhat  as  the  human  body  is  indwelt  by  the 
human  life  and  directed  by  the  human  spirit.  But  detailed 
discussion  of  this  suggestion  would  carry  us  into  metaphysics. 

Complementary  to  the  attribute  (or  relation)  of  immanence 
is  the  attribute  (or  relation)  of  transcendence.  Experimental 
religion  arises  out  of  a  state  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  already 
experienced.  It  exhibits  a  "tendency  toward  the  transcendent " 
(to  use  Wobbermin's  phrase),  a  seeking  to  promote  and  con- 
serve values  appreciated,  by  forming  an  alliance  with  the 
supra-mundane.  It  is  interested,  to  be  sure,  in  revelation,  the 
becoming  immanent  of  the  divine;  but  it  is  the  (otherwise)  tran- 
scendent that  it  would  have  to  become  immanent.  In  practical 
experimental  religion  at  its  best  not  only  is  an  adequate  trans- 
cendent divine  Power  favorable  to  man's  spiritual  welfare 
postulated;  the  postulate,  taken  as  a  working-hypothesis,  has 
led  to  the  verifying  experience  of  the  immanence  of  the  divine 
in  the  spiritual  uplift  dependent  upon  this  right  religious  ad- 
justment. The  emphasis  upon  transcendence  is  thus  a  mark  of 
religious  realism,  with  its  doctrine  of  a  real  God  for  man's 
practical  dependence. 

The  doctrine  of  transcendence  must  not  be  carried  to  a  one- 
sided extreme,  of  course;  for  if  we  think  of  God  as  so  transcend- 
ent that  he  is  never  immanent,  we  not  only  (with  the  deists) 
practically  deny  revelation  of  a  living  God ;  we  adopt  a  position 
which,  from  the  standpoint  of  experimental  religion,  practically 
amounts  to  having  no  God  at  all.  Thus  we  see  that  the  pan- 
theistic extreme  of  immanence  without  transcendence  and  the 
deistic  extreme  of  transcendence  without  immanence  are  both, 
pragmatically  considered,  about  the  same  thing  as  atheism. 

But  how  can  we  think  of  God  as  both  transcendent  and  im- 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  189 

manent — as  being  both  in  the  universe  and  beyond  it?  May  not 
the  solution  of  this  problem  be  found  in  the  attribute  of  per- 
sonality, and  Lotze's  suggestion  that,  as  the  human  personal 
self  is  in  a  sense  present  within  the  little  world  of  its  experience, 
and  yet  as  subject  forever  distinct  from  and  more  than  that 
world  as  its  object,  so  the  divine  Being  is  a  personal  Spirit, 
present  in  the  universe,  which  is  the  world  of  its  experience,  and 
yet  as  subject  distinct  from  and  more  than  that  world  as  it 
object?  The  detailed  elaboration  and  theoretical  defense  of 
this  suggestion  belong  to  metaphysics,  but  the  conception  of 
God  as  personal  has  ample  support,  not  alone  in  the  primitive 
phases  of  experimental  religion,  with  their  "personifying  ap- 
perception," as  Wundt  calls  it,  but  also  and  especially  in  the 
assurances  of  practical  experimental  religion  at  its  highest  stage 
of  development.  Indeed  the  essentials  of  personality  in  the 
religious  Object  have  been  either  clearly  implied  or  remotely 
indicated  throughout  practically  the  whole  of  our  theological 
procedure,  beginning  with  our  first  collation  of  the  empirical 
data.  The  divine  has  been  found  revealed  in  the  supreme  human 
personality  and  in  the  highest  phases  of  the  spiritual  experience 
of  other  human  persons,  presumably  as  the  Holy  Spirit.  The 
peculiarly  divine  work  has  been  the  work — presumably  per- 
sonal— of  reconciling  human  persons  to  the  divine  Being — 
evidently  a  Person.  The  only  "absolutely  satisfactory"  moral 
attributes  of  the  divine  character,  holiness  and  love,  virtually 
presuppose  personality.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  meta- 
physical attributes,  particularly  omniscience  and,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  immanence  and  transcendence  viewed  in  conjunction. 
Throughout  all  this,  personality  is  the  only  unifying  concept 
humanly  available. 

Objection  is  frequently  made  to  the  idea  of  the  personality 
of  God  on  the  ground  of  its  being  unduly  anthropomorphic. 
Now  it  is  doubtless  true  that  many  of  the  specific  qualities  and 
limitations  of  human  personality  cannot  be  properly  applied  to 
God.  But  this  may  be  interpreted  as  meaning  (to  follow  a  sug- 
gestion from  Lotze  again),  not  that  God  is  not  personal,  but 
that  he  alone  is  completely  personal,  man's  personality  being 
but  incomplete  and  fragmentary.  In  any  case  what  we  are 
concerned  to  affirm  of  God  is  the  essence  of  personality,  viz., 


190  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

rational  (and  no  doubt  one  might  add,  empirical)  consciousness, 
including  self-consciousness  and  self-directed  activity.  A  per- 
son is  a  spiritual  being,  or  spirit — not  a  visible  "  ghost,"  and 
not  even  disembodied  necessarily,  but  a  "loving,  intelligent 
will"  (R.  L.  Swain).  The  question  of  the  personality  of  the 
Absolute  is  generally,  and  truly  enough,  regarded  as  a  problem 
of  metaphysics;  but  in  the  present  connection  it  may  be  said 
of  the  religious  Absolute  (the  absolutely  sufficient  Object  of 
religious  dependence)  that  it  is  not  only  practically  necessary 
that  it  be  personal,  and  intuitively  certain  that  it  is  so,  as  we 
have  seen;  there  seems  to  be  promise  also  that  the  view  will 
prove  theoretically  permissible  as  well.  For  although  the  Ab- 
solute (of  metaphysics)  includes  all,  and  a  person  distinguishes 
himself  from  all,  as  Mansel  pointed  out,  it  is  also  true  that  the 
person  may  think  of  himself  as  including  all  his  experience  of 
other  things  within  himself,  and  of  the  field  of  his  experience  as 
in  some  sense  containing  all  the  objects  of  which  he  has  ex- 
perience. At  all  events,  the  concept  of  "superpersonality" 
does  not  help  us  much,  notoriously  because  of  our  absolute 
lack  of  experience  of  any  entity  qualitatively  superior  to  per- 
sonality at  its  best.  Consequently  either  one  or  the  other  of 
two  courses  becomes  necessary.  Either  we  must  interpret 
"superpersonality"  (quantitatively,  for  example)  as  including 
personality  (along  with  extra-personal  phases  of  life),  in  which 
case  it  becomes  legitimate  enough  as  predicated  of  the  religious 
Object  (for  there  is  more  than  mere  personality  in  all  incarnate 
human  beings,  and  the  same  thing  may  perhaps  be  true  of 
the  divine  Being) ;  or  else,  excluding  the  personal,  we  may  allow 
the  term  "superpersonal"  to  sink  to  the  significance  of  the  sub- 
personal,  which,  it  is  true,  we  have  experienced,  but  which  is 
obviously  inadequate  to  be  the  Object  of  religious  dependence 
and  adoration.  In  other  words,  God  may  be  superpersonal, 
but  not  in  any  sense  of  the  term  that  would  contradict  his 
being  truly  personal. 

We  shall  next  consider  the  unity  of  God.  Practical  experi- 
mental religion  not  only  demands,  but  at  its  best  it  is  assured 
of  at  least  one  God.  But  granted  that  this  God  is  the  absolute 
One,  absolutely  sufficient  for  man's  needs,  it  follows  that  no 
more  than  one  is  needed.  Unless  there  is  adequate  empirical 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  191 

evidence  of  the  existence  of  more  than  one  God,  or  unless  mono- 
theism should  prove  to  be  metaphysically  indefensible,  this  sug- 
gestion of  one  and  only  one  God  should  be  allowed  to  stand. 
The  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  person  who  affirms  poly- 
theism as  against  monotheism.  The  principle  of  parsimony,  so 
fundamental  to  scientific  method,  opposes  explaining  by  refer- 
ence to  more  than  one  causal  agency  what  can  be  fully  explained 
by  referring  to  one,  especially  if  that  one  is  the  only  one 
known  to  exist.  Moreover,  not  only  does  the  unity  of  the  world 
suggest  the  unity  of  the  divine,  if  the  divine  is  to  be  thought 
of  as  ruling  the  world;  the  natural  religious  attitude  is  also  in- 
herently unitary  in  its  direction.  Even  polytheism  tends  to 
be  the  worship  of  one  god  at  a  time.  Polytheistic  theory  arose 
because  no  one  god  believed  in  was  thought  to  be  adequate  to 
fulfil  all  the  functions  attributed  to  the  divine.  But  belief  in 
more  than  one  god  makes  difficulties  for  practical  religion,  more 
troublesome  than  the  theoretical  difficulties  it  was  designed  to 
remove.  As  has  happened  over  and  over  again  in  historic 
polytheism,  mutual  opposition  might  be  thought  of  as  arising  be- 
tween the  gods;  and  in  such  a  case  the  religious  individual  could 
never  be  fully  assured  that  the  right  relation  to  any  particular 
god  was  the  right  relation  to  the  divine  in  general  or  as  a  whole. 

What  we  have  said  in  disparagement  of  polytheism  is  not 
without  its  application  to  certain  phases  of  traditional  Christian 
belief.  The  constant  intervention  of  spirits,  good  or  bad,  and 
especially  of  a  practically  omnipresent,  almost  omnipotent  and 
absolutely  evil  spirit,  the  devil,  in  human  affairs,  has  tended  to 
prevent  or  impair  the  insight  that  there  is  only  one  religious 
adjustment  required,  and  that,  that  being  fulfilled,  the  wor- 
shiper has  no  need  to  have  any  concern  about  a  devil,  even  if  he 
does  not  feel  that  he  can  go  so  far  as  to  deny  that  there  may  be 
one.  We  are  perhaps  not  in  a  position  to  deny  that  there  are  any 
good  or  evil  spirits  besides  God  and  those  "finite"  spirits  who 
either  are  or  have  been  physically  embodied;  but  from  the  point 
of  view  of  a  critical  empirical  theology,  there  seems  no  adequate 
reason  for  affirming  their  existence.  (Further  discussion  of  this 
topic  will  be  found  toward  the  end  of  the  final  chapter.) 

But  at  times  in  the  history  of  Christian  thought  the  doctrine 
of  the  unity  of  God  has  been  imperilled  in  another  way.  By 


192  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

many  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  has  been  held  in  such  a  way 
as  involved  a  departure  from  monotheism,  not  only  theoretically, 
but  practically  as  well.  If  God  is  one  and  God  is  personal,  the 
most  obvious  suggestion  is  that  God  is  one  Person.  The  Trini- 
tarian dogma  that  God  exists  in,  or  is,  three  persons,  has  some- 
times come  almost  or  altogether  to  mean  to  the  believer  that 
there  are  three  personal  gods;  and  not  infrequently  there  has 
been  the  still  more  serious  departure  from  monotheism  of  sup- 
posing that  the  attitude  of  the  first  Person  of  the  Trinity  toward 
man  is,  or  at  least  was,  essentially  different  from  that  of  the 
second  Person,  the  latter  being  much  more  approachable  and 
gracious  than  the  former.  This  is  polytheism,  practically  as 
well  as  theoretically. 

However,  let  us  look  further  into  this  Christian  doctrine  of  a 
divine  trinity.  It  is  a  highly  metaphysical  doctrine,  and  is 
largely  the  outcome  of  an  attempt  to  set  forth  the  Christian 
revelation-faith  in  terms  of  Greek  philosophy.  But  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  it  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to  note,  in- 
cludes within  itself  a  practical  and  a  somewhat  mystical  ele- 
ment, the  former  derived  largely  from  Judaism  and  the  latter 
probably  in  some  measure  from  the  most  vital  phases  of  con- 
temporary Greek  religion.  Now  practical  religion  naturally 
tends,  as  it  progresses,  to  arrive  at  the  belief  in  one  transcendent 
personal  God  who  can  be  depended  upon  to  respond  to  man  in 
his  religious  attitude.  Moreover,  as  this  practical  and  pre- 
eminently monotheistic  religion  becomes  moral,  its  God  conies 
to  be  regarded  as  morally  perfect — "your  Father  in  heaven," 
who  "is  perfect."  Thus  Jewish  religion  culminates  in  the  re- 
ligion of  Jesus.  But  Christianity  includes  not  only  this  but, 
as  has  often  been  pointed  out,  the  religion  about  Jesus.  The 
gospel  about  Jesus  seems  not  to  have  been  developed  without 
certain  influences  from  Greek  mystical  religion  and  the  meta- 
physics with  which  mystical  religion  generally  undertakes  to 
vindicate  its  point  of  view.  On  this  side  we  find  emphasized 
not  so  much  the  transcendence  as  the  immanence  of  God — e.  g., 
as  the  Logos  or  divine  presence  in  the  world  and  especially 
within  the  human  in  its  more  spiritual  aspects.  Thus  the  one 
great  outstanding  revealer  of  the  divine  might  be  considered  as 
the  divine  man.  Moreover,  the  Logos,  or  divine  presence, 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  GOD  193 

which  was  in  a  sense  incarnate  and  revealed  in  him,  was  also 
to  be  found  in  other  lives  in  so  far  as  they  were  brought  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  same  ideal  qualities.  But  from  this  point  of 
view  the  ultimate  divine  Being,  the  Object  of  mystical  contem- 
plation, was  the  super-rational,  super-moral,  super-personal, 
ineffable  One.  The  resources  of  Christian  thought  were  then 
as  follows :  On  the  practical-Jewish  side,  the  one  personal  moral 
God,  "the  Father";  on  the  mystical-philosophical  Greek  side, 
the  super-personal  One,  and  the  divine  in  the  human,  especially 
in  the  one  uniquely  divine  man  or  "Son  of  God,"  and  in  others 
as  the  divine  or  "Holy  Spirit."  In  Christianity  as  expressed 
in  the  Trinitarian  formula,  we  have  these  various  resources 
added  together — somewhat  crudely,  perhaps — and  modified 
somewhat  by  metaphysical  speculation.  The  result  was  this: 
the  one  divine  Substance  in  which  eternally  subsist  three  dis- 
tinct divine  persons,  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit. 
This  particular  solution  may  not  be  entirely  acceptable  to  us, 
but  in  large  measure  the  problem  of  which  it  was  the  proffered 
solution  is  still  our  problem,  viz.,  how  to  combine  the  results  of 
practical  moral  religion  in  its  highest  development,  with  the 
insights  of  mystical,  philosophical  religion  at  its  purest  and  best; 
or  more  briefly,  to  combine  the  truths  of  the  divine  transcen- 
dence and  the  divine  immanence.  And  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  this  can  be  done  better  than  by  a  formula  which  rather 
closely  approximates  the  traditional  Trinitarianism.  If  we  take 
the  term  "  God  "  broadly,  so  as  to  include  the  Body  (the  physi- 
cal universe)  as  well  as  the  Spirit  of  God,  we  can  say  that  in  a 
quantitative  sense  God  is  super-personal,  although  at  the  same 
time,  of  course,  personal.  But  God  is  only  one  divine  Person, 
although  he  is  immanent  in  myriads  of  (human)  persons.  God 
is  "the  Father,"  transcendently  real,  but  self -revealing  as  well, 
and  morally  perfect.  The  outstanding  and  uniquely  saving  in- 
dividual self-revelation  of  the  Father  was  in  his  beloved  "Son," 
the  historic  Jesus.  But  the  God  who  was  in  Christ,  reconciling 
the  world  to  himself,  is  at  the  same  time  the  "Holy  Spirit/' 
immanent  in  the  Christlike  everywhere.  Indeed,  to  introduce 
momentarily  once  more  the  point  of  view  of  fundamental  re- 
ligion, we  may  surmise  that  the  divine  Spirit  is  immanent  in 
some  measure  in  all,  as  "the  Light  which  lighteth  every  man/' 


194  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

In  this  way  the  vital  religious  essence  of  historic  Trinitarianism 
can  be  rationally  retained  for  modern  thought,  and  that  without 
any  requirement  of  subscription  to  the  perplexing  dogma  of 
three  eternal  and  equally  divine  persons  which  are  nevertheless 
not  three  personal  gods,  but  only  one. 

Finally  among  the  attributes  of  God,  if  we  may  call  it  one,  is 
existence.  A  reviewer  of  a  recent  volume  entitled  "The  Christ- 
ian Doctrine  of  God"  felt  called  upon  to  remark  that  while  the 
author  had  succeeded  in  setting  forth  a  picture  of  the  divine 
character  to  which  one  could  feel  no  moral  repugnance,  he  had 
nevertheless  failed  to  mention  one  very  important  attribute  of 
this  God,  viz.,  the  attribute  of  non-existence.  Now  it  is  true 
enough  that  if  we  proceed  to  build  up  in  purely  apriori  fashion 
our  notion  of  God,  it  becomes  exceedingly  difficult  in  the  end 
to  demonstrate  that  fully-defined  God's  existence.  Moreover, 
if  we  have  made  even  the  slightest  mistake  in  our  delineation, 
then  it  becomes  true  that  the  God  of  whom  all  we  have  asserted 
is  true  does  not  really  exist  at  all.  But  if  we  start  with  the  as- 
surance, already  achieved  in  normal  religious  experience  and 
critically  defensible,  to  the  effect  that  God  is,  and  if  we  proceed 
inductively  to  discover  ever  more  completely  what  God  is,  an 
erroneous  conclusion  does  not  invalidate  the  judgment  that 
there  is  an  Object  of  religious  dependence  which  is  Source  of 
deliverance  from  evil,  a  Power  not  identical  with  the  empir- 
ical self  which  makes  for  righteousness  on  condition  of  a  cer- 
tain discoverable  objective  religious  adjustment,  a  Being  great 
enough  and  good  enough  to  deliver  from  sin  and  to  enable  the 
one  rightly  related  thereto  to  be  spiritually  prepared  for  all  that 
may  possibly  happen.  Indeed,  if  we  have  made  no  mistake  in 
our  attempts  to  formulate,  on  the  basis  of  the  findings  of  ex- 
perimental religion,  the  view  of  God  involved  in  this  experience 
of  moral  salvation  through  religious  dependence,  then  we  are 
entitled  to  say  that  the  God  who  has  all  these  other  attributes 
has  the  attribute  of  existence  also.  In  short,  when  our  idea  of 
God  is  scientific  enough  and  our  religious  experience  is  what  it 
ought  to  be,  we  shall  know  that  the  God  of  whom  we  have  an 
idea  exists.  This,  then,  will  be  the  one  and  only  satisfactory 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  the  religio-empirical  proof  in  its 
final,  consummate  form. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  UNIVERSE 

THERE  exists  a  God,  then,  who  is  good  enough  and  great 
enough  to  be  absolutely  sufficient  for  the  imperative  and  valid 
demands  of  practical  experimental  religion.  What  does  this 
involve  for  the  relation  of  God  to  the  universe?  Obviously, 
adequate  control  in  the  interests  of  his  relation  to  men.  This 
absolutely  sufficient  and  satisfactory  providential  control  must 
mean,  at  its  essential  minimum,  provision  that  the  universe 
shall  be  orderly  enough,  but  not  too  rigid,  to  permit  both  what 
we  have  designated  variously  as  special  providence,  revelation, 
answer  to  prayer,  salvation,  preparedness  for  whatever  may  have 
to  be  faced,  actual  deliverance  from  absolute  evil — this  in  re- 
sponse to  the  right  religious  adjustment — and  at  the  same  time 
all  that  such  special  providence  necessarily  presupposes.  Among 
these  presuppositions  of  special  providence  are  human  experi- 
ence, intelligence  and  moral  freedom,  and  man's  relation  to  a 
universe  in  which  there  are  both  occasion  and  appropriate  means 
for  intelligent  and  moral  action.  Involved  also  in  the  absolute 
sufficiency  of  the  inner  preparedness  and  salvation  for  the  realiz- 
ing of  which  man  is  able  confidently  to  relate  himself  to  God, 
is  personal  immortality.  This  last  consideration  will  be  de- 
veloped more  fully  in  a  latter  connection,  but  for  completeness 
it  is  important  to  mention  it  here  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
physical  order  necessitates  the  physical  death  not  only  of  every 
individual  but  ultimately  of  the  race  as  well.  What  is  asserted 
is  that  God  is  absolutely  sufficient  to  keep  the  universe  from  pre- 
venting adequate  spiritual  preparedness  for  all  contingencies 
and  the  steadily  progressive  salvation  of  such  individuals  and 
communities  as  maintain  the  right  religious  adjustment.  God 
is  absolutely  sufficient  for  this,  whether  it  may  involve  main- 
taining the  order  of  the  universe,  or  responding  to  man's  ad- 
justment in  spite  of  the  order  of  the  universe,  or  both. 

195 


196  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

When  the  question  is  raised  as  to  how  this  absolutely  suffi- 
cient providential  control  is  accomplished,  the  answer  some- 
times given  is  that  it  is  through  absolute  predetermination  of 
every  event,  including  every  human  action.  This  predeter- 
mination is  sometimes  thought  of  as  having  been  antecedent 
to  all  creation,  sometimes  as  more  immanental  and  progressive 
throughout  the  course  of  time.  In  any  case,  it  is  claimed,  by 
this  means  it  is  guaranteed  that  everything  that  happens  shall 
be,  as  seen  from  the  ultimate  point  of  view,  perfectly  in  accord 
with  the  perfectly  good  and  wise  will  of  God.  But  any  such 
doctrine  of  absolute  predetermination  is  opposed  by  two  ob- 
jections, which,  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  empirical  theology 
as  thus  far  developed,  are  absolutely  fatal.  In  the  first  place  it 
would  make  it  necessary  for  us  to  think  of  moral  evil,  or  what 
we  cannot  avoid  judging  to  be  moral  evil,  as  being  God's  deed — 
in  which  case  we  could  not  regard  him  as  good  enough  to  be 
absolutely  worthy  of  trust  or  worship.  In  the  second  place, 
since  absolutely  to  predetermine  free  moral  agents  is  impossible, 
being  self-contradictory,  man  would  have  to  be  regarded  as 
not  free — in  which  case  he  could  not  even  be  a  moral  person, 
much  less  morally  saved.  Manifestly  God's  providential  con- 
trol of  the  universe  must  be  conceived  in  some  such  way  as 
will  mean  the  avoidance  of  any  interference  with  man's  being 
a  free  and  responsible  agent. 

Another  suggestion  sometimes  offered  as  to  how  God  secures 
his  absolutely  sufficient  providential  control  of  the  universe 
is  that  he  intervenes  from  time  to  time,  as  need  may  arise,  by 
free,  more  or  less  creative  acts  (such  as  " miracles"  would  be), 
in  order  to  direct  the  course  of  events  according  to  his  good 
pleasure.  Waiving  for  the  moment  the  question  whether  there 
is  or  is  not  divine  intervention  within  the  inner  life,  religious 
or  other,  of  the  human  spirit,  it  may  be  remarked  that  even  if 
there  is  intervention  enough  for  moral  salvation,  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  there  is  direct  intervention  in  external  nature. 
Moreover,  the  assertion  of  such  intervention  in  external  nature 
would  raise  serious  problems.  In  the  first  place,  is  there  any 
evidence,  tested  with  adequately  critical  care  and  found  con- 
vincing, upon  which  such  intervention  can  be  based  as  in  any 
one  instance  an  established  fact?  In  the  second  place,  if  inter- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  UNIVERSE  197 

vention  is  the  method  depended  upon  for  the  providential 
control  of  nature,  why  is  it  not  resorted  to  more  frequently,  so 
as  to  prevent  those  appalling  calamities,  physical  and  social, 
individual  and  racial,  with  which  we  are  so  familiar?  In  the 
third  place,  if  it  were  resorted  to  at  all  frequently,  would  it 
not  interfere  with  man's  ever-  learning  how  to  adjust  himself 
to,  and  how  to  make  use  of  his  natural  environment?  These 
questions  would  easily  carry  us  into  a  systematic  discussion  of 
the  question  of  miracles,  but  this  we  shall  postpone  to  a  later 
part  of  our  theological  theory.  The  question  of  immediate  in- 
terest here  is  as  to  God's  providential  control  of  the  universe, 
in  so  far  as  this  can  be  thought  of  as  secured  not  only  without 
interference  with  the  freedom  and  moral  responsibility  of 
human  beings,  but  also  apart  from  any  miraculous  intervention 
in  the  realm  of  external  nature. 

But  perhaps  we  ought  not  to  reject  totally  either  the  idea  of 
predetermination  or  that  of  divine  intervention.  May  we  not 
say  that  there  are  both  enough  predetermination  and  enough 
divine  intervention  to  secure  adequate  providential  control  of 
the  course  of  the  world?  More  explicitly,  may  there  not  be, 
on  the  one  hand,  predetermination  of  the  processes  of  the 
universe  sufficient  for  the  education  of  man  through  his  obser- 
vation of  natural  sequences,  including  the  consequences  of 
human  action?  And  on  the  other  hand,  may  there  not  be 
divine  intervention  enough  for  man's  moral  salvation  through 
the  response  of  God  to  the  right  religious  adjustment  on  the 
part  of  man?  Indeed,  so  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned,  we  have 
already  seen  this  to  be  a  fact;  and  if  this  involves  miracle,  then 
miracle  is  a  fact.  But  it  seems  scarcely  less  certain  that  the 
predetermined  order  of  nature  is  providentially  designed  to 
have  an  instrumental  and  especially  educational  function  in 
human  life.  Assuming,  as  in  the  light  of  considerations  already 
mentioned  we  may,  that  the  divine  goodness  and  greatness 
are  absolutely  sufficient  for  human  need,  why,  we  may  ask,  has 
the  universe  been  left  for  us,  and  why  have  we  been  left  in  it 
and  under  the  necessity  of  relating  ourselves  to  it,  if  it  is  not 
that  it  is  God's  will  that  the  consequences  of  action  should  be 
what  they  are,  and  that  we  should  learn  from  the  universe, 
especially  in  the  light  of  consequences,  what  the  will  of  God  is 


198          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

for  our  lives?  Clearly  enough  the  order  of  the  universe  consti- 
tutes a  divinely  authorized  educational  course;  and  so,  other 
things  being  equal,  he  who  has  made  most  progress  in  getting 
and  spreading  a  scientific  understanding  of  the  world  he  lives 
in  has  acted  most  agreeably  to  the  will  of  God.  But  scientific 
information  is  not  the  whole  of  education.  Science,  to  be  sure, 
"has  doubled  the  average  length  of  life  and  quadrupled  the 
productivity  of  labor,"  thus  enabling  twice  as  many  human 
beings  to  live  and  learn  and  develop  for  twice  the  former  period 
upon  a  now  much  more  intelligible  earth;  and  this  must  be 
pleasing  to  the  God  of  perfect  benevolence.  But  science  has 
also  much  more  than  quadrupled  the  destructiveness  of  war; 
it  has  rendered  all  human  activity  more  efficient,  whether 
guided  by  good  or  ill  will;  and  so  it  is,  if  anything,  more  impera- 
tive than  ever  that  the  will  of  man,  individual  and  social,  be 
made  what  it  ought  to  be.  Man  must  learn  to  do  right,  i.  e.,  to 
act  in  accord  with  a  proper  appreciation  of  values  and  a  correct 
understanding  of  consequences.  He  must  learn,  for  example, 
to  act  upon  the  truth  that  only  justice  and  mercy  will  work 
satisfactorily  in  the  long  run,  whether  it  be  between  individuals 
or  between  nations.  And  that  the  order  of  the  universe  is  such 
that  this  is  what  experience  finally  teaches,  goes  to  prove  the 
providential  character  of  the  natural  order. 

But  not  only  does  the  universe  (or  God  through  the  universe) 
teach  that  scientific  culture  needs,  for  its  guidance  into  benefi- 
cent channels,  a  certain  sort  of  morality;  we  are  also  taught  in 
the  same  empirical  way  that  morality,  for  its  highest  develop- 
ment and  efficiency,  requires  a  certain  sort  of  experimental 
religion.  We  are  taught  by  consequences  that  in  certain  special 
crises  of  the  spiritual  life  we  need  vital  and  scientific  experi- 
mental religion  for  the  promotion  of  good  will,  the  imperative 
need  of  which,  among  other  things,  we  learn  through  scientific 
observation  of  predetermined  consequences.* 

*  From  the  point  of  view  of  fundamental  religion  it  may  be  made  to 
appear  that  God  teaches  internally  as  well  as  externally,  and  that  even  the 
intellectual  striving  for  truth  is  a  divine  process,  as  is  also  the  becoming 
more  tractable  on  the  part  of  the  disposition  and  will.  Similarly  too,  when 
the  man  of  good  will  provides  for  any  of  the  needs  of  man,  this  may  be  in- 
terpreted, from  the  standpoint  of  fundamental  religion  and  belief  in  the 
immanence  of  God,  as  God's  providential  activity. 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  UNIVERSE  199 

Thus  we  find  that  God  has  at  least  two  ways  of  securing  his 
adequate  providential  control  of  the  universe,  without  inter- 
ference with  human  freedom  of  action  and  apart  from  any  re- 
course to  miraculous  intervention  in  the  realm  of  external  nature. 
He  offers  a  shorter  and  therefore  preferred  way  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  will,  but  has  a  longer,  more  roundabout  way  to  be 
brought  into  operation  in  case  man's  actions  make  it  impossible 
to  use  the  former.  The  preferred  way  is  essentially  that  of  the 
divine  control  of  human  persons  not  only  through  their  pro- 
gressive rationalization,  but  particularly  through  such  inter- 
vention as  is  involved  in  the  salvation  of  wills  in  response  to  the 
right  religious  adjustment.  Since  it  becomes  possible  in  this 
way  for  God's  will  to  be  done,  even  if  it  should  not  be  possible 
without  this,  the  situation  in  which  man  finds  himself  is  such 
that  for  him  any  absolute  evil  is  rendered  unnecessary,  and  so 
the  indispensable  minimum  of  God's  control  of  the  universe 
is  adequately  provided  for.  But  if  man  should  refuse  to  will 
God's  will,  or  to  turn  to  God  that  he  may  be  enabled  to  do  so, 
he  will  be  caused  to  experience  certain  painful  and  otherwise 
undesirable  consequences,  in  the  light  of  which  he  may  learn 
that  no  way  works  well  ultimately  but  the  morally  right  way. 
Thus  he  will  tend  to  discover,  by  the  roundabout  "trial  and 
error"  method,  his  need  of  morality,  individual  and  social, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  of  a  moral  form  of  experimental  religion 
on  the  other.  Thus  God's  more  roundabout  method  of  provi- 
dential control  through  natural  consequences  tends  to  point 
men  toward  his  preferred  method,  of  controlling  the  course  of 
events  by  making  essentially  right  and  good  the  wills  which 
freely  enter  into  the  right  religious  relation.* 

Assuming,  then,  on  the  basis  of  what  has  been  said,  that  ex- 
perimental religion  at  its  best  furnishes  an  adequate  basis  for 
assurance  that  there  is  an  adequate  divine  providential  control 
of  the  universe,  guaranteeing  the  permanent  possibility  of 
special  providence,  or  revelation,  in  response  to  the  right  re- 
ligious adjustment,  and  furnishing  an  objective  basis  for  educa- 
tion through  consequences,  the  question  may  be  asked  whether 

*  On  the  relation  of  the  divine  providence  to  war  and  its  outcome,  see 
the  author's  booklet,  "  God  in  a  World  at  War,"  London:  George  Allen 
and  Unwin,  1918,  especially  pages  23  to  26. 


200          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

empirical  theology  has  anything  to  say  further  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  this  for  God's  relation  to  the  universe.  How  is  it  that  God 
is  able  thus  adequately  to  provide  for  imperative  human  needs, 
in  spite  of  all  that  the  universe  can  do?  Here  the  most  obvious 
suggestion  is  that  the  providential  control  is  possible  because 
the  universe  itself  is  being  constantly  preserved  or  upheld  in 
some  way  by  the  divine  power.  The  only  other  alternatives 
which  seem  at  all  plausible  are  that  God  made  a  universe  that 
would  be  self-sustaining  and  self-directing,  or  that  he  found  an 
already  existing  independent  universe  which  happened  to  be  of 
such  a  character  that  he  could  judge  the  realization  of  his  pur- 
poses to  be  possible  therein.  The  pragmatic  difference  between 
either  of  these  latter  views  and  the  one  first  suggested  is  per- 
haps not  great,  since  in  either  case  the  universe  is  divinely 
guaranteed  to  be  adequately  dependable,  and  the  laws  of  its 
sequences  to  be  what  God  wills,  or  at  least  consents,  that  they 
should  be.  The  only  consideration  requiring  special  attention 
on  grounds  of  practical  religion  is  that  the  idea  of  the  aseity 
of  God  be  properly  safeguarded,  for  it  is  involved  in  the  abso- 
luteness of  God  that  we  need  not  go  beyond  him  to  find  the  ob- 
ject of  our  ultimate  (or  religious)  dependence.  Any  further 
elaboration  of  this  point  must  come  from  metaphysics. 

We  seem  able  to  say,  then,  either  that  God's  relation  to  the 
universe  is  preservation,  or  else  that  it  is  as  if  it  were  preserva- 
tion. And  when  the  question  is  asked  as  to  how  this  preserva- 
tion is  accomplished,  the  most  obvious  suggestion  is  that  it  is 
through  a  dynamic  process  which  may  be  characterized  as 
creative  preservation  or  upholding.  This  would  mean,  for  in- 
stance, that  the  psychophysical  laws  according  to  which  various 
psychical  elements  and  complexes  come  into  being  on  cer- 
tain physiological  conditions,  and  themselves  in  turn  con- 
dition certain  physiological  events,  are  laws  of  the  divine  ac- 
tivity.* Again,  the  laws  of  biological  evolution,  according  to 
which  life  presses  on  toward  more  highly  complicated  forms, 
checked  and  negatively  guided  by  natural  selection,  would  also 

*The  surmise  of  fundamental  religion  that  the  spiritual  processes  in- 
volved in  the  realization  of  valid  ideals  are  divine  activities  is  suggestive 
in  this  connection,  but  it  raises  problems  as  to  the  relation  of  the  free  human 
personality  to  the  divine  which  must  be  handed  over  to  metaphysics. 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  UNIVERSE  201 

be  laws  of  the  immanent  divine  operation.  Moreover,  even  the 
chemical  and  mechanical  laws  would  appear  as  laws  of  the  divine 
creative  preservation,  or  active  upholding,  of  the  universe.  At 
any  rate  the  laws  of  nature,  from  this  point  of  view,  either  are 
laws  of  God's  creative  preservation  of  the  world,  or  else  they 
are  as  if  they  were  such;  they  are  what  amounts  to  this  for  all 
practical  purposes.  Further  consideration  of  the  point  belongs 
to  metaphysics. 

If,  finally,  the  question  be  put  as  to  how  this  divine  creative 
preservation  of  the  universe  comes  to  have  been  possible,  the 
most  obvious  answer  is  that  it  rests  upon  the  fact  of  an  original 
divine  creation  of  the  stuff  of  the  universe;  because  if  God 
brought  the  world  into  being  in  the  first  place,  he  presumably 
can  preserve  it  and  adequately  control  it.  The  suggestion  is 
somewhat  speculative,  however,  for  experimental  religion  at  its 
best  is  assured  that  God  can  adequately  control  the  universe, 
whether  he  created  it  or  not.  The  question  as  to  whether  God 
actually  created  the  world,  or  found  it  ready-made  or  coming 
into  being  independently,  must  be  referred  to  metaphysics.  But 
obviously  a  God  great  enough  for  all  valid  religious  needs  of 
men  can  be  said  to  be  great  enough  to  have  been  the  Creator 
of  the  world,  if  it  should  appear  that  in  no  other  way  would  he 
have  been  in  a  position  adequately  to  control  its  course. 

In  connection  with  this  conception  of  God's  creation  of  the 
universe,  the  problem  of  the  origination  of  the  lives  of  free 
creative  spirits  is  an  interesting  one.  It  would  seem  that  the 
idea  in  question  involves  God's  being  a  Creator  of  creators. 
At  any  rate  our  theological  theory  would  indicate  that  God  is 
at  least  related  to  men  practically  as  if  he  were  the  Creator 
of  creators.  This  question  too  we  must  hand  over  to  meta- 
physics. 

We  have  now  come  to  the  place  in  our  consideration  of  the 
relation  of  God  to  the  universe  where  we  can  take  up  the  ques- 
tion of  miracles.  In  contemporary  thought  we  find  miracle 
defined  in  two  widely  different  ways.  One  of  these  types  of 
definition  is  objective  but  very  narrow,  while  the  other  is  broad 
but  wholly  subjective.  The  narrow  type  of  definition  is  offered 
in  some  cases  by  conservatives,  who  wish  to  affirm  miracle  in 
the  sense  defined,  and  in  other  cases  by  radicals  who  intend  to 


202          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

deny  the  reality  of  any  such  event.  Such  definitions  are  that  a 
miracle  is  an  event  involving  the  suspension  of  some  law  or  laws 
of  nature;  "an  event  in  the  external  world,  due  to  the  imme- 
diate activity  of  God  apart  from  second  causes"  (C.  W.  Hodge) ; 
"a  marvellous  event  occurring  within  human  experience, 
which  cannot  have  been  brought  about  by  human  power  or 
by  the  operation  of  any  natural  agency,  and  must  therefore  be 
ascribed  to  the  special  intervention  of  the  Deity,  or  of  some 
supernatural  being"  (J.  M.  Thompson).  The  broad  type  of 
definition  is  offered  by  mediating  liberals  who  wish  to  affirm 
miracle  in  the  sense  defined.  Such  a  definition  is  that  of 
Schleiermacher,  in  which  he  is  followed  by  Ritschl,  according 
to  which  "miracle"  is  "the  religious  name  for  an  event,"  i.  e., 
any  event  religiously  appreciated,  or  felt  to  have  religious  or 
revelation-value.  With  this  definition,  it  would  seem,  there 
would  be  almost  no  event  which  might  not  be  a  miracle  to  some 
one;  some  would  find  all  reality  miraculous,  while  others  would 
be  without  any  consciousness  of  miracle  anywhere.  In  empirical 
theology,  however,  as  in  experimental  religion,  we  are  interested 
in  practically  significant,  objective  distinctions,  which  this 
broad,  subjective  definition  would  tend  to  ignore.  Evidently 
then,  before  attempting  to  affirm  or  deny  the  reality  of  miracle, 
it  is  important  that  we  decide  upon  a  definition. 

Originally,  what  was  called  miracle  was  a  remarkable  event, 
such  as  was  believed  to  require  for  its  performance  a  divine  or  at 
least  mysterious  superhuman  power,  and  which  was  felt  to  have 
special  value  as  evidence  of  the  existence,  presence  and  activity 
of  a  Being  possessing  such  power.  Now  the  history  of  experi- 
mental religion  is,  in  one  of  its  most  important  aspects,  the  his- 
tory of  the  attempt  to  discover  just  what  miracles  (in  the  sense 
of  this  definition)  do  actually  take  place,  i.  e.,  what  miracles 
man  will  be  able  to  depend  upon  God  to  perform  in  response  to 
the  right  religious  adjustment  on  man's  part.  As  the  under- 
standing of  events  became  gradually  more  scientific  and  the 
conception  of  natural  law  consequently  more  definite,  many 
events  formerly  regarded  as  miracles  came  to  be  looked  upon  as 
purely  natural  occurrences,  while  the  conception  of  miracle  came 
commonly  to  include  the  idea  of  an  infringement  or  suspension 
of  natural  law.  This  brought  on  the  modern  crisis  in  miracle- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  UNIVERSE  203 

belief,  in  the  midst  of  which  we  still  are,  and  which  has  led  to  the 
different  types  of  definition  to  which  we  have  referred. 

Committed  as  we  are  to  the  scientific  attitude  in  empirical 
investigation,  we  must.accept  as  historic  fact  what  is  sufficiently 
attested  as  such,  recognizing  at  the  same  time  that  an  important 
consideration  in  favor  of  this  sufficient  attestation  is  the  pos- 
sibility of  explanation  according  to  known  laws,  or,  if  not  that, 
according  to  some  discoverable  new  law.  This  does  not  mean 
that  we  assume  that  all  events  are  totally  and  without  re- 
mainder explicable  in  terms  of  rigid  law;  whether  all  or  indeed 
any  events  are  of  this  sort  is  a  question  final  consideration  of 
which  we  must  refer  to  metaphysics.  But  we  feel  justified,  in 
the  light  of  our  scientific  presuppositions,  in  a  rather  sceptical 
attitude  toward  the  idea  of  immediate  divine  interpositions  in 
the  realm  of  external  nature. 

And  not  on  grounds  of  scientific  procedure  alone,  or  chiefly, 
do  we  object  to  this  idea  of  arbitrary,  exceptional,  unmediated 
and  therefore  unpredictable  " miracles";  our  chief  objection  is 
practical  and  religious.  We  shall  find  that  the  problem  of  evil 
is  exceedingly  difficult  to  solve,  or  indeed  impossible  of  solution, 
if  we  admit  the  even  occasional  occurrence  of  miracles  of  this 
sort.  As  Hegel  remarks,*  "Whether  at  the  marriage  at  Cana  the 
guests  got  a  little  more  wine  or  a  little  less  is  a  matter  of  ab- 
solutely no  importance;  nor  is  it  any  more  essential  to  determine 
whether  or  not  the  man  who  had  the  withered  hand  was  healed; 
for  millions  of  men  go  about  with  withered  and  crippled  limbs, 
whose  limbs  no  man  heals."  What,  indeed,  should  we  have  to 
think  of  God,  if  we  had  to  believe  that  he  once  miraculously 
changed  water  into  wine  in  order  to  satisfy  the  thirst  of  a  few 
merry-makers,  but  has  persistently  refused  to  work  any  miracle 
to  prevent  even  such  unexampled  atrocities  as  have  recently 
occurred  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  innocent  and  helpless 
victims  of  the  systematic  attempt  to  exterminate  a  race  through 
deportation  to  the  desert  and  through  ruthless  massacre?  Is 
it  too  much  to  say  that,  in  view  of  recent  events,  any  such 
miracle  as  that  of  Cana  is  religiously  incredible? 

If,  however,  we  seek  to  preserve  the  good  essence  of  historical 
miracle-faith,  let  us  define  miracle  as  any  event  that  has  special 
*  "Philosophy  of  Religion,"  Eng.  Tr.,  Vol,  I,  p.  219. 


204          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

value  to  experimental  religion,  as  revealing  the  divine  presence 
and  activity,  and  that  can  be  rationally  interpreted  as  being, 
objectively  considered,  a  special,  purposive  act  of  God.  This 
combines  the  subjective  and  the  objective  elements;  when  what 
has  special  revelation-value  for  man  coincides  with  what  can 
be  interpreted  as  being  a  special  activity  of  God's,  we  have 
what  may  fairly  be  designated  miracle.  The  objective  element, 
however,  can  be  completely  vindicated  only  in  metaphysics.* 
What  miracles,  then,  in  this  sense  of  the  word,  do  actually 
occur?  Experimental  religion  at  its  best  not  only  demands  but 
is  assured  of  miracle  enough  (in  this  sense)  for  adequate  revela- 
tion of  the  living  God.  There  is  miracle  enough  for  an  answer 
to  true  prayer,  in  the  sense  of  a  dependable  response  to  the 
right  religious  adjustment;  miracle  enough  for  special  prov- 
idence, in  the  sense  of  spiritual  provision;  miracle  enough  for 
salvation,  the  regeneration  of  the  individual,  his  reconciliation 
with  God,  his  progressive  sanctification  through  the  indwelling 
Holy  Spirit;  and  there  can  be  miracle  enough,  ultimately,  for 
the  regeneration  of  society  and  the  establishment  of  the  king- 
dom of  God.  Doubtless  we  should  recognize  that  to  some  ex- 
tent miracles  in  this  sense  of  the  term  take  place  outside  the 
bounds  of  our  own  religion;  but  the  chief  miracle  up  to  the 
present  is  the  miracle  of  the  spiritual  personality  of  Jesus 
Christ,  the  miracle  of  what  God  did  in  and  through  him  and 
ultimately  for  the  world,  in  response  to  the  right  religious  ad- 
justment on  the  part  of  this  "well-beloved  Son." 

*  We  have  used  the  term  "miracle"  in  a  special  sense,  as  expressing  an 
interest  in  preserving  the  good  essence  of  historical  miracle-faith;  but  it  is 
a  fair  question  whether  it  is  expedient  to  make  much  use  of  the  term  in 
this  sense.  Very  possibly  it  is  not,  as  ambiguity  would  almost  inevitably 
result,  unless  constant  care  were  taken  to  explain  the  exact  sense  in  which 
the  word  was  being  used. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ESCHATOLOGICAL   DEDUCTIONS 

HAVING  now  developed  upon  the  basis  of  religious  experience 
our  theory  of  the  nature  of  God  and  of  his  relation  to  man  and 
to  the  world,  we  are  in  a  position  to  draw  some  conclusions  as 
to  the  future  which  seem  to  be  logically  involved  in  the  view  at 
which  we  have  arrived.  We  shall  speak  of  immortality,  con- 
tinued divine  justice  and  mercy  in  the  future  life,  "Heaven," 
and  the  future  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  or  "Heaven  on  earth." 

With  reference  to  immortality  we  are  now  able  to  go  much 
further  than  when  we  were  simply  setting  forth  the  presupposi- 
tions of  theology.  Then  we  could  only  say  that  personal  im- 
mortality was  so  highly  desirable  as  to  be  imperative,  and  that, 
so  far  from  its  having  been  shown  to  be  impossible,  there  were 
certain  considerations  which  seemed  to  favor  the  hypothesis. 
In  other  words,  we  concluded  that  there  ought  to  be  and,  so  far 
as  one  could  say,  there  might  be  a  future  life  for  the  individual. 
But  now,  on  the  basis  of  the  absolute  goodness  and  absolute 
greatness  of  God,  his  sufficiency  to  meet  every  legitimate  de- 
mand on  the  part  of  man,  we  are  in  a  position  to  say  not  only 
that  there  ought  to  be  and  may  be,  but  that  there  will  be  and  is 
for  every  personal  spirit  an  immortal  future  existence.  What 
we  presupposed  tentatively,  as  practically  imperative  and  theo- 
retically admissible,  we  can  now  affirm  as  religiously  certain. 
The  person  of  adequate  religious  experience  and  logical  reflec- 
tion can  say,  "I  know  God,  and  I  know  he  will  not  let  me  die; 
whatever  may  befall  this  instrument  which  I  use  temporarily 
(my  body  of  flesh  and  blood),  my  real  self  will  survive."  We 
know  enough  about  God  to  know  that  he  can  be  trusted  to 
appreciate  the  absolute  worth  of  the  human  spirit,  especially 
in  view  of  its  capacity  for  endless  progress,  and  to  provide  for 
the  undiminished  conservation  of  this  absolute  value.  Indeed 

205 


206  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

it  may  be  said  that  to  know  God  in  immediate  religious  ex- 
perience (i.  e.,  "  knowledge  of  acquaintance,"  as  distinct  from 
mere  "knowledge  about")  is  to  know  one's  own  spiritual  life 
as  being  eternal,  i.  e.,  to  experience  the  eternal  life  within  one's 
self  (John  17:3). 

There  are  various  ways  in  which  religious  reflection  elabo- 
rates this  fundamental  assurance.  God,  known  to  the  Christian 
as  "the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,"  revealed  in 
the  unselfish  love  and  service  of  Christ,  can  be  depended  upon 
to  continue,  in  spite  of  physical  death,  the  work  he  has  begun, 
the  work,  namely,  of  moral  salvation,  of  bringing  many  sons 
to  perfection.  He  has  imposed  upon  the  individual  as  a  duty 
the  moral  law  of  absolute  perfection,  and  this,  which  is  es- 
sentially an  endless  task,  makes  imperative  the  demand  for 
unending  opportunity.  This  unending  opportunity,  then,  all 
well-intending  wills,  at  least,  must  in  justice  be  given  (cf.  Herr- 
mann). Not  until  God  has  no  more  use  for  the  individual,  will 
the  individual  cease  to  exist  (cf.  Royce).  But  the  moral  will  is 
always  a  means  of  incalculable  future  good,  as  well  as  an  abso- 
lute good  in  itself,  so  that  God  must  always  have  use  for  it. 
Moreover,  all  normal  human  beings,  all  real  persons,  either 
have  or  can  develop  a  moral  will — with  the  aid  of  moral  ex- 
perimental religion,  if  not  otherwise. 

The  only  limitation  which  should  be  placed  upon  the  assertion 
of  immortality  is  that  if  any  person  should  become  so  degraded, 
either  in  the  present  or  in  the  future  life,  that  it  became  cer- 
tain that  moral  progress  or  amendment  was  no  longer  possible, 
there  would  then  seem  to  be  no  good  purpose  which  could  be 
served  by  the  continuation  of  his  existence,  and  God  might  be 
depended  upon  to  end  it.  This  measure  of  truth  there  would 
seem  to  be  in  the  idea  of  conditional  immortality.  But  if  our 
view  of  the  moral  freedom  involved  in  personal  consciousness 
is  correct,  it  does  not  appear  that  it  ever  is  or  will  be  certain 
beforehand  that  moral  amendment  or  progress  is  no  longer 
possible,  given  a  continuation  of  personal  consciousness.  In 
view  of  which  consideration  the  immortality  of  all  persons 
may  be  asserted. 

We  have  thus  set  forth  adequate  religious  experience  as  being 
the  logical  basis  of  assurance  of  immortality.  But  there  are 


ESCHATOLOGICAL  DEDUCTIONS  207 

many  who,  in  defect  of  their  own  religious  experience,  will  feel 
more  confident  in  view  of  the  religious  experience  and  assurance 
of  eternal  life  achieved  by  some  others,  especially  the  " founder" 
of  the  Christian  religion.  Jesus  had  so  cultivated  acquaintance 
with  God,  the  perfect  Father,  that  although  he  looked  forward 
to  a  violent  death  at  the  hands  of  his  enemies,  he  was  assured 
that  he  would  rise  triumphant  in  spite  of  the  incident  of  physical 
death.  He  had  not  seen,  yet  he  believed.  And  if  his  disciples 
had  had  keener  spiritual  insight,  they  too  would  have  believed 
and  been  similarly  assured  without  any  apparition  of  a  risen 
Jesus;  even  had  they  found  the  dead  body  of  their  Master  in 
the  tomb  of  the  Arimathean,  they  ought  to  have  been  able  to 
say,  "He  is  not  here;  he  is  risen."  But,  after  all,  the  real  basis 
for  their  resurrection-faith  was  the  enduement  of  the  Spirit; 
and  this,  while  the  direct  activity  of  the  immanent  God,  was 
psychologically  conditioned  upon  the  religious  influence  of  the 
historic  Jesus  before  his  crucifixion.  Moreover,  this  assurance 
of  Jesus,  that  God  would  give  him  victory  over  death  and  the 
grave,  gives  us  assurance.  We  see  that  human  life  at  its  best 
is  sure  of  immortality.  It  fortifies  our  souls  in  the  immortal 
faith  to  know  that  what  we  tend  to  become  assured  of  when  we 
feel  that  we  are  spiritually  at  our  best,  is  what  Jesus  was  as- 
sured of,  whose  life  was  of  all  lives  the  best.  Thus,  without  any 
loss  of  rational  or  spiritual  autonomy,  we  may  find  support  in 
the  religious  authority  of  the  spirit  of  Jesus  Christ. 

And  throughout  their  whole  future  existence  God  will  deal 
with  all  individuals  in  absolute  justice  and  mercy.  By  a  strange 
caricature  of  the  divine  Person,  people  have  often  thought  it 
incumbent  upon  them  to  believe  that  some  of  the  attributes  of 
God  in  relation  to  man  are  absolutely  changed  by  the  death 
of  man's  body.  Whereas  before  one's  death,  God's  justice,  it 
is  supposed,  is  held  in  abeyance,  and  he  is  all  love  and  mercy, 
as  soon  as  a  man  dies,  God  absolutely  ceases  to  be  merciful, 
and  becomes  simply  (what  is  called)  "just,"  (but  what  would 
be  in  reality  unspeakably  cruel) .  This  is  not  the  morally  perfect 
God,  whose  acquaintance  is  made  in  experimental  religion  at 
its  best.  The  fatherly  God,  whom  we  know  best  as  revealed 
in  the  spirit  of  Christ  and  the  "Christ-like"  spirit,  is  self- 
consistent,  essentially  the  same  in  his  attitude  toward  his 


208  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

children  "yesterday,  to-day  and  forever."  He  is  and  always 
will  be  "waiting  to  be  gracious."  There  may  be  and  probably 
will  be  need  for  discipline  in  the  future  life,  and  occasion  for 
the  seeking  of  divine  grace  and  power  for  right  conduct.  And 
from  what  we  know  of  God  we  may  infer  that  there  will  be 
continued  opportunity  for  right  development,  and  divine  grace 
for  those  who  seek  it  in  the  right  spirit.  There  will  be  judgment, 
it  is  true;  as  during  the  present  life,  so  also  after  death,  every 
day  is  and  will  be  a  day  of  divine  judgment.  Every  person 
will  be  judged  in  absolute  justice  and  dealt  with  in  absolute 
holiness  and  love.  This  will  mean  continued  discipline  and 
in  many  cases  bitter  experiences,  but  the  intended  end  in  all 
cases  will  be  the  true  well-being  of  the  persons  concerned.  God 
will  always  be  doing  the  best  he  can,  even  for  those  whom  we 
speak  of  as  "lost."  Whatever  hell  (evil  consequences  of  sin) 
there  is  that  is  felt  to  be  such,  is  purgatorial  in  the  divine  in- 
tention. The  very  feeling  of  remorse  will  indicate  the  possi- 
bility of  amendment  still;  and  if  a  soul  even  in  the  lowest  depths 
of  hell  should  turn  to  God  in  sincere  repentance,  God  would 
be  neither  merciful  nor  just  if  he  were  to  refuse  forgiveness  and 
salvation. 

This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  the  evil  consequences  of 
sin  may  not  or  do  not  commonly  last  much  longer  than  the  sin 
of  the  one  who  caused  them.  Evil  consequences  in  the  way  of 
limitation  of  character  and  personality  have  to  be  outgrown 
by  a  gradual  process,  even  when,  through  repentance  and  the 
grace  of  God,  the  conditions  are  most  favorable.  And  evil 
consequences  in  the  lives  of  others  may  go  on  and  on  indefi- 
nitely. In  this  connection  the  New  Testament  expression, 
"for  the  age  of  ages,"  is  none  too  strong.  And  it  must  be  for- 
ever regrettable  that  the  sin  was  committed.  And  so,  not  only 
in  "hell"  and,  as  we  know  well  enough,  on  earth  is  there 
suffering  which  in  the  intention  of  God  is  remedial,  purga- 
torial; doubtless  there  will  still  be  a  touch  of  purgatory  for 
some  of  those  who,  after  death,  will  be,  in  many  respects,  in 
"heaven." 

Now  this  notion  of  "future  probation"  and  a  purgatorial 
discipline  in  the  future  life  is  regarded  by  many  as  highly  dan- 
gerous doctrine.  It  is  true  enough  that  the  Catholic  dogma 


ESCHATOLOGICAL  DEDUCTIONS  209 

of  purgatory  was  the  occasion,  first,  of  postponing  to  a  future 
state  that  purgation  from  sin  which  ought  to  have  been  accom- 
plished during  the  earthly  life;  and  second,  of  the  corrupt  and 
corrupting  sale  of  "indulgences,"  i.  e.,  ecclesiastical  remission, 
in  return  for  a  money  payment,  of  the  future  purgatorial  penalty 
of  sin  yet  to  be  committed  during  the  earthly  life!  Against 
these  abuses  and  the  dangerous  doctrine  that  led  to  them  the 
older  Protestantism  with  much  justification  revolted.  But,  for 
the  modern  critical  mind,  to  deny  purgation  and  purgatorial 
discipline  in  the  future  life  is  more  dangerous  than  to  affirm  it, 
since  it  tends  almost  inevitably  to  encourage  atheism  and 
irreligion.  If  the  modern  man  cannot  have  a  God  he  can  re- 
spect and  reverence,  he  will  have  none  at  all.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  whether  one  be  a  medievalist,  blindly  trusting 
in  the  magical  sacraments  and  dogmatic  dicta  of  Mother 
Church,  or  a  modernist,  taking  chances  on  the  strength  of  the 
indulgent  good-nature  of  a  universal  Father-God,  if  one  de- 
liberately postpones  his  purgatory  to  a  future  life  instead  of 
utilizing  the  experiences  of  the  present  life  for  his  moral  purga- 
tion, he  will  find  himself  in  the  future  life  not  in  a  mere  purga- 
tory, but  in  a  hell  of  moral  degradation,  an  "outer  darkness" 
of  alienation  from  all  that  is  best  in  personal  associations,  a 
state  of  remorse  and  shame  and  fear  of  further  evil  still  to 
come.  But  the  same  evil  consequences  may  be  hell  or  purga- 
tory, according  to  the  spirit  in  which  they  are  taken. 

"Heaven"  stands,  in  the  language  of  religion,  for  the  trans- 
cendent reality  and  future  realization  of  the  ideal.  Naturally, 
therefore,  its  content  has  varied  greatly  according  to  differences 
in  the  interests  and  experiences  of  those  cherishing  the  ideal. 
Thus  the  ancient  Egyptian  looked  forward  to  a  heaven  of 
farming  under  ideal  conditions,  where  the  Nile  never  failed  to 
overflow  and  harvests  were  always  bountiful;  the  ancient 
Teuton,  to  Valhalla,  with  its  endless  round  of  eating,  drinking 
and  fighting;  and  the  North  American  Indian,  to  the  Happy 
Hunting  Ground.  Intermediate  between  the  two  extremes  of 
the  Buddhist  ideal  of  Nirvana,  or  rest  through  extinction  of 
desire,  and  the -Mohammedan  ideal  of  satisfaction  through  the 
gratification  of  all  desires  in  Paradise,  however  sensual  those 
desires  might  be,  the  essentially  Christian  ideal  is  that  of  rest 


210  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

through  the  extinction  of  immoral  desire,  and  joy  in  the  pro- 
gressive satisfaction  of  every  right  desire.  But  traditional 
Christianity  has  not  always  given  to  this  general  idea  a  content 
such  as  can  be  satisfactory  to  the  modern  mind.  According  to 
the  mediaeval  mind  "Heaven"  was  a  sort  of  ideal  monastery, 
with  nothing  but  distinctly  religious  interests  and  activities. 
To  the  Puritans  and  older  evangelicals  it  was  a  sort  of  ideal 
meeting-house  or  " protracted  meeting" — "where  congrega- 
tions ne'er  break  up,  and  Sabbaths  never  end."  And  to  many 
within  the  Christian  community,  as  well  as  to  the  oppressed 
and  over-worked  in  all  ages,  "Heaven"  appealed  as  being  that 
ideal  abode  "where  the  wicked  cease  from  troubling  and  the 
weary  are  at  rest."  And  so  for  many  there  grew  up  what  G.  B. 
Foster  has  called  "that  worst  of  all  dualisms,  joyless  labor  here 
and  laborless  joy  hereafter." 

The  earliest  expression  of  the  Christian  ideal  of  Heaven  we 
find,  of  course,  in  the  New  Testament.  But  many  of  the  state- 
ments we  find  there  are  obviously  figurative.  White  robes, 
crowns,  palms,  harps  and  the  like,  are  symbolic  representa- 
tions of  purity,  power,  victory,  joy  and  harmony.  Other 
expressions,  although  somewhat  narrowly  related  to  the  person 
of  Christ,  can  be  taken  more  literally,  as  depicting  a  realizable 
ideal,  and  can  be  accepted  as  adequately  assured  on  the  basis  of 
our  empirical  knowledge  of  God.  Thus  to  be  "with  Christ" 
may  be  taken  as  representing  the  best  companionship,  to  be 
"like  Christ"  as  signifying  ideal  character,  and  the  statement, 
"his  servants  shall  serve  him,"  as  indicating  a  life  of  activity 
and  social  service.  Doubtless  this  distinctively  Christian  ideal 
needs  to  be  supplemented  by  the  inclusion  of  the  Greek  ideal, 
voiced  by  Socrates,  of  continued  intellectual  activity  and 
exploration  of  the  realms  of  truth.  Art  is  already  represented, 
perhaps,  in  the  idea  of  a  vast  heavenly  symphony.  But  the 
main  phases  of  the  Christian  ideal  are  Christian  fellowship, 
Christian  character  and  Christian  activity,  and  upon  each  of 
these  we  may  offer  a  further  brief  comment. 

In  connection  with  the  idea  of  social  fellowship  the  question 
is  sometimes  raised  as  to  whether  there  will  be  recognition  of 
earthly  friends  in  the  future  life.  To  this  the  answer  we  seem 
justified  in  making  upon  the  basis  of  our  view  of  God  is  that 


ESCHATOLOGICAL  DEDUCTIONS  211 

there  will  be  such  recognition;  otherwise  some  of  the  greatest 
of  all  spiritual  values,  those  of  friendship,  would  be  lost  forever. 
To  the  objection  that  this  would  involve  memory  of  the  earthly 
life,  and  consequently  much  vain  regret  and  sorrow,  the  reply 
is  that  in  an  active  future  existence,  full  of  interest  on  its  own 
account,  and  full  of  hope  for  the  future  triumph  of  righteous- 
ness in  all  individual  and  social  life,  memory  of  the  earthly  life 
would  be,  as  our  present  memory  is,  selective  only:  we  should 
tend  to  recall  only  what  we  had  some  practical  occasion  to 
think  of  at  the  particular  time,  or  what  our  minds  could  dwell 
upon  with  satisfaction. 

With  reference  to  the  ideal  of  moral  perfection,  it  seems 
absurd,  in  view  of  what  we  know  of  the  gradual  development  of 
character  as  the  outcome  of  conduct,  to  suppose  that  the 
Christian  ideal  of  perfection  will  be  completely  realized  imme- 
diately after  death  by  all  who  can  claim  to  have  adopted  the 
Christian  principle  of  life.  We  shall  doubtless  begin  our  next 
life  with  the  characters  with  which  we  end  this  one.  The  con- 
summation of  the  Christian  salvation,  or  deliverance  from  moral 
evil,  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  future  state  of  existence,  it  is  true, 
but  that  "state"  is  to  be  a  dynamic  one,  a  state  of  eternal 
progress.  If  life  is  to  appeal  to  one  as  worth  while,  there  must 
always  be  something  yet  to  achieve.  To  be  sure,  liberation  from 
the  gross  physical  body  may  mean  greater  freedom  for  expres- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  good  will,  without  the  resistance  from 
bodily  habit.  And  yet  he  who  would  begin  his  heavenly  career 
with  the  "treasures"  of  good  character  and  desirable  friend- 
ships— friendship  with  men  and  with  God — must  begin  to  lay 
them  up  while  still  on  earth.  He  who  would  enter  upon  a 
heavenly  state  of  existence  at  death  must  take  his  purgatory 
during  the  present  life. 

And  in  connection  with  the  ideal  of  social  service  it  may  be 
remarked  that  notwithstanding  the  probability  that  in  the 
future  life  there  will  be,  at  least  temporarily,  between  different 
social  groups  a  "great  gulf  fixed"  by  differences  of  principle, 
sympathy  and  interest,  this  will  not  necessarily  be  a  spatial 
gulf;  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  and  expected  that  those  whose  minds 
have  been  trained  and  whose  wills  are  essentially  right  will 
not  be  kept  from  doing  educational  and  missionary  work  among 


212          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

those  whose  souls  are  less  advanced.  Such  an  arrangement 
would  be  highly  desirable  on  both  sides,  and  a  hint  in  the  direc- 
tion of  something  of  the  sort  is  contained  in  the  traditional 
Christian  belief  that  Jesus,  after  his  death  on  the  cross,  preached 
to  "spirits  in  prison." 

If  the  question  be  raised  as  to  just  where  heaven  is,  the  simple 
answer  is  that  we  do  not  know.  The  future  life  must  be  lived 
somewhere,  of  course,  but  the  question  of  spatial  location  is  not 
the  most  important.  Like  hell  and  purgatory,  heaven  is  not  a 
place  but  an  experience.  There  are  places  enough  in  God's 
universe  where  heaven  might  be.  The  one  suggestion  we  seem 
most  able,  in  the  light  of  science,  to  deny  is  that  the  future  life 
will  be  a  reincarnation  on  earth.  A  scientific  understanding  of 
the  principles  of  heredity  and  of  the  process  of  character- 
formation  seems  absolutely  to  preclude  this  notion. 

Eschatology  includes,  or  ought  to  include,  besides  a  series  of 
doctrines  about  the  post-mortem  existence  of  the  individual,  a 
consideration  of  what  is  to  be  expected  or  hoped  in  connection 
with  the  future  of  the  race  upon  this  planet.  Here  the  central 
thought  is  the  "Kingdom  of  God,"  an  ideal  state  of  society  in 
which  God's  will  is  done  on  earth  as  it  is  in  heaven — in  short, 
heaven  on  earth.  It  is  at  this  point  perhaps  more  than  at  any 
other  that  traditional  Christian  teaching  requires  revision.  The 
pious  Jew  associated  his  ideal  for  the  future  with  a  Jewish  world- 
kingdom,  whose  capital  should  be  Jerusalem  and  whose  long  the 
divinely  appointed  "Messiah."  It  was  but  natural  that  when 
Jews  became  Christians  they  should  retain  the  essentials  of  this 
ideal,  and  so  we  find  the  doctrine  that  Jesus,  who  had  been 
chosen  of  God  to  be  the  Messiah,  but  who  had  been  wickedly 
crucified,  had  been  raised  from  the  dead  by  the  power  of  God, 
and  was  to  return  with  divine  power  and  glory  to  vanquish  his 
enemies  and  establish  his  Messianic  world-kingdom  with  a 
renovated  Jerusalem  as  its  centre.  As  generations  and  centuries 
elapsed,  and  still  the  Messiah  did  not  return,  a  division  of 
opinion  manifested  itself  between  the  pre-millennialists  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  post-millennialists  on  the  other.  The  former 
still  tried  to  hold  to  the  belief  that  the  visible  return  of  Christ 
was  to  be  expected  any  moment,  and  certainly  before  and  as  a 
necessary  preliminary  to  the  predicted  millennium  of  righteous- 


ESCHATOLOGICAL  DEDUCTIONS  213 

ness  and  peace.  The  post-millennialists,  however,  maintained 
that,  through  the  triumph  of  Christian  influences,  and  especially 
through  the  preaching  of  the  Christian  gospel,  the  world  would 
gradually  pass  into  a  millennial  reign  of  the  Spirit  of  Christ  in 
righteousness  and  world-wide  peace,  after  which  Christ  would 
return  to  judge  the  living  and  the  dead.  The  dilemma  in 
which  the  Christian  traditionalist  found  himself  with  reference 
to  this  question  was  that  while  premillennialism  was  more  in 
accord  with  certain  explicit  statements  in  the  Scriptures,  post- 
millennialism  did  more  honor  to  the  conquering  power  of  the 
spiritual  forces  of  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  the 
merely  spectacular,  and  altogether  seemed  more  sane  and 
reasonable. 

But  a  scientific  understanding  of  the  world  we  live  in  and  of 
the  history  of  the  Jewish-Christian  way  of  thinking  produces 
the  conviction  that  there  is  no  adequate  ground  for  either  pre- 
millennialism or  post-millennialism  as  a  whole.  The  idea  of  an 
imminent  visible  return  of  Jesus  as  the  world-conquering  and 
world-judging  Messiah  is  seen  to  be  simply  a  relic  of  Jewish 
nationalistic  and  pre-scientific  ways  of  thinking.  Instead  of 
either  of  these  systems  of  thought  the  modern  Christian  mind 
is  seen  to  demand  a  non-adventist  view,  the  beginnings  of  which 
are  to  be  found  in  the  Johannine  literature  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment,* and  which  in  its  present-day  form  looks  for  the  progres- 
sive domination  of  individuals  and  society  by  the  moral  and 
religious  principles  of  essential  Christianity,  i.  e.,  by  "the  Spirit 
of  Christ,"  until  at  last,  as  scientists  prognosticate,  millions  of 
years  from  now  this  earth  will  have  become  so  cold  as  to  be  no 
longer  a  possible  habitation  for  the  human  race — unless  in  the 
meantime  the  life  of  the  race  on  the  earth  should  be  cut  short  by 
some  as  yet  unforeseeable  disaster. 

The  ideal  for  the  future  of  the  race  upon  earth  includes  many 
elements,  such  as  the  advancement  of  science  and  culture; 
biological  and  hygienic  well-being,  based  upon  scientific  eugenics 
and  sanitation;  economic  welfare,  including  the  elimination  of 
extreme  poverty  and  probably  also  of  extreme  wealth  in  the 
hands  of  individuals;  a  maximum  of  co-operation  with  only 
the  minimum  of  competition  which  is  necessary  as  a  stimulus 
*  £ee  John  14  to  16  and  I  John, 


214  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

to  efficiency;  industrial  peace  based  upon  righteous  relations 
between  capital  and  labor;  international  peace  based  upon  right- 
eous international  relations  and  adequate  world-government; 
also  a  "moral  equivalent  for  war."  These  and  kindred  ideals, 
however,  can  be  guaranteed  as  to  be  realized  in  large  measure 
within  a  reasonable  time,  only  if,  in  addition  to  the  enlighten- 
ment of  science  and  the  pressure  of  biological  necessity,  recourse 
is  constantly  had  to  an  essentially  Christian  individual  and  social 
morality,  which,  in  turn,  can  be  adequately  guaranteed  only 
by  the  cultivation  of  an  essentially  Christian  type  of  experi- 
mental religion.  In  other  words,  only  an  increased  revelation, 
or  presence  of  God  on  earth  ruling  in  the  wills  and  lives  of  men, 
can  bring  in  the  fulness  of  "heaven  on  earth."  And  as  the 
social  instrument  whose  function  it  is  to  facilitate  the  realization 
of  this  ideal,  we  have  the  church,  which  can  only  prove  its  claim 
to  be  the  true  church  by  its  efficiency  in  propagating  the  type  of 
experimental  religion  which  is  most  dynamically  related  as 
means  to  the  kingdom  of  God  on  earth  as  end. 

One  further  point  in  connection  with  eschatology  remains  to 
be  discussed,  viz.,  the  relation  between  the  ideals  of  "heaven" 
and  "heaven  on  earth."  In  the  Jewish  type  of  thought  the  two 
ideals  were  unified  by  making  the  kingdom  of  heaven  on  earth 
the  ultimate  end,  and  the  state  of  the  righteous  dead  prior  to 
the  spectacular  inauguration  of  the  Messiah's  reign  simply 
intermediate  and  preliminary.  But  the  modern  Christian  ideal, 
superficially  considered  at  least,  seems  to  fall  apart  in  dualistic 
fashion  into  two  disconnected  ideals,  viz.,  heaven  for  the  in- 
dividual, and  the  kingdom  of  God  on  earth  for  the  race.  But  the 
disconnection  is  not  ultimate.  The  desired  unification  is 
secured  when  this  earth  is  regarded  as  God's  public  school  or 
kindergarten  for  the  human  spirit,  in  which  he  gives  us  the 
opportunity  of  learning  certain  fundamental  lessons,  before  we 
pass  on  to  the  higher  school  in  which  the  next  stage  of  our  educa- 
tion is  to  be  accomplished.  From  this  point  of  view  there  is  an 
answer  to  the  misgivings  commonly  felt  by  social  workers  with 
reference  to  the  ideas  of  immortality  and  heaven.  All  that  the 
most  zealous  social  reformer  can  justly  demand  is  called  for  by 
the  requirement  that  this  earth  be  made  a  good  kindergarten  in 
which  the  immortal  human  spirit  is  to  begin  the  never-to-be- 


ESCHATOLOGICAL  DEDUCTIONS  215 

ended  process  of  its  education  and  development.  Moreover 
the  social  workers  themselves  have  special  need  of  the  per- 
spective gained  by  keeping  in  view  the  endless  life  beyond, 
if  their  ideals  for  the  humanity  they  would  help  are  not  to 
suffer  deterioration. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  (THEODICY)* 

OUR  final  topic  under  theological  theory  is  the  question  as  to 
whether  our  view  of  the  nature  and  character  of  God  and  of 
his  relations  to  man  and  the  universe  will  stand  the  test  of 
criticism  in  face  of  the  evils  which  exist  in  the  world.  The  most 
insistent  problem  with  regard  to  evil  is  undoubtedly  the  prac- 
tical problem — how  to  get  rid  of  it.  But  the  more  theoretical 
problem  of  evil — the  problem  as  to  how,  in  the  presence  of  so 
much  evil  in  the  world,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  God  both  great  enough  and  good  enough  for  the 
religious  needs  of  man — this,  too,  becomes  in  the  end  a  practi- 
cal problem,  since  the  vitality  of  a  theistic  faith  for  thoughtful 
people  depends  in  no  small  measure  upon  their  finding  a  toler- 
able intellectual  adjustment  at  this  point. 

This  religious  problem  of  evil  is  one  in  face  of  which  some  sys- 
tems of  theology  simply  collapse  in  self-contradiction.  This  is 
true,  for  example,  of  the  theology  which  affirms  on  the  one  hand 
the  absolute  moral  perfection  and  absolute  omnipotence  of 
God  and  his  complete  predetermination  of  all  facts  and  events, 
the  evil  as  well  as  the  good,  and  yet  maintains  on  the  other 
hand  that  for  the  moral  evil  which  has  come  into  existence  in 
human  life  men  will  be  punished  with  inconceivably  severe  and 
absolutely  endless  torments.  Well  may  the  problem  of  evil 
be  given  up  in  such  a  system  as  insoluble. 

In  undertaking  to  consider  the  question  as  to  whether  any 
self-consistent  view  is  possible  which  shall  at  once  meet  the 
requirements  of  our  empirically  founded  religious  assurances 
and  square  with  the  experienced  facts  of  evil,  it  is  easily  evident 
that  certain  doctrines  are  virtually  excluded  from  the  outset. 

*  A  part  of  this  chapter  reproduces  (with  some  slight  modifications)  a 
part  of  one  of  the  chapters  of  my  recently  published  booklet,  "  God  in  a 
World  at  War"  (London:  George  Allen  and  Unwin). 

210 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  217 

This  is  particularly  true  of  that  exaggerated  and  misguided 
optimism  which  would  maintain  that  even  at  present  "all's 
well  with  the  world,"  that  the  world  we  live  in  is  in  all  respects 
the  best  possible  world — in  short  that  "whatever  is,  is  best." 
But  on  the  other  hand  our  theological  theory  would  suggest 
the  question  as  to  whether  any  view  is  not  unduly  pessimistic 
if  it  holds  concerning  the  world  (at  least  in  its  general  constitu- 
tion and  as  it  is  dependent  upon  the  willed  activity  of  God) 
that  it  is  not  a  good  kind  of  world — or  even  the  best  possible 
kind — in  which  to  have  man  begin  his  development.  In  dis- 
tinction from  both  of  these  positions,  the  unduly  pessimistic 
and  the  inconsiderately  optimistic,  the  thesis  we  would  under- 
take to  defend  is  this:  that  while  this  world  is  far  from  being 
as  yet  the  best  possible  world,  nevertheless  in  view  of  its  gen- 
eral constitution  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  best  possible  kind  of 
world  in  which  to  have  man  begin  his  development,  and  that 
the  evils  which  exist  in  the  world  furnish  no  good  reason  for 
abandoning  belief  in  a  God  who  is  both  good  enough  and 
great  enough  to  meet  every  real  religious  need. 

The  best  possible  kind  of  world  must  be  a  world  of  law  and 
order.  This  seems  a  pretty  obvious  assertion  with  which  to 
begin.  The  physical  world,  as  a  world  of  law,  gives  all  living 
beings  a  steady  and  dependable  platform  upon  which  to  stand. 
To  its  uniform  processes  the  organism  may  adjust  its  activities 
and  learn  to  make  habitual  the  most  favorable  adjustments. 
Indeed,  if  the  world  were  not  thus  essentially  dependable  in 
its  processes,  it  would  seem  that  no  real  or  permanent  progress 
in  the  constitution  or  activities  of  organic  beings  could  be 
looked  for.  No  habit  could  be  any  better  than  any  other  habit; 
no  character  any  better  than  any  other  character. 

But  the  ruthless  processes  of  natural  law,  admitting  of  no 
exceptions  in  order  to  spare  the  individual  organism  or  any 
other  object,  inevitably  tend  and  not  infrequently  lead  to  the 
injury  or  even  to  the  violent  and  premature  death  of  organic 
beings,  human  as  well  as  other,  and  to  the  destruction  of  ob- 
jects which  have  value  for  living  beings.  The  lives  of  men  and 
animals  and  the  existence  of  objects  of  value  are  exposed  from 
time  to  time  to  various  "accidents,"  in  all  of  which  the  impar- 
tial, law-abiding  processes  of  nature  are  involved.  Earthquakes, 


218          THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

volcanic  eruptions,  tempests,  floods,  fires,  extremes  of  heat  and 
cold,  diseases  of  all  sorts — these  and  other  disaster-bringing 
events  are  incidental  to  the  world  we  live  in  being  a  world  of 
undeviating  natural  law. 

Now  it  is  all  very  well  to  enlarge  upon  the  desirability  of  a 
world  of  law  and  order,  but  would  it  not  be  well  if  there  were  a 
way  of  intervening  in  this  world  of  mechanical  and  chemical 
law,  for  the  guarding  of  life  and  objects  of  value  from  the  in- 
jury and  destruction  that  would  otherwise  befall  them?  And  in 
order  that  this  intervention  should  not  break  up  the  orderliness 
and  dependableness  of  the  world,  and  thus  lead  to  confusion  and 
stagnation,  might  it  not  be  well  that  it  should  be  not  a  process 
of  suspending  the  laws  of  the  physical  world,  but  one  of  intro- 
ducing new  factors  whose  processes  would  themselves  be  ac- 
cording to  their  own  laws  and  uniformities? 

This  may  seem  a  good  deal  to  ask — an  intervention  in  a 
world  of  law,  which  would  yet  be  no  breach  of  law,  but  itself 
the  exemplification  of  law,  a  sort  of  law-abiding  miracle — but 
as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  just  this  which  we  find  in  existence  in 
the  world  in  which  we  live.  In  the  processes  of  sensation  we 
see  this  law-abiding  miracle  for  the  protection  of  the  living 
organism  and  its  possessions.  Sight,  hearing,  sensations  of 
taste,  smell,  touch,  heat  and  cold,  pleasant  sensations  and 
sensations  of  pain — these  are  the  desired  protective  processes 
made,  as  it  were,  to  order.  Miraculous  as  they  are  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  merely  mechanical,  chemical  and  physiologi- 
cal, they  are  nevertheless  themselves  perfectly  orderly  and 
law-abiding,  being  definitely  conditioned  upon  certain  events 
in  the  nervous  system,  and  exhibiting  certain  inner  uniformities 
(psychical  laws)  of  their  own. 

The  serviceable  function  of  sense-processes  is  well  known. 
Sight,  hearing  and  the  sense  of  smell  not  only  enable  men  and 
animals  to  avoid  many  enemies  and  threatening  dangers;  they 
also  make  it  possible  for  them  to  secure  their  own  food  and  the 
other  necessities  of  life.  Sensations  of  sight,  smell  and  taste  help 
to  identify  wholesome  food-substances.  Feelings  of  pleasure  are 
associated  with  the  activities^  involved  in  satisfying  appetites 
which  in  the  main  operate  to  preserve  the  life  of  the  individual 
or  of  the  race.  And  one  of  the  most  indispensable  of  sensations 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  219 

is  the  sensation  of  pain  in  its  various  forms  and  combinations. 
Where  quick  or  decisive  reversal  of  conditions  is  necessary,  if 
injury  to  the  organism  is  to  be  avoided,  a  special  sort  of  sensa- 
tion, sharply  stimulating  to  change,  is  called  for;  and  this  is 
what  we  have,  as  a  blessing  in  disguise,  in  the  sensation  of  pain. 
If  the  burning  of  the  flesh,  exposure  to  extreme  heat  or  cold, 
bodily  exhaustion,  hunger,  thirst,  wounds  and  conditions  of 
acute  disease  were  not  normally  accompanied  by  sensations 
of  pain,  all  the  "higher"  and  more  complicated  forms  of  ani- 
mal life  would  soon  be  killed  off  by  the  ruthless  operation  of 
natural  forces.  Indeed,  in  the  light  of  the  now  well-established 
evolutionary  view  of  the  origin  of  species,  the  human  species 
included,  we  can  say  that  a  world  without  any  pain  in  it  would 
have  been  a  world  in  which  man  could  never  have  appeared; 
his  animal  ancestors  would  have  been  killed  off  long  before  the 
biological  conditions  for  the  appearance  of  the  human  species 
had  been  reached. 

It  seems  clear,  then,  that  a  world  in  which  there  occur,  in 
a  law-abiding  way,  sensations  of  many  sorts,  including  sensa- 
tions of  pain,  is  a  much  more  desirable  kind  of  world,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  well-being  of  physical  life  and  all  that  depends 
upon  it,  than  any  world  of  physical  law  without  such  processes 
of  sensation.  But  it  may  be  objected  that  in  this  law-abiding 
character  of  sensation  there  is  involved  a  good  deal  of  pain 
which  is  not  of  immediate  use  to  physical  life.  For  example, 
just  because,  when  certain  bodily  conditions  exist,  certain  sen- 
sations appear,  there  is  often  much  pain  in  connection  with 
incurable  disease,  and  even  in  curable  cases  pain  may  continue 
for  some  time  after  the  appropriate  remedy  has  been  applied. 
Moreover,  biologically  necessary  operations  are  often  accom- 
panied by  intense  suffering.  Of  course,  it  is  to  be  recognized 
that  pain  which  is  not  directly  and  immediately  valuable  for 
the  life  of  the  body  may  still  prove,  in  the  case  of  man,  valuable 
for  moral  discipline.  Theoretically,  it  would  seem,  this  ought 
to  be  true  of  all  human  pain  ultimately.  Besides,  most  systems 
of  education  and  reform  provide  for  the  deliberate  addition 
of  pain  of  one  sort  or  another,  for  the  sake  of  correction  and 
discipline.  Thus  much  pain  that  is  not  immediately  and  di- 
rectly useful  for  the  life  of  the  body  may  come  to  have  biological 


220  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

value  ultimately  and  indirectly.  And  yet,  when  all  has  been 
said,  it  would  seem  that  there  is,  by  virtue  of  the  law-abiding 
processes  of  sensation,  a  good  deal  of  suffering,  human  and 
animal,  which,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  the  world 
would  be  much  better  without.  While  it  is  not  easy  to  prove 
that  any  human  suffering  will  be  absolutely  useless,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  much  of  it  is  needless. 

Would  it  not  be  well,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  if  there  were  a 
way  of  intervening  so  as  to  regulate  the  life  of  sense,  and  espe- 
cially sensations  of  pain,  in  order  that  needless  pain  might  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum?  It  would  be  desirable,  however,  on 
general  principles,  that  any  such  intervening  process  should 
not  involve  a  suspension  of  the  laws  of  sensation,  and  that  it 
should  proceed  according  to  laws  of  its  own.  This  amounts  to 
a  demand,  once  more,  for  a  "law-abiding  miracle";  but  it  is  a 
demand  which  we  find  already  granted.  Just  such  a  factor  of 
modification  in  the  life  of  sense,  intervening  without  suspending 
the  laws  of  sensation  and  in  a  way  that  is  according  to  laws  of 
its  own,  we  find  to  exist  in  the  activity  of  thought. 

Thought  observes  sensations  and  their  conditions,  remembers 
'them,  and  anticipates  future  possibilities,  probabilities  and 
certainties.  Such  thought  leads  to  knowledge  of  the  conditions 
of  pain,  and  when  combined  with  consideration  of  what  pain, 
on  the  one  hand,  is  valuable  for  guidance  or  discipline,  and 
what  pain,  on  the  other  hand,  is  unnecessary,  this  knowledge 
tends  to  lessen  the  amount  of  needless  suffering.  By  taking 
thought  man  can  anticipate  and  avoid  unnecessary  and  dis- 
agreeable experiences.  For  example,  he  can  learn  to  avoid 
the  pains  that  follow  excess  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure.  By 
''taking  pains"  enough  to  study  the  causes  of  undesirable 
effects,  he  has  been  able,  on  behalf  of  others  as  well  as  for  him- 
self, to  provide  against  very  much  greater  future  pains.  The 
discovery  of  anaesthetics  is  simply  a  conspicuous  example  of 
the  law-abiding  intervention  of  thought  in  the  processes  of 
sensation. 

But  thinking  is  a  means  of  intervening,  not  only  to  prevent 
pain  and  modify  other  sense-experiences  for  the  better;  it  can 
work  against  physical  disasters  directly.  Especially  in  the 
overcoming  of  disease,  scientific  investigation  has  accomplished 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  221 

wonderful  results,  and  it  is  probably  not  too  much  to  say  that 
science  has  made  it  possible  for  twice  as  many  people  to  live 
twice  as  long  as  formerly.  And  science,  of  course,  is  not  the 
whole  of  thought,  but  only  its  more  methodical  development. 

But  while  thought  is  a  most  important  means  of  intervening 
for  the  prevention  of  needless  suffering  and  for  the  more  effec- 
tive safeguarding  of  life  and  property,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
it  is  not  always  as  successful  as  could  be  wished.  In  fact,  there 
is  evil  in  the  realm  of  thought,  intellectual  evil  in  the  form  of 
ignorance  and  positive  error,  and  this  further  complicates  our 
original  problem.  Sometimes  error  as  to  the  ends  to  be  pursued, 
or  as  to  the  means  to  be  employed,  or  mere  ignorance  and 
vacuity  of  mind  may  cause  an  immense  amount  of  unnecessary 
suffering  and  disaster  to  life  and  objects  of  value.  Not  only  is 
there  often  a  failure,  through  ignorance,  to  remedy  remediable 
evils;  there  is  often  the  imposition  of  additional  suffering  and 
destruction  of  life  as  the  direct  result  of  erroneous  ideas. 
Religious  persecution  is  a  case  in  point. 

But  not  only  are  ignorance  and  error,  as  results  of  inadequate 
thought,  themselves  evils  and  the  occasion  of  further  evils  in 
the  way  of  suffering  and  disaster.  Exact,  scientific  thinking 
may  serve  to  make  injurious  processes  all  the  more  potent  and 
disastrous.  Science  serves  to  make  crime  more  skilful  and  to 
make  war  so  destructive  as  to  threaten  the  future  existence  of 
the  race. 

Does  it  not  seem  desirable,  then,  that  there  should  be  some 
intervention  in  the  life  of  thought,  such  as  might  direct  it  into 
beneficent  channels,  making  information  more  accurate  and 
complete,  and  the  whole  process  of  thought  more  effective  for 
good?  No  doubt  such  intervention  would  be  desirable,  pro- 
vided it  did  not  unduly  interfere  with  the  dependable  order  of 
the  universe  in  the  realm  of  the  physical,  or  in  the  life  of  sensa- 
tion or  thought,  but  took  place  only  under  definite  conditions 
and  within  narrow  and  discoverable  limits. 

This  third  call  for  normal  "miracle"  has  also  been  anticipated 
in  the  constitution  of  human  nature.  In  the  human  will,  or 
capacity  for  voluntary  attention,  we  find  a  way  of  intervening 
for  the  direction  and  concentration  of  thought,  so  that  ignorance 
and  error  may  in  the  normal  and  dependable  way  be  progres- 


222  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

sively  overcome,  and  the  whole  thought  process  directed  to- 
wards eliminating  needless  suffering  and  disaster  and  realizing 
in  a  more  positive  way  the  truest  human  ideals. 

This  miracle  of  human  free  will  carries  with  it  immense  pos- 
sibilities of  making  the  world  a  better  place  for  man  to  live  in. 
Our  doctrine  that  the  world  in  its  general  constitution  is  the 
best  possible  kind  of  world  does  not  mean  that  it  is  as  good  a 
world  as  it  ever  can  be.  While  remaining  a  world  of  physical 
law,  and  one  in  which  there  occur  the  orderly  miracles  of  sen- 
sation and  thought,  our  world  may  be  made,  by  virtue  of  human 
free  agency,  a  much  better  world  than  it  is  or  ever  has  been.  If 
all  human  wills  were  as  good  and  efficient  as,  by  virtue  of  their 
freedom,  they  might  be,  thought  would  become  so  much  more 
effective  for  good,  that  the  life  of  sense  would  be  so  unified  for 
the  better,  and  physical  evils  so  guarded  against,  as  ultimately 
to  make  the  conditions  of  life  on  the  earth  in  most  respects  almost 
ideal.  Apart  from  the  final  inevitableness  of  physical  death — a 
fact  which  involves  problems  which  we  must  presently  con- 
sider— it  may  be  said  that,  if  only  the  wills  of  men  were  as  well- 
disposed  as  they  might  be,  there  would  be  little  or  nothing  to 
regret,  ultimately,  in  such  injurious  accidents  and  biologically 
unnecessary  sufferings  as  might  still  persist  through  man's  not 
yet  having  learned  how  to  prevent  them.  Is  it  not  better  that 
man  should  have  the  training  in  mind  and  character  involved  in 
finding  out  how  to  combat  disease  and  other  causes  of  pain  and 
disaster  than  that  by  some  arbitrary  and  purely  magical  mir- 
acle these  evils  should  be  removed  without  any  human  effort, 
and  so  without  any  training  of  the  human  intellect  or  will? 
Moreover,  the  possibility  of  training  in  fortitude  involved  in 
the  facing  of  unavoidable  danger,  and  in  the  endurance  of 
unpreventable  pain,  is  surely  not  a  thing  to  be  regretted. 
Neither  does  it  seem  desirable  that  the  race  should  be  without 
any  such  training  in  social  sympathy  and  helpfulness  as  is 
made  possible  by  the  fact  of  actual  or  threatened  suffering  and 
loss.  Nor,  finally,  would  it  be  well  for  humanity  to  be  without 
the  socially  unifying  spectacle  of  individuals,  voluntarily  and 
for  the  good  of  others,  undertaking  courses  of  action  which 
necessarily  involve  great  suffering  for  themselves. 

With  the  exception  of  the  problem  involved  in  the  inevi- 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  223 

table  death  of  the  individual,  our  general  problem  of  evil 
might  now  be  regarded  as  solved,  if  this  free  will  of  man,  to 
which  we  have  referred,  were  always  at  the  same  time  a  good 
will.  But  the  very  fact  of  free  will,  which  is  the  necessary  con- 
dition of  good  choices,  and  consequently  of  the  development 
of  moral  character  and  a  good  will,  also  makes  evil  choices  pos- 
sible,* with  their  many  unfortunate  consequences,  including 
the  development  of  immoral  character  and  an  evil  will.  More- 
over, this  evil  will  tends  to  make  evil  choice  habitual,  and  so  to 
aggravate  its  own  evil  condition.  Besides,  moral  evil  is  very 
potent  in  increasing  the  other  kinds  of  evil  to  which  we  have 
referred,  viz.,  needless  injury  and  disaster  to  life  and  its  values, 
needless  suffering,  and  needless  ignorance  and  error.  Through 
man's  inhumanity  to  man,  the  world  is  far  from  being  the  best 
possible  world.  Universal  and  permanent  good  will  in  man 
would  make  heaven  on  earth,  but  the  evil  human  will  has  gone 
far — in  war,  for  instance — toward  making  hell  on  earth. 

And  yet  what  is  desirable  is  not  the  taking  away  of  human 
freedom  of  choice  and  action.  Other  things  being  equal,  a  world 
of  human  free  agency  is  the  best  possible  kind  of.  world.  With- 
out it  moral  personality  would  be  impossible.  Man  would  be  a 
mere  mechanical  puppet,  some  of  whose  actions  were  myste- 
riously accompanied  by  processes  of  completely  predetermined 
sensation  and  thought.  But  a  world  of  moral  freedom  is  one 
in  which  it  is  possible  for  man  to  learn  the  right  way  of  life,  if 
not  through  the  preferred  way  of  anticipating  possible  evil  and 
avoiding  it,  then  through  the  bitter  consequences  of  thoughtless 
or  wilful  wrong-doing.  The  case,  then,  is  similar  to  that  of  in- 
tellectual evil.  There  is  danger  in  free  thought  and  investiga- 
tion, lest  one  fall  into  error,  with  its  unfortunate  consequences. 
There  is  danger,  similarly,  in  free  choice  and  action,  lest  one 
fall  into  sin  and  its  many  consequent  evils.  But  it  is  better  to 
think  than  not  to  be  able  to  think,  and  better  to  choose  than  not 
be  able  to  choose.  The  possibility  of  moral  personality  and  of 
continual  progress  towards  an  ever-developing  moral  ideal  is 
without  doubt  worth  the  risk  of  individual  choices  of  moral  evil. 

*  How  it  comes  that  beings  that  are  free  to  choose  between  good  and 
evil  sometimes  choose  evil,  not  simply  through  ignorance,  but  even  against 
their  best  moral  judgment,  will  be  dealt  with  toward  the  end  of  this  chapter. 


224  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

But  in  view  of  the  seriousness  of  moral  evil  and  its  conse- 
quences, and  considering  the  costliness  and  uncertain  efficacy 
of  learning  to  do  right  through  experiencing  the  painful  conse- 
quences of  doing  wrong,  it  seems  highly  desirable  that  there 
should  be  yet  another  way  of  intervening,  this  time  in  the  life 
of  the  human  will,  to  guard  against  this  peculiarly  serious  form 
of  evil,  viz.,  human  sin.  But  it  is  desirable  also  that  this  inter- 
vention should  occur  without  destroying  the  orderliness  of 
nature  or  of  the  life  of  sense  and  thought,  and  without  interfer- 
ing with  the  freedom  of  human  choice  and  action.  This  again 
may  seem  a  great  deal  to  ask,  but  it  is  not  too  much.  Provision 
has  been  made  for  just  this  sort  of  normal  intervention,  in  the 
miracle  of  moral  salvation  through  the  right  sort  of  religious 
dependence.  This  experience  of  salvation  from  sin  through  the 
right  adjustment  of  the  life  to  God  is  not  forced  upon  anyone; 
human  freedom  is  not  violated,  and  happily  so,  for  there  could 
be  no  moral  salvation  if  it  were.  But  if  all  individuals  were  to 
fulfil  as  fully  as  possible  the  religious  conditions  of  salvation 
from  sin,  the  world  we  live  in  would  come  to  seem  to  us  so 
nearly  the  best  possible  world,  that  it  would  be  easy  to  believe 
it  to  be  the  best  possible  kind  of  world  for  the  first  stages  of 
man's  development.  If,  then,  the  world  is  not  what  it  would  be 
if  man  were  to  make  as  full  use  as  he  might  of  the  source  of 
moral  renewal  in  religious  experience  at  its  best,  the  fault  is  his 
own.  The  world  as  a  world  of  human  freedom,  even  in  the  mat- 
ter of  choosing  or  rejecting  moral  salvation,  is  a  better  kind  of 
world  than  one  of  any  other  imaginable  sort  would  be,  whether 
it  were  a  world  in  which  developing  creatures  could  never  need 
salvation,  because  they  were  not  free  and  so  could  not  sin,  or  a 
world  in  which  there  was  sin  but  no  provision  for  salvation,  or  a 
world  in  which  an  external  "salvation,"  so  called,  was  forced 
upon  the  individual  without  his  choice  or  against  his  will,  and 
so  at  the  expense  of  his  moral  personality. 

Religious  evil,  whether  in  the  form  of  undesirable  develop- 
ments of  religion,  or  in  that  of  "unbelief"  or  irreligion,  is  re- 
ducible either  to  ignorance  and  error,  or  to  sin  (including  all 
such  as  is  peculiarly  or  at  least  primarily  sin  against  God), 
or,  it  may  be,  to  both  intellectual  and  moral  evil.  Hence  it 
presents  no  radically  new  problem. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  225 

But  there  is  still  another  element  of  the  problem  of  evil  which 
would  remain  to  exercise  our  minds,  no  matter  how  fully  moral 
evil  were  overcome  through  educative  discipline  and  religious 
dependence.  There  is  the  problem  involved  hi  the  universal 
and  inevitable  fact  of  physical  death.  However  the  good  will 
with  the  aid  of  scientific  thought  may  guard  man  against  violent 
and  premature  death,  the  limit  of  the  power  to  live  is  neverthe- 
less soon  reached.  Every  human  individual,  however  valuable 
he  may  be  as  a  means  of  human  betterment  or  as  an  end  in  him- 
self, must  ultimately  part  with  his  material  body  and  disappear 
from  the  earthly  life  of  the  race. 

Now  so  far  as  the  well-being  of  the  human  race  on  earth  is 
concerned,  it  is  no  doubt  better  that  all  must  ultimately  die  than 
that  there  should  be  no  such  thing  as  bodily  death.  If  the 
latter  were  the  case,  the  earth  would  soon  be  full  of  old  people, 
there  would  be  no  room  for  new  generations,  and  the  resulting 
racial  stagnation  may  be  left  to  the  imagination  to  depict. 
If  only  it  were  possible  to  be  assured  that  all  the  essential  values 
of  individual  personality  were  somehow  conserved,  in  spite  of 
the  death  of  the  body,  it  would  be  possible  to  maintain  that 
even  a  world  in  which  physical  death  is  universally  inevitable 
is  still  the  best  possible  kind  of  world  in  which  to  have  the  human 
individual  pass  the  first  stage  of  his  development. 

But  is  it  possible  to  find  a  reasonable  basis  for  believing  that 
the  death  of  the  body  does  not  mean  the  end  of  those  values  that 
are  bound  up  inseparably  with  personal  existence?  What  is 
called  for  is  one  more  normal  and  universally  dependable  miracle, 
viz.,  the  miracle  of  personal  immortality.  But  we  have  already 
found  adequate  cause  to  believe  in  the  immortality  of  the  in- 
dividual.* Hence  we  would  conclude  that  even  a  world  in  which 
the  ultimate  physical  death  of  all  human  beings  is  inevitable 
may  still  be,  so  far  at  least  as  that  is  concerned,  the  best  pos- 
sible kind  of  world  to  be  the  scene  of  the  first  stage  of  man's 
development.  The  death  of  the  body  may  be  but  the  liberation 
of  the  spirit  to  enter  upon  a  further  and  possibly  more  untram- 
melled stage  in  its  development. 

We  have  thus  indicated  the  solution  of  the  religious  problem 
of  evil,  the  problem  as  to  how  the  fact  of  evil  in  the  world  is 
*  See  Part  I,  Chapter  IV,  and  Part  III,  Chapter  IV,  supra. 


226  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

compatible  with  the  sufficient  greatness  and  goodness  of  God. 
It  may  be  well  to  summarize  briefly  the  main  course  of  our  dis- 
cussion. A  physical  world  of  absolutely  dependable  law  and 
order  is  a  better  basis  for  the  development  of  physical  life  than 
any  alternative  that  can  be  suggested.  But  the  working  out  of 
the  natural  processes  in  such  a  world  tends  to  prove  disastrous 
at  times  to  physical  life  and  to  objects  having  value  for  life. 
A  means  of  guarding  against  such  disasters  without  violating 
physical  law  is  to  be  found  in  the  facts  of  sensation,  including 
pain.  Sensation  itself  occurs  according  to  law,  and  consequently 
under  certain  circumstances  there  tend  to  be  instances  of  need- 
less pain.  A  means  of  guarding  against  such  needless  pain, 
and  also  against  disaster  to  life,  is  to  be  found  in  thought.  The 
processes  of  thought  occur  according  to  psychical  law,  and 
consequently  under  certain  circumstances  there  tends  to  be 
erroneous  thought.  A  means  of  guarding  against  error  is  to 
be  found  in  the  capacity  of  directing  attention,  within  neces- 
sary limits  and  yet  in  a  free  and  creative  way.  This  free  agency, 
however,  while  indispensable  for  the  development  of  moral 
personality,  also  necessarily  involves  the  possibility  of  moral 
evil,  which  when  it  becomes  actual,  carries  with  it  a  train  of 
error,  needless  suffering  and  disaster  or  injury  to  life  and  objects 
of  value.  A  means  of  guarding  effectively  against  moral  evil 
is  to  be  found  in  the  religious  experience  of  moral  salvation,  an 
experience  which  occurs  without  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature 
or  of  mind,  and  without  violating  the  free  agency  of  man.  But 
in  spite  of  these  normal  miracles  of  sensation,  thought,  free 
will,  and  the  religious  experience  of  moral  salvation,  there  re- 
mains the  inevitable  fact  of  physical  death.  The  complete 
solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  thus  requires  the  postulate  of 
the  further  miracle  of  the  soul's  survival  of  bodily  death — a 
miracle  assurance  of  which  may  be  found  in  a  type  of  religious 
experience  which  is  universally  valid  and  accessible  to  all  who 
are  willing  to  fulfil  the  necessary  conditions.  These  are  the 
miracles  we  can  be  assured  of,  and  they  are  the  only  ones  we 
need  to  be  assured  of  to  be  able  to  maintain  that  however  far, 
through  man's  misuse  of  freedom,  the  world  may  fall  short  of 
being,  as  yet,  the  best  possible  world,  it  is  nevertheless  the  best 
possible  kind  of  world  to  be  the  scene  of  the  first  stages  of  man's 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  227 

development.  And  through  man's  co-operation  with  God, 
undertaken  in  dependence  upon  God,  this  best  possible  kind 
of  world  may  be  brought  more  and  more  into  conformity  with 
the  ideal  of  the  best  possible  world. 

There  is  one  further  aspect  of  the  general  problem  of  evil 
which  has  figured  largely  in  traditional  theology,  viz.,  the  prob- 
lem of  the  origin  of  evil,  and  especially  of  the  origin  of  moral 
evil  in  the  race.  According  to  pre-evolutionary  theories  the  first 
man  was  created  mature  and  endowed  with  a  "liberty  of  in- 
difference," i.  e.,  with  power  to  choose  without  any  previous 
bias  toward  either  good  or  evil.  Man  having  under  these  cir- 
cumstances chosen  evil  and  having  thereby  experienced  a  moral 
"fall,"  the  obvious  explanation  was  that  he  was  induced  to  do 
so  by  some  extraneous  influence,  tempted  and  persuaded  into 
sin  by  some  radically  evil  spirit,  or  devil.  The  existence  of  such 
a  being  having  been  posited,  reflection  clothed  him  with  attri- 
butes almost  of  omnipresence  and  omnipotence,  pictured  him  as 
absolutely  evil,  and  tended  to  regard  all  evils  as  his  work,  mak- 
ing him  responsible,  as  the  "prince  of  the  power  of  the  air," 
for  unfavorable  weather  conditions,  and  thinking  of  him  as  the 
objective  source  of  all  temptation  to  moral  evil. 

But  science  and  philosophical  reflection  have  been  largely 
instrumental  in  cutting  the  ground  from  under  this  belief  in  a 
personal  devil.  The  natural  causation  of  evils  is  too  well  known 
for  the  hypothesis  of  a  transcendent  and  well-nigh  omnipotent 
creator  of  evil  to  be  any  longer  necessary.  As  a  later  and  prac- 
tically truer  substitute  for  the  primitive  view  that  God  was  the 
author  of  deception  and  moral  evil,  the  idea  of  a  devil  had  tem- 
porary religious  value.  But  it  no  longer  seems  reasonable  to 
explain  physical  evils  as  due  to  an  evil  spirit  and  physical  goods 
as  due  to  a  good  spirit.  The  physical  universe  is  too  unitary  to 
admit  of  any  such  radical  antagonism,  and  anyway  the  question 
as  to  whether  a  physical  event — the  weather  for  instance — is 
good  or  bad  is  relative  to  the  individual.  And  in  the  light  of  the 
natural  history  of  evil,  together  with  that  afforded  by  the  evolu- 
tionary theory,  the  mystery  about  the  racial  origin  of  moral 
evil  largely  disappears.  The  first  human  beings  were  not 
created  mature  and  without  predispositions.  On  the  con- 
trary the  race,  as  well  as  the  individual,  began  in  infancy;  it 


228  THEOLOGY  AS  AN  EMPIRICAL  SCIENCE 

inherited  tendencies  and  developed  habits  which,  while  ap- 
propriate enough  to  the  conditions  of  animal  life,  could  not  be 
regarded  as  satisfactory  to  the  gradually  increasing  insight  of 
developing  humanity.  The  consequence  was,  naturally  enough, 
a  struggle  between  the  old  impulse  and  the  new  ideal,  with  the 
not  very  surprising  result  that  often,  through  spiritual  inertia, 
action  followed  habit  or  instinct  as  the  line  of  least  resistance, 
in  spite  of  the  protest  of  the  best  judgment  of  the  individual. 
No  reference  to  the  agency  of  any  transcendent  evil  spirit  is 
needed  to  account  for  either  the  beginning  or  the  subsequent 
history  of  moral  evil.  Temptation  to  evil  is  explained  psycho- 
logically, without  any  need  of  introducing  the  concept  of  a 
transcendent  tempter. 

At  this  point,  however,  a  further  question  may  arise.  If  the 
scientific  explanation  of  the  origin  of  evil,  and  especially  of  temp- 
tation and  sin,  does  away  with  the  necessity  of  a  devil,  why  does 
not  the  scientific  explanation  of  the  origin  of  good,  and  especi- 
ally of  the  religious  experience  of  salvation,  do  away  with  the 
necessity  of  God?  Obviously,  to  begin  with,  because  our  sup- 
posed need  of  the  devil  was  theoretical,  rather  than  practical, 
whereas  our  need  of  God  is  primarily  and  fundamentally  prac- 
tical. We  thought  we  needed  to  posit  the  devil  to  account  for 
temptation;  perhaps,  too,  there  has  been  an  emotional  need  for 
some  such  concept,  man's  action  has  sometimes  appeared  so 
inhuman  and  devilish;  but  our  need  of  God  is  not  only  theoreti- 
cal and  emotional;  it  is  as  imperative  as  the  need  of  righteous- 
ness, of  moral  salvation.  Moreover,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Ob- 
ject of  religious  dependence  is  not  merely  postulated,  albeit 
with  an  absolute  imperative;  in  what  we  take  to  be  experi- 
mental religion  at  its  best  the  claim  made  is  that  he  has  been 
found,  his  acquaintance  has  been  made,  and  it  has  not  yet  ap- 
peared that  critical  reflection  has  refuted  the  claim. 

From  what  has  been  said  the  impression  may  be  gained  that 
the  whole  question  of  belief  in  a  devil  is  a  matter  of  merely 
theoretical  concern.  But  while  the  need  or  supposed  need  of 
the  devil  in  religion  has  been  theoretical,  and  only  he  who  has 
desired  to  resort  to  magic  for  anti-social  purposes  has  felt  any 
need  of  the  Satanic  power  in  practice,  the  harm  done  by  belief 
in  a  devil  has  been  not  theoretical  alone,  but  practical  as  well. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  EVIL  229 

It  is  true  enough  that  the  question  as  to  where  temptation  comes 
from  is  comparatively  unimportant;  temptation  cannot  make 
one  sinful,  but  only  the  yielding  to  it.  And  so  long  as  the  re- 
ligious individual  does  not  feel  called  upon  to  propitiate  the 
devil,  or  to  divide  his  dependence  between  God  and  the  devil, 
acceptance  of  the  traditional  notion  of  a  great  transcendent 
spirit  of  evil  may  be  fairly  innocuous.  But  ethical  monotheism 
can  hardly  be  recognized  as  safe,  so  long  as  the  traditional  belief 
in  a  devil  remains.  In  religiously  interested  and  reflective  minds 
questions  are  almost  sure  to  arise  as  to  the  relation  of  God  to 
the  devil.  Did  God  create  the  devil  an  absolutely  and  hope- 
lessly evil  spirit?  If  so,  how  can  God  himself  be  regarded  as 
absolutely  good?  But  if  God  did  not  create  the  devil  as  such, 
why  does  he  not  destroy  this  now  absolutely  and  hopelessly 
evil  spirit?  Since  God  does  not  do  this,  must  it  not  be  either 
because  he  cannot,  and  so  is  not  absolutely  great,  or  because 
he  will  not,  and  so  is  not  absolutely  good? 

But  on  the  basis  of  religious  experience  at  its  best  we  know  not 
only  that  God  is,  but  that  he  is  perfect  in  character  and  abso- 
lutely adequate  in  power.  Hence  we  know  also  that  the  devil 
does  not  exist. 


APPENDIX 

A  SKETCH  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION,   SHOWING   THE  RELATION 
OF  THEOLOGY   AS   AN   EMPIRICAL   SCIENCE   TO   PHILOSOPHY  * 

Analysis  of  Contents 

Introduction:  Philosophy. 

The  Philosophy  of  Religion. 
Part  I.  The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Religion. 
Division  A.  The  Empirical  Basis. 

Subdivision  I.  The  Essence  of  Religion. 
Introductory:  The  Concept  of  Essence. 

1.  What  is  Most  Essential  in  Religion. 

2.  What,  Further,  is  Essential  in  Religion. 

3.  What,  Further,  is  Essential  to  Religion. 

4.  What,  Further,  is  Essential  to  the  Weil-Being  of 

Religion. 

5.  What,  Further,  is  Essential  to  the  Most  Effective 

Propagation  of  Religion. 
Subdivision  II.  The  Development  of  Religion. 

A.  The  Genesis  of  Religion. 

B.  The  Differentiation  of  Religions. 

1.  The  Primary  Differentiation. 

2.  The  Secondary  Differentiation. 

3.  The  Tertiary  Differentiation. 

C.  Religious  Progress. 

1.  Development  in  Rationality. 

2.  Development  in  Morality. 

3.  Conservation  of  Vitality. 
Division  B.  The  Philosophical  Superstructure. 

Subdivision  I.  The  Value  of  Religion  for  Life, 

1.  The  Religious  Value  of  Religion. 

2.  The  Moral  Value  of  Religion. 

3.  The  Social  Value  of  Religion. 

4.  The  ./Esthetic  Value  of  Religion. 

*  Reproduced,  with  some  omissions,  additions  and  slight  modifications, 
from  "  Mind,"  N.  S.  No.  110,  April,  1919. 

231 


232  APPENDIX 

5.  The  Hygienic  Value  of  Religion. 

6.  The  Economic  Value  of  Religion. 

7.  The  Political  Value  of  Religion. 
Subdivision  II.  The  Value  of  Religion  for  Knowledge. 

(Religious   Epistemology,    Including    a   Discussion    of 
Epistemology  in  General.) 

A.  The  Problem  of  Acquaintance. 

1.  Extreme  Idealism. 

2.  Extreme  Realism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

B.  The  Problem  of  Truth. 

1.  Extreme  Intellectualism. 

2.  Extreme  Pragmatism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

C.  The  Problem  of  Proof. 

1.  Extreme  Rationalism. 

2.  Extreme  Empiricism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

Part  II.  The  Metaphysical  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Division  A.  The  Empirical  Basis.     (Theology  as  an  Empirical 

Science.) 

Division  B.  The  Philosophical  Superstructure. 
Subdivision  I.  Introductory. 

A.  The  Definition  of  Metaphysics. 

B.  Metaphysical  Methods. 

1.  Rationalistic  Speculation. 

2.  A  Synthesis  of  the  Sciences,  Theology  not  In- 

cluded. 

3.  A  Synthesis  of  Sciences  with  the  Implications 

of  Values. 

4.  A  Synthesis  of  the  Sciences,  Theology  In- 

cluded. 

C.  The  Mutual  Relations  of  Metaphysics  and  Theology. 

1.  The  Reaction  of  Metaphysics  against  Theol- 

ogy. 

2.  The   Reaction   of   Theology   against   Meta- 

physics. 

3.  The  Function  of  Theology  in  Metaphysics. 

4.  The  Function  of  Metaphysics  in  Theology. 


APPENDIX  233 

Subdivision  II.  Particular  Metaphysical  Problems. 

A.  The  Problem  of  Matter  and  Mind. 

1.  Extreme  Materialism. 

2.  Extreme  Immaterialism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

B.  The  Problem  of  Body  and  Mind. 

1.  Extreme  Materialism. 

2.  Extreme  Immaterialism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

G.  The  Problem  of  Law  and  Freedom. 

1.  Extreme  Determinism. 

2.  Extreme  Indeterminism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

D.  The  Problem  of  Origins. 

1.  Extreme  Evolutionism. 

2.  Extreme  Creationism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

E.  The  Problem  of  Ends. 

1.  Extreme  Mechanism. 

2.  Extreme  Finalism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

F.  The  Problem  of  Nature  and  the  Supernatural. 

1.  Extreme  Naturalism. 

2.  Extreme  Supernaturalism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

G.  The  Problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many. 

1.  Extreme  Singularism. 

2.  Extreme  Pluralism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 

H.  The  Problem  of  Good  and  Evil. 

1.  Extreme  Optimism. 

2.  Extreme  Pessimism. 

3.  Dualism. 

4.  Critical  Monism. 


234  APPENDIX 

Philosophy  differs  from  science  as  wisdom  differs  from  information. 
Science  is  systematized  information.  In  its  most  characteristic  form 
it  is  description  of  fact.  Abstract  sciences,  e.  g.,  pure  mathematics, 
furnish  information  as  to  what  would  be,  if  certain  assumptions  were 
according  to  fact.  Normative  sciences,  e.  g.,  scientific  (as  distinct 
from  philosophical)  logic,  ethics,  aesthetics  and  economics,  furnish  in- 
formation as  to  what  must  be,  if  certain  ends  are  to  be  attained.  Funda- 
mentally, all  is  information,  description. 

Philosophy  is  more  than  science,  as  wisdom  is  more  than  informa- 
tion. But  a  sound  philosophy  will  make  use  of  science,  as  it  is  the 
part  of  wisdom  to  make  use  of  available  information.  And  yet,  how- 
ever far  or  fully  the  sciences  may  develop,  there  will  always  be  a  place 
for  wisdom  in  the  estimation  of  values  at  least,  and  doubtless  also  in 
the  framing  and  weighing  of  theories  as  to  the  ultimate  nature  of  reality. 

All  philosophy,  then,  may  be  divided  into  two  main  parts,  viz.,  criti- 
cism (philosophy  of  values)  and  metaphysics  (philosophy  of  reality). 
Some  of  the  branches  of  critical  philosophy  are  relatively  simple,  deal- 
ing with  the  nature  of  ideals.  Thus  philosophical  logic  deals  with  the 
nature  of  consistency  and  of  truth,  philosophical  ethics  with  the  nature 
of  moral  goodness,  philosophical  aesthetics  with  the  nature  of  beauty, 
and  philosophical  economics  with  the  nature  of  economic  well-being 
as  a  human  ideal.  But  other  branches  of  critical  philosophy  are  rela- 
tively complex,  dealing  as  they  do  with  selected  phases  of  human  life. 
One  such  branch  is  epistemology,  or  the  philosophy  of  knowledge, 
which,  while  it  makes  use  of  science,  particularly  psychology,  and  con- 
tains metaphysical  elements,  still  is  in  the  main  a  critique  of  the 
knowledge-value  of  human  perception  and  thought.  Other  relatively 
complex  branches  of  critical  philosophy  are  the  philosophy  of  history, 
the  philosophy  of  the  state,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

Until  recently  what  has  gone  by  the  name  of  "philosophy  of  religion  " 
has  been  mainly  metaphysical.  It  has  been  religion's  philosophy — the 
religious  man's  theory  of  reality.  More  recently,  however,  the  name 
has  been  used  to  denote  a  branch  of  philosophical  criticism;  it  has 
meant  philosophizing  about  religion. 

Now  all  thinkers,  whether  believing  or  sceptical  from  the  religious 
point  of  view,  can  agree  on  the  possibility  of  the  philosophy  of  religion 
as  a  branch  of  critical  philosophy.  Such  a  discipline  would  undertake 
to  consider,  as  critically  as  possible,  the  question  of  the  value  of  religion 
for  life,  including  its  value  for  knowledge  of  reality.  The  question  as 
to  whether  there  ought  to  be  included  in  the  philosophy  of  religion  a 
metaphysical  part,  embodying  religion's  philosophy  of  reality,  will 
depend  upon  the  outcome  of  that  part  of  the  critical  philosophy  of 
religion  which  has  to  do  with  the  value  of  religion  for  knowledge  of 


APPENDIX  235 

reality.  If  the  outcome  is  negative,  unfavorable  to  the  validity  of  "re- 
ligious knowledge,"  the  metaphysical  part  will  be  omitted.  An  example 
of  this  is  found  in  Hoffding's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  which  consists  of 
three  main  parts,  viz.,  Epistemological,  Psychological,  and  Ethical. 
But  if  the  outcome  of  the  philosophy  of  religious  knowledge  should 
prove  to  be  positive,  i.  e.,  favorable  to  religion,  the  metaphysical  part 
will  naturally  and  very  properly  be  included.  In  the  latter  case  the 
philosophy  of  religion  would  logically  fall  into  two  main  divisions,  viz., 
the  critical  and  the  metaphysical,  in  each  of  which  divisions  there 
would  be  included  two  main  subdivisions,  setting  forth,  respectively, 
the  empirical  basis  and  the  philosophical  superstructure. 

The  empirical  basis  for  the  critical  philosophy  of  religion  is  to  be 
found  mainly  in  the  history,  psychology  and  sociology  of  religion. 
Here  the  matters  of  chief  concern  are  the  essential  nature  of  religion, 
and  the  development  of  religion,  with  special  reference  to  the  concept 
of  religious  progress,  or  movement  in  the  direction  of  an  ideal  goal. 

The  question  of  the  essence  of  religion  presupposes  a  definition  of 
essence.  The  essence  (strictly,  the  good  essence)  of  any  historical  or 
experiential  quantum  is  that  in  the  facts  which  it  is  essential  to  retain 
in  order  to  realize  some  valid  ideal — provided  this  selected  element  can 
retain  its  vitality  when  separated  from  all  which  it  is  essential  for  the 
same  purpose  to  exclude.  Roughly  speaking,  it  is  the  greatest  common 
measure  of  the  actual  and  the  ideal.  The  bad  essence  of  anything  is 
that  which  it  is  essential  to  exclude,  if  the  ideal  is  to  be'realized.  What 
has  a  good  essence  is  essentially  good;  but  what  has  no  good  essence, 
i.  e.,  no  good  element  which  can  retain  its  vitality  when  separated  from 
all  objectionable  elements  with  which  it  may  have  been  associated,  is 
essentially  bad.* 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  essence  of  religion,  it  may  be 
well  to  distinguish  between  that  in  historical  and  experiential  religion 
which  it  is  most  essential  to  retain  (the  quintessence  of  religion),  and 
what,  in  addition  to  this,  may  be  considered  essential.  And  it  may 
be  suggested  that  the  quintessence  of  religion  is  devotion  to  a  divine 
Ideal,  i.  e.,  to  an  ideal  regarded  as  worthy  of  man's  absolute  devotion. 
(All  but  extreme  pessimists  will  agree  that  this  is  a  good  essence.)  But 
the  essence  of  religion  also  includes  (whether  it  be  considered  a  good 
or  a  bad  essence)  dependence  upon  a  divine  Being,  i.  e.,  upon  a  being 
regarded  as  worthy  of  man's  absolute  dependence.  Devotion  to  an 
ideal  regarded  as  divine,  we  may  call  fundamental  religion.  Dependence 
upon  a  being  regarded  as  divine  we  may  call  experimental  religion. 

*For  a  fuller  discussion  of  essence,  see  my  article,  entitled  "What  is 
the  Christian  Religion?"  in  the  "  Harvard  Theological  Review,"  Vol.  VII, 
No.  1  (Jan.,  1914). 


236  APPENDIX 

(The  highest  conceivable  unity  of  fundamental  and  experimental 
religion  would  be  where  the  divine  Ideal  is  found  in  the  divine  Being. 
But  if  the  Ideal  is  already  real,  how,  it  may  be  asked,  can  it  still  be 
an  ideal?  The  answer  would  be  found  in  the  conception  of  the  divine 
will,  the  content  of  which  is  the  highest  good,  but  whose  purposes 
have  not  yet  been  fully  realized.  Whether  or  not  such  a  unification 
of  fundamental  and  experimental  religion  is  rationally  possible  is  a 
question  which  would  belong  to  the  metaphysical  part  of  the  philosophy 
of  religion.) 

The  main  problems  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  center  about  ex- 
perimental religion,  since  there  is  little  room  for  question  as  to  the 
value  and  validity  of  religion  in  the  sense  of  devotion  to  the  Ideal. 
And  so,  before  passing  from  this  question  of  the  essence  of  religion, 
let  us  consider  what  further,  in  addition  to  the  essence  of  religion,  may 
be  regarded  as  essential  to  religion,  especially  to  experimental  religion. 
(The  distinction  is  a  valid  one,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  parallel  in- 
stance of  food,  which,  while  not  the  essence  of  physical  life,  is  essential 
to  it.) 

It  may  be  said  that  it  is  essential  to  the  continued  existence  of  ex- 
perimental religion,  that  there  should  be  something  in  experience  which 
can  be  taken  as  "revelation,"  i.  e.,  as  giving  evidence  of  the  reality  of 
the  divine  Being.  An  obvious  form  for  this  "  revelation  "  to  take  would 
be  the  experience  of  deliverance  from  some  supreme  obstacle,  or  evil, 
through  dependence  upon  the  divine  Being.  This  deliverance  from 
evil  through  religious  dependence  experimental  religion  itself  has  called 
"salvation."  If  no  such  experience  can  be  counted  upon,  in  response 
to  any  discoverable  form  of  religious  dependence,  it  does  not  seem  pos- 
sible that  experimental  religion  can  permanently  survive. 

The  Object  of  religious  dependence  does  not  normally  remain  to  the 
religious  subject  a  mere  Means.  The  transition  is  a  natural  one,  from 
use  of  an  object  as  means  to  contemplation  of  it  as  end.  And  the 
divine  Being  tends,  as  the  result  of  man's  successful  religious  depend- 
ence, to  become  an  Object  of  contemplation  and  an  End,  as  in  worship 
with  its  more  or  less  mystical  developments. 

But  in  addition  to  what  is  essential  for  the  continued  being  of  re- 
ligion, we  may  ask,  what  further  is  essential  to  the  well-being  of  religion? 
Here  several  elements  may  be  enumerated.  First,  social  life  in  general, 
with  its  influence  in  the  development  of  ideals  and  interests  for  the 
sake  of  which  man  is  impelled  to  be  experimentally  religious.  Again, 
and  more  particularly,  there  is  the  social  life  of  the  religious  community, 
with  its  religious  experience  to  be  shared  by  the  individual,  and  its 
religious  history  and  traditions.  Moreover,  the  well-being  of  experi- 
mental religion  would  seem  to  call  for  the  social  expression  of  religious 


APPENDIX  237 

thought  (in  a  creed),*  of  religious  feeling  (in  a  form  of  worship),  and 
of  the  active  impulses  fostered  by  religion  (in  a  certain  way  of  living). 
It  would  seem  well  for  the  religious  individual,  in  freely  choosing  his 
creed,  ritual  and  rules  of  conduct,  to  consider  seriously,  in  addition  to 
his  individual  needs  and  experiences,  the  possible  requirements  or  con- 
tributions of  the  social  life  in  general,  and  of  the  experience  and  history 
of  the  vitally  religious  community  in  particular. 

Finally,  it  would  seem  essential  for  the  most  effective  preservation 
and  propagation  of  experimental  religion,  that  there  should  be  an 
institution,  a  social  religious  organization,  devoted  primarily  and 
specifically  to  these  ends.  The  church  is  ostensibly  such  an  institu- 
tion, and  the  true  (or  truest)  church  is  that  one  which  most  effectively 
preserves  and  propagates  the  best  form  of  experimental  religion.  And 
that  is  the  true  form  of  church  government  which,  in  any  given  situa- 
tion, is,  religiously  considered,  the  most  efficient. 

But  if  we  are  to  have  an  adequate  empirical  basis  for  an  estimate 
of  the  value  of  religion,  we  must  see  it  not  only  in  its  general  nature, 
but  in  the  main  lines  of  its  development,  and  especially  in  such  progress 
toward  a  definite  goal  as  its  historical  and  contemporary  forms  may 
manifest.  The  question  of  the  genesis  of  experimental  religion,  i.  e., 
its  differentiation  from  pre-religious  life,  has  been  much  discussed;  but, 
with  the  definition  of  its  essence  here  adopted,  its  origin  as  a  life- 
reaction  definitely  different  from  other  experimental  adjustments  will 
naturally  be  sought  in  some  crisis  or  situation  in  which  other  adjust- 
ments are  felt  to  be  inadequate  or  even  futile,  and  which  calls  for  some 
form  of  adjustment  to  and  dependence  upon  the  Being  or  Power  felt 
to  be  the  supreme  and  ultimate  court  of  appeal. 

But  not  only  has  religion  been  differentiated  from  other  phases  of 
human  life;  within  the  developing  life  of  religion  itself  many  differen- 
tiations have  taken  place.  The  primary,  or  most  general,  internal 
differentiation  of  religion  has  been  into  regional  groups  of  religions. 
Asia  has  been  the  cradle  of  practically  all  the  great  historic  religions, 
and  the  primary  differentiation  of  religions  is  connected  with  three 
divisions  of  Asia — the  East  (China  and  Japan),  the  South  (India),  and 
the  West  (Persia,  Mesopotamia,  Arabia,  Syria  and  Palestine).  The 
religions  of  the  East  are  in  the  main  practical,  this-worldly,  ethical. 

*  The  function  of  the  thought-element  in  religion  has  been  interpreted 
by  the  rationalists  as  simply  the  anticipation,  in  terms  of  the  imagination, 
of  a  true  philosophy;  by  the  subjectivists,  as  simply  the  symbolic  expres- 
sion of  religious  feeling;  in  current  pragmatism,  as  simply  to  be  used  as 
instruments  of  adjustment  in  a  comprehensive  way  to  the  situation  with 
which  the  subject  is  confronted.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  religious  ideas  are 
related  to  cognition,  feeling  and  action,  and  discharge  all  three  functions. 


238  APPENDIX 

The  religions  of  the  South  are  mystical,  other-worldly,  philosophical. 
The  religions  of  the  West  have  tended  to  combine  both  qualities. 

The  secondary  differentiation  of  religions  is  into  various  religions 
which,  for  the  most  part,  bear  different  historic  names.  They  are  in 
the  main  national  religions,  or  else  religions  which  have  grown  up 
around  some  personal  founder. 

The  tertiary  differentiation  of  religions  is  into  sects.  The  general 
distinction  between  a  religion  and  a  sect,  historically  speaking,  is  that 
religions  differ  as  to  the  "revelation"  they  recognize  as  authoritative, 
while  sects  differ  simply  in  their  interpretation  of  that  revelation,  but 
differ  (or  have  differed)  sharply  enough  to  have  found  it  desirable  to 
form  different  fellowships. 

The  differentiations  of  religions  have  been  occasioned  mainly  by 
more  or  less  accidental  circumstances,  such  as  geographical  location 
and  individual  leadership.  But  in  the  development  of  religion  other 
factors  have  been  at  work  which  are  more  universal  in  human  nature 
and  which  have  been  tending,  especially  in  recent  times,  toward  uni- 
fication. Speaking  broadly,  these  are  the  common  needs  and  interests 
of  developing  humanity,  experience  and  observation  of  the  consequences 
of  certain  ways  of  acting  (especially  in  religion),  and  rational  reflection 
upon  the  facts  of  experience.  These  factors  tend  to  refine  and  spirit- 
ualize religion.  More  particularly,  they  tend  to  make  experimental 
religion  more  rational  and  more  moral.  Experimental  religion  becomes 
moral  by  being  made  a  means  to  moral  reinforcement,  i.  e.,  through  de- 
pendence upon  the  Absolute  Being  (interpreted  as  moral)  for  power  to 
realize  moral  ends.  This  moral  element  is  a  content  of  experimental 
religion  to  which  there  can  be  no  rational  objection;  and  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  as  development  in  rationality  and  in  scientific  outlook  con- 
tinues to  discredit  superstitious  beliefs  and  practices,  experimental 
religion  seems  faced  with  the  necessity  of  having  to  develop  in  moral- 
ity, or  die.  Among  critical  thinkers  religion  either  comes  to  be  ra- 
tionalized out  of  existence  or  else  tends  to  be  rationalized  into  its  final 
and  universally  acceptable  form;  and  this  form,  whatever  else  it  may 
be  or  may  not  be,  must  be  thoroughly  moral.  But  besides  these  two 
criteria  of  religious  progress,  viz.,  development  in  rationality  and  de- 
velopment in  morality,  there  is  also  a  third,  conservation  of  vitality. 
Religion  at  its  best,  then,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  must  be  religion 
in  its  most  vital,  most  moral  and  most  rational  form. 

Having  arrived  at  these  conceptions,  first,  of  the  essence  of  religion, 
and  second,  of  religious  progress  and  religion  at  its  best,  we  may  now 
turn  to  the  critical  philosophy  of  religion  proper.  What  is  the  value 
of  religion? 

There  is  not  much  dispute  as  to  the  worth  of  fundamental  religion. 


APPENDIX  239 

Its  value  for  life  is  obvious.  So  too  ought  to  be  its  value  for  knowl- 
edge— at  least  for  the  knowledge  of  values. 

There  is  more  difference  of  opinion,  and  hence  more  call  for  philo- 
sophical criticism,  with  reference  to  the  value  of  experimental  religion. 
A  critical  philosophy  of  religion  must  examine  the  value  of  experi- 
mental religion,  first  as  an  end,  and  then  as  a  means  to  life  and  to 
knowledge — especially  knowledge  of  reality. 

The  primary  and  only  adequate  basis  for  the  appreciation  of  experi- 
mental religion  as  an  end  is  the  religious  experience  in  its  immediacy. 

The  discussion  of  the  value  of  religion  for  life  will  include  a  consider- 
ation of  its  effectiveness  as  a  means  toward  the  moral,  social,  aesthetic, 
hygienic,  economic  and  political  well-being  of  humanity.  Here  the 
basis  for  judgment  must  be  empirical  information,  historical,  psycho- 
logical and  sociological.  In  general,  it  may  be  said,  the  way  in  which 
experimental  religion  promotes  the  fundamental  human  interests 
other  than  the  moral  is  not  so  much  directly,  as  by  strengthening 
and  developing  the  moral  will  of  the  individual,  which  then  becomes 
a  more  effective  means  toward  social,  aesthetic,  hygienic,  economic 
and  political  well-being. 

In  all  of  these  estimates  of  value,  exaggeration  must  be  guarded 
against.  Sceptical  prejudice  tends  to  deny  to  experimental  religion 
any  positive  value,  while  mystical  religion  tends  so  to  absolutize  the 
value  of  religion  as  to  deny  any  ultimate  value  to  anything  else.  A 
more  critical  view  will  recognize  that  in  historic  religion,  or  intimately 
associated  with  it,  there  has  been  on  the  one  hand  much  that  has  been 
unfavorable  to  the  moral,  social,  aesthetic,  hygienic,  economic  and 
political  well-being  of  humanity,  and  on  the  other  hand  much  that 
has  tended  to  promote  these  human  values. 

But  the  crucial  question  always  is  with  reference  to  the  value  of 
religion  at  its  best.  Here  the  question  may  be  raised  as  to  whether  ex- 
perimental religion  in  its  most  vital  and  spiritual  (e.  g.,  moral  and  ra- 
tional) form  is  not  indispensable  to  fundamental  religion  at  its  best, 
and  hence  also  to  the  highest  possible  well-being  of  humanity. 

The  final  test  of  the  value  of  religion  is  the  critical  examination  of 
the  knowledge-value  of  its  essential  experiences  and  ideas.  Here  we 
enter  the  field  of  the  philosophy  of  religious  knowledge,  or  religious 
epistemology.  Now  the  situation  in  the  philosophy  of  religious  knowl- 
edge is  closely  parallel  to  that  which  confronts  the  student  of  the 
problem  of  knowledge  in  general.  We  shall  therefore  turn  aside  mo- 
mentarily into  the  field  of  general  epistemology. 

Almost  all  theories  of  knowledge  readily  fall  into  one  or  another  of 
three  main  classes,  a  dualistic  doctrine  and  the  two  corresponding  one- 
sided monisms.  Thus,  with  reference  to  the  problem  of  direct  (i.  e., 


240  APPENDIX 

immediate,  or  preservative)  knowledge  of  physical  objects,  there  are 
three  groups  of  views.  Idealistic  monism  claims  that  physical  objects 
are  directly  presented  in  perception,  inasmuch  as  physical  objects  are 
nothing  but  "ideas" — this  term  being  used  either  in  the  psychological 
sense  (in  subjective  idealism)  or  in  the  logical  sense  (in  objective  ideal- 
ism). Realistic  monism  in  its  extreme  form  claims  that  physical  and 
other  objects  are  directly  presented  in  sense-experience,  and  retain  all 
their  qualities  of  color,  sound,  and  the  rest,  even  when  they  are  not 
presented  to  anyone.  Epistemological  dualism  maintains  that  what 
is  immediately  presented,  or  experienced  in  the  realm  of  sense,  is  a 
representation  of  the  independently  real  object,  and  not  the  object 
itself.  This  position  is  incurably  agnostic;  there  is  always  room  for 
doubt  as  to  whether  the  independent  object,  if  it  exists  at  all,  is  really 
knowable  through  the  appearance  which  is  supposed  to  represent  it. 
The  strength  of  epistemological  dualism  is  in  its  hard-headed,  critical 
common  sense,  but  it  is  weak  in  philosophical  construction,  and  it 
leaves  its  task  unfinished.  The  two  one-sided  monisms,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  strong  in  imaginative  construction,  but  weak  in  critical 
common  sense.  They  give  point  to  the  remark  of  William  James,  that 
this  unifying  or  monistic  tendency,  with  its  enthusiasm  for  construc- 
tion and  a  completed  system,  may  need  to  be  "snubbed"  occasionally. 
It  tends  to  be  unfair  to  facts  and  to  well-established  distinctions  of 
ordinary  human  knowledge.  It  may  be  a  mark  of  ingenuity,  but  it  is 
no  mark  of  critical  common  sense,  to  suggest,  as  the  idealist  does, 
that  material  things  are  ideas,  either  in  the  (psychological)  sense  of 
mere  dependent  contents  of  states  of  consciousness,  or  in  the  (logical) 
sense  of  general  meanings,  definitions,  or  systems  of  propositions.  Nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  it  in  accord  with  the  common  sense  scientific 
principle  called  the  "law  of  parsimony"  to  suppose,  with  the  extreme 
monistic  realist,  that  all  the  actual  and  possible  variations  of  quality 
in  sense-presentation  are  real  independently  of  their  relation  to  the 
perceiving  subject. 

Instead  of  any  of  these  three  sorts  of  theory  of  direct  knowledge, 
or  acquaintance  with  objects,  we  would  suggest  a  view  which  may 
be  called  critical  monism.  It  stands  for  the  attempt  to  combine  with 
the  critical  common  sense  of  the  dualists  a  little  more  of  the  construc- 
tive enthusiasm  of  the  monists.  In  other  words,  critical  monism  may 
be  described  in  preliminary  fashion  as  undertaking  to  be  as  monistic 
as  it  can  be,  while  remaining  as  critical  as  it  ought  to  be.  It  would  find 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  immediate  knowledge  in  the  view  that 
the  physical  object  is  a  certain  quantum  of  energetic  reality,  existing 
in  certain  relations  independently  of  the  perceiving  subject,  and  that, 
on  occasion  of  certain  subjectively  produced  sense-qualities  and  apper- 


APPENDIX  241 

ceptive  elements,  it  is  presented  directly  to  the  perceiving  subject  in 
the  complex  of  these  sense  and  apperceptive  elements.  Thus,  without 
departing  from  critical  common  sense,  or  violating  the  conservative 
scientific  principle  of  parsimony,  agnosticism  would  be  avoided,  and 
the  problem  of  acquaintance,  or  immediate  knowledge,  solved. 

But  in  addition  to  the  problem  of  acquaintance,  or  direct  awareness, 
general  epistemology  must  face  the  problem  of  indirect  knowledge, 
or  how  to  arrive  at  valid  certainty  of  the  truth  of  judgments.  This 
involves  two  problems,  the  problem  of  truth  and  the  problem  of  valid 
certainty,  or  proof. 

On  the  problem  of  truth  we  find,  as  in  the  case  of  the  problem  of 
acquaintance,  two  extreme  and  one-sided  monisms  (in  this  case,  in- 
tellectualism  and  anti-intellectualism,  of  which  latter  the  chief  form 
is  current  pragmatism)  and  a  corresponding  extreme  dualism.  Accord- 
ing to  intellectualism  truth  is  the  identity  of  predicate  with  subject, 
or  of  the  idea  with  the  thing.  But  here  the  criticism  is  obvious,  that 
on  this  definition  there  can  be  no  true  judgment  that  means  anything, 
for  in  any  significant  judgment  there  must  be  a  distinction  between 
the  subject  and  the  predicate.  According  to  current  pragmatism,  on 
the  other  hand,  truth  is  the  practical  value  of  the  idea  in  dealing  with 
the  thing.  Here,  as  distinguished  from  intellectualism,  which  makes 
truth  inaccessible,  truth  is  made  too  accessible.  Whatever  judgment 
serves  the  purpose  with  which  it  is  made  is,  for  him  who  makes  it 
and  for  the  time  being,  true.  According  to  dualism,  truth  is  in  some 
cases  the  one  thing,  and  in  other  cases  the  other,  intellectualism  being 
valid  in  the  realm  of  pure  reason,  and  pragmatism  in  the  realm  of 
practical  reason.  This  simply  adds  to  the  difficulties  of  extreme  in- 
tellectualism the  absurdities  of  extreme  pragmatism. 

Critical  monism,  however,  in  distinction  from  the  two  one-sided 
monisms  and  the  dualism,  would  maintain  that  the  truth,  or  trueness, 
of  judgments  is  a  quality  which  may  be  predicated  of  them  when  the 
predicate,  or  idea,  is  practically  identical  with  the  subject-matter  which 
it  represents.  In  other  words,  in  making  a  judgment  one  is  justified 
in  regarding  as  true  that  judgment  in  which  the  idea  represents  the 
reality  sufficiently  for  all  the  purposes  which  ought  to  be  considered 
in  deciding  between  the  judgment  and  its  contradictory. 

With  reference  to  the  problem  of  proof,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  the  true  method  is  that  union  of  rational  with  empirical  pro- 
cedure which  we  find  in  scientific  verification.  This,  too,  is,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  opposite  one-sided  monisms  and  an  extreme  dualism, 
a  critical  monism* 

*  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  problem  of  acquaintance,  the 
problem  of  truth,  and  the  problem  of  proof,  see  the  writer's  recent  work, 


242  APPENDIX 

But  in  the  philosophy  of  religion  our  concern  is  not  so  much  with 
the  problem  of  knowledge  in  general,  as  with  the  more  particular 
problem  of  religious  knowledge.  Here  we  have,  as  in  the  other  case, 
the  problem  of  direct,  immediate  knowledge,  or  acquaintance,  and  the 
problem  of  indirect,  mediate  knowledge,  or  proof  of  the  truth  of 
judgments. 

The  fundamental  problem  of  religious  epistemology,  the  problem 
of  religious  acquaintance,  is  the  problem  as  to  whether  there  ever  is, 
in  religious  experience,  direct  awareness — or  something  corresponding 
to  what  is  ordinarily  styled  perception — of  the  religious  Object,  the 
divine  Reality;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  the  Divine  is  ever  revealed 
within  the  field  of  human  religious  experience.  Here  again,  as  in 
general  epistemology,  most  theories  fall  into  one  or  another  of  three 
classes,  two  one-sided  monisms  and  a  corresponding  extreme  dualism. 
On  the  one  hand  there  is  an  idealistic  monism  with  reference  to  the 
religious  Object.  Of  this  there  are,  as  in  general  epistemology,  two 
main  forms,  subjective  idealism  and  objective  idealism.  As  subjective 
idealism  in  general  philosophy  is  the  result  of  a  fallacious  snap-judgment 
to  the  effect  that  psychology  shows  physical  objects  to  be  mere  com- 
plexes of  "ideas"  in  the  sense  of  dependent  psychical  contents,  so  sub- 
jective idealism  in  religion  is  the  result  of  a  fallacious  snap-judgment 
to  the  effect  that  the  psychology  of  religion  shows  the  religious  Object 
to  be  nothing  but  an  idea,  or  a  complex  of  ideas,  in  the  human  mind; 
in  other  words,  that,  so  far  as  religious  experience,  when  scientifically 
examined,  can  say,  there  is  no  God  but  the  God-idea.  (Cf .  Feuerbach 
and,  more  recently,  Leuba  and  many  others.)  This  would  be  a  positive 
solution  of  the  problem  of  religious  knowledge,  it  is  true;  but  its  adop- 
tion would  mean  the  acceptance  of  atheism.  It  would  affirm  the  possi- 
bility of  immediate  knowledge  of  the  religious  Object,  since  what  it 
means  by  the  religious  Object  is  the  product  and  mere  dependent  con- 
tent of  the  human  mind.  But  the  psychology  of  religion  no  more 
proves  the  truth  of  subjective  idealism  with  reference  to  the  religious 
Object  than  the  psychology  of  sense-experience  proves  the  truth  of 
subjective  idealism  with  reference  to  the  physical  object. 

Objective  idealism  regards  the  object  of  religious  experience  as  it 
does  all  other  objects  of  experience,  viz.,  as  a  logical  idea  or  a  complex 
of  logical  ideas.  In  its  more  abstract  form  it  asserts  the  eternal  reality 
of  this  ideal  Object,  apart  from  any  conscious  existence.  In  its  more 
concrete  form  it  asserts  the  reality  of  this  ideal  Object  in  an  all-inclusive 
conscious  experience.  In  the  end  it  would  substitute  for  the  God  of 
practical,  historical  religious  experience,  the  complex  unity  of  all 

"  The  Problem  of  Knowledge,"  Macmillan,  New  York,  1915;  George  Allen 
and  Unwin,  London,  1916. 


APPENDIX  243 

logical  ideas  in  the  "Absolute  Idea,"  interpreted  either  as  the  abstract, 
or  as  the  "Concrete  Universal."  But  all  this  is  open  to  two  main 
criticisms.  On  the  one  hand,  as  an  argument  it  is  fallacious;  it  involves 
a  snap-judgment  to  the  effect  that  there  is  an  existential  identity  be- 
tween the  object  denned  and  its  complete  definition,  viewed  either 
as  a  mere  system  of  eternally  valid  relationships,  or  as  consciously 
entertained  in  a  completely  rational  Experience,  wherein  all  imperfect 
and  mutually  conflicting  experiences  and  thoughts  are  included  and 
unified.  On  the  other  hand,  from  the  point  of  view  of  experimental 
religion  this  doctrine  is  in  the  one  form  atheism  again,  and  in  the  other 
form  simply  a  refined,  intellectual  species  of  idolatry.  In  its  abstract 
form,  while  it  affirms  a  transcendent  divine  entity,  it  fails  to  attribute 
to  this  entity  any  existence,  but  leaves  it  a  mere  logical  Essence.  In 
its  concrete  form  it  substitutes  a  false  god,  "the  Absolute"  of  absolute 
idealism,  an  artifact  of  fallacious  human  thought,  for  the  true  God 
which  positive  experience  claims  to  discover  as  an  independent  Reality. 

At  the  opposite  extreme  from  these  one-sided  idealistic  monisms  in 
the  philosophy  of  religion,  which  involve,  as  we  have  seen,  either 
atheism  or  a  species  of  idolatry,  there  is  a  one-sided  realism  with  ref- 
erence to  the  religious  Object.  Of  this  the  best  examples  are  to  be 
found  among  the  more  extreme  mystics.  Their  tendency  is  to  ignore 
the  large  element  of  pure  subjectivity  in  mystical  experiences,  and  to 
affirm  as  objectively  valid  practically  all  that  is  suggested  in  the 
mystical  state.  Inasmuch  as  the  characteristically  mystical  experience 
involves  a  highly  concentrated  contemplation  of  the  religious  Object, 
thought  of  as  perfectly  good,  there  is  a  tendency  for  the  consciousness 
of  self,  of  finite  individuals  and  things,  of  all  experienced  evils  and  of 
the  lapse  of  time,  to  disappear,  for  the  time  being.  Then,  under  the 
influence  of  the  suggestion  that  the  mystical  state  is  superior,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  knowledge  as  well  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  life, 
to  all  non-mystical  states,  the  extreme  mystic  makes  bold  to  affirm 
that  there  is  but  one  Reality,  viz.,  God,  and  that  physical  things,  finite 
selves,  time  and  evil  are  all  unreal — mere  deceptive  appearances  in 
"mortal  mind."  Thus  extreme  mysticism  is,  in  the  philosophy  of 
religion,  what  the  more  extreme  forms  of  the  new  realism  are  in  general 
philosophy,  and  the  criticisms  which  may  be  offered  in  the  two  cases 
are  much  the  same.  In  both  there  is  a  dogmatism  and  a  fantastical 
departure  from  critical  common  sense.  In  violation  of  the  principle 
of  parsimony,  qualities  are  affirmed  to  be  real  which  there  is  no  scien- 
tific reason  to  regard  as  more  than  the  subjective  products  of  subjective 
activity. 

Distinguishing  itself  from  both  the  idealistic  and  the  realistic  form 
of  extreme  monism  with  reference  to  the  religious  Object,  there  is  the 


244  APPENDIX 

very  common  religious  position  of  extreme  dualism,  according  to  which 
there  is  a  real  religious  Object,  or  God,  distinct  from  all  ideas  of  God, 
but  one  which  never  comes  within  the  field  of  immediate  human  ex- 
perience, or  direct  awareness.  Here  again,  then,  the  tendency  is 
naturally  to  agnosticism.  If  God  is  never,  strictly  speaking,  revealed 
within  the  field  of  human  experience,  never  the  direct  Object  of  human 
awareness,  how  can  we  know  what  that  Object  is,  or  even  that  any 
such  Object  exists.  What  basis  is  there  for  the  verification  of  our  theo- 
logical theories?  Some  dualistic  philosophers  are  frankly  agnostic;  but 
others  try,  in  one  way  or  another,  to  escape  the  logical  consequences  of 
their  dualistic  theory.  One  favorite  method  has  been  to  point  out 
that  even  if  we  are  shut  up  to  a  subjective  world,  so  far  as  direct  ex- 
perience is  concerned,  we  can  do  two  things  with  these  subjective 
contents:  we  can  describe  them,  in  which  case  we  get  the  sciences; 
or  we  can  evaluate  them,  and  our  judgments  as  to  religious  value  can 
be  manipulated  so  as  to  give  us  an  ostensibly  objective  theology.  (Cf. 
Ritschlianism.)  Or,  according  to  a  rather  cheap  and  easy  pragmatism, 
while  we  cannot  know  anything  about  God  on  a  purely  theoretical 
basis,  we  are  justified  in  believing  in  a  God  of  a  certain  sort,  in  view  of 
the  valuable  practical  results  following  from  such  a  belief.  Now  what- 
ever may  deserve  to  be  said  concerning  the  merits  of  such  a  position 
from  a  practical  point  of  view,  provided  it  is  psychologically  possible, 
it  remains  clear  that  what  it  offers  is  not  religious  knowledge.  Theo- 
retically it  remains  on  the  ground  of  agnosticism. 

In  distinction  from  all  three  of  these  positions  in  religious  epis- 
temology — from  idealistic  monism,  the  subjective  variety  with  its 
atheism  and  the  objective  variety  with  what  is  either  atheism  from 
the  point  of  view  of  experimental  religion  or  else  a  species  of  idolatry; 
from  the  extreme  realistic  monism  of  mysticism,  with  its  extravagant 
dogmatism;  and  from  extreme  dualism,  with  its  consequent  agnosti- 
cism— we  would  advocate  again  what  may  be  called  a  critical  monism. 
As  it  is  maintained,  and  with  ample  justification,  in  judgments  of  com- 
mon sense  and  science,  that  independently  real  physical  objects  are  per- 
ceived, experienced,  intuited  by  the  perceiving  subject,  i.  e.,  revealed, 
or  presented  to  it,  in  the  complex  of  sense  qualities  for  which  the  sense- 
process  is  responsible;  and  as  the  self  is  similarly  revealed,  presented, 
perceived,  intuited,  directly  known  to  be  present,  in  the  complex  of 
psychical  activities  (perceiving,  remembering,  thinking,  willing,  etc.), 
while  these  activities  in  turn  are  perceived  or  intuited  in  their  charac- 
teristic complexes  of  psychical  qualities;  so  it  may  be  maintained  by 
the  person  of  adequate  religious  experience  that  the  religious  Object 
is  revealed  within  the  complex  of  that  experience.  God,  defined  as  a 
dependable  Power,  which  makes  for  righteousness  in  and  through  the 


APPENDIX  245 

human  will  in  response  to  a  certain  discoverable  religious  attitude,  is 
an  object  of  direct  acquaintance  to  the  man  of  adequate  experimental 
religion.  Not  all  fugitive  suggestions  of  special  developments  of  the 
religious  consciousness  are  to  be  taken  as  valid;  but  on  the  other  hand 
the  God  of  which  one  has  experience  in  experimental  religion  at  its 
best  can  no  more  be  identified  with  the  mere  idea  of  God,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  practical  religion,  than  the  idea  of  food  can  be  taken 
as  food  with  satisfaction  to  the  physical  life. 

With  reference  to  the  problem  of  truth  in  religion,  the  situation  is 
quite  similar  to  that  which  exists  in  the  more  general  field  of  knowledge. 
Extreme  intellectualism,  extreme  pragmatism  and  extreme  dualism  all 
have  their  representatives  and  are  open  in  the  religious  field  to  the 
same  criticisms  as  apply  in  the  more  general  sphere.  Only,  it  is  to  be 
noted,  the  danger  of  making  a  careless  and  extravagant  use  of  prag- 
matism is  probably  greater  in  religious  apologetics  than  in  most  other 
fields  of  thought.  What  we  would  advocate,  in  distinction  from  in- 
tellectualism, current  pragmatism  and  dualism,  is  the  synthesis  of 
the  partial  truths  of  intellectualism  and  pragmatism  which  we  de- 
fined, under  the  term  critical  monism,  in  connection  with  the  general 
problem  of  the  nature  of  truth. 

There  remains,  however,  as  a  part  of  the  problem  of  religious  episte- 
mology,  the  problem  of  religious  proof,  or,  in  other  words,  the  problem 
of  the  scientific  verification  of  religious  judgments.  This  leads  us  into 
the  whole  question  of  theological  method.  Here  we  find,  as  in  the  other 
fields  of  our  investigation,  that  prevailing  points  of  view  are  classifiable 
into  two  opposite  and  one-sided  monisms  and  the  corresponding  ex- 
treme dualism. 

On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  point  of  view  of  extreme  rationalism, 
seen  in  the  so-called  "speculative  theology,"  undertaking  to  derive 
from  the  categories  inherent  in  "pure  reason,"  by  a  deductive  or  dia- 
lectical process,  the  main  outlines  at  least  of  a  theological  system,  and 
to  furnish  for  it  at  the  same  time  an  absolute  proof.  The  constructive 
enthusiasm  of  the  rationalistic  theologian  awakens  interest  and  ex- 
pectation at  first;  but  in  the  light  of  criticism  speculative  theology 
proves  unsatisfactory  in  its  religious  content  and  far  from  convincing 
in  its  "proof." 

On  the  other  hand  we  find  a  variety  of  theological  methods,  all  re- 
jecting the  rationalistic  procedure  and  exemplifying  a  one-sided  em- 
piricism. First,  there  is  mystical  theology,  taking  at  their  face-value 
the  uncriticized  suggestions  of  the  mystical  experience.  Then  there 
are  some  one-sidedly  empirical  methods  which  we  may  class  together, 
as  eclectic,  inasmuch  as  the  doctrines  which  are  to  be  held,  according 
to  them,  are  chosen,  i.  e.,  selected  for  some  reason  that  falls  short  of 


246  APPENDIX 

scientific  verification.  Under  this  head  would  be  included  Schleier- 
macher's  "theology  of  the  Christian  consciousness,"  the  Ritschlian 
theology  of  religious  value- judgments,  Troeltsch's  "religio-historical" 
and  Wobbermin's  "religio-psychological"  method,  and  the  pragmatic 
method  of  some  of  the  younger  American  theologians.  They  are  em- 
pirical, and  consequently  vital,  but  they  are  not  rational  enough  to 
provide  for  scientific  theological  verification. 

But  in  addition  to  the  one-sided  rationalism  and  the  different  types 
of  one-sided  empiricism  in  theological  method  to  which  we  have  re- 
ferred, we  must  notice  the  extreme  dualism  which  was  characteristic 
of  the  method  of  the  older  theology.  Part  of  its  content  (theism,  and 
especially  the  ontological  "proof")  it  professed  to  derive  in  rationalistic 
fashion,  by  deductive  argument,  and  the  remainder  ("revealed  theol- 
ogy")— although  at  second  hand — from  religious  experience.  The 
logical  deficiencies  of  the  older  rationalistic,  demonstrative  theism  have 
been  pointed  out  often  enough,  and  need  not  be  dwelt  upon  here.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  may  be  remarked  that  when  the  traditionalistic 
theologian  has  claimed  to  make  theology  a  science,  what  he  has  meant 
by  this  has  been  simply  a  self-consistent  system  of  doctrines,  derived 
by  scientific  methods  of  interpretation  from  his  more  or  less  arbitrarily 
chosen  authority.  Of  scientific  method  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term 
all  traditionalistic  systems  of  theology  are  entirely  innocent. 

In  opposition  to  both  extreme  monisms  in  theological  method  (the 
rationalistic  and  the  empirical)  and  to  the  extreme  dualism,  what  we 
may  call  again  critical  monism  would  undertake  no  mere  juxtaposition 
of  rational  and  empirical  procedures,  but  their  synthesis  in  a  truly 
scientific  method,  i.  e.,  a  method  related  to  the  discoveries  of  religious 
experience  as  the  recognized  physical  and  other  objective  sciences  are 
related  to  the  discoveries  of  sense-experience.  The  content  of  such  a 
theology  would  fall  under  four  main  heads,  viz.,  presuppositions,  em- 
pirical data,  laws  and  theory.* 

We  are  now  ready  to  turn  to  the  second  main  part  of  our  outline  of 
the  philosophy  of  religion,  viz.,  the  metaphysical.  Here  the  chief 
content  of  the  special  empirical  basis  for  philosophical  construction 
would  be  found  in  the  scientific  empirical  theology  to  which  we  have 
just  referred,  and  which  we  have  undertaken  to  set  forth  in  the  body 
of  this  book.  We  shall  therefore  pass  immediately  to  the  metaphysical 
construction  proper. 

*  For  a  more  detailed  exposition  and  criticism  of  the  various  methods 
of  pre-scientific  theology,  see  the  first  half  of  the  introduction  to  this 
volume.  For  a  further  exposition  and  defense  of  the  idea  of  scientific  em- 
pirical theology  and  for  its  detailed  application,  see  the  whole  remaining 
content  of  the  above  discussion  preceding  this  appendix. 


APPENDIX  247 

William  James  has  described  metaphysics  as  an  extraordinarily 
stubborn  attempt  to  think  clearly  and  consistently.  This  will  serve 
as  a  definition,  if  we  add  that  its  subject-matter  is  the  nature  of  reality 
in  its  more  general  aspects  and  as  a  whole — in  so  far  as  it  can  properly 
be  viewed  as  a  whole. 

The  history  of  metaphysics  is  not  very  reassuring  as  to  its  future 
possibilities.  While  science  has  made  fairly  steady  progress,  meta- 
physics has  seemed  to  wander  about  in  a  circle,  like  a  traveller  lost 
in  a  fog  or  in  a  wood.  This  may  be  because,  like  theology,  metaphysics 
has  been  without  an  adequate  method. 

The  most  important  types  of  metaphysical  method  before  the  world 
to-day  are  three.  First  there  is  the  rationalistic  or  speculative  method, 
aiming  to  demonstrate  by  a  deductive  or  dialectical  process,  and  with 
almost  no  reference  to  the  facts  of  experience,  the  ultimate  nature  of 
reality  in  general  and  as  a  whole.  However  satisfactory  this  method 
may  seem  to  be  at  first,  a  critical  examination  of  its  many  and  strangely 
differing  resulting  systems  goes  to  show  that  it  has  been  a  failure  both 
as  to  doctrinal  content  and  as  to  the  certainty  of  its  "proof."  * 

A  second  method  is  that  of  synthesizing  the  recognized  empirical 
sciences,  theology  being,  of  course,  excluded.  This  leads  to  results 
which,  in  so  far  as  they  are  positive  rather  than  negative,  are  fairly 
satisfactory  with  reference  to  certainty.  But  in  doctrinal  content  the 
result  is  unsatisfactory,  because  incomplete.  The  method  ignores 
certain  fields  of  great  human  interest,  in  which  belief  has  not  yet  been 
reduced  to  scientific  knowledge,  and  so  could  not  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  be  fully  satisfactory. 

A  third  metaphysical  method  seeks  to  remedy  this  deficiency  by 
effecting  a  combination  of  the  established  results  of  the  recognized 
sciences  with  the  metaphysical  doctrines  which  are  felt  to  be  necessarily 
bound  up  with  our  consciousness  of  values.  For  example,  the  doctrine 
of  human  free  agency  seems  bound  up  with  our  consciousness  of  moral 
values,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  existence  of  God  with  our  consciousness 
of  religious  values.  Now  this  method,  if  applied  with  duly  critical 
care,  may  lead  to  very  satisfactory  results,  especially  with  reference 
to  doctrinal  content.  But  with  reference  to  certainty  it  will  always 
leave  something  to  be  desired,  because  of  the  failure  of  a  part  of  its 
content  to  arrive  at  a  completely  scientific  form.  It  remains  in  the 
end  a  synthesis  of  scientific  information  with  a  set  of  postulates. 

As  distinguished  from  the  first  method,  which  is  defective  both  in 
content  and  in  certainty;  from  the  second,  which  is  defective  in  con- 
tent, and  from  the  third,  which  is  defective  in  certainty,  we  would 
suggest  a  fourth  metaphysical  method,  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  ulti- 
*  See  Chapters  VII  to  IX  of  "  The  Problem  of  Knowledge." 


248  APPENDIX 

mately  prove  satisfactory  both  as  to  content  and  as  to  certainty.  This 
is  the  method  of  synthesizing  the  results  of  the  empirical  sciences, 
theology  as  an  empirical  science  being  included.  (In  framing  the 
synthesizing  theories,  it  may  be  remarked,  there  will  still  be  ample 
scope  for  the  exercise  of  wisdom,  as  well  as  for  the  use  of  scientific  in- 
formation.) 

Having  thus  indicated  a  point  of  view  with  reference  to  both  theo- 
logical and  metaphysical  method,  we  are  in  a  position  to  discuss  a  little 
further,  before  turning  to  particular  metaphysical  problems,  the  mu- 
tual relations  of  metaphysics  and  theology.  We  shall  refer  on  the  one 
hand  to  the  reaction  of  metaphysics  against  theology  and  the  reaction 
of  theology  against  metaphysics,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  function 
of  theology  in  metaphysics  and  the  function  of  metaphysics  in  theology. 

Metaphysics  has  shown  a  tendency  to  react  against  theology  and 
to  exclude  it  as  a  foreign  and  vitiating  element.  This  has  been  true  of 
what  is  generally  regarded  as  the  main  stream  of  philosophical  thought, 
from  the  beginning  of  the  modern  period.  This  reaction  against  theol- 
ogy has  been  intended  to  safeguard  the  true  metaphysical  content  and 
its  adequate  certainty.  Now  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  as  against 
so  unscientific  a  type  of  theology  as  that  of  scholasticism,  whether 
Catholic  or  Protestant,  the  reaction  was  largely  justified.  But  if  the 
reaction  is  against  all  theology,  the  consequence  can  only  be,  as  it 
has  already  proved,  to  lead  to  results  which  cannot  fully  satisfy  the 
human  consciousness.  There  will  be  deficiencies  of  content  first  of  all, 
and  also,  since  there  are  metaphysical  hypotheses  which  cannot  be 
empirically  verified  apart  from  religious  experience,  deficiencies  of 
certainty  as  well.  However,  when  once  the  ideal  of  theology  as  an 
empirical  science  is  realized,  it  may  be  no  longer  necessary  for  meta- 
physics to  exclude  the  contributions  of  theology. 

But  the  repugnance  between  metaphysics  and  theology  has  often 
been  mutual.  Theology  has  shown  from  time  to  time  a  tendency  to 
react  against  metaphysics.  This  has  been  especially  conspicuous  in 
the  Ritschlian  movement.  For  the  sake  of  conserving  both  the  dis- 
tinctly religious  content  of  theology  and  its  distinctly  religious  cer- 
tainty, it  has  been  maintained  that  metaphysics  should  be  excluded 
from  theology  altogether.  And  no  doubt  there  has  been  a  large  measure 
of  justification  for  theology's  reaction  against  the  prevalent  types  of 
metaphysics,  with  their  deficiencies  either  in  content,  or  in  certainty, 
or  in  both.  But  if  all  metaphysics  is  to  be  excluded  from  theology,  if 
the  religious  thinker  is  not  to  be  permitted  to  submit  the  religious 
content  and  certainty  of  his  theology  to  a  final  test  in  the  arena  of 
metaphysics,  doubt  is  sure  to  be  suggested  as  to  whether  they  would 
stand  such  a  test.  Thus  the  religious  certainty  of  theology  will  be 


APPENDIX  249 

imperilled,  and  as  a  consequence  in  the  end  its  religious  content  will 
also  be  put  in  danger.  If,  however,  metaphysics  should  come  to  be, 
as  we  have  suggested,  a  synthesis  of  empirical  sciences,  theology  being 
included,  there  will  no  longer  be  any  reason  for  the  exclusion  of  meta- 
physics from  theology. 

Thinking,  then,  of  theology  as  an  empirical  science  and  of  meta- 
physics as  a  synthesis  of  the  sciences,  including  theology,  the  mutual 
functional  relations  of  theology  and  metaphysics  can  be  readily  de- 
fined. Theological  theory,  resting  upon  empirical  theological  laws, 
will  furnish  material  for  metaphysical  hypotheses,  as  do  scientific 
theories  in  general.  The  elements  of  scientific  theological  theory  will 
be  tested  as  to  their  compatibility  with  other  empirically  grounded 
elements  of  metaphysics,  and  will  thus  be  in  a  position  to  make  their 
due  contribution  to  the  content  of  metaphysics.  But  metaphysics 
will  gain  thereby  in  certainty  as  well,  since  the  theological  elements 
will  come  with  the  backing  of  verification  in  religious  experience.  On 
the  other  hand,  theology  in  its  turn  will  gain  in  certainty  as  a  result  of 
having  its  religiously  supported  theories  finally  verified  by  their  proved 
compatibility  with  the  established  results  of  the  other  sciences.  And 
not  in  certainty  alone,  but  in  content  too,  theology  may  expect  to  be 
enriched  through  its  contact  with  metaphysics,  since  thereby  all  the 
more  general  results  of  the  sciences  will  be  placed  at  its  disposal.  Thus 
it  would  appear  that  while  theology  and  metaphysics  are  well-nigh 
bound  to  be  mutually  incompatible  so  long  as  their  methods  remain 
defective,  when  theology  becomes  an  empirical  science,  and  meta- 
physics becomes  a  wise  synthesis  of  the  well-established  theories  of 
all  the  empirical  sciences,  they  will  each  fit  into  the  needs  of  the  other 
as  not  only  mutually  compatible,  but  as  all  but  mutually  indispensable. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  turn  our  attention  to  particular  meta- 
physical problems,  and  in  doing  so  we  shall  deal  simply  with  those 
questions  of  metaphysics  which  are  of  special  interest  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  These  are  the  problem  of  sub- 
stance, or  the  quality  of  being,  or  matter  and  mind;  the  problem  of 
the  mutual  relation  of  body  and  mind;  the  problem  of  law  and  freedom; 
the  problem  of  origins,  or  evolution  and  creation;  the  problem  of  ends, 
or  mechanism  and  purpose;  the  problem  of  nature  and  the  super- 
natural; the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  many,  and  the  problem  of 
good  and  evil. 

We  shall  first  take  up  the  question  of  the  quality  of  being,  or  the 
problem  of  matter  and  mind.  With  reference  to  this  problem  almost 
all  metaphysical  theories  fall  into  one  or  another  of  three  groups,  viz., 
two  one-sided  monisms  (an  extreme  materialism  and  an  extreme  im- 
materialism)  and  the  corresponding  extreme  dualism. 


250  APPENDIX 

Materialistic  monism  is  the  doctrine  that  in  its  true  or  ultimate 
nature  all  reality  is  material.  Sometimes  what  is  called  mind  or  con- 
sciousness has  been  explained  as  an  extraordinarily  fine  and  mobile 
sort  of  matter,  sometimes  definitely  as  a  secretion  of  the  brain.  Some- 
times again  it  has  been  said  to  be  a  mode  of  motion  in  the  brain,  or  a 
form  of  behavior  of  the  nervous  system.  In  other  instances  conscious- 
ness or  mind  has  been  identified  with  the  content  of  that  cross-section 
of  the  physical — or,  as  some  would  say,  "neutral" — realm  to  which 
the  nervous  system  responds,  either  taken  by  itself,  or  together  with 
that  responsive  action.  Or  again,  the  whole  realm  of  the  psychical 
has  been  simply  identified  with  the  unreal.  Or  consciousness  has  been 
said  to  be  a  mere  external  relation  between  different  parts  of  the 
material  world.  A  veiled  form  of  materialism  exists  under  the  form 
of  "energism,"  according  to  which  matter  is  ultimately  reducible  to 
physical  energy,  of  which  the  mental  is  also  said  to  be  simply  a  special- 
ized form.  But  in  all  its  forms  materialism  is  much  more  satisfactory 
in  its  account  of  matter  than  it  is  in  its  account  of  mind.  It  makes 
the  mistake  of  regarding  the  material  part  of  experienced  reality  as  a 
fair  sample  of  the  whole. 

Opposed  to  extreme  materialism  is  another  form  of  one-sided  mon- 
ism, viz.,  immaterialism.  This  exists  in  several  forms,  viz.,  spiritual- 
ism, idealism  and  panpsychism.  According  to  spiritualism  there  is 
but  one  sort  of  substance,  viz.,  spirit,  or  mind.  Material  objects  are 
all  explained  as  dependent  appearances  or  ideas  in  a  mind  or  minds. 
According  to  metaphysical  idealism  all  realities,  material  or  spiritual, 
are  to  be  regarded  ultimately  as  nothing  but  ideas,  or  systems  of 
thought.  According  to  panpsychism  some  realities  are  made  up  of 
thought-content,  and  all  others  are  made  up  of  feeling-content,  or  some 
other  sort  of  "mind-stuff."  Immaterialism  is  much  more  satisfactory 
in  its  account  of  the  mental  than  in  its  account  of  matter.  Under  the 
influence  of  a  more  or  less  explicit  desire  to  conserve  the  "spiritual" 
values  of  human  life,  it  has  tried  to  maintain  that  mental  or  spiritual 
reality  is  a  fair  sample  of  reality  as  a  whole. 

Both  materialism  and  immaterialism  excel  in  constructive  enthusi- 
asm, but  they  are  weak  in  critical  common  sense.  Quite  the  opposite 
is  true  of  extreme  dualism.  It  holds  that  there  are  two  absolutely 
different  sorts  of  substance,  and  two  only,  viz.,  matter  and  mind.  Ex- 
cept that  they  are  both  substances,  existing,  some  would  admit,  in 
time,  they  have,  according  to  the  dualist,  no  common  nature. 

Now  dualism  is  a  more  conservative  philosophical  position  than  the 
fantastical  constructions  of  extreme  monism,  but  it  gives  the  impression 
of  having  failed  to  solve  its  problem.  As  an  alternative  we  would  sug- 
gest a  more  monistic  view,  and  yet  one  which  seems  to  be  equally 


APPENDIX  251 

tenable  from  the  point  of  view  of  critical  common  sense,  so  that  it  may 
be  brought  under  the  general  caption  of  critical  monism.  In  the  first 
place,  from  this  point  of  view  the  sharpness  of  the  opposition  between 
mind  and  matter  may  be  relieved  somewhat  by  raising  the  question 
whether  there  may  not  be  a  third  sort  of  reality  which  is  more  than 
matter  or  physical  energy  on  the  one  hand,  and  yet  something  less 
than  mind  on  the  other.  Such  would  be  the  "entelechy,"  or  vital 
factor  posited  and  defended  rather  plausibly,  even  if  inconclusively, 
by  some  recent  writers.  But  whether  this  vitalistic  theory  is  adopted 
or  not,  it  would  seem  possible  to  reduce  the  material,  or  physical,  the 
spiritual,  or  mental,  and  the  vital,  if  there  be  any  such  thing,  to  a 
common  denominator.  Matter,  it  may  be  maintained,  is  ultimately 
a  form  of  energy,  and  when  this  rather  obscure  concept  of  energy  is 
analyzed,  it  seems  possible  to  interpret  it  as  the  activity  of  some 
reality.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  whole  range  of  the  mental  or 
psychical;  sensing,  perceiving,  remembering,  imagining,  conceiving, 
judging,  reasoning,  desiring,  feeling,  willing — what  are  these  but  va- 
rious forms  of  the  essentially  creative  activity  of  the  conscious  subject? 
And  the  intermediate  vital  factor,  if  such  there  be,  is  also  readily 
interpreted  in  activistic  terms.  Thus  we  have  carried  the  unifying 
process  beyond  the  point  reached  by  dualism,  and  yet  we  have  re- 
mained upon  essentially  the  same  ground  of  critical  common  sense. 

Closely  related  to  the  problem  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  matter  and 
mind  is  the  problem  of  the  mutual  relation  of  body  and  mind.  Among 
prevalent  views  we  find  not  only  the  two  opposite  one-sided  monisms 
and  the  corresponding  dualism,  but  a  fourth  view  also,  which  may  be 
classed  as  a  critical  monism.  The  common  materialistic  view  of  the 
body-mind  problem  is  known  as  epiphenomenalism,  and  is  to  the  effect 
that  while  material  processes  cause  other  material  processes  and 
(through  the  brain)  all  mental  events,  there  is  no  mental  causation, 
either  of  events  in  the  brain  or  of  any  changes  in  the  realm  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  Immaterialistic  views  (spiritualism,  idealism  and 
panpsychism)  would  solve  the  problem  by  making  all  real  causation 
mental  or  psychical,  the  material  (including  the  cerebral)  being  a 
mere  dependent  psychical  content,  and  not  an  ultimate  or  independent 
reality  at  all.  The  dualistic  view  is  known  as  parallelism,  and  is  the 
doctrine  that  there  are  two  parallel  causal  series  of  events,  the  one 
physical  (cerebral)  and  the  other  psychical,  but  that  there  is  no  effect 
of  the  physical  in  the  psychical  series,  nor  any  effect  of  the  psychical 
in  the  realm  of  the  physical.  A  view  more  consonant  with  critical 
common  sense  than  any  of  these,  and  at  the  same  time  more  in  accord 
with  the  ideal  of  philosophy  as  wisdom  than  either  epiphenomenalism 
or  parallelism  (since  it  would  make  it  possible  to  vindicate  the  validity 


252  APPENDIX 

of  the  moral  consciousness),  is  the  widely  accepted  doctrine  of  inter- 
actionism.  From  the  point  of  view  of  interactionism,  which  we  may 
regard  as  critical  monism  in  the  body-mind  problem,  there  is  not  only 
causation  within  the  physical  series  and  within  the  psychical,  but  also 
from  the  physical  to  the  psychical  and  from  the  psychical  to  the 
physical. 

We  shall  turn  next  to  the  problem  of  law  and  freedom,  or,  as  some 
would  phrase  it,  law  and  chance,  or  differently  still,  determinism  and 
indeterminism.  On  the  one  hand  extreme  nomism,  or  determinism, 
maintains  that  the  reign  of  law  is  absolute,  that  the  complete  pre- 
determination of  events  is  universal  and  without  exception.  This 
would  render  the  human  consciousness  of  freedom  and  moral  obligation 
illusory,  which  illusory  consciousness,  as  well  as  all  acts  that  we  call 
morally  evil,  would  have  to  be  regarded  as  absolutely  predetermined. 
This  course  of  thought,  apart  from  other  more  purely  theoretical  ob- 
jections *  would  thus  run  counter  to  all  the  more  satisfying  forms  of 
religion,  as  well  as  to  any  serious  morality. 

At  the  opposite  extreme  from  this  one-sided  nomism,  or  determinism, 
there  might  stand  (although  it  has  had  few  serious  defenders)  an  ex- 
treme tychism,  or  indeterminism,  according  to  which  all  events  would 
be  interpreted  as  ultimately  matters  of  chance.  Not  only  would  the 
so-called  laws  of  nature  themselves  be  regarded  as  mere  approxima- 
tions to  absolute  laws;  the  whole  orderliness  or  regularity  of  nature 
would  itself  be  held  to  have  come  into  being  as  habits  formed  by  chance, 
without  any  predetermination  whatsoever.  Human  conduct  would, 
of  course,  be  viewed  as  having  no  necessary  relation  to  previous  or  to 
subsequent  character.  The  obvious  moral  and  religious  unsatisfac- 
toriness,  as  well  as  theoretical  defenselessness,  of  such  a  view  need  not 
be  enlarged  upon. 

A  more  common  view  than  this  last  is  the  extreme  dualism  which 
would  maintain  that  while  some  events  are  absolutely  law-abiding  and 
predetermined,  there  are  other  events  which  are  wholly  without  pre- 
determining factors  and  are  thus  matters  of  the  purest  chance.  One 
form  of  this  dualism  is  found  in  a  certain  type  of  fatalism,  which  re- 
gards the  end  as  absolutely  fixed,  but  holds  that  there  are  undeter- 
mined or  chance  events  in  the  intermediate  stages.  Another  form  of 
the  doctrine  is  that  which  affirms  complete  determinism  everywhere 
save  in  human  choices,  which  are  regarded  as  absolutely  free  and  un- 
determined by  any  previous  events  or  conditions. 

Over  against  these  views  may  be  set  a  critical  monism,  according  to 
which  one  might  hold  that  a  certain  measure  of  predetermination  and 
some  measure  of  freedom  attach  to  many  and  perhaps  most,  if  not  all, 
*  See  Boutroux:  "  Natural  Law  in  Science  and  Philosophy." 


APPENDIX  253 

events  that  come  within  the  range  of  human  observation,  although 
the  degrees  of  predetermination  and  of  freedom  in  different  events 
vary  greatly.  Even  the  free  decisions  of  the  human  will  are  not  to 
be  regarded  as  matters  of  chance,  but  as  being  very  largely  determined 
by  antecedent  events  and  conditions,  previous  character  being  one  of 
the  most  important  of  these  conditions.  Moreover,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  free  and  not  predetermined,  these  free  choices  of  the  human  will 
are  to  be  thought  of  as  being  creatively  determined  at  the  time, 
in  and  by  the  voluntary  attention  devoted  by  the  agent  to  certain 
considerations,  which  constitute  the  motive  of  the  action.  On  the 
other  hand,  even  the  law-abiding  events  of  nature  may  be  regarded 
as  happening  in  accord  with  certain  regular  or,  as  it  were,  habitual 
processes,  which  need  not  be  thought  of  as  having  been  eternally 
predetermined  by  either  blind  or  conscious  forces,  but  which  were 
perhaps  creatively  determined  in  the  distant  past,  whether  at  once 
or  through  a  long  process  of  evolution.  In  particular,  if  the  vitalistic 
theory  should  finally  claim  our  assent,  it  might  be  maintained  that 
the  life-processes,  while  very  largely  predetermined,  nevertheless  are 
to  some  extent  being  determined  only  at  the  tune  of  their  happening. 
Such  a  view  as  we  have  outlined  would  obviously  leave  room  for  the 
validity  of  both  morality  and  religion. 

We  shall  now  turn  to  the  question  of  origins,  or  the  problem  of 
evolution  and  creation.  On  the  one  hand  we  find  a  one-sided  evolu- 
tionism, according  to  which  all  things  have  come  into  being  through 
an  unfolding  or  evolution  of  what  was  virtually  in  the  pre-existing 
conditions,  without  any  creative  act  or  process  whatsoever.  On  the 
other  hand  one  sometimes  finds  upholders  of  an  extreme  creationism, 
according  to  which  God  first  produces  individual  souls  by  special 
creative  fiat,  and  then  proceeds  to  create,  in  cinematographic  fashion, 
all  the  contents  of  their  individual  consciousnesses.  Opposed  to  both 
of  these  one-sided  monisms,  dualism  would  hold  that  some  events  are 
special  acts  of  creation  and  not  at  all  evolutionary,  while  others  are 
purely  evolutionary,  without  any  creative  element  whatsoever.  There 
are  different  varieties  of  this  dualism,  some,  for  instance,  making  the 
origin  of  species  creative  and  the  origin  of  varieties  within  the  species 
evolutionary,  while  others  would  make  the  origin  of  species  also  evo- 
lutionary, reserving  explanation  by  the  theory  of  creation  for  such 
events  as  the  first  appearance  of  life  and  sentience  and  rational  con- 
sciousness. 

But  over  against  all  these  views  we  would  set,  as  a  critical  monism, 
a  doctrine  of  creative  evolution,  according  to  which  perhaps  not  only 
all  processes  of  life,  as  Bergson  maintains,  but  all  processes  whatsoever 
are  both  creative  and  evolutionary.  Outside  of  the  organic  realm  the 


254  APPENDIX 

case  for  present  creativeness  is  rather  problematical,  but  the  notion 
seems  not  inconceivable.  In  any  case,  while  adhering  closely  to  science 
and  common  sense,  the  view  is  one  which  seems  eminently  favorable 
to  the  validity  of  the  moral  consciousness  and  to  a  vitally  religious 
interpretation  of  the  universe. 

We  now  come  to  the  problem  of  ends,  the  problem  of  purpose,  or 
teleology,  or  in  other  words,  the  question  as  to  mechanism  or  finalism. 
Extreme  mechanism  maintains  that  all  events  taking  place  in  the 
physical  world,  including  not  only  all  vital  processes  but  all  human 
behavior,  are  purely  and  without  remainder  mechanical  movements; 
no  purpose  has  any  dynamic  potency;  there  is  no  force,  ultimately, 
but  mechanical  and  (the  essentially  similar)  chemical  force — vis  a 
tergo;  the  whole  universe  is  a  gigantic  machine,  and  every  organism 
neither  more  nor  less  than  a  machine  within  a  machine.  To  begin 
with,  this  is  pure  dogmatism  in  metaphysics.  Science  is  doubtless 
justified  in  looking  ever  further  for  mechanical  elements  in  organisms; 
but  that  all  organic  life  is  remainderlessly  mechanical  is  an  hypothesis 
which  not  only  has  never  been  verified,  but  of  which  the  full  verifica- 
tion would  seem  to  be  forever  impossible.  Moreover,  to  mention  a 
consideration  which  should  have  weight  so  long  as  metaphysics  re- 
mains to  any  extent  philosophy  as  wisdom,  the  completely  mechanistic 
view  would  take  all  validity  out  of  morality  and  experimental  religion, 
and  indeed  all  ideal  meaning  out  of  the  whole  life  of  the  human  spirit. 

On  the  other  hand,  extreme  finalism  upholds  the  view  that  all  that 
happens  is  equally  the  expression  of  an  all-predetermining  purpose. 
Not  only  in  the  adaptations  of  organisms  to  their  environment,  and 
in  events  which  may  be  plausibly  interpreted  as  "providential,"  but 
throughout  the  whole  range  of  nature  and  the  whole  course  of  history, 
all  events,  good,  bad  or  indifferent,  are  the  expression  of  one  all- 
comprehensive,  infinitely  detailed  and  eternally  complete  plan.  An- 
other form  of  extreme  finalism  is  that  which  is  characteristic  of  an 
extremely  subjective  pragmatism,  according  to  which  everything  is 
for  the  individual  or  social  group  what  it  is  made  to  be  by  the  pur- 
poses of  that  individual  or  that  group.  Both  forms  of  extreme  finalism 
are,  from  the  point  of  view  of  critical  common  sense,  absurdly  dog- 
matic; and  while  the  former  leaves  no  room,  logically,  for  morality,  the 
latter  leaves  no  room  for  experimental  religion. 

In  distinction  from  both  these  one-sided  monisms  an  extreme  dual- 
ism would  maintain  that  there  are  mechanical  events  which  are  in  no 
sense  teleological,  and  teleological  events,  even  in  the  physical  world, 
which  are  not  at  all  mechanical.  According  to  this  view  the  Designer 
is  an  interloper  in  the  mechanical  order,  with  the  constitution  of  which 
he  has  nothing  to  do.  This  ancient  and  supposedly  outworn  religious 


APPENDIX  255 

theory  has  been  revived  in  our  day  of  religious  perplexity,  in  a  rather 
frantic  effort  to  preserve  for  mankind  the  benefits  of  faith,  in  spite  of 
the  depressing  insistence  of  the  problem  of  evil.  But  such  a  God 
would  scarcely  be  an  adequate  Object  of  absolute  dependence,  and, 
as  has  been  pointed  out  by  critics,  the  would-be  devotee  is  impelled 
to  seek  further,  even  if  it  should  be  only  to  find  the  "veiled  Being" 
back  of  the  whole  phenomenal  order. 

Suggestive  material  for  a  critical  monism  is  found  in  the  vitalism 
which  Bergson  defends  in  opposition  to  both  mechanism  and  finalism. 
The  vitalists  may  have  gone  to  an  uncritical  extreme  in  their  advocacy 
of  this  doctrine;  but  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  in  certain  processes 
of  life  there  seems  to  be  a  factor  at  work  (making  physical  energy  more 
instead  of  less  available,  for  instance)  which  is  more  than  mere  mechan- 
ism, but  concerning  which  we  cannot  always  say  that  it  is  a  consciously 
purposive  performance.  Moreover,  deliberate  human  action  is  in  some 
measure  creative,  vitalistic,  and  not  purely  mechanical,  unless  the 
whole  moral  consciousness  is  to  be  rejected  as  illusory.  And  if  there 
is  a  super-mechanical  factor  in  human  life,  it  is  no  improper  departure 
from  the  principle  of  parsimony  to  entertain  the  hypothesis  that  there 
may  be  a  vital  factor  also  in  the  lower  forms  of  life  from  which  the 
human  form  has  been  evolved. 

But  while  vitalism  tends  to  undermine  not  only  extreme  mechanism 
and  extreme  finalism,  but  extreme  dualism  as  well,  it  does  not  yet 
amount  to  a  fully  rounded-out  critical  monism.  On  the  problem  before 
us,  critical  monism,  by  virtue  of  its  constructive  spirit,  would  suggest 
that  there  is  perhaps  no  event  in  the  physical  world  which  does  not 
involve  mechanism,  and  no  event  in  which,  in  the  last  analysis,  nothing 
but  mechanism  is  involved.  Will  this  suggestion  stand,  in  the  face 
of  a  critical  examination  of  available  facts? 

One  side  of  the  problem  is  easily  dealt  with.  An  event  may  be  one 
in  which  a  machine  is  made  use  of,  but  when  the  user  is  taken  into 
account,  it  is  readily  seen  that  the  act  as  a  whole  includes  something 
more  than  mechanism.  The  other  element  of  the  problem  presents 
more  difficulty.  But  some  recent  writers  have  dwelt  with  much  force 
upon  the  apparent  adaptation  beforehand  of  the  environment  to  or- 
ganic life  and  to  its  further  evolution,  and  it  would  seem  not  unrea- 
sonable to  entertain  the  view  that  in  its  general  features  the  universe 
is  the  kind  of  universe  a  worthy  Object  of  religious  dependence  may 
have  intended  it  to  be.*  Not  only  are  the  mechanical  processes  neces- 
sary to  furnish  a  dependable  platform  for  the  activities  of  life  and  con- 
sciousness; even  the  processes  of  physical  life,  vitalistically  interpreted 
as  not  completely  predetermined,  either  mechanically  or  by  purpose, 
*  See  above  discussion  on  "The  Problem  of  Evil." 


256  APPENDIX 

and  yet  as  not  in  themselves  definitely  or  consciously  purposive — 
processes  which,  when  so  interpreted  seem  necessarily  to  lie  quite 
outside  the  domain  of  teleology — even  these  may  be  included  under 
a  teleological  view.  It  seems  quite  reasonable  to  believe  that  such 
vitalistic  processes  may  have  been  the  necessary  precondition  of  the 
later  evolution  of  beings  endowed  with  creative  free  agency.  And 
even  the  fact  of  evil  choices,  made  by  these  human  free  agents,  may 
be  reconciled  with  the  idea  of  an  all-comprehensive  purpose  in  the 
mind  of  a  Being  to  whose  will  these  same  evil  choices  are  opposed.  For 
if  it  was  intended  that  men  should  develop  into  moral  character,  it 
must  also  have  been  intended  that  they  should  be  free  agents  and 
should  learn  in  the  light  of  consequences;  and  this  necessarily  involves 
the  possibility  of  immoral  choices. 

We  now  face  the  problem  of  nature  and  the  supernatural.  On  this 
topic  possible  views  may  be  grouped  under  four  heads,  as  usual,  viz., 
two  one-sided  monisms  (extreme  naturalism  and  extreme  supernat- 
uralism),  the  corresponding  extreme  dualism,  and  a  critical  monism. 
But  these  views  have  a  special  relation  to  the  views  outlined  in  dealing 
with  the  three  preceding  problems.  The  main  content  of  what  we 
have  called  extreme  naturalism  is  involved  in  extreme  determinism, 
extreme  evolutionism  and  extreme  mechanism.  Extreme  super- 
naturalism,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be,  in  its  main  content,  a 
combination,  as  far  as  possible,  of  extreme  indeterminism,  extreme 
creationism  and  extreme  finalism.  (If  it  be  objected  that  an  extreme 
indeterminism  and  an  extreme  finalism  are  not  wholly  compatible  with 
each  other,  the  reply  is  that  what  we  mean  here  by  an  extreme  super- 
naturalism  would  not  itself  be  a  self-consistent  system.  The  vulgar 
notion  of  the  supernatural  is  at  once  that  of  an  event  which  is  an  in- 
tended and  creative  performance,  and  yet  one  which  could  not  have 
been  rationally  predicted  as  certain,  or  rationally  expected  as  probable 
or  even  rationally  waited  for  as  possible.) 

Extreme  dualism  with  reference  to  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
or  as  it  is  often  called,  "dualistic  supernaturalism,"  sums  up  the  three 
preceding  dualisms.  It  holds  that  there  are  events  which  are  exclu- 
sively deterministic,  evolutionary  and  mechanical,  and  others  which 
are  exclusively  indeterministic,  creative  and  teleological.  This  position 
is  more  widely  prevalent  than  what  we  have  called  extreme  super- 
naturalism. 

Finally,  the  main  features  of  critical  monism  with  reference  to  nature 
and  the  supernatural  are  indicated  in  what  has  been  suggested  under 
the  same  head  in  connection  with  the  same  three  problems.  What 
critical  monism  here  comes  to  is  a  natural  supernaturalism  or  a  super- 
natural naturalism,  having  among  its  governing  ideas  that  of  an  or- 


APPENDIX  257 

derly  universe  in  which  there  is  ample  room  for  divine  and  human 
freedom,  in  which  also  origins  may  be  described  in  terms  of  creative 
evolution,  and  in  which  mechanical,  vital  and  humanly  purposive 
processes  may  all  be  comprehended  within  one  general  plan. 

We  now  come  to  the  much-discussed  problem  of  the  One  and  the 
Many.  Is  reality  fundamentally  one,  or  is  it  fundamentally  many? 
Here  again  most  views  may  be  grouped  under  three  heads,  viz., 
extreme  singularism  (a  less  ambiguous  term  than  the  commonly 
employed  "monism"))  extreme  pluralism,  and  what  may  be  called 
again  an  extreme  dualism  (of  the  One  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Many  on  the  other). 

Extreme  singularism,  affirming  the  ultimate  reality  of  the  One  and 
denying  the  ultimate  reality  of  the  Many,  has  existed  in  various  forms. 
Materialists  have  claimed  to  hold  to  the  oneness  of  the  universe,  al- 
though with  doubtful  justice;  the  atomic  theory,  and  similar  views, 
taken  as  a  complete  metaphysic,  suggest  pluralism  rather  than  singu- 
larism. But  spiritualism,  panpsychism  and  especially  metaphysical 
idealism  of  the  Hegelian  type  have  exhibited  considerable  affinity  for 
singularism.  Vitalism  also  may  take  a  "monistic"  turn,  as  in  Bergson; 
or  voluntarism,  as  in  Schopenhauer.  And  finally  there  may  be  a  more 
neutral  singularism,  like  that  of  Spinoza,  according  to  which  Reality  is 
to  us  simply  the  ultimate  One,  God  or  Nature,  of  whom  (or  which)  we 
know  only  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought.  Naturally,  the  re- 
ligious affiliations  of  the  more  characteristic  forms  of  singularism  are 
with  pantheism  and  hence  with  either  extreme  mysticism  or  practical 
irreligion.  Pantheism  obviously  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  human  indi- 
vidual, and  hence,  in  the  end,  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  divine  Individual 
as  well.  It  is  unfavorable  to  the  vitality  of  both  morality  and  practical, 
experimental  religion. 

Extreme  pluralism  has  denied  the  reality  of  any  all-embracing,  uni- 
tary Being.  Reality,  in  its  fundamental  nature,  it  regards  as  a  mani- 
fold of  atoms,  or  of  "monads,"  or  of  spiritual  substances,  or  of  unified 
systems  of  experience  and  thought,  or  of  both  material  atoms  and 
spiritual  substances.  Here  the  tendency  is,  in  denying  the  ultimate 
One,  to  interpret  the  result  atheistically.  Sometimes,  however,  a 
greatly  reduced  God  is  admitted  as  one  of  the  society  of  spirits. 

What  we  may  call  an  extreme  dualism  of  the  One  and  the  Many 
exists  in  certain  more  or  less  deistic  systems,  according  to  which  the 
One  and  the  Many  both  exist,  but  the  One  is  not  in  any  sense  to  be 
found  in  the  Many,  nor  the  Many  in  the  One.  The  significance  of  the 
One  for  the  Many  thus  becomes  doubtful,  and  finally  the  existence  of 
the  One  also  becomes  a  matter  of  doubt.  Deism,  like  pantheism,  tends 
toward  atheism  and  practical  irreligion. 


258  APPENDIX 

In  distinction  from  extreme  singularism,  with  its  pantheism  and 
ultimate  atheism;  from  extreme  pluralism,  with  its  more  or  less  explicit 
atheism,  and  from  extreme  dualism,  with  its  deism  and  final  atheism, 
we  would  suggest  again  a  critical  monism,  according  to  which  the  One 
and  the  Many  both  exist  in  the  closest  relations  with  each  other,  and 
yet  without  either  losing  its  individuality  or  being  merged  in  the 
other.  The  One  is  immanent  in  the  Many,  and  yet  transcendent  of 
the  Many;  the  Many  are  immanent  in  the  One,  and  yet  in  a  sense 
beyond  it. 

The  particular  view  we  have  in  mind  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a 
recent  attempt  to  mediate  between  singularism  and  pluralism  (Royce : 
"  The  Problem  of  Christianity,"  Vol.  II),  in  which  it  is  maintained  on 
the  one  hand  that  every  individual  is  a  community  (inasmuch  as,  in  in- 
terpreting one's  self  to  one's  self,  there  are  three  distinguishable  selves, 
viz.,  the  interpreted  self,  the  interpreter  and  the  one  to  whom  the 
interpretation  is  addressed) ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  every  com- 
munity, even  the  universal  human  community,  is  an  Individual  (since 
it  also  is  unified  by  a  Mediator,  or  Interpreter,  who  reconciles  individual 
with  individual).  Such  levelling  down  of  the  distinction  between  the 
relation  of  the  "I"  to  the  "me"  in  a  personal  life,  on  the  one  side, 
and  that  between  different  persons,  on  the  other,  as  if  thinking  them 
under  the  same  categories  made  them  for  all  essential  purposes  the 
same  relation,  may  be  permissible  for  the  idealistic  way  of  thinking; 
but  if  so,  it  simply  adds  to  the  charges  in  the  indictment  against  ideal- 
ism. It  is  a  fantastical  construction,  departing  widely  from  critical 
common  sense,  and  hence  not  quite  the  sort  of  philosophy  we  are  aiming 
at  under  the  designation,  "critical  monism." 

Our  point  of  departure  must  be  the  critical  realism  which  was  the 
outcome  of  our  epistemological  inquiry,  and  our  position  here  must 
harmonize  with  our  position  with  reference  to  the  problem  of  matter 
and  mind.  We  would  suggest,  then,  that  the  universe  of  physical 
energy,  with  matter  as  one  of  its  forms,  and  of  psychical  activity  with 
its  products,  with  the  vital  factor  in  addition  perchance,  be  regarded 
as  activities  so  intimately  co-ordinated  as  to  constitute  one  dynamic 
and  organic  system.  The  physical  and  vital  factors  constitute  the 
Body,  of  which  in  experimental  religion  at  its  best  man  is  aware  of 
coming  into  inner  contact  with  the  immanent  divine  Spirit.  Human 
beings  would  then  be  comparable  to  organs  within  the  Organism,  save 
that  their  relative  independence  is  even  more  pronounced  than  this 
analogy  would  suggest.  And  yet,  with  all  their  freedom  and  relative 
independence,  they  are  constantly  dependent  upon  the  organic  One, 
not  only  physically,  but  also,  for  the  highest  possible  spiritual  achieve- 
ment, religiously  as  well. 


APPENDIX  259 

We  now  come  to  the  last  of  the  special  metaphysical  problems  which 
we  shall  here  consider — and  it  is  a  problem  of  critical  evaluation  as 
well — viz.,  the  problem  as  to  whether  reality  is  good  or  bad,  or  in  other 
words,  the  problem  of  optimism  or  pessimism.  Here  once  more  we 
find  two  one-sided  monisms  (extreme  optimism  and  extreme  pessim- 
ism) and  an  extreme  dualism.  Perhaps,  too,  we  shall  be  driven  once 
more  to  search  out  some  satisfying  critical  monism. 

Extreme  optimism  has  existed  under  several  variant  forms.  Under 
the  guidance  either  of  philosophical  theory  or  of  mystical  fervor,  it 
has  been  maintained  that  as  All  is  God,  and  God  is  good,  so  All  is  good; 
that  evil  is  an  illusion  of  mortal  mind;  that  whatever  is,  is  right.  Or 
it  has  been  maintained  that  evil,  which  is  empirically  real,  is  meta- 
physically a  mere  negation  or  defect  of  being.  Or  it  has  been  admitted 
that  there  is  real  evil,  which  we  must  strive  against  and  overcome; 
and  yet,  when  we  come  to  see  it  in  "the  Absolute,"  we  shall  see,  it  is 
claimed,  that  this  same  evil  was  a  good  thing — to  overcome!  (This 
may  be  true  of  some  kinds  of  "evil "  to  a  limited  extent,  but  not  of 
moral  evil.  It  is  only  the  possibility  of  moral  evil  involved  for  the 
immature  in  the  possibility  of  moral  good  that  is  to  be  consented  to 
as  better  than  its  opposite.)  Or  finally,  it  has  been  maintained  that 
while  the  world  is  not  yet  completely  good,  it  has  been  infallibly  pre- 
determined to  become  what  it  ought  to  be  "in  God's  good  time," 
whatever  man  may  do  or  leave  undone.  The  main  objections  to  all 
such  one-sided  optimism  are,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  fails  to  derive 
its  estimate  from  the  available  facts,  but  imposes  an  arbitrarily  chosen 
theory  upon  the  facts;  and  in  the  second  place,  that  logically  and 
psychologically  it  tends  to  lull  and  paralyze  the  moral  will.  This  latter 
consideration  makes  it  possible  to  show  that  extreme  optimism  ulti- 
mately refutes  itself.  If  one  is  to  be  a  consistent  optimist,  one  must 
be  able  to  hold  that  the  truth  will  act  favorably  upon  the  moral  will, 
and  thus,  through  struggle  and  victory,  make  the  individual  free  from 
evil.  But  extreme  optimism  acts  unfavorably  upon  the  will;  hence, 
according  to  optimism  itself,  an  extreme  optimism  cannot  be  true. 
The  only  way  to  evade  this  reductio  ad  ahsurdum  is  to  refuse  to  recog- 
nize any  real  distinction  between  good  and  evil.  But  to  take  that 
stand  leads  the  extreme  optimist  into  another  self-contradiction. 
Whether  All  is  good,  or  not,  not  all  accept  this  doctrine;  hence  there 
is  this  much  evil  in  the  universe,  if  no  other  evil  is  real,  viz.,  the  evil 
of  the  error  of  mortal  mind's  supposition  that  evil  is  real.  Hence 
not  quite  all  is  good! 

It  has  been  remarked  that  a  pessimist  is  a  person  who  has  to  live 
with  an  optimist.  There  is  this  much  truth  in  the  observation,  that 
an  extreme  pessimism  tends  to  be  begotten  of  an  extreme  optimism, 


260  APPENDIX 

by  way  of  reaction.  But  it  is  a  part  of  the  case  against  pessimism  that 
it  is  ordinarily  regarded  as  calling  for  a  psychological  explanation,  as 
a  morbid  and  abnormal  development  of  thought.  Hindu  religious 
philosophy  has  been  pessimistic  as  regards  this  world  and  the  present 
life,  but  it  offers  a  ray  of  hope  in  the  prospect — not  particularly  in- 
viting to  Occidental  minds — of  absorption  in  the  One,  a  sort  of  nega- 
tive state  of  peace  in  "Nirvana."  Pessimism  as  represented  by  Scho- 
penhauer and  Hartmann,  however,  is  more  absolute  still.  Its  only 
true  Nirvana  is  unconsciousness,  non-existence.  The  tendency  of 
extreme  pessimism  obviously  is  to  discourage  both  religious  dependence 
and  moral  effort. 

Distinct  from  both  the  optimistic  and  the  pessimistic  form  of  ex- 
treme monism,  there  is  an  extreme  dualism,  found,  for  example,  in 
the  older  Christian  orthodoxy,  according  to  which  for  some  individuals 
the  outlook  into  the  eternal  future  is  absolutely  optimistic,  without  a 
shadow  upon  it,  while  for  other  individuals  the  outlook  is  just  as  ab- 
solutely pessimistic,  without  a  single  ray  of  hope. 

When  we  turn  to  the  ways  of  critical  monism,  seeking  to  avoid  the 
extravagances  of  monistic  construction  on  the  one  hand,  and  yet  to 
pass  beyond  the  unsatisfying  commonplaces  of  dualism  on  the  other, 
we  find  fruitful  suggestions  in  the  meliorism  advocated  by  William 
James.  According  to  this  practical  and  common-sense  doctrine,  the 
world  contains  much  good  and  much  evil,  and  while  for  the  future  the 
good  is  in  danger,  it  nevertheless  has  a  fighting  chance  of  coming  out 
victorious;  and  this  chance  will  be  distinctly  improved  if  we  devote 
our  best  efforts  to  that  desirable  end.  As  James  himself  indicates,  the 
view  is  moralistic,  rather  than  religious. 

What  we  would  suggest,  however,  is,  while  not  a  less  moral,  a  more 
religious  meliorism.  While  it  is  only  a  good  fighting  chance  of  success 
at  any  particular  time  that  good  ever  has  in  its  struggle  with  evil,  and 
while  the  best  efforts  of  all  moral  wills  are  needed,  it  is  important  to 
note  that  through  a  certain  dynamic  religious  relation  the  moral  will 
can  be  greatly  reinforced  and  made  more  effective  in  its  conflict  with 
evil  in  individual  lives  and  in  social  institutions.  Indeed,  if  humanity 
finds  and  maintains  the  right  religious  relation,  the  destruction  of 
moral  evil,  and  of  all  that  flows  from  it,  will  be  assured. 

In  the  way,  then,  that  we  have  here  summarily  indicated,  we  would 
undertake  to  verify  the  statement  that  theology  and  metaphysics 
stand  in  need  of  each  other,  and  that  the  outcome  of  the  metaphysical 
part  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  confirms  the  favorable  verdict  with 
reference  to  religion  at  its  best,  as  announced  at  the  close  of  our  sketch 
of  the  critical  philosophy  of  religion. 

AS  for  critical  monism,  in  so  far  as  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  method 


APPENDIX  261 

of  thought,  rather  than  as  a  set  of  resultant  doctrines,  we  would  char- 
acterize it  as  follows :  it  stands  for  the  attempt  to  temper  constructive 
enthusiasm  with  critical  common  sense;  it  has  learned  to  be  suspicious 
of  prevalent  one-sided  monisms  on  the  one  hand  and  extreme  dualisms 
on  the  other,  and  takes  up  a  critical  attitude  toward  them,  in  order 
to  avoid  their  errors  as  well  as  to  profit  by  the  partial  truths  which 
most  of  them  contain;  and  at  the  same  time,  recognizing  the  desirabil- 
ity of  system,  in  so  far  as  it  does  not  become  unfair  to  the  facts,  it 
seeks  to  become  as  monistic  as  it  can  be,  while  remaining  as  critical 
as  it  ought  to  be.  May  it  not  be  then  that  critical  monism  is  the  true 
novum  organum  for  philosophy  as  wisdom?  * 

*  Critical  monism  as  a  method  stands  in  sharp  contrast  with  a  certain 
philosophical  procedure  which  we  may  perhaps  not  unfairly  stigmatize 
as  an  uncritical  monism.  The  reference  is  to  the  Hegelian  dialectic,  as  it  is 
sometimes  understood.  It  has  been  the  fashion  in  certain  quarters — Mc- 
Taggart's  works  on  Hegelianism  furnish  a  conspicuous  illustration — 
after  a  first  acknowledged  momentary  dependence  upon  experience  in 
order  to  provide  the  initial  thesis  and  get  the  dialectic  started,  to  represent 
the  subsequent  philosophical  procedure  as  an  affair  of  the  purely  rational 
evolution  of  thought,  and  any  further  appeal  to  experience  for  verification 
as  wholly  superfluous.  The  original  thesis  is  speculatively  negated,  and 
then  thesis  and  antithesis  are  speculatively  reconciled  in  a  "higher  syn- 
thesis," which,  in  turn,  becomes  the  thesis  of  the  next  stage  in  the  dialec- 
tical development.  Now  an  apriori  dialectical  procedure  of  this  sort  may 
be  allowed  to  pass,  provided  it  is  understood  that  philosophy  is  to  be  noth- 
ing more  than  a  speculative  game;  but  it  is  certainly  very  far  from  being 
an  adequate  method  for  philosophy  as  wisdom.  Judged  by  practical, 
empirical  tests,  it  often  happens  that  a  thesis  is  true,  and  its  logical  an- 
tithesis simply  false;  in  which  case  there  is  more  truth  in  the  original  thesis 
than  there  would  be  in  the  proposed  speculative  synthesis.  As  opposed  to 
any  uncritical  monism  of  this  type,  our  critical  monism  would  undertake 
to  be  thoroughly  empirical,  critical  and  scientific,  both  as  regards  the  con- 
stituents which  are  to  be  admitted  to  a  place  in  the  proposed  synthesis, 
and  with  reference  to  the  final  verification  of  this  synthesis  itself.  Instead 
of  merely  reconciling  opposing  systems  of  ideas,  and  including  them,  in 
intellectually  omnivorous  fashion,  in  a  "higher  synthesis,"  it  would  return 
to  an  examination  of  the  facts,  retaining  an  interest  in  transcended  points 
of  view  chiefly  with  a  view  to  seeing  that  in  the  resultant  synthesis  their 
errors  are  excluded.  Only  that  is  to  be  included  which  has  satisfactory 
empirical  support. 

Of  course  this  thesis-antithesis-synthesis  formula  may  have,  when 
used  with  sufficient  self-restraint,  a  certain  pedagogical  value  in  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  history  of  thought  in  general  and  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy in  particular.  But  even  in  this  connection  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  there  are  many  non-dialectical  factors  in  the  formation  of  most  world- 


262  APPENDIX 

views  and  systems  of  philosophy,  and  that  there  may  be  more  than  one 
"synthesis"  of  the  same  two  antithetical  systems.  For  example,  the  philos- 
ophical method  we  have  styled  critical  monism  might  be  interpreted,  by 
one  favorably  disposed  toward  it,  as  involving  a  synthesis  of  the  partial 
truths  together  with  the  exclusion  of  the  erroneous  elements  of  the  He- 
gelian dialectic  and  that  "rough  and  ready"  method  for  philosophy  as 
wisdom  which  it  is  now  the  fashion  to  label  "pragmatism."  But  a  deliber- 
ate, speculative  or  "high  and  dry"  synthesis  of  Hegelianism  and  prag- 
matism would  not  necessarily  result  in  a  procedure  exactly  identical  with 
our  critical  monism. 


INDEX 


Absolute,  of  experimental  religion, 
95,  162-163,  176-177,  178,  181, 
190,  216,  226,  238;  of  mystical 
intuition,  12,  93,  177,  192-193, 
243,  259;  of  speculative  phi- 
losophy, 11,  75,  106,  177,  190, 
192-193,  242-243,  259. 

Acquaintance,  problem  of,  240- 
241,  242-245. 

Advent,  second,  of  Christ,  212- 
213. 

^Esthetic  value,  v.  Values. 

Agnosticism,  philosophical,  18, 21, 
117-118, 121,  240;  religious,  30, 
179,  244. 

Anselm,  115,  128. 

Anthropomorphism,  178,  189. 

Appreciation,  religious,  18,  32, 
33,  34,  116,  117-118,  119,  131. 

Aquinas,  Th.,  45. 

Aristotelianism,  45,  114. 

Aseity  of  God,  181,  200. 

Assurance,  v.  Certainty. 

Atheism,  187-188,  188,  242,  243, 
257. 

Atonement,  124-131,  166ff.,  170, 
171;  see  also  Christ,  Reconcil- 
iation, Redemption,  Sacrifice, 
Satisfaction,  Substitution. 

Authority  in  religion,  external,  7, 
104,  110-111;  valid,  110-111, 
207. 

Bacon,  F.,  2. 
Bacon,  B.  W.,  58. 


Bagehot,  W.,  49. 
Bergson,  H.,  70,  253,  257. 
Bible,    criticism   of   the,   6,  52; 

inspiration   of,    105,    109-110; 

function  in  theology,  5-6,  7,  8; 

what  it  is,  109-110. 
Body,    and    mind,    251-252;    of 

God,  178,  258. 
Boutroux,  E.,  252. 
Buddha,  53,  67. 
Buddhism,    118. 

Certainty,  rational,  10,  11,  247- 
248;  religious,  8,  9,  19,  29,  30, 
98,  99,  136,  153-154,  155-156, 
159-160,  170,  194,  205-207, 
248-249. 

Christ,  person  of,  history  of 
doctrine  concerning,  112-118, 
192-194;  constructive  state- 
ment, 118-122,  193-194;  place 
of,  in  theology,  17;  work  and 
suffering  of,  124-131. 

Christian,  what  it  is  to  be  a,  134- 
135,  143. 

Christianity,  its  religious  experi- 
ence, 132-139. 

Christocentric  principle,  121, 160- 
164. 

Christology,  v.  Christ. 

Church,  the,  as  religious  com- 
munity; experiences  of,  155- 
156;  relation  to  theology,  14, 
15,  22,  236-237;  as  an  institu- 
tion, 237, 
263 


264 


INDEX 


Coe,  G.  A.,  73. 

Coleridge,  S.  T.,  13. 

Common  Sense,  240-241,  250- 
251,  261. 

Comte,  A.,  4. 

Conversion,  134-136. 

Creation,  200,  201,  253-254. 

Creative  evolution,  v.  Vitalism, 
v.  Critical  monism. 

Creative  preservation,  v.  Pres- 
ervation of  the  universe. 

Creed,  237. 

Critical  monism,  240,  241,  244, 
245,  246,  250,  251,  252,  253, 
254,  255,  256,  257,  258,  260, 
260-262. 

Darwin,  C.,  96. 

Data,  empirical,  of  theology,  31- 
34,  103,  106,  112. 

Death,  225,  226. 

Definitions,  theological,  27,  44, 
90,  91,  140-141,  159-204. 

Deism,  188,  257. 

Dependableness  of  God,  v.  In- 
duction, ground  of  theological. 

Design,  v.  Teleology. 

Determinism,  68-71,  196-198, 
252. 

Development  of  religion,  v.  Evo- 
lution of  religion. 

Devil,  the,  127-128,  191,  227- 
229. 

Dewey,  J.,  107. 

Dialectic,  106,  261-262. 

Dilthey,  W.,  20,  21. 

Dogmatism,  3^,  6,  18,  22,  24-25, 
29,  105,  159. 

Dorner,  J.  A.,  120. 

Draper,  J.  W.,  3. 

Dualism,  epistemological,  240, 
243-244;  logical,  241,  245; 
methodological,  241,  216;  in. 


various  metaphysical  problems, 
250,  251,  252,  253,  254-255, 
256,  257,  260. 

Eclecticism,  in  theology,  13-25, 
245-246;  in  metaphysics,  247. 

Economic  value,  v.  Values. 

Education,  divine,  of  man,  197- 
199. 

Edwards,  J.,  34. 

Election,   165-166. 

Empiricism,  in  science,  241;  v. 
Induction;  in  theology,  11-46, 
103-105,  106-109,  117,  140- 
156,  194,  245-246;  in  philos- 
ophy, 247-248,  249,  261-262. 

Energism,  250. 

Epiphenomenalism,  251. 

Epistemology,  general,  239-241; 
religious,  29-30,  91,  109n.,  235, 
239,  242-246. 

Error,  221,  226. 

Eschatology,  45,  72-80,  87,  88- 
89,  115,  128,  165,  167,  183-84, 
185-186,  205-215,  225,  226. 

Essence,  235. 

Essenes,  62. 

Eternity,  v.  Timelessness. 

Evaluation,  v.  Appreciation;  v. 
Values. 

Evil,  problem  of,  216-229,  259- 
260;  physical,  217-218,  225, 
226;  psychical,  219-220,  226; 
intellectual,  221,  226;  moral, 
223-224,  226;  v.  Sin;  religious, 
224;  consequences  of  sin,  86-89; 
origin  of,  227-228. 

Evolution,  in  general,  96,  200- 
201,  219,  253-254,  255;  of  re- 
ligion, 237-238. 

Experience,  religious,  cognitive 
aspect  of,  29-30,  94,  95,  96,  97, 
98,  103-105,  106-109,  214-245; 


INDEX 


265 


Christian,    132-139;    laws    of, 
140-156. 
Expiation,  171. 

Faith,  as  right  religious  adjust- 
ment, 142-144;  relation  to 
revelation,  106-107;  relation  to 
repentance,  135. 

Father,  God  as,  136,  163-164, 
192-194. 

Feeling,  religious,  17;  Christian, 
150-152. 

Feuerbach,  L.,  242. 

Finalism,  254,  255. 

Flournoy,  Th.,  39. 

Forgiveness,  personal,  136,  168- 
171;  judicial  (pardon),  124- 
125;  limits  of,  86. 

Foster,  G.  B.,  210. 

Frazer,  J.  G.,  4. 

Free  agency,  v.  Freedom,  human. 

Freedom,  human,  concept  of,  68- 
70;  theoretical  possibility  of,  70; 
moral  certainty  of,  70-71;  re- 
ligious certainty  of,  164-166; 
relation  to  God,  182-184,  184- 
186,  200n.;  relation  to  immor- 
tality, 79;  relation  to  evil,  221- 
223;  relation  to  teleology,  255; 
evolution  of,  255;  problem  of, 
252-253. 

Future,  v.  Eschatology  v.  Immor- 
tality. 

God,  attributes  of,  fundamental 
(absoluteness),  162,  176-177, 
178,  181,  216,  226;  moral,  162- 
163,  216,  226;  metaphysical, 
176-194,  216,  226;  existence  of, 
28-31,  90-99,  194;  arguments 
for,  epistemological,  92;  cos- 
mological,  94-95;  ontological, 
93,  94,  97,  98;  moral,  94,  cf. 


228;  teleological,  95-97;  em- 
pirical, 90-99,  194;  relation  of 
to  man,  163-175,  186,  187; 
relation  of,  to  the  universe, 
195-204. 

Gospels,  synoptic,  55;  Matthew, 
53,  60;  Mark,  52,  57,  58,  59; 
Luke,  53;  "Q,"  52,  57,  58; 
fourth  gospel,  56,  57,  114, 
116. 

Grace  of  God,  163ff.,  167-168, 
172,  174-175. 

Grotius,  H.,  128-129. 

Guidance,  Divine,  152-153,  155. 

Guilt,  83-86,  115,  128. 

Hartmann,  E.,  260. 

Hastie,  W.,  9. 

Healing,  Divine,  154-155. 

Heaven,  209-212,  214-215. 

Heaven  on  earth,  v.  Kingdom  of 
God. 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  203. 

Hegelianism,  8,  116,  257,  261, 
262. 

Hell,  87-89,  208,  209;  duration  of, 
89,  115,  128;  in  relation  to 
God's  justice,  165,  216. 

Herrmann,  W.,  19,  121,  206. 

Higher  Criticism,  v.  Bible. 

History,  function  of,  in  theology, 
17,  19,  20,  51;  results  of  sci- 
entific, 52-67,  76-78. 

Hocking,  W.  E.,  93. 

Hodge,  C.  W.,  202. 

Hoffding,  H.,    235. 

Holiness,  103,  108,  163ff. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  25. 

Hygienic  value,  v.  Values. 

Hypotheses,  in  theology,  29,  30, 
35,  36;  verification  of,  36,  41, 
44,  94,  142-143,  160-161,  176, 
188. 


266 


INDEX 


Idealism,  criticism  of,  10,  11,  92, 
93;  in  general  epistemology, 
240;  in  religious  epistemology, 
242-243;  in  metaphysics,  250, 

251.    Idolatry,  242. 

Immanence  of  God,  121, 162, 187- 
188,  189,  258. 

Immaterialism,  250,  251. 

Immortality,  desirable,  72-73; 
morally  imperative,  73-74,  75; 
value  of  belief  in,  74;  supposed 
demonstrations  of,  75-79;  pos- 
sibility of,  79-80;  religious  cer- 
tainty of,  195,  205-207;  relation 
to  problem  of  evil,  225,  226; 
conditional,  74,  206. 

Immutability  of  God,  179-180. 

Impassibility  of  God,  179. 

Incarnation,  114,  120. 

Incomprehensibility  of  God,  179. 

Incorporeality  of  God,  178. 

Indeterminism,  68,  71,  252. 

Individualism  in  theology,  13,  14. 

Induction,  ground  of  theological, 
34,  35,  140-141;  methods  of 
theological,  35-51, 140-145, 159 
162. 

Infinity  of  God,  180-181. 

Inspiration,  of  prophets,  104;  of 
the  Scriptures,  105,  109-110; 
relation  to  revelation,  109-110. 

Intellectualism,  241,  245. 

Intellectual  value,  v.  Values,  v. 
Science,  v.  Epistemology. 

Interactionism,    251-252. 

Interpretation,  258. 

Intuition,  v.  Perception. 

Invisibility  of  God,  178-179. 

James,  W.,  21,  69,  74,  117,  181, 

247,   260. 
Jesus,  the  historic,  52-67;  sources 

of  information  concerning,  52, 


57-59;  work  and  death  of,  61, 
65-66,  129-131,  143,  167;  atti- 
tude toward  authority,  111; 
attitude  toward  a  future  life, 
207;  moral  personality  of,  118- 
119;  religious  experience  of,  119 
120;  significance  of,  143. 

Joy,    151. 

Judgment,  86,  166,  169-170. 

Justice  of  God,  163ff.,  207;  what 
it  involves,  164-175,  207-208; 
v.  Judgment. 

Justification,    169-170. 

Kaftan,  J.,  19,  20,  21,  110. 
Kant,  I.,  9,  70,  94,  95,  96. 
Kantianism,  18,  20. 
Kingdom  of  God,  66,  123,  156, 

212-215. 

Knowledge,  v.  Epistemology. 
Krishna,  53. 

Lake,  K.,  78. 

Law,  divine,  133;  v.  Laws. 

Laws,  of  nature  and  mind,  49-50, 
200-201,  201-204,  252-253; 
value  of,  217,  226;  evils  inciden- 
tal to,  217-218,  219,  221;  the- 
ological, 26,  34,  37,  41-43,  140- 
156;  application  of,  43. 

Legend,  112-113. 

Leuba,  J.  H.,  38,  39,  40,  242. 

Logos,  57,  114,  116,  167,  192-193. 

Loisy,  A.,  78. 

Lotze,  R.  H.,  189. 

Love,  Christian,  151-152;  of  God, 
163ff.,  167. 

Mansel,  H.,  190. 
Many,  the  One  and  the,  257-258. 
Martineau,  J.,  185. 
Materialism,  250,  251. 
Matter  and  Mind,  249,  250-251. 


INDEX 


267 


McTaggart,  J.  M.  E.,  75,  261. 

Mechanism,  254,  255. 

Meliorism,  260. 

Mercy,  v.  Grace. 

Messiah,  57-67,  113-114,  116, 
125-126,  142. 

Metaphysics,  definition  of,  247; 
cf.  234,  235;  history  of,  247; 
methods  of,  247-248;  problems 
of,  249-260;  relation  to  ethics, 
247,  252,  253,  254,  256,  257, 
258,  259,  260;  relation  to  the- 
ology, 18,  19,  20,  21,  22,  45-46, 
95,  97,  114,  117,  121,  176,  178, 
184,  187,  189,  190,  192-193, 
200,  201,  247,  248-249,  252, 
253,  254,  255,  256,  257,  258, 
260. 

Methodology,  1-46,  241,  245- 
246,  et  passim;  v.  Induction,  v. 
Theology. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  34,  35,  36,  37,  39,  41. 

Millennium,  212-213. 

Mind  and  Body,  251. 

Mind  and  Matter,  249,  250-251. 

Miracle,  definition  of,  201-203, 
203-204;  science  and,  49-50;  in 
the  gospels,  52-56,  76-78;  the- 
ology of,  182,  201-204;  provi- 
dence and,  196-197;  "Law- 
abiding  miracles,"  218-226; 
philosophy  of,  252-257. 

Monism,  v.  Singularism;  extreme, 
240,  250;  Critical,  v.  Critical 
monism. 

Monotheism,  190-192,  229. 

Moral  consciousness,  82. 

Morality,  81,  82,  198;  in  religion, 
107-108,  118-123,  129-131, 
132-139,  143-144,  192-193, 
198,  237,  238,  239. 

Moral  value,  v.  Values. 

Mormonism,  178. 


Mysticism,  in  religion,  12;  in 
theology,  12,  13,  98,  104,  177, 
180,  187,  192-193,  236,  243, 
245. 

Myth,  42,  113-114. 

Naturalism,    256-257. 
Nietzscheanism,  118-119. 
Nirvana,  209,  260. 
Nomism,  252. 

Omnipotence   of  God,    181-184, 

216,   226. 

Omnipresence  of  God,  186-187. 
Omniscience  of  God,  184-186. 
One  and  the  Many,  257-258. 
Optimism,  217,  259,  260. 
Origin  of  religion,  237. 
Origins,  253-254. 

Pain,  as  evil,  219-220;  as  good, 

218-219,   220. 
Panpsychism,  250,  251. 
Pantheism,    187-188,    188,    257, 

259. 

Parallelism,    251. 
Parsimony,  principle  of,  40,  191. 
Pascal,  B.,  13. 
Paul,  as  historical  source,  52,  54 

55,  57-58,  59,  64,  77,  78. 
Paulinism,  57,  113,  125-126. 
Peace,    151. 
Penalty,  86,  87-89;  in  the  present 

life,  87;  in  the  future  life,  88- 

89,  115,  128,  208. 
Perception,  religious,  26,  31,  32, 

33-34,  44,  91,  93,  106,  107,  108, 

131,    153,    154,    159-160,    176, 

178-179,  187,  189,  244-245. 
Perseverance,  136-137,  144,  149. 
Personality  of  God,  32,  189-190. 
Pessimism,  217,  259-260. 
Pharisees,  62,  64,  66. 


268 


INDEX 


Philosophy,  10,  192-193,  234, 
248,  260-262. 

Philosophy  of  religion,  234-235, 
234-262. 

Platonism,  114,  115. 

Pluralism,  117,  257. 

Political  value,  v.  Values. 

Polytheism,  190-192. 

Post-millennialism,  212-213. 

Postulates,  in  induction,  44,  160- 
161;  in  theism,  94;  in  theology, 
176,  188;  a  theology  of,  23. 

Power,  mysterious,  103,  104; 
spiritual,  148;  of  God,  181-182, 
216,  226. 

Pragmatism,  241;  in  interpreta- 
tion, 162-163,  176-178,  181- 
187,  200;  in  religion  and  the- 
ology, 22-24,  245,  246. 

Prayer,  answer  to,  42,  146-148, 
175,  204. 

Predestination,  165-166,  216. 

Premillennialism,  212-213. 

Preservation  of  the  universe,  200. 

Presuppositions,  of  all  science,  49- 
50;  of  theology,  27-31,  49-99, 
72,  81,  90,  91,  99. 

Probation,  future,  87,  207-209, 
211-212. 

Prophecy,  104,  147. 

Propitiation,  v.  Atonement,  v. 
Sacrifice. 

Providence,  general,  172-174, 
195-200;  special,  146,  172-175, 

195-200,   204. 

Psychology  of  religion,  14,  20,  21, 
26,  29,  32,  34,  37,  38,  39,  40, 
43,  51,  104,  228,  242. 

Purgatory,  89,  146-147,  208-209. 

Purpose,  v.  Teleology. 

Rationalism,  in  science,  241;  in 
philosophy,  261-262;  in  theol- 


ogy'and  metaphysics,  9,  10,  11, 
21,  25,  98,  105-106,  116-117, 
159,  177,  187,  242-243,  245, 
247. 

Rationality  in  religion,  238. 

Rauschenbusch,  W.,  66. 

Realism,  in  general  epistemology, 
240;  in  religion,  31,  32,  38,  39, 
108-109, 159-160, 178-179, 188, 
243. 

Reconciliation,  125,  130,  131, 
136,  168,  170. 

Redemption,  127-128,  166ff. 

Regeneration,  135-136,  148-149. 

Religion,  essence  of,  235-237; 
genesis  of,  237;  experimental, 
1,  2,  4,  119,  131,  162,  188,  235, 
236,  239;  fundamental,  1,  2, 
119,  131,  180,  187,  200n.,  235, 
236,  239. 

Religions,  non-Christian,  33,  42, 
204,  209-210,  237-238. 

Religious  value,  v.  Values. 

Repentance,  86,  129,  135,  168- 
171. 

Resurrection,  76-78,  125. 

Revelation,  31,  32,  33,  34,  103- 
139, 106-109,  186, 187,  188,204, 
236;  in  general,  103-111;  in 
the  person  of  Christ,  112-123, 
131;  in  the  work  of  Christ,  124- 
131,  167-168;  in  the  experience 
of  salvation,  132-139;  relation 
of,  to  inspiration  and  the  Bible, 
109-110;  relation  of,  to  author- 
ity, 110-111,  238;  laws  of,  146ff. 

Righteousness,  v.  Justice. 

Ritschl,  A.,  17-19,  202. 

Ritschlianism,  17-19,  20,  21,  22, 
32,  117-118,  120-121,  246. 

Ritual,  237. 

Robertson,  F.  W.,  147. 

Royce,  J.,  75,  206. 


INDEX 


269 


Sacrifice,  125-127,  129-131. 

Sadducees,  62,  65. 

Salvation,  definition  of,  81,  132; 
through  Christ,  121,  124^125, 
129-131,  166ff.,  171;  experi- 
ence of,  132-139,  224,  236;  laws 
of,  140-156;  final,  210,  211, 
212,  213-215. 

Sanctification,  138-139,  149-150. 

Sanday,  W.,  117. 

Satan,  v.  Devil. 

Satisfaction  of  divine  justice,  128, 
129,  167,  170-171. 

Scepticism,  religious,  239. 

Schleiermacher,  F.  E.  D.,  14-17, 
167,  202,  246. 

Scholasticism,  9,  45,  248. 

Schopenhauer,  A.,  257,  260. 

Science,  ancient,  2;  modern,  2,  3; 
relation  to  theology,  3 ;  relation 
to  religion,  4,  5;  its  essential 
nature,  25,  234;  its  method,  1- 
46,  49-50,  159-162;  its  results, 
51ff.;  its  value,  198,  220- 
221. 

Scott,  E.  F.,  57. 

Scriptures,  v.  Bible. 

Shamanism,  104. 

Shankara,  53. 

Shaw,  G.  B.,  73. 

Sin,  definition  of,  81,  83;  objective 
nature  of,  82-83;  subjective  na- 
ture of,  83-86,  115;  consequen- 
ces of,  86-89;  conviction  of, 
133-134,  150-151;  problem  of, 
223-224,  226,  227-228;  the 
"unpardonable  sin/'  86,  168; 
v.  Forgiveness. 

Singularism,  116-117,  257. 

Social  factor  in  religion,  236, 
237. 

Social  value  of  religion,  239,  155- 
156. 


Sociology,  function  of,  in  the- 
ology, 22,  23. 

Socrates,  67,  82,  210. 

Speculative  theology,  v.  Absolute; 
v.  Rationalism. 

Spinoza,  B.,  257. 

Spinozism,  17. 

Spirit,  Holy,  133,  134,  135,  137, 
138, 140-141, 148-156, 187, 189, 
192-194,  258;  fulness  of,  137- 
138,  149;  "gifts"  of,  154;  na- 
ture of,  178,  179,  189-190. 

Spiritism,  75-76,  122. 

Spiritualism,  250,  251. 

Subconscious,  117. 

Subjective    idealism,     v.     Ideal- 
Subjectivism,  in  theology,  13,  14, 
ism. 
16,  17,  18,  38,  39,  40. 

Substitution,  83,  125,  126,  127, 
128,  129,  167. 

Supernaturalism,  256,  v.  Miracle; 
v.  Revelation. 

Superpersonality,  190,  192-193. 

Swain,  R.  L.,  190. 

Teleology,  95-97,  254-257. 

Telepathy,  76,  79-80,  146. 

Theism,  v.  God,  existence  of. 

Theodicy,   216-229. 

Theology,  definition  of,  1,  2; 
function  of,  2;  relation  of,  to 
science,  3,  4;  to  rational  devel- 
opment, 4,  5;  deductive,  5,  6; 
"biblical,"  6;  "new,"  45;  "nat- 
ural" and  "revealed,"  104,  105, 
106;  methods  in,  7^6;  can  it 
become  scientific?  2,  3,  5,  6,  9, 
11,  15,  16,  19,  22,  24,  25,  25-46, 
140-156,  159-162,  246. 

Theory,  theological,  26,  43-45, 
159-229,  161,  176,  249. 

Thompson,  J.  M.,  202. 


270 


INDEX 


Timelessness  of  God,  180. 
Traditionalism,  7-8,  9,  25,  105. 
Transcendence  of  God,  188-189, 

258. 

Trinity,  192-194;  cf.  190-192. 
Troeltsch,  E.,  19-21,  22,  246. 
Truth,  problem  of,  241,  245. 
Tychism,  252. 

Unitarianism,  116,  118. 
Unity  of  God,  v.  Monotheism. 
Universalism,  182,  183,  184. 
Universe,  relation  of  God  to  the, 

94-95,    95-97,    178,    187-189, 

195-204. 

Value-judgments,  18,  19,  32,  120, 

121,    202,    203-204. 
Values,  philosophy  of  religious, 


118,  234-246;  philosophy  of 
moral,  social,  aesthetic,  hy- 
gienic, economic  and  political, 
239;  philosophy  of  intellectual, 
239,  242-246. 

Virgin  birth  of  Christ,  52,  53,  54, 
112-113. 

Vitalism,  96,  251,  253,  253-254, 
255,  257. 

Voluntarism,  257. 

Wobbermin,  G.,  21-22,  188,  246. 
"Word  of  God,"  v.  Revelation; 

v.  Bible. 
World,    evaluation   of   the,    217, 

224,  225,  226-227. 
Wundt,  W.,  32,  189. 

Zealots,  62. 


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